
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

14 April 2008

Original: English

Second session

Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

1. Step 12 of the 13 practical steps agreed to by all Governments at the 2000 Review Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) calls for “regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996”. In recognition of the commitment made on reporting and to enhance transparency and build confidence, Canada submits the present report on the implementation of the NPT on an article-by-article basis and on the 13 practical steps. Such comprehensive reporting is not intended to expand the scope of the commitments made but is a reflection of the linkages that exist among the articles of the Treaty as well as the 13 practical steps.

Article I

2. Canada continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In that respect, Canada views reductions by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons inventories and the diminishment of the political and military value ascribed to nuclear weapons as factors playing an important role in discouraging further nuclear weapons proliferation. In his address to the General Assembly on 21 September 2006, the Prime Minister of Canada noted that nuclear proliferation continues to pose a threat to the world. The Prime Minister also highlighted the need for States Members of the United Nations to ensure that Security Council resolutions are fully implemented, and for States to work together to halt activities that have no reasonable purpose other than the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

3. Canada is a member of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Leaders have committed to raise \$20 billion over 10 years to address the threat posed by terrorist groups and countries of



proliferation concern seeking to gain access to weapons or materials of mass destruction and related knowledge. The Global Partnership, with 23 members, is a concrete international cooperative threat reduction mechanism implementing the non-proliferation, disarmament and counter-terrorism goals and objectives of the NPT. Canada is also an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which, consistent with national legal authorities and international law, seeks to establish a more effective basis for impeding and stopping shipments of, inter alia, nuclear weapons material and technology flowing illegally to and from States and non-State actors. Canada is a founding partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and in June 2008 will host a conference in Ottawa on the security of radioactive sources. Canada is also an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Group of Eight (G-8) Non-Proliferation Directors Group, and has fully implemented Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1718 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007). (At the time of the writing of the present report steps are being taken to ensure full compliance with Security Council resolution 1803 (2008).)

Article II

4. Canada continues to abide by its NPT commitment not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. That commitment is implemented domestically through the Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000 and corresponding regulations.

5. Canada also calls on other non-nuclear-weapon States not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture, acquire or seek to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or explosive devices. Canada supported Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), condemning the nuclear explosive test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 2006. The test violated international commitments previously undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and stood in opposition to the norms established by the NPT. Canada continues to call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil without delay its commitments to the Six Party Joint Statement of September 2005 and its obligations under Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), including the abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as necessary steps towards the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In a statement delivered on 4 October 2007, the Foreign Minister of Canada welcomed the Six Party talks agreement in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pledged to provide a complete declaration of all its nuclear programmes and disable the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. He noted that those are important steps toward the full dismantlement of the nuclear weapons programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called on that country to take prompt action to fulfil its commitments.

6. In a statement delivered on 3 March 2008, the Foreign Minister of Canada urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with the international obligations set out by the Security Council, including suspension of all enrichment. He reminded the Islamic Republic of Iran that doing so is key to the Security Council suspending measures against it and opening the way for negotiations on a mutually acceptable political settlement. He also noted that it is vital that the Islamic Republic of Iran extend its full cooperation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to clarify remaining questions on reports that it is pursuing studies relevant to

weaponization of nuclear materials. It is only through such cooperation and renewed implementation of its Additional Protocol that the Islamic Republic of Iran can begin to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

Article III

7. Pursuant to article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. IAEA has provided annually a positive conclusion concerning the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Canada pursuant to that agreement. In support of IAEA efforts to strengthen safeguards, Canada concluded a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement, which entered into force on 8 September 2000. Canada continues to cooperate with IAEA with regard to implementation of the Protocol. In 2006, Canada maintained the broad conclusion on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, first achieved in 2005. That broad conclusion provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its peaceful use commitments and is a necessary condition for the transition to integrated safeguards. With respect to the latter, there have been ongoing consultations with IAEA and the Canadian nuclear industry, in both a bilateral and trilateral context, regarding the State-level approach for integrated safeguards in Canada, as well as the corresponding facility-level procedures for implementation. To date, an integrated safeguards approach has been implemented for transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at the multi-unit Canada Deuterium Uranium stations and for small research reactors, static spent fuel dry storages, and locations outside facilities, providing for significant savings in terms of IAEA effort. In addition, through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributed to the development of advanced safeguards equipment and techniques aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. That effort has resulted in a contribution of approximately Can\$ 1.6 million over the last year. At IAEA and in the General Assembly, Canada has urged States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and protocols additional to their safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. Canada continues to encourage recognition of a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol as the safeguards standard required under article III.

8. Consonant with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Canada will authorize nuclear cooperation involving proliferation-significant items only with those non-nuclear-weapon States that have made an internationally legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, have accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities and have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That policy has been in place since 1976. Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items specially designed or prepared

for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items, including, with respect to the specific requirements of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. It ensures that exports of nuclear items are not authorized where there is found to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or when an export would be counter to the non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations of Canada. Canadian export control legislation includes a catch-all provision. The national system of Canada is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. All of those measures serve to facilitate peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation without contributing to proliferation.

9. In response to the threat posed to the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Canada continues to cooperate actively with other like-minded States in a variety of international forums to develop new measures aimed at further strengthening the regime, particularly with regard to the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies associated with the production of special fissionable material suitable for nuclear weapons purposes, and the suspension of nuclear cooperation in cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Article IV

10. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and maintains a robust nuclear power programme. It is the world's largest exporter of uranium, and is a world leader in the supply and export of radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications. Canada believes that nuclear energy can make an important contribution to prosperity and sustainable development, while also addressing concerns about climate change, for those countries that choose to use nuclear energy. To that end, Canada has 26 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements in force covering 43 States parties to the NPT, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear and other material, equipment and technology. Since the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Canada has held five official bilateral consultations with Nuclear Cooperation Agreement partner States as well formal administrative arrangement consultations with eight Nuclear Cooperation Agreement partner country authorities. Canada supports the IAEA technical cooperation programme, and for several years has met or exceeded the rate of attainment for voluntary contributions to the IAEA technical cooperation Fund.

11. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consonant with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV. In 2007, Canada and Australia also jointly provided a paper to IAEA suggesting elements for consideration in analysis of the various fuel supply assurance proposals.

12. Canada has also been involved in efforts to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. As one of the world's leading suppliers and exporters of radioactive sources, Canada has a strong interest in the establishment of an effective, efficient and harmonized international regime for ensuring their safety and security, including measures to prevent their use in malicious or terrorist acts. Effective 1 April 2007, Canada began full implementation of an enhanced export and import control programme for risk-significant radioactive sources covered by the Code. The programme encompasses full export controls, notifications and other control measures required under the Code and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. That step completes a key regulatory initiative undertaken to adopt the Code to meet its commitments to IAEA and to the G-8 to implement the provisions of the IAEA Guidance. As noted elsewhere in the present report, Canada will also host a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism conference on the security of radioactive sources in Ottawa in June 2008.

Article V

13. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference affirms that provisions of article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Canada signed that Treaty on 24 September 1996, when it opened for signature, and deposited its instrument of ratification on 18 December 1998. Canada was the first State signatory to the CTBT to sign a facility agreement with the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, on 19 October 1998. Canada has played an active role in encouraging further signatures and ratification of the Treaty with a view to achieving its universality. Canada participated in a regional workshop on the CTBT that took place in November 2007 in Nassau. Canada worked to strengthen the Final Declaration agreed by consensus at the fifth Article XIV Conference to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the CTBT held in Vienna in September 2007 by proposing language that encouraged supporters of the CTBT to focus outreach efforts on the remaining Annex 2 States that have yet to ratify the Treaty. From 11 to 13 October 2006, Canada co-hosted a workshop with Mexico to encourage signature, ratification and implementation of the CTBT in the Caribbean. In September 2006, Canada co-chaired with Australia, Finland, Japan, and the Netherlands the Friends of the CTBT event in the margins of the General Assembly, to reiterate support for the Treaty. The Joint Ministerial Statement that was issued at the event was signed by 72 countries.

14. Canada co-sponsored the resolution on the CTBT (resolution 62/59) at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly. The resolution calls for the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty and urges the maintenance of unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions until entry into force is achieved. Canada places a priority on the establishment of the Treaty verification system and, as such, is a leader among Member States in contributing resources, equipment and expertise to the development of the Treaty's International Monitoring System. Canada hosts 15 International Monitoring System stations and 1 laboratory. Only one radionuclide station remains to be built and only two stations require certification by the secretariat. Data gathered by the radionuclide station in Yellowknife were key to determining the nature of the explosion in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear test of October 2006.

Article VI

15. Canada continues to take very seriously the obligation of article VI and the commitments agreed upon in the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and in the 13 steps at the 2000 Review Conference. Those have been at the forefront of a number of activities and statements.

Steps 1 and 2

16. Canada's action in support of the CTBT and the moratorium on nuclear testing is described above under article V implementation.

Steps 3 and 4

17. At the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, Canada consulted fellow United Nations Member States on a procedural decision which called for the addition of an agenda item for a fissile material cut-off treaty to be added to the agenda of the sixty-third session. Though the decision was ultimately not tabled due to lack of consensus, it demonstrated Canada's commitment towards encouraging negotiations on such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. Canada also supports draft decision CD/2007/L.1, which was tabled by the six Conference on Disarmament Presidents in 2007, revised and then issued in draft by the six Conference on Disarmament Presidents for consideration as CD/1840 in 2008.

Step 5

18. Canada emphasizes the importance of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon arsenals and facilities. At the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored the resolution "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 62/37), in which the Assembly emphasizes the importance of applying irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency in the process of working towards nuclear disarmament.

Step 6

19. Canada reiterated its call on nuclear-weapon States to securely reduce and dismantle their nuclear weapon arsenals in an irreversible and verifiable manner in the First Committee during the sixty-second session of the General Assembly. At that session, Canada voted in favour of the resolutions entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (resolution 62/25) and "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 62/37).

20. Canada supports the reduced salience of nuclear weapons and the significant reduction of the nuclear forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that has taken place since the end of the cold war. As a member of NATO, Canada continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives through a continuous step-by-step approach in a manner which increases international peace and stability. Canada was one of the strongest and most vocal proponents of the NATO decision to endorse the 13 practical steps towards disarmament. NATO allies have significantly reduced the number of nuclear

weapons in Europe: by 85 per cent since 1991, and by almost 95 per cent since the height of the cold war.

Step 7

21. As noted above, Canada co-sponsored the resolution “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (resolution 62/37) at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, in which the Assembly encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which would serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty. In that resolution, the Assembly also welcomed the progress made by nuclear-weapon States, including the Russian Federation and the United States of America, on nuclear arms reductions to date.

Step 8

22. Canada has encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement the Trilateral Initiative by submitting surplus stocks of fissile material to IAEA control.

Step 9

23. The support of Canada for further reductions of nuclear weapons as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons was expressed by our vote in favour of the resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (resolution 62/25) at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly. Canada also supports measures to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security, as called for in the resolution entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (resolution 62/37).

24. Canada has committed Can\$ 1 billion to the Global Partnership, focusing initially on the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union, and is involved in projects for the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of nuclear submarines, nuclear and radiological security, the redirection of former weapons scientists and biological non-proliferation. The Canadian Global Partnership Programme is funding physical protection upgrades at Russian facilities with weapons-grade nuclear material. Five projects are under way and several more are in development. The Global Partnership Programme has also funded multiple projects to secure highly radioactive sources in the Russian Federation. Canada has contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and is the second largest State donor to strengthen nuclear and radiological security in countries of the former Soviet Union. Working with the Department of Energy of the United States of America, Canada contributed border security in Ukraine in order to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Canada has fully dismantled 11 nuclear submarines and defuelled 24 reactors in the north-western part of the Russian Federation. In the Far East of the Russian Federation, Canada plans to dismantle up to five nuclear submarines and upgrade a railway system to transfer safely spent nuclear fuel. Canada has contributed to the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to manage safely and securely

spent fuel (including highly enriched uranium) from submarines in the northern part of the Russian Federation. As a member of the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, Canada has funded over 100 individual research projects engaging over 2,600 former weapons scientists in civilian employment through various research projects and other programmes and activities, including in the area of nuclear and radiological security.

Step 10

25. Through the Global Partnership Programme, Canada is contributing to the elimination and disposition of fissile material, ensuring that it cannot be acquired by terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. Canada has pledged Can\$ 65 million towards the plutonium disposition programme of the Russian Federation, which will convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into forms not usable for weapons. In addition, Canada contributed to a project led by the United States of America to shut down the last Russian weapons-grade plutonium producing reactor in Zheleznogorsk.

Step 11

26. At the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, Canada tabled a resolution entitled “Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification” (resolution 62/21), which was adopted by consensus. It followed the submission of a report by a 16-member Group of Government Experts chaired by Dr. John Barrett, a Canadian. In the interests of general and complete disarmament, Canada is also a State party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Canada has provided financial support for mine clearance and related activities in over 25 States, as well as for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Africa and Asia.

Step 12

27. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Canada submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF/2005/WP.39) on the concept of “permanence with accountability” for the NPT, which, among other proposals, supported the practice of submitting annual reports on treaty implementation prior to such meetings. The working paper followed up on a number of previous papers submitted by Canada at earlier Preparatory Committee meetings on that topic. Canada commends States for the information they have provided to date, and would encourage them to submit information about their efforts and activities as official reports prior to Preparatory Committee meetings and Review Conferences.

Step 13

28. In early 2005, Canada submitted a major study on weapons of mass destruction verification and compliance to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which has been published as part of the Commission's series of papers and studies and is available at <http://www.wmdcommission.org>. As noted above, Canada tabled a resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification" (resolution 62/21) at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, which was adopted by consensus.

Article VII

29. Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. While not itself a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Canada welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally agreed criteria. At the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, Canada supported resolutions calling for the establishment or consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Article VIII

30. The indefinite extension of the NPT and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 enshrined the concept of permanence with accountability. In accordance with the commitments arising from the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Canada delivered at the 2005 NPT Review Conference its fourth report on its implementation of the Treaty, followed by another report at the 2007 Preparatory Committee. Canada also reported on the steps taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

31. Canada has been active in promoting measures to reinforce the authority and integrity of the Treaty and ensure the implementation of its obligations. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Canada presented a working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39) with recommendations for a revamped NPT process, making suggestions on meeting frequency and structure (including the possibility of emergency meetings), reporting, the participation of civil society and the creation of a standing bureau. Canada continues to advocate these proposals.

Article IX

32. Canada has consistently worked for the universalization of the NPT. At the sixty-second session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored the resolution "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 62/37), in which the Assembly reaffirmed the importance of the universality of the NPT and called upon States not party to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions. Canada views its position in this regard as conforming with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in which the Security Council called on all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Article X

33. Canada has continued to coordinate a core group of countries at the IAEA General Conference responsible for a resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As in past years, in September 2006 and 2007, the Canadian-led core group facilitated the adoption by consensus of a resolution which sought to promote the resumption of that country's obligations under the NPT, including the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

34. Canada welcomed the indefinite extension of the NPT, adopted without a vote in 1995. Negative security assurances provided in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty furnished part of the basis for this indefinite extension, as did paragraph 8 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Article XI

35. Not applicable.
