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**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Summary record of the 3rd meeting**

Held at the Austria Center, Vienna, on Tuesday, 1 May 2007, at 10 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Amano ..... (Japan)  
*later:* Mr. Yelchenko (Vice-Chairman) ..... (Ukraine)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.*

**General debate** (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Goicochea Estenoz** (Cuba) expressed concern at the slow progress being made by nuclear-weapon States in achieving the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Building on the achievements made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences required the strong political will of all States parties and of the nuclear-weapon States in particular. It was important not to repeat the failure of the 2005 Review Conference. In addition, it was necessary to conduct the review process in accordance with paragraph 3 of article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which required States parties to meet all their commitments under the Treaty.

2. Cuba had never envisaged developing weapons of mass destruction and had fulfilled its obligations under all relevant international treaties. The existence of nuclear weapons represented a serious threat to international peace and security. Almost 40 years after the Treaty had entered into force, there were still approximately 32,300 nuclear weapons, of which more than 12,000 were ready for immediate deployment. At the 2000 Review Conference, States parties had agreed to take 13 practical steps to ensure the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty. It was unacceptable to develop a concept of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence.

3. Some nuclear-weapon States condemned developing countries for allegedly failing to honour their commitments, while themselves continuing to develop vertical proliferation programmes. Disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing processes, necessary for strengthening international peace and security. Some States parties mistakenly sought to ignore or minimize the relevance of nuclear disarmament and to impose a selective non-proliferation approach, claiming that the problem lay not in the very existence of nuclear weapons but in the behaviour of the States that possessed them. Her delegation objected to the lack of political will of some nuclear-weapon States. Non-nuclear-weapon States should be given assurances to protect them from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and those

assurances should be embodied in a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty.

4. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represented an important contribution to the efforts aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Cuba had honoured all its international commitments, including under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991) as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (part I), annex). Her delegation called on Israel to accede to the NPT, to place all its nuclear facilities under the full scope of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and to carry out its activities in compliance with the non-proliferation regime. In addition, the United States of America must stop providing material and technological and scientific assistance to Israel. The statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel on 12 December 2006, in which he had admitted that Israel possessed nuclear weapons, represented a serious threat to the security of the region and of the world.

5. It was important to respect the three pillars of the Treaty, including the inalienable right of all States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Her delegation was concerned by the excessive controls placed on developing countries that were using nuclear technology for peaceful uses. There was a need for international export-control regimes to be transparent, multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory and to place no restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology which developing countries required for peaceful purposes for the sake of their continued development. Given that technical cooperation was a tool allowing States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses, Cuba opposed the use of the IAEA technical cooperation programmes for political ends. Her delegation reaffirmed the role of the Agency as the sole authority responsible for nuclear verification through the safeguards and verification system. It was therefore important to ensure that undue pressures were not exerted on the Agency that might undermine its efficiency or credibility. In the opinion of Cuba, the constant increase in military expenditure globally,

which exceeded \$1 trillion, created a climate of mistrust and legitimate international concern. It was regrettable that one country spent as much on weapons as the rest of the world combined, while millions of people died of curable diseases, malnutrition and hunger every year. Her delegation called for the total elimination of weapons and the full achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

6. **Mr. Wibowo** (Indonesia) said that the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference made it clear that the non-proliferation regime needed to be fixed. Despite the inequities in the Treaty, the vast majority of States parties continued to support it. It was a cornerstone of the global aspiration for a nuclear-free world and the essential starting point for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

7. The existing stock of nuclear weapons should be systematically eliminated. The total elimination of nuclear weapons, however, required leadership on part of the nuclear-weapon States, including United States leadership. As States with more than three quarters of the world's nuclear arsenal, the United States of America and the Russian Federation bore particular responsibility for overcoming the obstacles to implementing article VI of the Treaty. Although both States had agreed to a significant reduction in nuclear warheads by 2012 under the Moscow Treaty, that Treaty did not include the principles of verification, irreversibility and transparency. The nuclear-weapon States should provide security assurances guaranteeing that non-nuclear-weapon States would not be threatened by the use of nuclear weapons, and those assurances should be translated into a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty.

8. The IAEA safeguards system was an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. His delegation reaffirmed the role of IAEA as the sole authority responsible for nuclear verification and appreciated the extensive efforts made by the Agency in strengthening the safeguards and verification system. Indonesia had signed and ratified the NPT and concluded the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the Agency. It called on all States which had not yet done so to do likewise.

9. The inalienable right of all States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the article IV of the NPT constituted one of the fundamental objectives of the NPT. For many

non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear energy was crucial for energy security and independence. Although many States considered that access to dual-use technology should be further restricted and more closely monitored, excessive controls on access to the full nuclear fuel cycle could unfairly deprive developing countries of nuclear energy and technology. Indonesia shared the concern over growing non-proliferation challenges and noted the initiatives put forward by Member States to meet them. However, the issues of uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel cycle services, the spent fuel cycle and reprocessing should be addressed through multilateral negotiations under the auspices of IAEA in a comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner. The proposal for a regionally based multinational facility put forward in the report of the expert group on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle (NPT/CONF.2005/18) submitted to the IAEA Director General at the 2005 Review Conference should be pursued further, as it would help to increase non-proliferation assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle while preserving assurances of supply and services.

10. The prolonged conflict in Iraq, the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme and Israel's acknowledgment of possessing nuclear weapons could directly or indirectly affect regional stability. Consideration must therefore be given to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The time had come for implementation of Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991) as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (part I), annex).

11. Although States parties had the right to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with article X, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such withdrawal did not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the Treaty prior to its termination. Obligations and commitments applied equally to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It would be unfair to insist that non-nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations when the nuclear-weapon States had failed to fulfil their disarmament commitments. Double standards would only further undermine the integrity of the Treaty.

12. His Government remained concerned that some nuclear-weapon States had been providing nuclear

material and technology to non-States parties to the NPT, in violation of article I of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, must not acquire or seek assistance for nuclear programmes other than for peaceful purposes.

13. In conclusion, there was a need for consensus on the nuclear threat and for revitalization of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. States must not reinterpret existing obligations under the Treaty. Building on the achievements of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences required visionary leadership, strong political will and a balanced and comprehensive approach to implementing all provisions of the Treaty.

14. *Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

15. **Mr. Kavanagh** (Ireland), speaking also on behalf of the other members of the New Agenda Coalition — Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden — noted with regret that the previous Review Conference had failed to reach a substantive or satisfactory outcome. The 2010 Review Conference must strengthen the three pillars at the core of the Treaty. It must work towards the implementation of the commitments made by States parties at previous Review Conferences, universalization and the effective realization of the Treaty's fundamental goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. That objective had been recognized as a legal obligation by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.

16. The New Agenda Coalition noted with concern that although NPT membership covered almost the entire international community, the Treaty had not achieved universality. It reiterated its call to all States parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the NPT and urged India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions.

17. No progress had been achieved in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region. The Coalition reiterated its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

18. Regrettably, few advances had been made in the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference (see the final document (NPT/CONF.2000/28)). It was a matter of concern that

some delegations seemed to call that agreement reached into question. At the Review Conference in 2000, States parties had also reaffirmed the unanimous agreement reached at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 not to enter into new nuclear supply arrangements with parties which had not accepted IAEA full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities. His delegation noted with concern evidence that such arrangements were being entered into with States which were not a party to the NPT.

19. The achievement of nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of non-proliferation obligations under the NPT were both central to the Treaty's success. Attempts to secure advances on non-proliferation while diminishing the significance of nuclear disarmament were counterproductive. Disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing processes. The genuine implementation of irreversible, verifiable and transparent nuclear weapon reductions leading to their total elimination would diminish the perceived utility of those weapons and thus their desirability. Any presumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

20. The only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination and the assurance that they would never be produced again. Meanwhile, nuclear-weapon States should renew their existing negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT through legally binding instruments.

21. Although the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) had resulted in a positive downward trend in the deployment of nuclear weapons, it had not involved any warhead destruction, agreed counting rules or new verification measures. The NPT regime was currently lacking transparency, especially with regard to the nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear disarmament measures must involve a series of phased, transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions. In the interest of greater transparency and confidence-building, nuclear-weapon States should publish uniform and consistent data on their aggregate holdings of nuclear weapons in active and reserve status.

22. Noting that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty would expire before the 2010 Review Conference, the Coalition urged the United States of America and the Russian Federation to commence negotiations on a follow-up treaty incorporating the same disarmament principles while implementing further reductions.

23. New military doctrines emphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons had emerged since 2000, reinforced by plans to modernize nuclear forces and introduce tactical uses for nuclear weapons. Moreover, certain policies had broadened the scope of potential use of nuclear weapons, for example as a preventive measure or in retaliation against the use of other weapons of mass destruction. If the nuclear-weapon States continued to treat nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing security, there was a real danger that other States would consider doing the same. Any increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would exacerbate existing regional tensions, further undermine the goals of nuclear disarmament and ultimately increase the likelihood of nuclear weapons use. The nuclear weapons test announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 2006, which the Coalition had condemned, provided a graphic illustration of those dangers.

24. **Mr. Morejón Almeida** (Ecuador) said that his country's foreign policy reflected a strong commitment to non-proliferation, international law, multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of disputes. His delegation supported international instruments that aimed to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons and prevent an arms race in outer space. The NPT was an essential instrument for preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieving total and complete nuclear disarmament and promoting cooperation between States for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

25. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only means of preventing their use or the threat of their use. It was regrettable that effective multilateral agreements had not been reached to achieve nuclear disarmament, eliminate weapons of mass destruction and establish measures to promote transparency and mutual trust. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States had a joint responsibility to achieve the effective and non-selective implementation of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should commit to reducing nuclear stockpiles and non-nuclear-weapon

States should develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with relevant provisions and safeguards. His delegation called on all States parties to reach a consensus that would allow the achievement of the goal of total nuclear disarmament. To that end, non-nuclear-weapon States should advance concrete proposals that took into consideration the politico-military aspects of international security.

26. Ecuador firmly supported the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and called on the 10 countries referred to in annex 2 to sign and/or ratify the Treaty with the utmost urgency. In 1969, Ecuador had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. The establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Africa and Central Asia showed that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons was achievable. Consideration must therefore be given to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in order to achieve comprehensive and lasting peace in that region. His delegation reaffirmed the role of IAEA as the sole authority responsible for nuclear verification and ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements. It was important to achieve universal implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and his delegation called on non-States parties to accede to that instrument without delay. It was important to prevent the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or assistance for military purposes, especially to non-States parties.

27. Ecuador firmly supported the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in accordance with the obligations set out in the Treaty. That inalienable right should not be diminished by additional agreements and commitments for countries that did not pose a threat. The objectives of the Treaty should be to reduce nuclear stockpiles, achieve universal non-proliferation and strengthen the safeguards and verification system. As a supporter of multilateral approaches, Ecuador opposed any unilateral action or initiative against another State that did not have the support of the United Nations. It was important to step up efforts to ensure that nuclear technology was used for the benefit of mankind and did not remain a source of concern or destruction.

28. **Mr. Madi** (Jordan) endorsed the statements made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Group and the Arab Group and added that, with genuine political will, the experience of the previous conference could be avoided. The three pillars of the Treaty — nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy — needed to be pursued in parallel. It was in no one's interest for certain States to remain outside the Treaty. Twelve years had passed since the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East, on the strength of which the Treaty had been extended indefinitely at the 1995 Review Conference. During that time, the resolution had been reaffirmed and reinforced by the 2000 Review Conference, by IAEA and by various international resolutions, including in particular paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), but it still had yet to be implemented. His delegation called on Israel to give up its claim that it needed nuclear weapons because its existence was threatened, to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA supervision, and also to respond to the Arab Peace Initiative. It also called for implementation of articles IV and V of the Treaty, which required nuclear-weapon States to assist non-nuclear States parties in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as Jordan was doing with its nuclear programme.

29. **Mr. Sychov** (Belarus) said that his delegation attached particular importance to all three pillars of the NPT — disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes — and to regional efforts to implement the Treaty in accordance with the decisions of previous Review Conferences. As the first State to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons, Belarus called on the international community to bear in mind a strategic aim of the NPT: nuclear disarmament. Further modernization of nuclear weapons and defence doctrines which allowed for the use of nuclear weapons were contrary to the strategic aims of the NPT. In the light of the consequences of the man-made nuclear catastrophe at Chernobyl, his Government warned the international community of the unacceptability of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to resolve any dispute.

30. His Government firmly supported efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The spread of nuclear weapons and technology, especially given the growing threat of terrorism in the world, was one of the greatest challenges to international security

and stability. Belarus also attached great importance to the IAEA safeguards system and commended the Agency on its non-proliferation efforts. International export controls were also instrumental in stemming the proliferation of nuclear material, equipment and technology. For its part, Belarus had established an effective national export control system and supported the Nuclear Suppliers' Group Guidelines.

31. NPT mechanisms must not be used as a pretext for opposing peaceful nuclear programmes, which must, however, be carried out with maximum transparency in accordance with the Treaty. The international community had the necessary mechanisms, including within the framework of IAEA, to enable all interested States to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without discrimination.

32. The achievement of universalization of the Treaty remained a pressing challenge. His delegation noted with concern the continued existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and recalled the importance of negative security assurances. Attention should also be given to the regional aspects of the Treaty, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His Government supported the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, which was an important element of the NPT system. Lastly, Belarus welcomed the signing of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in 2006.

33. **Mr. Abdulla** (Bahrain), noting that the 2005 Review Conference had not achieved the success sought by the international community, said that the Treaty rightly recognized the existence and spread of nuclear weapons as one of the most dangerous threats to global peace and security. That threat was currently even greater than at the time of its signature, in the light of the alarming possibility of nuclear weapons being obtained by non-State actors or destabilizing vital regions of the world.

34. His Government reiterated its call to all States which had not done so to become parties to the Treaty. Bahrain was particularly concerned about the possible spread of nuclear weapons to the Middle East and the Gulf region. The existence of such weapons threatened not only the countries and peoples of the region but also the entire global economic system. Bahrain had therefore repeatedly called for the Middle East to be a zone free of nuclear weapons and had fully supported General Assembly resolutions with that aim. It called

upon Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under the full scope of the IAEA safeguards.

35. At the same time, Bahrain recognized the right of States to the peaceful civilian use of nuclear energy. Trust was the key to maintaining security and stability in regions where nuclear energy was being used or developed, and it must be based on openness and transparency with regard to nuclear programmes. Bahrain therefore called once again on all countries to fulfil their NPT obligations and to cooperate fully with IAEA.

36. **Mr. Dobelle** (France) said that the NPT was an invaluable instrument for collective security. The challenges which had arisen during the previous review cycle, including serious proliferation crises and the discovery of a clandestine nuclear supply network, had radically changed the international security situation. The 2005 NPT Review Conference had failed to meet the expectations of the international community. States parties must now resume the work which they had been unable to complete. It was unacceptable for a small number of States, supported by clandestine networks, to breach their obligations while asserting their rights, thus undermining the foundations of the Treaty.

37. His delegation deplored the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had failed to comply with Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and regretted that it had further reduced its cooperation with IAEA. For the sake of the integrity of the NPT, it was essential that the review process should address the challenge raised by the continuation of the Iranian nuclear programme. The crisis caused by the announcement by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from the NPT and of a nuclear test in October 2006 should be resolved within a multilateral framework leading to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of its nuclear programmes in accordance with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006). Those two crises demonstrated the need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime through the universal application of the IAEA safeguard agreements and universalization of the Additional Protocol. There was also a need for strict export controls, especially within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The two crises showed the need for a collective approach to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons or their means of delivery, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540

(2004). In addition, the international community must address the threat of nuclear terrorism. France had actively supported IAEA measures to combat the illicit trafficking in radioactive nuclear material and had participated in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

38. Further consideration should be given to the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty. No State party should be allowed to acquire nuclear materials, facilities and technology under article IV only to withdraw subsequently from the Treaty and use them for military purposes. He drew attention to working paper NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.25, entitled "Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: European Union common approach", which set out the effects of withdrawal. Any State withdrawing from the Treaty should no longer use nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and technologies acquired from a third country prior to withdrawal. Such nuclear materials must be frozen, with a view to having them dismantled or returned to the supplier State, under IAEA control. In addition, in the event of withdrawal, an INFCIRC/66-type agreement should cover each facility pending its dismantling or return.

39. France reaffirmed its commitment to the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 687 (2001) and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. A resolution of the Iranian nuclear question would contribute to the international non-proliferation efforts and the achievement of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. Nuclear energy would help to meet the world's increasing energy needs by reducing the use of fossil fuels and providing energy which was available, affordable and environmentally friendly. Nuclear energy had a key contribution to make to sustainable development. France attached great importance to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the NPT. The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime did not call into question the right to make peaceful use of nuclear energy. In June 2006, France and five other countries had put forward a proposal for fuel supply assurance mechanisms. His delegation awaited with interest the working paper on that question by the

IAEA Director General. The NPT must guarantee that States which complied with their obligations would enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy.

40. France attached great importance to decisions adopted at the 1995 Review Conference entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (part I), annex), which contained in paragraph 4 a programme of action for the implementation of article VI. France and the United Kingdom had been the first nuclear-weapon States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). France had dismantled its nuclear test facility in the Pacific, announced a definitive halt to the production of fissile weapons material and closed and begun the dismantlement of facilities in Pierrelatte and Marcoule. France had also made drastic cuts in its nuclear arsenal, eliminating all surface-to-surface missiles, reducing the number of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles and cutting by more than half the total number of delivery vehicles since 1985. His delegation called for the universalization and entry into force of the CTBT. It was prepared to initiate, without preconditions, negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons at the Disarmament Conference. France reaffirmed its determination to contribute to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

41. India, Israel and Pakistan should be encouraged through dialogue to adhere to the international standards on non-proliferation and export controls. Although some progress had been made in that respect, much more remained to be done.

42. His delegation attached great importance to the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee and the organization of the 2010 Review Conference. It regretted the amount of time spent on procedural issues at the 2005 Review Conference, owing to the lack of agreement on the agenda and programme of work, and called on members to do everything possible to avoid a repetition of that situation. It therefore proposed that the Preparatory Committee should consider “rules of conduct” for discussions during the 2007-2010 cycle. His delegation would spare no effort in assisting the Chairman to progress on questions both of substance and procedure for the present review cycle.

43. **Mr. Othman** (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, noted that recent setbacks

had cast doubt on the effectiveness and credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Not only had universalization not been achieved, but certain nuclear States were rewarding States that were not parties to the Treaty, while placing unfair burdens on States that had signed and implemented Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with IAEA. The Disarmament Conference and the entire disarmament regime had been paralysed by the failure of nuclear-weapon States to recognize that disarmament and non-proliferation were two sides of the same coin and that the decisions of the NPT Review Conferences were an integral element of implementation. This was particularly true in the case of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, without which the indefinite extension of the Treaty would not have been approved without a vote in 1995.

44. The Middle East had become emblematic of the Treaty’s ineffectiveness. No effective efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons there had been made, and Israel had been emboldened to move from a policy of ambiguity to publicly declaring that it possessed nuclear weapons. Israel’s position that a comprehensive peace needed to be achieved before the region could be rid of nuclear weapons, with its implication that security could be achieved through nuclear weapons, undermined the Treaty’s credibility, as did the double standard applied by the international community towards Israel’s failure to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under an IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The Arab States also emphasized the need to continue dialogue to reassure the international community about Iran’s nuclear programme and allow Iran to exercise its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty and under IAEA supervision.

45. Israel’s intransigence, with political cover from influential Powers, had blocked repeated Arab initiatives to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons, most recently during the debate surrounding the agenda item on Israel’s nuclear capabilities at the fiftieth session of the 2006 IAEA General Conference. As a consequence, the recent Arab Summit at Riyadh had decided to make a comprehensive evaluation of Arab policy on this issue. The Arab States called on the Depository Governments to reaffirm the resolution on the Middle East and reach agreement in the Preparatory Committee on practical recommendations that could be adopted during the 2010 Review Conference.



46. The Arab States also attached great importance to balanced implementation of the three pillars of the NPT. On disarmament, the Arab States demanded that the five nuclear-weapon States implement the 13 steps adopted as benchmarks by the 2000 Review Conference, and were troubled by recent statements of certain States about modernizing their nuclear arsenals, by justifications given by certain other States for possessing nuclear weapons, and by nuclear cooperation between certain States and other States that were not parties to the NPT. The Arab States emphasized the need for legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

47. The non-proliferation pillar was threatened by failure to universalize the NPT, and in particular by Israel's development of its nuclear military capabilities in the absence of international supervision. The Arab States supported strengthening the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System and viewed the Additional Protocol as an important verification mechanism, but felt that too many obligations were being placed on non-nuclear States without being balanced by progress on disarmament.

48. Regarding the third pillar, the Arab States viewed the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an inalienable right under article IV of the Treaty, and were troubled by the increasing restrictions on the export of nuclear materials and equipment to States that were using nuclear energy in accordance with the Treaty and within the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System. Careful study was needed to ensure that any new fuel guarantee initiatives conformed to article IV and did not reinforce any individual State's monopoly over nuclear technology.

49. **Mr. Cancchola** (Mexico) said that at the 2005 Review Conference States parties had missed a valuable opportunity to adopt measures to achieve nuclear disarmament and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. In 2007, almost 40 years after the signing of the NPT, it was important for States parties to renew commitments and comply with all obligations under the Treaty, which was the internationally recognized legal standard in disarmament affairs. It was important to attach equal importance to all three pillars of the NPT and to step up efforts to effectively implement article VI of the Treaty relating to disarmament.

50. It was unacceptable that disarmament was not a priority focus within the international agenda and that a reference to disarmament had not been included in the 2005 World Summit outcome document. His delegation was convinced that the stockpiling of nuclear weapons should be prohibited, because of the capacity of those weapons to destroy mankind. On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice had delivered an Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which it had concluded that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. That obligation had not yet been met and some States had further developed their nuclear weapon capabilities by upgrading nuclear warheads.

51. Mexico was concerned by the prevalence of defence doctrines which allowed for the use of nuclear weapons; such doctrines depended on the credible threat of the use of nuclear weapons for their effectiveness. It was necessary to establish a legally binding instrument in which nuclear-weapon States agreed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation was also concerned that it had not yet been possible to find a way to prevent outer space becoming part of the arms race. States parties should not undertake additional agreements if they were not willing to respect already established ones. In that connection, it was essential to uphold the commitment made at the 2000 Review Conference to implement 13 practical steps to ensure the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

52. Mexico had played a leading role in establishing the first nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was committed to establishing similar zones in other parts of the world and to furthering the cooperation between such zones. Nuclear-weapon States should provide assurances that they would not use nuclear weapons against countries within the nuclear-weapon-free zones. It should be possible for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Such a treaty would be an effective contribution to the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

53. The Preparatory Committee must step up efforts to achieve full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and his delegation supported the aims of the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-

Ban Treaty, which would be held in Vienna in September 2007. In accordance with Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, there was an urgent need to achieve universal implementation of the NPT and to ensure that non-States parties placed their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. States parties to the NPT should not enter into agreements with non-States parties: his Government was concerned that one nuclear-weapon State had entered into agreements with a non-State party in violation of the Treaty. In order to guarantee the peaceful use of nuclear weapons, it was essential to strengthen the safeguards and verification system through universal adherence to the Agency's Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements. The strengthening of the Agency's verification capacity was necessary for the revitalization and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*