
**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East
adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons**

**Working paper submitted by Oman on behalf of the States
members of the League of Arab States**

I. Basic information

1. The State parties agreed, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to extend the Treaty indefinitely in a package deal consisting of three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East. The Conference undertook to strengthen the Treaty, to achieve its universality, to adopt principles and objectives to address the implementation of the Treaty and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
2. During the period between the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, and as a positive development owing to the Middle East resolution and the commitments declared by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, all Arab States became parties to the NPT.
3. The 2000 Review Conference recognized that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference resolution on the Middle East remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. It also recognized that the resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote.
4. The 2000 Review Conference welcomed, inter alia, the accession of all the Arab States to the Treaty, and called upon Israel, the only State in the Middle East which has not done so, to join the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system.
5. In spite of all this, Israel continues to defy the international community, by not acceding to the NPT and refusing to place all its nuclear facilities under



comprehensive IAEA safeguards, which represents a source of increasing concern that reflects negatively on regional and international peace and security.

6. The General Assembly, for the twenty-seventh consecutive year, adopted by consensus a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

7. The General Assembly has also continued to overwhelmingly support and adopt every year the resolution entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”. The most recent of these resolutions is resolution 61/103, in which the Assembly expressed concern about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region, noting that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the NPT, and reaffirmed the importance of accession by Israel to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities and materials under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in order to achieve universality of the Treaty in the Middle East region.

8. In September 2006, the IAEA adopted resolution GC(50)/RES/16, entitled “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East”, which affirmed, in operative paragraph 2, “2. ... the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)”.

9. It was regretful, that during the IAEA General Conference at its fiftieth regular session in 2006, some States undertook to abort all efforts made to discuss the draft resolution of the item entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat”, an item which reflects the concerns of the States in the Middle East region of the risk caused by these capabilities that threaten regional and international peace and security.

II. Position of the States members of the League of Arab States

10. The States members of the League of Arab States believe that the NPT remains the corner stone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and, in spite of the lack of real advancement on its resolution, the decisions and outcomes adopted by previous review conferences, particularly the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, they still believe that the 2010 Review Conference and the work of its Preparatory Committee is an opportunity to review means of enhancing the Treaty and to agree on how to proceed and to adopt practical and executable steps for implementation.

11. A number of Arab initiatives were launched and dozens of resolutions were proposed to different multilateral disarmament forums regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It is unfortunate that, in spite of international support for these Arab initiatives, no real practical steps have been taken at the international level to advance the implementation of these resolutions.

12. It has always been the conviction of the Arab States that the only practical solution to the issues of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is not only by adopting a regional approach to the problem through establishing a verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone, but also through applying an international approach that avoids selectivity and double standards.

13. Owing to the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the outcomes of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which are based on the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, represent the point of departure for the discussions at the 2010 Review Conference and at the meetings of its Preparatory Committee, which is the cumulative result reached by these two Conferences. In this process, consideration should be given to the fact that compromising the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference means that all the outcomes of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference would be compromised, and would result in weakening the integrity of the Treaty and its extension resolution.

14. Despite the elapse of 12 years since the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East in 1995, the active parties in the international community have not made any serious attempt to implement or adopt a follow-up mechanism.

15. Regretfully, the continued insistence of Israel not to accede to the NPT represents a threat to the security and stability of the Arab States that are all parties to the NPT, and may lead them to review their future approach to this issue.

16. Therefore, the States parties to the NPT, in particular the three depository States, must exercise their responsibilities by exerting their utmost efforts to achieve the full implementation of the resolution and to assist the 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee in identifying practical steps that assure the full implementation of the resolution and fulfil its objectives.

III. Proposals of the States members of the League of Arab States

17. Therefore it is imperative that the Conference, in addition to an unequivocal call demanding that Israel accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear State without delay, should take the following steps:

(a) Renew the commitment of the international community to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and adopt effective mechanisms for implementing it;

(b) Establish a subsidiary body within Committee II to discuss the implementation of the Middle East resolution and prepare a follow-up mechanism;

(c) Establish a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East intersessionally, in particular the prompt accession by Israel to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and report to the 2015 Review Conference and its preparatory Committee meetings;

(d) Call upon the United Nations to convene an international conference according to the agenda item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East" in preparation to making the Middle East region a zone free from nuclear weapons;

(e) Obtain a clear commitment from all the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and not in any way to assist Israel

in a manner that would contribute to its ability to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices under any circumstances;

(f) In conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and article IV of the Treaty, all States parties to the Treaty should declare their commitment not to transfer nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices relevant to nuclear weapons, or to provide assistance in the peaceful or military nuclear field to Israel;

(g) To monitor and follow up on these commitments through reports by the States parties to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, as well as to the meetings of the Preparatory Committee to be held in advance of that Conference. These reports should transparently report on the status of movement of these materials or nuclear technology or in relation to the peaceful or military nuclear field to Israel;

(h) Request the United Nations Secretariat to circulate these reports during the 2015 Review Conference and the meetings of its Preparatory Committee for consideration and evaluation of the progress made in implementing the obligations requested by these States.
