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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 435 (1978) AND 439 (1978) CONCERNING
THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

1. On 29 December 1983, I submitted to the Security Council my report (S/16237) pursuant to paragraph 9 of its resolution 539 (1983) concerning the question of Namibia. The present report is intended to provide the Security Council with an account of developments since then concerning the implementation of its resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia.

2. Members of the Council will recall that, in his communication of 15 December 1983 (S/16219, p. 2), the Foreign Minister of South Africa informed the Secretary-General that:

"... with a view to facilitating the process of achieving a peaceful settlement of the South West Africa/Namibia issue, the Government of South Africa is prepared to begin a disengagement of forces which from time to time conduct military operations against SWAPO in Angola, on 31 January 1984, on the understanding that this gesture would be reciprocated by the Angolan Government, which would assure that its own forces, SWAPO and the Cubans would not exploit the resulting situation, in particular with regard to actions which might threaten the security of the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia.

"The proposed action by South Africa would last initially for thirty days, and could be extended on condition that the provisions of this proposal are adhered to. ..."

3. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General on 31 December 1983 (S/16245), the President of Angola referred to the communication of 15 December 1983 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/16219, p. 2) by the Foreign Minister of South Africa, with the offer of a disengagement. President dos Santos stated that:

"... In order to contribute to an early, peaceful and durable solution to the problem of Namibia, the Angolan Government would not oppose the establishment of a truce of 30 days after 31 January 1984, if Your Excellency obtains the agreement of SWAPO, if the South African Government withdraws its military units from Angolan territory and solemnly promises to initiate the implementation, within 15 days after that period, of resolution 435 (1978) on Namibia, without extraneous considerations in that context.

"For the setting of the exact date for the proclamation of a cease-fire in Namibia between SWAPO and the Government of South Africa, a matter that involves only these two parties, Your Excellency has the mandate from the Security Council to proceed with the necessary consultations. ..."

4. The President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Mr. Sam Nujoma, addressed a communication to the Secretary-General on 5 January 1984 (S/16256, annex). In that communication, the President of SWAPO said that SWAPO had always been agreeable to the immediate signing of a cease-fire between itself and South Africa. The President of SWAPO stated that SWAPO agreed with the Angolan proposal for the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with the two parties concerned to agree on the exact date for a cease-fire in Namibia, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations plan for Namibia. He suggested that the Secretary-General should immediately initiate steps towards convening a meeting between SWAPO and South Africa to discuss the final details of the cease-fire.

5. Following SWAPO's suggestion for cease-fire talks as indicated above, the Foreign Minister of South Africa stated on 7 January 1984 that his Government would not oppose talks taking place between SWAPO and a delegation headed by the Administrator-General of South West Africa/Namibia. On 10 January 1984, SWAPO issued a statement in which it said that it hoped the South African announcement that the Administrator-General would meet SWAPO for direct talks was genuine. It emphasized that, while SWAPO had no intention of interfering in the matter of the composition of the South African delegation, its standpoint was that the proposed talks were welcome and must strictly and solely deal with the issue of the cease-fire.

6. In a subsequent statement commenting on the South African offer of disengagement of forces, the President of SWAPO, on 29 January 1984, said that his organization was willing to observe the terms of such an arrangement provided that, during the period of troop disengagement, the South African Government agreed to talk to SWAPO about the overall implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia as contained in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). SWAPO expressed the view that a temporary disengagement alone would not bring a lasting solution to the problem of Namibia unless it was used as a means of attaining the kind of cease-fire that was envisaged in Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

7. In a statement in the South African Parliament on 31 January 1984, Prime Minister Botha reaffirmed the position of his Government in regard to the disengagement of its forces in Angola, as communicated to the Secretary-General on 15 December 1983 (see para. 2), and confirmed South Africa's decision to begin disengaging its forces in Angola with effect from 31 January 1984.

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8. On 16 February 1984, the Governments of Angola and South Africa signed an agreement in Lusaka establishing a joint South African/Angolan commission to monitor the disengagement process in southern Angola and to detect, investigate and report any alleged violations of the commitments of the parties.

9. It was in the context of these developments that I resumed my consultations in regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). My consultations encompassed discussions with the Permanent Representative of South Africa, the front-line States and SWAPO. I also held consultations with the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as with the Secretary-General ad interim of OAU, and was in touch with others who were following this question closely.

10. In my consultations, I emphasized to all concerned that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) remained the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian situation and urged that the Namibian issue be considered a primary issue in its own right, the solution of which would in itself ease other tensions in the region and be in the long-term interest of all concerned. I also emphasized the central role assigned to the United Nations in regard to all matters pertaining to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). I expressed particular concern at the inordinate delay in proceeding with the implementation of the United Nations plan and asked all concerned to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General in order to facilitate an early settlement.

11. In follow-up discussions I had with the President of SWAPO and his colleagues, they emphasized that the truce in regard to the disengagement applied only to southern Angola and did not extend to Namibia. They expressed the view that priority should be given to the question of the cease-fire in Namibia within the context of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), so that there would be peace on both sides of the border. To this end, they stated that SWAPO felt that the Secretary-General should endeavour to convene a meeting between SWAPO and South Africa to discuss the cease-fire for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). They also informed me that they had made counter-proposals to meet with South Africa on neutral ground for bilateral talks, but that there had been no reply to the SWAPO offer from South Africa.

12. In my consultations with the Permanent Representative of South Africa, Ambassador von Schirnding, he repeatedly assured me of the willingness of his Government to co-operate in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), subject to agreement being reached on the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Ambassador von Schirnding further informed me of recent developments in the region, including in particular the Lusaka agreement, which he said constituted an important and constructive step towards the peaceful solution of the problems of the region, including the question of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He indicated that, subject to the co-operation of all concerned, the disengagement would be completed at the end of March or early April 1984.

13. With respect to SWAPO's suggestion to me to initiate cease-fire talks between SWAPO and South Africa for the implementation of Security Council resolution

435 (1978), the Permanent Representative of South Africa said that the view of his Government was that such a meeting would be premature and in the circumstances counter-productive. However, he informed me that South Africa's offer for SWAPO to meet with the Administrator-General of Namibia was still open.

14. In reply, I reiterated my position that the so-called linkage pre-condition was unacceptable to me, in the context of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and that it had been rejected by the Security Council. I urged his Government to co-operate fully in the implementation of the United Nations plan in order to achieve an early settlement in Namibia.

15. In my discussions with Ambassador von Schirnding, I stated that it was imperative that the disengagement process must accelerate the momentum for a settlement in Namibia and be seen to lead to early implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). To this end, I stressed that the Government of South Africa should, as a matter of urgency, follow up the disengagement process with a definitive move, which would provide an indication of a time-frame for implementation.

16. On 19 March 1984, the Governments of Cuba and Angola issued a joint declaration at Havana, which was communicated to me by their Permanent Representative on 19 March 1984 (S/16427). In the joint declaration, the Governments of Cuba and Angola reiterated that they would reinstitute, by their own decision and in exercise of their sovereignty, the execution of the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent as soon as their requirements, which were specified in the declaration were met.

17. The Heads of State and Government of the front-line States and the leaders of liberation movements met at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, on 29 April 1984. A communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting stated that the liberation movements had discussed the understanding reached by Angola and South Africa, and had expressed the hope that South Africa would honour its commitment to withdraw its troops from southern Angola. In this connection, the Heads of State of the front-line States and the leaders of liberation movements stated that that withdrawal would constitute an opportunity for the immediate and unconditional implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

18. Talks aimed at finding a way of hastening the process of implementing Security Council resolution 435 (1978) were held at Lusaka, Zambia, from 11 to 13 May 1984. The talks were attended by the delegations of Zambia, the Administrator-General of Namibia, SWAPO and the Multi-Party Conference (MPC). The talks were co-chaired by President Kaunda of Zambia and the Administrator-General of Namibia, Mr. W. A. Van Niekerk. Observers of the front-line States were present at Lusaka at the time of the talks. At the invitation of President Kaunda I sent an official to be present at Lusaka during that period.

19. At the conclusion of the talks, President Kaunda stated that, while the talks had not succeeded in their main objective, namely a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), they had none the less succeeded in identifying areas of agreement and disagreement

between the parties. He emphasized that it was important that contacts should continue at various levels among those who had arranged the meeting and to keep the doors open. He made it clear that the talks were not intended to find an alternative to resolution 435 (1978), but rather to facilitate the implementation of that resolution. In a communication addressed to me on 18 May 1984, President Kaunda confirmed the outcome of the talks as indicated above.

20. Following the Lusaka talks, the President of SWAPO informed me that, notwithstanding his disappointment with the outcome of the Lusaka talks, SWAPO was still prepared to meet with South Africa to discuss the cease-fire for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He said that SWAPO was getting increasingly concerned by the delays in completing the disengagement and the lack of any clear indication of a time-frame for the related processes envisaged to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations plan. He rejected South African charges that SWAPO was violating the truce in southern Angola, but confirmed that SWAPO was fighting in Namibia where the truce was not applicable. Mr. Nujoma also confirmed to me that SWAPO rejected any notion of an interim government in Namibia and emphasized that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) remained the only basis for a peaceful settlement in Namibia.

21. In subsequent discussions with Ambassador von Schirnding of South Africa, I expressed to him my concern in regard to press reports suggesting that South Africa intended to circumvent the United Nations plan for Namibia by opting for an internal settlement in Namibia. I asked him to convey my concern in this regard to Foreign Minister Botha and requested a clarification of South Africa's position on this matter. Ambassador von Schirnding stated that South Africa did not intend to sidetrack the United Nations in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He reiterated to me South Africa's willingness to proceed with the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), provided agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. He subsequently conveyed to me assurances from Foreign Minister Botha that there had been no change in South Africa's policies in this regard.

22. Ambassador von Schirnding further informed me that the disengagement of South African forces had proceeded in successive phases to Ngiva, 35 kilometres north of the Namibian border, in the second half of April 1984. He said that while progress had been made in this regard, there had been subsequent delays in completing the disengagement owing to technical factors and the situation on the ground.

23. The Administrator-General of Namibia held discussions with a SWAPO delegation led by the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, in Cape Verde on 25 July 1984. In a statement issued on 26 July 1984, the Administrator-General stated that the purpose of the Cape Verde meeting was to convince SWAPO to cease hostilities. He stated that, in the discussions in Cape Verde, he had confirmed that, despite the policy differences between SWAPO and South Africa regarding the presence of Cuban forces in Angola, there was no reason to continue the armed violence. The Administrator-General confirmed that he had made it clear to SWAPO that South Africa sought an end to the loss of life and wished to find a formula for a cessation of hostilities. He said that SWAPO was, "however, not prepared to depart from its entrenched position that a cease-fire could only be effected under United Nations supervision and after implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It had not been possible to reach agreement in Cape Verde".

24. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General on 28 July 1984, the President of SWAPO stated that, at the Cape Verde meeting, SWAPO had proposed that the two delegations agree to request the Secretary-General to initiate the process of the United Nations plan on the independence of Namibia starting with an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all acts of hostility. He stated that:

"... The South African delegation rejected our proposal at hand, saying that it had no mandate to negotiate outside the already stated and restated position of its Government, namely, that there can be no discussion of the implementation of resolution 435 without a firm commitment on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. It insisted on preconditioning implementation of resolution 435 to Cuban troops withdrawal as well as pressing for 'cessation of hostile acts' by SWAPO while rejecting implementation of resolution 435 and United Nations involvement. ..."

25. On 30 August 1984, SWAPO issued a statement on the cessation of armed hostilities in Namibia, which was transmitted to me at the request of the President of SWAPO (S/16725). In that statement, SWAPO reaffirmed its readiness to cease armed struggle in Namibia if South Africa should agree to a specified time-frame, with a fixed date, for the commencement of the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia as embodied in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The statement emphasized that SWAPO would not agree to a South African-supervised and controlled transitional process to Namibia's independence. It stated that SWAPO could not accept the idea of a cessation of hostile acts in Namibia, which South Africa was proposing, in the absence of a firm commitment by South Africa to a fixed date for the commencement of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). SWAPO stated that it remained ready, however, for direct and constructive contacts with South Africa at the highest level.

26. On 6 September 1984, the Permanent Representative of South Africa transmitted to me the text of a press release dated 5 September 1984 containing the reaction of the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs to the SWAPO statement on cessation of armed hostilities in Namibia (S/16735). In that statement, the Government of South Africa said that the SWAPO statement was "simply a repetition of SWAPO's position, which was in effect that resolution 435 (1978) must be implemented without an agreement with regard to Cuban withdrawal". It stated that the question of Cuban withdrawal was a matter which rested with the Angolan Government and which was being discussed with that Government. In the mean time and until a conclusion had been reached on Cuban withdrawal, it said that the Government of South Africa would like to see an end to violence in South West Africa. It further stated that there was no reason why violence should not be ended before resolution 435 (1978) was implemented.

27. In follow-up discussions that I had with the front-line States and SWAPO, they expressed to me their concern at the delays in completing the disengagement of South African forces from southern Angola. They emphasized that they had expressed support for the disengagement process, on the clear understanding that it would facilitate the processes leading to the implementation of the United Nations plan. The front-line States and SWAPO expressed disappointment that South Africa's undertakings in that regard had thus far not yielded any positive results, and indicated that in the circumstances, they would initiate action for the convening of a Security Council meeting to consider the question of Namibia.

28. I raised these matters with Ambassador von Schirnding of South Africa and urged his Government to expedite action for the completion of the disengagement and to facilitate action in regard to the processes leading to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Concerning the completion of the disengagement, Ambassador von Schirnding informed me that the remaining South African forces in the border region of Angola/Namibia would be withdrawn as soon as agreement had been reached on a follow-up mechanism to the disengagement.

29. With regard to my call to South Africa to expedite action for the implementation of the United Nations plan, Ambassador von Schirnding again reiterated that South Africa was committed to Security Council resolution 435 (1978), but added that the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola remained an absolute prerequisite.

30. In November 1984, while at Addis Ababa to attend the twentieth summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, I had the opportunity to hold in-depth discussions in regard to the question of Namibia with President Nyerere, Chairman of the front-line States and current Chairman of OAU, as well as with other African leaders. I also held consultations with Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO. They all expressed great concern at the protracted delays in proceeding with the implementation of the United Nations plan and urged that the international community redouble its efforts to ensure the early implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

31. Following bilateral discussions between the Governments of Angola and the United States, President dos Santos of Angola addressed a communication to the Secretary-General on 17 November 1984 (S/16838). In that communication he elaborated in detail on the position of his Government in regard to those discussions. President dos Santos categorically rejected the so-called linkage pre-condition, and reaffirmed the common position of the Governments of Cuba and Angola as reflected in their joint declaration of March 1984 (see para. 16). President dos Santos further stated that in the course of Angola's talks with representatives of the United States, held at Lusaka on 6 and 7 September 1984, Angola had presented the United States of America with a Platform to be conveyed to the Government of South Africa containing five points, the text of which reads as follows:

- "1. The completion of the process of withdrawal of South African forces from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola and control by FAPLA of Angola state borders.
- "2. A solemn statement by the Republic of South Africa in which it pledges to honour and contribute to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) for the independence of Namibia.
- "3. A cease-fire agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).
- "4. A statement by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola reiterating its decision, in agreement with the Government of Cuba, to proceed with the start of the withdrawal of the Cuban Internationalist Contingent once implementation of resolution 435 (1978) is in progress.

"5. The signing, within the parameters of the United Nations Security Council, which would act as guarantor, of an international agreement between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Cuba, and a representative of the South West Africa People's Organization, and in which would be defined the respective undertakings for achieving Namibia's independence, and the guarantees for the security and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola and a lasting peace in south-west Africa."

32. In a letter dated 23 November 1984 (S/16839), Foreign Minister Botha informed the Secretary-General that South Africa had been able to reach "broad agreement on the general political principles" contained in the Angolan proposal conveyed to his Government by the United States. However, he stated that South Africa continued to insist on an agreement which should provide for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, parallel and simultaneous with the reduction of its own forces in South West Africa/Namibia in terms of resolution 435 (1978).

33. Foreign Minister Botha further stated that the South African Government supported the concept of a Security Council resolution which would approve of an agreement on Cuban withdrawal from Angola in conjunction with the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978), recognizing the commitments and contributions of all interested parties.

34. On 20 December 1984, the Permanent Representative of South Africa communicated to the Secretary-General the text of a letter dated 6 December 1984, addressed by the Secretary of the Multi-Party Conference of South West Africa/Namibia to the President of the General Assembly, as well as the annexures thereto (S/16869). Subsequently, it was reported on 25 March 1985 that leaders of MPC had called for the establishment of an interim government in Namibia at a meeting with President Botha in Cape Town. It was further reported that President Botha had indicated that he would respond to their proposals in April 1985.

35. On 28 March 1985, I met with Ambassador von Schirnding to convey to his Government my serious concern in regard to the implications of the proposal by MPC. At that meeting, I urged the Government of South Africa to desist from any action which would contravene the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) regarding unilateral measures in Namibia which were not recognized by the United Nations. In this connection, I reminded the Government of South Africa of the pertinent decisions of the Security Council on this matter. I made it clear that all unilateral measures taken in Namibia in contravention of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) were null and void and that no recognition would be accorded either by the United Nations or by any Member State to any representatives or organs established in that manner. I asked the Government of South Africa to take into account the concerns of the international community and its own commitments to the Security Council in responding to the MPC proposals.

36. In reply, Ambassador von Schirnding informed me that the Government of South Africa had not yet responded to the proposals by MPC and that he would convey my views on this matter to his Government. He emphasized that there was no question

of South Africa departing from its commitment in regard to Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He reiterated that South Africa still remained committed to Security Council resolution 435 (1978) subject to agreement being reached on the linkage pre-condition.

37. Following my meeting with Ambassador von Schirnding, I conveyed to the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America my concern in regard to developments concerning the establishment of an interim government in Namibia, which would be in conflict with the proposal they had submitted to the Security Council on 10 April 1978 (S/12636). They indicated their support for the position I had taken on this matter.

38. On 18 April 1985, the President of South Africa responded to the MPC proposals (S/17152, annex III). He stated in Parliament that legislative and executive authorities for South West Africa would be reconstituted which would be empowered to promulgate a Bill of Rights and establish a Constitutional Court and a Constitutional Council. The Government of South Africa would retain all those powers in respect of South West Africa/Namibia which were vested in it at this stage, including foreign relations and defence. He said that:

"... while the current negotiations hold any possibility of bringing about the genuine withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, South Africa will regard any draft constitution produced by the constitutional council as a basis for future discussion or as a proposal which could be submitted to the Constituent Assembly envisaged in the international settlement plan. ..."

39. He stated that South Africa would continue to negotiate with the United Nations and the international community on achieving internationally recognized independence for South West Africa. He also said that the proposed arrangement in South West Africa/Namibia should accordingly be seen as an interim mechanism for the internal administration of the Territory pending agreement on an internationally acceptable independence for South West Africa.

40. Following the statement by President Botha, on 19 April 1983 I met again with Ambassador von Schirnding and reiterated to him the position of the United Nations with regard to all unilateral measures taken in Namibia in contravention of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). I also issued a statement on the same day, in which I expressed deep dismay that the South African Government had decided to proceed in the manner that it had (SG/SM/3684).

41. On 3 May 1985, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of members of the Council in regard to the decision of South Africa to establish an interim government in Namibia (S/17151). In that statement, members of the Council stated that the decision by the Government of South Africa to establish a so-called interim government in Namibia was contrary to the expressed will of the international community and in defiance of United Nations resolutions and decisions, in particular Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), which declared that any unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in contravention of relevant Security Council resolutions

were null and void. Further, members of the Council condemned and rejected any unilateral action by South Africa leading towards an internal settlement outside Security Council resolution 435 (1978) as unacceptable, and declared the establishment of the so-called interim government in Namibia to be null and void. They declared that any further measures taken in pursuance of this action would be without effect. They called upon all States Members of the United Nations and the international community at large to repudiate that action and to refrain from according any recognition to it. Members of the Council called upon South Africa to rescind the action taken by it and to co-operate in and facilitate the implementation of the United Nations plan contained in Security Council resolution 435 (1978), as called for in Security Council resolution 539 (1983). In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General on 4 May 1985 (S/17152), the Permanent Representative of South Africa conveyed to the Secretary-General a copy of a statement by Foreign Minister Botha on 3 May 1985 (S/17152, annex I), in response to the statement of the President of the Security Council on 3 May 1985 (S/17151).

42. As to the disengagement of South African forces in southern Angola, Foreign Minister Botha issued a statement on 15 April 1985 (S/17101). In that statement, Foreign Minister Botha said that, despite SWAPO's continuing activities, the South African Government had given instructions for the disengagement of its forces in the area in question in southern Angola to commence as soon as possible and to be completed in the same week.

43. On 26 April 1985, Ambassador von Schirnding stated to me that the South African Defence Forces had completed their disengagement from the area in question in southern Angola. He subsequently informed me that the mandate of the Joint Monitoring Commission had been extended, by mutual consent, to 16 May 1985.

44. On 24 May 1985, following reports on the operation of South African military reconnaissance teams in Angola, I issued a statement in which I indicated that I was very much concerned by such activities (SG/SM/3701).

Concluding remarks

45. As members of the Security Council are aware, in my report to the Council on 29 August 1983 (S/15943), I stated that in regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), virtually all outstanding issues had been resolved as far as UNTAG was concerned. However, I also made clear in that report that the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still made it impossible to launch the United Nations plan. There has been no change in the position of South Africa in regard to this particular issue. In the prevailing circumstances, it is with regret that I must report that it has not yet proven possible to finalize arrangements for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia.

46. The Security Council, in its resolution 539 of 28 October 1983, rejected South Africa insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues as incompatible with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and

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other decisions of the Council and the General Assembly on Namibia. In the same resolution the Council called upon South Africa to communicate to the Secretary-General its choice of the electoral system, in order to facilitate the immediate and unconditional implementation of the United Nations plan as embodied in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). I must report to the Council that South Africa has thus far not given me a definitive response in regard to its choice of the electoral system as called for in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 539 (1983).

47. The prevailing difficulties have been compounded and given a new dimension by the recent decision of South Africa to establish an interim government in Namibia. I consider it most important that the Government of South Africa, in the interest of the people of Namibia as a whole, as well as in the wider interests of the region, should reconsider carefully the implications of its decision, and desist from any actions which would contravene the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). It is imperative that all concerned respect the provisions of the United Nations plan, which is binding on the parties, and remains the only agreed basis for the independence of Namibia.

48. It is now nearly seven years since the international community adopted Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Regrettably, implementation of that resolution continues to elude us for reasons that the Security Council itself has described as irrelevant and extraneous. I should like to take this opportunity to urge that the Government of South Africa in particular, and all others in a position to help, make a renewed and determined effort to expedite implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) so that the people of Namibia can exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence without further delay.

