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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATION IN SOMALIA SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 14
OF RESOLUTION 897 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 14 of its resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, as soon as the situation warranted, and in any case in good time before 31 May 1994, a report on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of the resolution. After the adoption of resolution 897 (1994), the political process for national reconciliation in Somalia gained new impetus. The present report covers developments concerning that process, as well as progress achieved by other programmes of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in helping to restore peace and stability in Somalia.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. On 8 March 1994, Admiral Jonathan Howe completed his tour of duty in Somalia as my Special Representative, having overseen the establishment of UNOSOM II and steering it through a difficult phase of the operation. Following his appointment as the Acting Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate launched an initiative to normalize the relationship between UNOSOM II and the Somali National Alliance (SNA), while maintaining contacts with the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) or Group of 12. The tone of the meetings reflected the intention of both sides to re-establish dialogue and to work out concrete arrangements, for example for security in Mogadishu, including reactivating the Police Committee, and for a cease-fire in Lower Juba. The points of contention between SNA and UNOSOM were discussed at length and understandings were reached on them, which facilitated normalization of the relationship between UNOSOM and SNA.

3. Soon afterwards, in response to the deteriorating security situation in Kismayo, UNOSOM made every effort, within the context of its new mandate, to stop the serious inter-factional and inter-clan fighting that had erupted there. In mid-February, my Acting Special Representative travelled to Kismayo, Bossasso, Bardera, Nairobi and Addis Ababa, in addition to holding meetings in

Mogadishu, for consultations with the Somali leaders connected with the conflict. The immediate objective was to induce them to stop the fighting. He was able to persuade them to meet at Nairobi on 15 March 1994 for consultations with the objectives of securing agreement on the indefinite cessation of hostilities and long-term solution to the problems of Lower Juba. Nairobi was chosen as the venue because many of the key personalities concerned with the Lower Juba region were present there.

4. The timing of the consultations on Kismayo coincided with the return to Nairobi of the Group of 12 leaders from Cairo, where, together with leaders of SNA, they had been invited by President Hosni Mubarak, the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). With all the Somali political faction leaders assembled in Nairobi, my Acting Special Representative embarked on an effort to stimulate the national reconciliation process. He succeeded in bringing together political leaders who had not spoken to each other for a long time. The reconciliation process gained momentum once the personal relationship between the political leaders had been re-established. Most importantly, he brought together General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of SNA, and Mr. Ali Mahdi, Spokesman of the Group of 12, which resulted in a constructive proposal to establish a national Government of Somalia.

5. The two sides finalized a declaration, in the form of a manifesto on national reconciliation, which was signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 by Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, on behalf of the Group of 12 and SNA respectively (see annex I).

6. The Nairobi declaration stipulated that, in order to restore sovereignty of the Somali State, a national reconciliation conference should be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a President and Vice-Presidents, and to appoint a Prime Minister. The Conference would also complete and review the formation of local authorities, where needed, and establish them, where necessary, as a basis for regional autonomy and respect for community rights.

7. To prepare for the convening of the National Reconciliation Conference, the declaration made provisions for the holding of a meeting of the signatory factions to the 1993 Addis Ababa agreement and the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the north-west on 15 April 1994 at Mogadishu to set up rules and procedures for voting and criteria for participation in the Conference. The meeting would also discuss the ways and means of establishing the National Legislative Assembly, which would be constituted after the formation of the national Government.

8. Among the declaration's general principles, the political faction leaders reached an understanding on the inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Somali Republic; the repudiation of any form of violence as a means of solving conflict and implementation of a cease-fire and voluntary disarmament throughout Somalia; respect for, and preservation of, fundamental human rights and democratic principles; the creation of an atmosphere conducive to brotherly coexistence among all Somalis using traditional channels, cultural and political means; and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country after the devastation of civil war.

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9. In an appeal, the Somali leaders expressed their gratitude to the international community, particularly the United Nations, aid donor countries and countries of the region for their valuable assistance, and requested the continuation of those efforts until Somalia could stand on its own feet.

10. It should be noted that the Somali political faction leaders are no longer talking about the formation of a transitional national council, as stipulated in the Addis Ababa accords in March 1993. Instead, they are aiming at the formation of a National Legislative Assembly.

11. In principle, the faction leaders have accepted the district and regional councils established to date. They would like however to review a number of them. Two more district councils have been established since my last report, bringing the total to 55, out of 81 districts, excluding the north-west. The total number of regional councils remains at 8, out of 13, excluding the north-west. The establishment of new councils should be accelerated after the successful conclusion of the National Reconciliation Conference.

12. The two meetings scheduled in the Nairobi declaration will be entirely Somali affairs, with a view to finding a Somali solution to the Somali problem. UNOSOM, as it has done in the past few months, will only play the role of facilitator.

13. Shortly before 15 April 1994, the date set for the preparatory meeting, the two signatories of the declaration decided to postpone it to 25 April 1994 to give the political factions more time to conclude the deliberations of the technical committees they had set up. After inter-clan fighting broke out at Merka on 5 April, the Group of 12 took the position that they would not participate in the meeting until the SNA forces withdrew from that town. They were persuaded to relent on this condition, but subsequent inter-clan fighting between two sub-clans of the Hawiye at Mogadishu and the consequent deterioration in the security situation there resulted in some of the faction leaders asking for, among other things, a change of venue. Discussions were held between the two signatories regarding a new date and a new venue. UNOSOM was initially informed of an agreement to postpone the date to 10 May 1994 and to change the venue to Nairobi, but this was not confirmed. In the meantime, General Aidid has returned to Mogadishu.

14. Meanwhile another development had prompted the signatories to choose an even later date. The leaders of SNM of the north-west had responded positively to the invitation issued by the political faction leaders in the Nairobi declaration. Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, who had been Chairman of SNM before the Boroma Conference which elected a new administration, was in touch with General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi. He declared that the Somali people in the north and south of the country must sit together and resolve the issue in a manner that satisfied the desire and the rights of the people of "Somaliland" to have a separate status, on the one hand, and on the other hand maintained the unity and brotherhood of the Somali people. He announced that the Somali National Movement (SNM) would attend all future Somali reconciliation conferences as it had in the past.

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15. To allow sufficient time for SNM to undertake consultations, Mr. Ahmed Ali requested that the political factions' meeting be postponed to 30 May 1994. The response of the signatory factions to the Addis Ababa agreement was generally positive. However, Mr. Ahmed Ali's announcement was rejected by leaders in "Somaliland", including Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, its "President". Consultations among Somali political factions have since been under way to reach agreement on a new date and venue.

16. The signing of the Nairobi declaration provided an impetus for the signature on 27 March 1994 of an agreement on the process of resolving the situation in Lower Juba. The agreement was signed by members of a joint committee representing SNA and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and called for a Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference at Kismayo on 8 April 1994. The agreement stated that the principle of reconciliation should be based on dialogue and that all differences and enmities should be settled through Somali ethics and traditions. A technical committee would decide on the number of participants who would come from all the clans of the region. The faction leaders were to ensure and observe a cease-fire as from 27 March 1994; pull out the militias and restrict them to agreed locations; and establish a mechanism to restore both movable and immovable property to its rightful owners and a joint committee to supervise the implementation of the agreement, with the assistance of UNOSOM.

17. The technical committee has been meeting at Kismayo since 10 April 1994 to finalize the criteria for participation in the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference. It was agreed that 160 representatives of all clans should be selected to participate in the Conference. With the list of clan representatives finalized, the Conference opened at Kismayo on 24 May 1994. Despite the real effort made by both SPM and SNA for the organization of the Conference, there is a threat from SPM/SNA to disturb the process since Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, its Chairman, did not sign the agenda for the Conference in Nairobi. Meanwhile, fighting erupted at Kismayo on 21 April between two Darod sub-clans creating another obstacle to the general reconciliation process in the region.

18. There have been intra-clan and intra-factional reconciliation efforts in other regions. In February 1994, leaders of two Darod sub-clans and a Digil sub-clan, together with the Chairmen of SPM, the Somali National Front and the Somali Democratic Movement, concluded a reconciliation agreement at Bardera in the Gedo region.

III. SECURITY ISSUES

19. Despite the political reconciliation efforts, national and regional, described above, the security situation in Somalia has been deteriorating. The various factions, in apparent anticipation of an eventual withdrawal of UNOSOM, are making efforts to rearm and have, in particular, resumed the construction of the combat vehicles known as "technicals". In the Kismayo area, a number of factions are contending - without success so far - to gain control of the Lower Juba Valley. As indicated in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, however, the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference opened on 24 May 1994. On 10 April, the SNA

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militia successfully completed its campaign to seize Merka from an SNM faction. At about the same time, the Habr Gdir sub-clan militia, which has close ties with SNA, launched an assault on the Hawadle sub-clan, gaining control of the airport area and its approaches in South Mogadishu. The same sub-clans have also been involved in a tense confrontation in the Belet Weyne area, which seems to be the next major objective of SNA. Other SNA advances have been reported at Baidoa. In short, there have been concerted attempts, especially by SNA, to improve positions on the ground before the forthcoming National Reconciliation Conference.

20. At several locations, personnel from UNOSOM, United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been threatened, attacked or sometimes kidnapped by uncontrolled armed individuals. The most recent of these very unfortunate and serious incidents occurred on 16 May 1994 in South Mogadishu. A UNOSOM vehicle was attacked and five Nepalese soldiers were killed and one wounded. The wounded soldier was subsequently kidnapped from a local hospital. UNOSOM is working hard with local leaders to secure the release of the kidnapped soldier.

21. While the number of incidents involving United Nations organizations and NGO personnel has decreased in the past few weeks, the level of insecurity is unpredictable as disturbances and inter-clan fighting occur without warning. Banditry, especially in urban centres, is another major cause of concern. The cooperation of local elders has been very helpful in resolving difficulties relating to attacks and threats against UNOSOM and associated personnel as well as matters pertaining to their general security.

IV. FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES

22. The contingents of the following countries have completed their withdrawal from UNOSOM: Germany, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Norway, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and United States of America. Since my last report, Pakistan has increased its contingent strength by approximately 2,000 all ranks. In its resolution 897 (1994), the Security Council revised the mandate of UNOSOM and authorized the gradual reduction of the UNOSOM force level to 22,000, including 2,500 logistics and necessary support elements.

23. The current UNOSOM force strength is 19,000 (as at 11 May 1994). In an effort to correct this shortfall, requests have been made to Member States to provide additional units, so far only Pakistan has agreed to deploy one helicopter unit.

24. The deficiencies in capacity that resulted from the withdrawal of the United States forces have not been made up in full, especially with regard to air operations and night capabilities. However, the shortfalls in the areas of armoured protection, logistics and communications have been adequately addressed.

25. Troops deployed in Somalia are committed to the following tasks in UNOSOM's present area of operations:

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- (a) Security of major airports and seaports;
- (b) Security/patrolling of the routes leading to the interior so as to keep them open for humanitarian aid convoys;
- (c) Patrolling within the major towns and cities to allow for safe movement of UNOSOM and NGO personnel;
- (d) Escorting of humanitarian aid convoys;
- (e) Security of logistics convoys and installations;
- (f) Security of personnel and installations of UNOSOM, United Nations organizations and NGOs;
- (g) Providing assistance in the training of the Somali police.

26. To meet these requirements, UNOSOM's deployment has been modified following the recent withdrawals and is now as follows:

- (a) Baidoa-Kismayo: the Indian brigade with 4 battalions and the Botswana battalion, deployed in 10 different locations;
- (b) Outside Mogadishu: three battalions provided by Bangladesh, Nigeria and Zimbabwe deployed respectively at Afgoye, Merka and Balad, three strategic positions along the main lines of communication;
- (c) Mogadishu: three battalions, from Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan, are responsible for the security of UNOSOM personnel, installations and equipment. The three Egyptian battalions secure the port and the airport. The rest of the Pakistani brigade - four infantry battalions, one tank regiment and one helicopter squadron - provides the services of the UNOSOM Quick Reaction Force, secures the main route between the port, the airport, and UNOSOM compounds, holds nine company-size strong-points or checkpoints, and patrols the key areas of the city. The brigade also participates in escorting humanitarian convoys in the Mogadishu area;
- (d) Belet Weyne: a company from Zimbabwe.

27. Despite the troop reduction, military contingents continue to participate in humanitarian activities. The military hospitals are treating hundreds of Somali patients daily at Mogadishu, Baidoa, Oddur, Wajid and Kismayo. Military units are committed heavily on a daily basis for water, food distribution and other humanitarian operations, averaging 25 such convoys per day. Military contingents also support the activities of the newly established Police Division in reconstituting the Somali National Police, by providing basic training to Somali police instructors and logistic support.

28. Although the UNOSOM force is not at present a direct target, increased inter-clan fighting at Mogadishu, Merka, Belet Weyne and in the Lower Juba Valley may eventually pose a potential threat to UNOSOM. Over the past few weeks, information coming from different sources has indicated that all factions

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are rearming. SNA militia have been on the offensive in various parts of southern Somalia, are in full control of South Mogadishu and have launched repeated attacks to control Belet Weyne. At Kismayo, there has been hectic movement of SPM militia in anticipation of an attack by SNA. An outbreak of hostilities on a large scale cannot be ruled out and might cause the fragile humanitarian situation to deteriorate.

29. With its present strength of 19,000, the force is already stretched very thin. The size of the Quick Reaction Force has been reduced from a battalion to a mechanized company, a tank squadron and a helicopter squadron. Since January 1994, seven strong-points and checkpoints have been closed in Mogadishu because of the troop reduction and the requirement to release troops for higher priority tasks. Under the prevailing security conditions, the ability of the force to achieve its mandated tasks has become limited. The full deployment of the authorized level of 22,000 would enable UNOSOM to operate again in the middle Shabelle area, from Balad to Belet Weyne, and bring it back into the UNOSOM area of operation and also to meet fully its humanitarian convoy escort role. Any expansion of UNOSOM areas of deployment to incorporate the central region of Galcayo and ultimately the north-east would require the deployment of at least two additional battalions with integral support and logistics elements. This force does not currently exist in theatre.

V. POLICE AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME

30. In its resolution 865 (1993), the Security Council expressed its conviction that the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems was critical for the restoration of security and stability in the country. The reduction of the UNOSOM force level and the instability in the security situation referred to in the relevant parts of the present report have increased the importance and urgency of achieving the objectives of the Somali Justice Programme. Successful implementation of the programme would contribute enormously to the achievement of the goal of Somali institutions being the main agents providing for the maintenance of law and order in Somalia. The United Nations and the international community have not relented in their efforts to achieve this objective. As at 22 May 1994, the total number of police recruits was 7,799.

31. Since my last report to the Security Council (S/1994/12, paras. 17-19), UNOSOM has made considerable efforts to build up its civilian police component for providing training, equipment and assistance in the establishment of a viable national Somali police force.

32. Of the 54 civilian police personnel authorized to staff the Police Division, 41 from the following countries had arrived in the mission area as at 15 May 1994:

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Egypt	6
Ghana	6
Ireland	4
Italy	5
Netherlands	6
Malaysia	5
Republic of Korea	2
Sweden	2
Zimbabwe	5

The remaining civilian police personnel are scheduled to arrive shortly from Nigeria, Sweden and Zambia.

33. The north-east region merits special mention. Three hundred and sixty-seven former policemen have now been approved for reappointment but approximately 600 militiamen operating as policemen do not meet UNOSOM's criteria for recruitment. It is recognized, however, that the current UNOSOM policy of restricting appointment to persons who had served as members of the Somali police force for at least two years needs reconsideration. After proper training, selected demobilized ex-militiamen should also be able to qualify for induction into the police force.

34. Starting from the end of March, under the overall coordination and leadership of UNOSOM, the UNOSOM military component and the United States training team, provided by the International Criminal Investigations Technical Assistance Program (ICITAP), have played an important role in assisting the police programme. They have organized weapons training, driver and mechanics maintenance training, foot and arms drill, supervisor training, administration and middle management training. ICITAP also provides logistical support in the refurbishment of police stations, as well as in training facilities. They are now in the process of refurbishing a provisional training school within the UNOSOM headquarters compound at Mogadishu to accommodate 100 trainees per session. Other locations, such as Hargeisa (north-west), Galdayo (north-east), Baidoa (central), and Kismayo (south), are being considered for training centres. Logistic support is likely to be provided by ICITAP. The main problem is that the destruction of facilities has been thorough and the lack of financial resources makes it possible to rehabilitate only one or two facilities for training the police forces of the whole country.

35. An armourer's course was started on 30 April 1994 with an initial group of 20 police officers. A training programme for trainers for refresher development courses commenced on 2 May 1994. The middle management station administration courses commenced on 14 May 1994 at Mogadishu. These courses will be replicated throughout the country. UNOSOM plans to train over 3,000 personnel by December 1994 and another 3,000 will be trained by Somali police officers who would have themselves undergone training with UNOSOM II.

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36. Other training packages, including a refresher training programme, are being revised and updated to enhance the delivery mechanism. These are designed to ensure standardization of training throughout Somalia. Essentially, the police training programme involves the reinduction of a disciplined orientation into the Somali police personnel, as well as the enhancement of their capacity for general crime prevention duties and such specialist duties as investigation, criminal intelligence gathering, riot control, community policing, and human rights in law enforcement. UNOSOM Police Division is at present formulating a Darawishta (quick reaction force) training programme.

37. The UNOSOM police programme is in great part financed by voluntary contributions, in cash and in kind, from Governments. The following cash contributions have been received or pledged so far:

(Millions of United States dollars)

Denmark	0.5
Japan	9
Netherlands	0.5
Norway	1
Sweden	1.6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	0.037
United States of America	8
Total	20.637

Contributions in kind have been received from the following Governments:

(Millions of United States dollars)

Germany	1.5
Italy	4.5
United States of America	37
Total	43
Total cash and in-kind contributions	<u>63.637</u>

38. Complementary to the police programme, UNOSOM's Justice Division has developed five different work programmes: judicial, correctional, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human rights.

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39. The judicial work programme is now focused upon the repair and refurbishment of the courts, supply of equipment, stationery, furniture, statute books and training of judicial personnel. Assistance has been obtained from some Member States, regional institutions and organizations, NGOs and United Nations organizations and programmes. A mid-term assessment meeting is planned for June 1994, with a view to evaluating the progress made regarding assistance to the Somali Justice Programme, as a model for future United Nations interventions of this nature.

40. A work plan has been prepared for the refurbishment of 54 courts in 28 districts spread over 12 regions. Also, during the period from June to August 1994, the appropriate Somali authorities at the district and regional levels will be encouraged to appoint suitable personnel to staff these courts.

41. In the correctional work programme, efficient correctional management practices are being introduced into the prisons. Some projects for improvement of sanitation and prison facilities have been completed, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Estimates for reconstruction or refurbishment of prisons in Somalia are being compiled.

42. Efforts have been made to relieve congestion in the two large prisons at Mogadishu and Baidoa. Constant monitoring of the cases and calling attention of the appropriate authorities to the plight of those "awaiting trial" who have been in prison for three months or more without trial, has led to judicial review of the cases and, in many instances, the release of detainees.

43. As the regional courts in some regions are now fully functioning, those offenders held for serious crime are now being tried. With the continuing improvement in the staffing of the Justice Division, it is expected that the deployment of officers to the various regions will make it possible for the Division to carry out its correctional programme throughout the country. The assistance of the United Nations Volunteers has been particularly valuable in this regard.

44. Training courses to enhance the competence and managerial skills of prison personnel are due to be held in June. This will be undertaken with the assistance of the Arab Security Studies and Training Centre, the United Nations African Regional Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, and the Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

45. As part of UNOSOM's juvenile justice programme, steps have been taken to improve conditions for detained juveniles. The main priority has been to secure their separation from adult prisoners, in accordance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules). With the support of United Nations organizations, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and NGOs, it is planned to establish a basic educational programme for juvenile prisoners.

46. A Street Children Redemption Educational and Recreation Pilot Project, supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNESCO and the World Food Programme (WFP), is being implemented in North Mogadishu. The first

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beneficiaries will be about 100 children, between the ages of 6 and 12 years. They will receive food and about four hours of basic education daily.

47. The United Kingdom Overseas Development Administration has agreed, in principle, to support a project formulated jointly by the Justice Division and the Save the Children Fund (UK) on the therapy of traumatized children in Somalia.

48. In its crime prevention programme, with the support of the European Forum for Urban Safety, in Paris, and the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, at Montreal, the Division will formulate projects designed to develop institutional bonds of social control aimed at crime prevention and control. To this end, the Division is recruiting two crime prevention specialists (a social worker and a judge).

49. Through its human rights programme, the Division has investigated incidents of human rights abuses within the Somali Criminal Justice System. The results of the investigations have been discussed with the appropriate units, and mechanisms for avoiding such violations in the future have been jointly developed with such units. The Human Rights Section is currently identifying Somali human rights organizations with which it will cooperate in the promotion, protection and monitoring of human rights. Training programmes in human rights education for Somalis are also being developed with the assistance of some subregional and national institutes with specialization in this area, particularly the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, at Syracuse, Italy. Finally, the Section is cooperating closely with the Centre for Human Rights of the United Nations Secretariat in the development of its work programme.

VI. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAMME

50. In the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994, the Somali political faction leaders explicitly expressed their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. Regrettably, this commitment has not yet been honoured. Voluntary disarmament will be successful only if the Somali parties display the necessary determination to settle their disputes peacefully. In the past few weeks, on the contrary, there has, as reported above, been evidence that major factions are replenishing their weapons stockpiles. In Mogadishu, "technicals" have been spotted at different locations. Reports also indicate that clans are rebuilding defensive positions.

51. I appeal to the parties to implement the disarmament process agreed upon during the Addis Ababa meetings of 1993 and at the Nairobi meeting of March 1994. UNOSOM II is prepared to assist them in implementing their commitments. The UNOSOM force, which is already overstretched, would act as an honest broker in collecting surrendered weapons and safeguarding them for the Somali national Government. The selection of locations for the cantonment of weapons will have to be developed in concert with the Somali authorities.

52. In the north-west region, through the recently created National Demobilization Commission, an interim emergency programme for disarmament and

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demobilization was launched in February 1994. The programme, which was developed in conjunction with an advisory team established with the cooperation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), focuses on two broad areas: (a) support for immediate disarmament in Hargeisa and the anticipated spread of disarmament to other areas and (b) the commencement of an interim three-month support programme for demobilization and reintegration.

VII. DEMINING PROGRAMME

53. UNOSOM demining policy is based on the principle of using Somali deminers only. Recent experience shows that expatriate demining firms are not necessarily acceptable to local political authorities and a disproportionate amount of the fees is used to cover the security risks faced by the expatriates. Owing to the employment of Somali deminers, many of whom know where the mines are located and who enjoy the support of the local councils or authorities, larger areas have become more accessible for demining. It is to be noted that, before any demining project is supported, the local demining NGO has to satisfy UNOSOM with documentary evidence that the local authorities have agreed that the project can be executed effectively and in reasonable safety within their community. UNOSOM also carries out the field survey of the project to ensure its viability. Periodic inspections are carried out during project implementation to ensure satisfactory completion. To increase the safety of Somali deminers, a mine clearance training facility is planned. This will be staffed by expatriate instructors, and located in North Mogadishu, with the ability to deploy instructor teams to any area in Somalia.

54. From January 1994 to date, UNOSOM has engaged six demining groups, of which three have completed their jobs, and 18 more are in the pipeline. In the last three months, the following ordnance has been destroyed:

Anti-tank mines	3 210
Anti-personnel mines	1 116
Unexploded ordnance	8 655

An additional 500 anti-tank mines have been removed. Seventy-one square kilometres of grazing/pastoral land and 318.5 kilometres of roadway have been cleared of mines.

55. With the restructuring and increased staffing of the Division, UNOSOM intends to accelerate the implementation of the demining programme. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNESCO have jointly implemented a mine awareness programme in the north-west and in the Galcayo area using posters, books and through group discussions in the communities.

VIII. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

56. In spite of the significant progress made in 1993, the emergency situation continues and the welfare of large numbers of Somalis remains at risk. A major priority for 1994 is the provision of relief assistance to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. The Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in UNOSOM has continued to coordinate the provision of assistance to meet relief needs, resettle refugees and internally displaced persons and to contain the prevailing cholera epidemic throughout the country. However, security problems still plague relief efforts in a number of areas, affecting both the safety of humanitarian personnel and the regularity and efficiency of delivery of assistance.

A. The continuing emergency

57. Given the volatile situation in the country, humanitarian agencies operating in Somalia have been focusing their attention on the various scenarios that affect humanitarian activities. One major concern has been the increase in inter-clan conflicts and banditry and the resulting interruptions in the provision of relief assistance. Other contingency scenarios identified include food and water shortages, human and livestock epidemics and floods. The first step taken by the Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was to form the Contingency Operations Group comprising representatives of United Nations organizations, the NGO Consortium and the UNOSOM force command. The Group meets regularly to consider changing emergency scenarios and needs and to put into place concerted response mechanisms. Some of the specific issues with which the Group has been dealing include developing early warning arrangements; ensuring availability of contingency stocks; identification of key facilities, installations and routes; and evacuation planning.

58. Somalia is slowly recovering from an extended period of widespread famine and dramatic reductions in food production. While the overall food supply situation has improved, poor rains during the short agricultural season have resulted in food shortages in some areas. The development of forward indicators of vulnerability has been one of the most important steps taken within the emergency contingency planning mechanism. The Food Security and Crop Assessment Task Force, chaired by WFP, is currently providing data and information on crop situations and food balances. United Nations organizations, particularly FAO and WFP, and NGOs are collaborating in field monitoring and surveillance through field missions which are dispatched to assess the food supply and condition of crops produced locally. Concerted early action made it possible, for example, to detect the partial crop failure in the Bay region and to take prompt remedial action by providing special food-for-work programmes. There is a projected shortfall in domestic food production in 1994 and arrangements are being made to ensure an adequate food supply for the population.

B. Cholera outbreak

59. In early February, Somalia was faced with a health emergency resulting from an outbreak of cholera. A Cholera Task Force was formed, under the auspices of

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UNOSOM, to coordinate the efforts of United Nations organizations, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF, NGOs and Somali groups to deal with the epidemic, which spread rapidly and affected many parts of the country. As at 5 May, a cumulative total of 12,444 cases and 492 fatalities had been reported. In addition to collecting and publishing statistical data on the spread of the epidemic, other actions taken include the setting up of treatment centres, chlorination of water sources, environmental sanitation, information campaigns and social mobilization. Responses to new outbreaks have been prompt resulting in a low fatality rate.

60. The recent outbreak of inter-clan fighting at Mogadishu interrupted the flow of medical supplies from the Somali Central Pharmacy at a very critical point in efforts to combat the epidemic. Consequently, UNOSOM arranged for contingency supplies of cholera kits and disinfection materials to be moved to its zonal offices in order to avoid too much reliance on supplies from Mogadishu. Earlier projections that the disease had reached a peak in April turned out to be premature and the most optimistic scenario at present is that it would not be over before the end of June 1994. It should be noted that humanitarian agencies are experiencing shortfalls in resources as a consequence of having to divert funds from their other programmes to combat the cholera epidemic.

C. Resettlement

61. There are still hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees in neighbouring countries who are willing to return to Somalia with assistance. The facilitation of the safe return of Somali refugees is one of the priority concerns of the United Nations. During 1993 and the first three months of 1994, some 88,000 Somalis were voluntarily repatriated from Kenya to the Gedo region. During the course of 1994, it is anticipated that another 70,000 persons will require transport facilities for resettlement - mainly to the Lower Juba region and along the Somali coastline. However, security problems and shortfalls in resources have slowed the repatriation programme, forcing UNHCR to issue an urgent appeal for additional funds without which it would not be in a position to continue the programme.

62. To date, the Humanitarian Division in UNOSOM has assisted in resettling 30,770 internally displaced persons. It is estimated that there are still over 600,000 such persons throughout Somalia. Resettlement operations will continue to rely on the relatively limited resources and personnel of international NGOs and United Nations organizations that provide food and settlement kits and also basic social services in the communities receiving the displaced persons. UNOSOM provides transport and security. It should be noted that transport is the most costly aspect in resettlement operations. Assisting Somali families to return to their homes will remain a priority. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) will be fielding an assessment mission at the end of May, at the request of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, to make it possible to develop a comprehensive programme of assistance for resettling internally displaced persons.

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D. Impact of security problems

63. The humanitarian organizations have been working closely with the UNOSOM force command better to coordinate international humanitarian efforts, plans and strategies. The main objective for the remainder of 1994 is to ensure that whenever feasible the deployment of UNOSOM troops and the strengthening of the Somali police complement the implementation of humanitarian activities. The Humanitarian Division has been working with force command to establish standard operating procedures and to improve the support provided to humanitarian programmes and personnel.

64. In spite of concerted efforts by UNOSOM and humanitarian agencies working in Somalia to render assistance to needy sectors and vulnerable groups, humanitarian activities continue to face difficult security constraints. Increased banditry and inter-clan and inter-factional fighting, together with attacks directed at humanitarian agencies and their staff, have forced a number of United Nations organizations and NGOs to suspend their assistance programmes and reduce or withdraw their staff. Following the recent killing of one of its staff, and because of the continued insecurity, UNHCR was forced to evacuate its staff from Afmadow and to reduce its presence in Kismayo. WFP closed its operations in Kismayo as a result of persistent intimidation of its personnel. WFP had withdrawn from Belet Weyne earlier. A number of international NGOs have been obliged to take similar steps.

E. Rehabilitation and reconstruction

65. As a follow-up to the Addis Ababa declaration, the first meetings of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body and its Standing Committee were held at Nairobi on 1 and 2 February 1994. One of the major steps taken was the adoption of a plan of action for the first semester of 1994 on assistance for rehabilitation activities. The key elements of the plan include safety and security criteria for donors to assist in reconstruction schemes; the need for the establishment of appropriate Somali institutions in the regions; and the desirability of involving Somalis in the planning and implementation of rehabilitation programmes. To date, multi-donor missions have visited Nugal and Bakool regions to hold discussions with local authorities responsible for development activities.

66. Bearing in mind the long-term nature of reconstruction and development activities, I have approved the transfer of the United Nations Development Office from UNOSOM to UNDP, with effect from 1 May 1994. While it will be operated as a project by UNDP, the Development Office will function as an integral component of United Nations activities in Somalia. In that context, it will cooperate closely with UNOSOM and United Nations organizations operating in Somalia. The Development Office will be expected to provide institutional support and policy analysis to a future administration as an integral part of its functions.

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IX. ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

67. Since the withdrawal of United States forces at the end of March 1994, logistic support for UNOSOM has been provided by a United States civilian contractor, Brown and Root Services Corporation, whose services were recommended and approved by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts as a sole source in accordance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules until 1 October 1994, pending the effective bidding of the requirement. An Expression of Interest has been requested and several firms have responded positively. A Logistics Control Centre, staffed by 12 United States Government-loaned personnel, was established to monitor UNOSOM logistics operations and the support provided by the contractor.

68. While the overall staffing situation of UNOSOM has improved over the last six months (146 international Professional and 353 General and Field Service staff as at mid-April 1994), there still remains a large number of vacancies for which recruitment has proved to be difficult.

X. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

69. In the event the Security Council approves the extension of the mandate as recommended in paragraph 77 below, the related financial implications, based on my report to the General Assembly (A/48/850 and Corr.1), are estimated at \$464.7 million for a six-month period and are indicated in annex II to the present report. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.

XI. OBSERVATIONS

70. The Nairobi declaration of 24 March 1994 has brought the United Nations Operation in Somalia to a defining moment in its complex and stormy history. The issue that now confronts the Security Council is the extension of the UNOSOM II mandate, taking into account the Council's objective, set out in resolution 897 (1994), that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995. Renewal would signify the Member States' determination to fulfil the United Nations vision of assisting Somalia towards political reconciliation, national reconstruction and peace. Deciding to phase out the Somalia operation would signify abandonment of that vision and the risk of the country sliding back into the abyss from which it was barely rescued less than two years ago. The choice depends on two main factors, namely, the readiness of the Somali political and community leaders to fulfil their commitments to extricate the country from its present ordeal; and the readiness of troop and financial contributors, in the face of at times wrenching difficulties, to stay the course charted by the Security Council.

71. The present situation, though difficult, is not entirely devoid of hope. On the one hand, there is the unanimous commitment of the Somali parties to pursue the path of reconciliation and to work together to achieve voluntary

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disarmament and a permanent cease-fire. On the other hand, some of the factions have used their military strength to increase the areas under their control in order to enhance their negotiating positions.

72. All the Somali leaders have appealed to UNOSOM to continue supporting their reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts, which in itself is a positive development compared to the past attitudes of certain parties toward UNOSOM. This has enabled my Acting Special Representative over the past few months to pursue a political initiative. The result, so far, has been a resumption of the dialogue, normalization of UNOSOM's relationship with SNA, and the very important declaration adopted by the parties at Nairobi.

73. Unfortunately, for reasons explained elsewhere in this report, there have been considerable delays in implementing that agreement and the preparatory meeting is now scheduled for 30 May 1994, with no date fixed for the National Reconciliation Conference itself. A major effort is now required from the faction leaders if they are to retain the confidence of the international community in the sincerity of the commitments they entered into at Nairobi.

74. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground is a matter of growing concern. The withdrawal of several major UNOSOM contingents in March did not lead to civil war, as had been feared, nor to a resurgence of organized attacks on UNOSOM and on humanitarian agency and NGO personnel. However, there has been a steady deterioration of the security situation. Militia groups are rearming and are again constructing "technical" combat vehicles in anticipation of renewed fighting, particularly since the substantial military advances scored by SNA in the Merka and the Mogadishu airport areas. Moreover, banditry is on the rise, partly as a result of the reduction in UNOSOM's strength.

75. Elsewhere in Somalia, UNOSOM's efforts to help foster reconciliation among various local clans have made some progress. This can be significant as the clans generally have much influence with the Somali political factions. Of considerable significance in this connection are the ongoing reconciliation efforts being mediated by the Imam of Hirab. If successful, these may result in reducing mistrust and hostility between General Aidid, Mr. Mohamed Ali Mahdi and Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, the leaders of the major contending factions in the United Somali Congress.

76. Despite this somewhat negative assessment of the political and security situations, I believe that the Somali people deserve a last chance. But this must be firmly tied to evidence of serious and productive pursuit of the reconciliation process. It must also entail strict observance of the cease-fire and cooperation with UNOSOM in preventing the recurrence of clashes and in resolving local clan and factional conflicts.

77. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council reaffirm its objective, set out in resolution 897 (1994), that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995, and that, to this end, it now extend the UNOSOM II mandate for a period of six months. This extension would be at the present authorized strength of 22,000, and be subject to periodic reviews of the political and military situation and of progress towards reconciliation. The first such review would take place following my submission of a report on the outcome of

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the National Reconciliation Conference or on 15 July 1994 if the Conference had not taken place by then. Subsequent reviews would be scheduled at the discretion of the Security Council. I have instructed my Acting Special Representative to continue assigning top priority to his efforts for promoting political reconciliation in Somalia.

78. During the six-month period UNOSOM II would also continue to give priority to the speedy build-up of the Somali national police and justice system. This could be synchronized with a corresponding reduction of the UNOSOM military component, preferably beginning in November 1994. Until the Somali police force is in a position to shoulder its responsibilities, it is the considered opinion of the UNOSOM force Commander that the mandated level of 22,000 all ranks needs to be maintained to provide the requisite security. I have instructed my staff to make a major effort to rebuild the force to this level as soon as possible. A premature reduction in troop level would be counter-productive, since it would lead to a curtailment of the area where UNOSOM II can fulfil its mandate. The troop reduction process must at all costs be militarily sound and its execution orderly.

79. These recommendations are based on the assumption that the Somali leaders will prove able and willing to pursue the path to political reconciliation. Should this assumption prove unfounded, I will not hesitate so to report to the Security Council. In that event, I would not rule out recommending that the Council consider the withdrawal of the United Nations force in part or in full. I have accordingly instructed UNOSOM to formulate a comprehensive contingency withdrawal plan which would be ready for implementation should the Security Council so decide. There would probably be no alternative to this course of action, since, in the event of a failure of the political reconciliation process and/or a large-scale resumption of fighting, the continued flow of military and financial support for UNOSOM from Member States would surely diminish or cease altogether.

80. In my last report, I referred to the substantial resources generously made available to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives. In spite of scarce resources and the proliferation of emergencies in other parts of the world, the international community has demonstrated compassion and patience in continuing to provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Somalia. While relief requirements continue, and have recently increased because of the sudden outbreak of cholera, there is heightened concern that resources may not be available to meet those needs. The continuing security problems, in particular the threats and attacks directed at humanitarian agencies, are a growing cause for anxiety. When taken together with the prohibitive costs of delivering assistance for relief and rehabilitation, the circumstances under which humanitarian agencies are forced to operate can only be expected to lead to a reduced level of response. This in turn could leave those who are least able to help themselves in an even more precarious situation, and, worse still, result in a return to the tragic days of the worst phase of the emergency. The grave concern expressed by the donor community about the security situation should be another clear signal to the Somali political leaders to accelerate their efforts, in cooperation with UNOSOM, to achieve a political settlement and maintain peaceful conditions. If these efforts should bear fruit, there is still hope for collective international efforts to succeed in assisting Somalis

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to meet the continuing emergency needs and move towards the rebuilding of the economic and social fabric of their country.

81. In conclusion, I wish first of all to place on record again my deep appreciation for my former Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe; his successor as Acting Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, and the two officers who have served as Force Commanders of UNOSOM II: General Cevik Bir and General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar. These officials have demonstrated the highest qualities of leadership in some of the most difficult circumstances. My appreciation further extends to all the soldiers and civilians of all ranks and from many countries, including Somalia, who have devoted themselves to the effort of the United Nations to help the Somali nation in its hour of need. I further wish to convey my appreciation to ICRC, to the NGOs and to the many Governments that have supported UNOSOM in its efforts to carry out the Security Council mandate. Above all, I pay a tribute to the soldiers of UNOSOM, United Nations staff members, Somalis working for UNOSOM, and relief workers who made the supreme sacrifice in furthering the effort of the international community, under United Nations auspices, to bring succour to Somalia and restore peace in that country.

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Annex I

DECLARATION BY THE LEADERS OF THE SOMALI POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

General principles

1. Following the informal consultations in Nairobi, from 11 to 23 March 1994, the political leaders of Somalia have reached an understanding based on the following principles:

(a) Inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Somali Republic;

(b) Repudiation of any form of violence as a means of resolving conflicts and implementation of cease-fire and voluntary disarmament throughout Somalia;

(c) Respect for and preservation of fundamental human rights and democratic principles;

(d) Creation of an atmosphere conducive to brotherly coexistence among all Somalis, using traditional channels, cultural and political means;

(e) Rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country to recover from the devastation of the civil war.

2. In specific terms, the leaders have agreed to implement the following:

(a) To restore peace throughout Somalia, giving priority wherever conflicts exist;

(b) To hold a meeting of the signatory factions of the Addis Ababa peace agreement and the Somali National Movement (SNM) on 15 April 1994 in Mogadishu to set up rules and procedures of voting and criteria of participation in the National Reconciliation Conference. The meeting will also discuss the ways and the modalities to establish the National Legislative Assembly, which will be formed after the formation of the National Government;

(c) In order to restore the sovereignty of the Somali State, a National Reconciliation Conference should be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a President and Vice-Presidents (the number to be determined) and to appoint a Prime Minister;

(d) To complete and review the formation of local authorities, where needed, and establish them, where necessary, as a basis for regional autonomy and respect for community rights;

(e) To urge SNM to attend the above and all national reconciliation conferences, meetings and consultations;

(f) To establish an independent judiciary.

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Appeal to the international community

The Somali leaders wish to express their gratitude to the international community, particularly the United Nations, aid donor countries and countries of the region, for their valuable assistance and to request the continuation of these efforts until Somalia stands on its own feet.

Signed this 24th day of March 1994 on behalf of the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance:

(Signed) Ali Mahdi MOHAMED
Group of 12

(Signed) Mohamed Farah Hassan AIDID
(SNA)

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Annex II

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM)

Summary cost estimate for a six-month period

(Thousands of United States dollars)

1. Military personnel costs	198 940
2. Civilian personnel costs	61 680
3. Premises/accommodation	7 790
4. Infrastructure repairs	7 600
5. Transport operations	11 520
6. Air operations	79 620
7. Naval operations	-
8. Communications	5 200
9. Other equipment	7 460
10. Supplies and services	38 850
11. Elections-related supplies and services	-
12. Public information programmes	2 300
13. Training programmes	6 600
14. Mine-clearing programmes	4 950
15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	15 400
16. Air and surface freight	5 320
17. Integrated Management Information System	250
18. Support account for peace-keeping operations	4 560
19. Staff assessment	<u>6 660</u>
Total	<u>464 700</u>
