

**2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Summary record of the 2nd meeting

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President: Mr. Amano (Japan)

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Committee (*continued*)

Adoption of the agenda

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Ford** (United States of America) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced tremendous challenges resulting mainly from non-compliance with its non-proliferation provisions. In that connection, he cited the secret nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network, the withdrawal from the Treaty by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that country's subsequent nuclear explosion and the steady spread of nuclear technology for producing weapons-grade fissile materials. Failure to ensure NPT compliance undermined the most important benefit of the Treaty, namely, assurances against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty and the trust needed for peaceful nuclear cooperation and benefit sharing. Ultimately, non-compliance, with its risk of regional nuclear arms races, also undercut the aspirations of the international community to nuclear and general disarmament. States parties must focus on how to detect violations of the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations, return violators to compliance and deter potential violators.

2. Similarly, the system of international cooperation in peaceful nuclear endeavours relied on the observance of non-proliferation norms. There had been a dangerous tendency on the part of certain countries to twist and politicize discussions of the Treaty's article VI in an effort to provide political cover for programmes aimed at developing weapons-grade fissile materials, which could only serve non-peaceful purposes. There was growing need for nuclear cooperation to help meet the world's rising energy demands. United States nuclear energy partnerships and the initiative to provide a robust and reliable mechanism for international fuel supply held out promise for expanding nuclear cooperation and technology-sharing in proliferation-resistant ways for the benefit of all.

3. With the changed strategic relationship between the two former super-Power adversaries, dramatic progress had been possible in reducing the number of warheads and delivery systems. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was being

implemented, resulting in further reductions, and the United States was working with the Russian Federation in the environment created by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START) to build a productive relationship of transparency and confidence-building measures. Furthermore, the international community was about to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

4. States parties should encourage and promote practical steps that would create an environment enabling the elimination of nuclear weapons. To that end, the United States had produced a series of papers on NPT issues aimed at catalysing productive discussion. They were also available on the United States State Department website: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/wmd/nnp/c21893.htm>. At the Review Conference, States parties should all strive to reach consensus on a constructive final document, which should contain recommendations and guidance for future policymakers.

5. During the current review cycle, the United States wished to focus on six areas: non-proliferation, Treaty withdrawal, peaceful uses, safeguards and security, disarmament and procedures. Full compliance with the Treaty was critical and States parties needed to work together to detect, counter and deter violations of the Treaty. Violators should be returned to full compliance as soon as possible, and in that area the Security Council could be involved when there were serious proliferation threats that could endanger international peace and security. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in detecting and dealing with non-compliance with safeguards was central, and all IAEA member States must cooperate fully with the Agency and comply fully with Security Council resolutions dealing with proliferation threats and non-compliance.

6. Withdrawal from the Treaty must be made unattractive. To that end, States parties to the Treaty should affirm that accountability for violations would persist even after withdrawal and should call for IAEA measures for continued safeguarding of nuclear equipment and material in a withdrawing State party. The IAEA should exercise its authority under its Statute to terminate assistance and withdraw material and equipment provided in the context of an Agency project, if the recipient State did not comply with safeguards obligations.

7. Nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes should be strengthened by supporting supplier States' efforts to develop improved, proliferation-resistant nuclear power generation technologies that would help meet future power needs. A robust and internationally backed fuel-services regime should be established, covering both fuel supply and waste disposal. States party to the Treaty had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and nuclear suppliers should therefore not share nuclear technology where there was a risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. All States parties should comply fully with article III of the Treaty, and non-nuclear-weapon States should conclude Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, along with the Additional Protocol. It was critical to prevent unauthorized transfers of, or access to, nuclear technology or material. States parties should assist developing countries in complying with article III of the Treaty and other international obligations relating to nuclear safety and security.

9. The commitment of all States parties to the disarmament goals in the preamble and article VI of the Treaty should be reaffirmed. Realistic and practical thinking was called for in order to create an environment in which the total elimination of nuclear weapons could be achieved and sustained, an effort requiring the easing of tensions and strengthening of trust. Compliance with non-proliferation obligations was particularly important in order to prevent the emergence of regional nuclear arms races and promote the universality of the Treaty. The same applied to obligations relating to the non-proliferation of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Procedures should be established to deal with violations of disarmament regimes, including robust and effective compliance enforcement measures that would prevent violators from gaining any strategic benefits from their actions. Until total elimination of nuclear weapons was achieved, nuclear-weapon States should work to reduce their nuclear stockpiles as much as possible, reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, prevent unauthorized access to nuclear weapon-related knowledge and material, subject civil nuclear facilities to full IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol, and improve transparency and build confidence. States parties should use all appropriate tools to deter the acquisition and use of banned weapons of mass destruction. In that context, they should work to

achieve a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the framework of a stable regional peace. States parties should support measures to reinforce non-proliferation norms and impede the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

10. Future Review Conferences should have agendas generally consistent with the objectives of article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in order to permit the consideration of issues affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty. Likewise, they should accommodate the legitimate concerns of States parties with regard to matters of special importance and the adequate budgeting of time for the consideration of such matters. Future Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee meetings should also rotate their leadership so as to ensure a fair and representative selection from all regional groups.

11. **Mr. Yelchenko** (Ukraine), speaking on behalf of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM, said that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. Current challenges were multifaceted, as they included not only the risk of nuclear war but the quite real possibility that non-State actors could use weapons of mass destruction as weapons of terror.

12. Although the inability of the 2005 Review Conference to reach agreement on a substantive final document was regrettable, the international community should do its best to uphold the authority of the Treaty, which was vital for global peace and security, placing special emphasis on universal adherence. The principle of irreversibility in disarmament was an important element in the maintenance of international peace and stability as well. Those processes should be accompanied by implementation of universal security guarantees, unconditional adherence by States to international law and the consolidation of an atmosphere of mutual trust. Credible negative security assurances in the form of a legally binding international instrument would substantially enhance the non-proliferation regime.

13. The GUAM countries urged all States to accede to the basic instruments on arms control and non-proliferation. They considered the implementation of and compliance with those instruments to be a priority in their foreign policy. They strongly supported all

efforts to increase the effectiveness of the existing disarmament and arms control machinery, and hoped that negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty would soon begin and that the Conference on Disarmament could resume its work.

14. The GUAM countries underscored the significance of the safeguards system and the important work of IAEA in the implementation of NPT safeguards provisions. They fully endorsed the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. All nuclear facilities and materials in the territory of the GUAM countries were subject to IAEA full-scope safeguards. Those countries also participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and Ukraine participated as a recipient country in the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

15. The GUAM countries deeply regretted that, more than 10 years after it had been opened for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had not yet entered into force and they reiterated the call to all nuclear-weapon States to observe the moratorium on nuclear tests. They also continued to attach great importance to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and considered the relevant resolution of the 1995 Review Conference valid until its goals and objectives had been achieved.

16. A multilateral approach to the work of the Preparatory Committee was fundamental in order to resolve remaining problems and give a strong impetus to renewed non-proliferation endeavours.

17. **Mr. Park** In-Kook (Republic of Korea) reaffirmed his Government's strong commitment to the Treaty and to maintaining the delicate balance between its three pillars.

18. It was disappointing that the international community had been unable to seize rare opportunities in disarmament and non-proliferation. The current session of the Preparatory Committee was particularly important, because it would serve as a bellwether for the 2010 Review Conference and indeed, for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In that regard, his delegation expressed concern that no agreement had been reached on the agenda and the indicative timetable.

19. The unprecedented challenges to the NPT regime in recent years had not been resolved. The nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had long been a source of serious concern, and its October 2006 nuclear test had drawn criticism from around the world. It was therefore encouraging that the Six-Party Talks had achieved agreement on initial actions for the implementation of their September Joint Statement, in which all parties agreed on the verifiable dismantling of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. Moreover, when the Six-Party Talks had achieved denuclearization and had incorporated the Democratic People's Republic of Korea into the global community, that forum would function as a basis for a multilateral security regime in North-East Asia. The lessons learned in resolving one of the most serious security threats facing the region through cooperation and dialogue would be valuable in responding to new global security challenges.

20. Iran had been found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and the United Nations Security Council had demanded that Iran should suspend all enrichment-related activities. His delegation believed that the Iranian nuclear issue should not undermine the foundation of the Treaty and that the issue should be swiftly resolved in a peaceful and diplomatic manner. Meanwhile, the new proliferation threat posed by the nuclear black market could not be ignored. The detection of smuggled fissionable or radiological material required an immediate and urgent response.

21. His delegation attached great importance to strengthening the compliance and verification mechanisms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Adherence to the Additional Protocol, the main driving force for safeguards and verification, should be a condition for supply of nuclear materials and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States. Existing export control regimes, including those established by United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) were also very important.

22. Significant progress had been made in reducing nuclear arsenals and in making commitments for further reductions under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Nevertheless, there was demand for deeper cuts, as the number of existing warheads was still roughly the same as it had been in the early 1970s. To narrow the perception gap between nuclear-weapon

and non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the implementation of disarmament obligations, nuclear-weapon States must demonstrate a higher standard of compliance through sustainable disarmament measures. Voluntary cuts could lend greater moral authority and political legitimacy to their demand to non-nuclear-weapon States to join them in strengthening non-proliferation norms. The early entry into force of the CTBT and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty were also essential. The international community should also support the Conference on Disarmament in overcoming its current stalemate.

23. The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was neither absolute nor unconditional, but was contingent on full compliance with the non-proliferation and safeguards obligations in articles I, II and III. There was a need to control the transfer of sensitive fuel-cycle technologies and facilities, particularly to countries which gave rise to concern regarding proliferation or had no legitimate need for such technologies and facilities in terms of economic feasibility or energy security. The initiative of the IAEA Director General on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle was therefore welcome.

24. Security assurances by nuclear-weapon States could play a valuable and significant role in reducing the threats perceived by non-nuclear-weapon States. Credible negative security assurances should be accorded to non-nuclear weapon States in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, and there was merit in providing an increased level of individual security assurances and other incentives to States that accepted additional non-proliferation commitments beyond those set out in the Treaty.

25. Stressing the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty, his delegation called on the three States outside it to accede to the Treaty at an early date. Abuse of the article X withdrawal clause had seriously undermined confidence in the Treaty, and thus required further attention. The non-proliferation regime needed better tools to respond to situations involving threats to the Treaty.

26. Despite a prevailing sense of pessimism, the NPT was still perceived as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and was indeed playing an indispensable role in preserving it. Throughout its history, the Treaty had survived

challenges and frustrations, and his delegation hoped that, through innovation and adaptation, it would continue to serve as a credible and effective force in the global security regime.

27. **Mr. Streuli** (Switzerland) said that the disappointing results of the previous review cycle could be attributed to the stubborn defence of narrow national visions. The slow pace of nuclear disarmament was perceived by some as an incentive to proliferate, which undermined confidence and weakened the multilateral system. There were also concerns about the growing use of nuclear energy, as the desire to control proliferation hindered access to nuclear technology for States with growing energy needs. Unfortunately, there had been no substantial developments since 2005 in the field of nuclear disarmament, and nuclear-weapon States were currently pursuing programmes to develop or replace their existing arsenals and delivery systems. Such attitudes ran counter to the spirit of article IV and made nuclear weapons even more attractive to States trying to acquire them. It was also discouraging that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had not yet entered into force.

28. The situations in Iran and on the Korean peninsula were of great concern, but his delegation was convinced that only through diplomacy would it be possible to resolve them in the interests of all concerned. It therefore encouraged Iran to comply with IAEA requirements and Security Council resolutions, and urged the States engaged in the Six-Party Talks to spare no effort to bring them to a successful conclusion. His delegation was also of the view that the cooperation project between India and the United States of America in the field of civilian nuclear energy would call into question the validity of the compromise which had enabled consensus on the extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review Conference.

29. The growing use of nuclear energy for production of electricity in both developing and industrialized countries would inevitably lead to a growing number of nuclear programmes and a subsequent increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation and even terrorism. Access to the full range of sensitive nuclear technology must be conditional on accession to the Treaty and compliance with its provisions, in particular articles I, II, III and IV.

30. The agreements reached at earlier Review Conferences, in particular the "Principles and

Objectives for Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament” and the “Thirteen Practical Steps” adopted in 2000, should be preserved and implemented. His delegation hoped that the spirit of compromise could be revived in order to overcome the current challenges facing the Treaty, which was the only legally binding instrument with global scope able to respond to the issues of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

31. **Mr. Duncan** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had also been disappointed that the 2005 Review Conference had not been able to agree on substantive measures to strengthen the Treaty regime, which remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the framework for nuclear disarmament. His hope was that the beginning of the 2010 review cycle would see a real improvement in the atmosphere among States parties, and that they would be able to trust one another to share the same goals for the full implementation of the Treaty.

32. The rights under article IV to enjoyment of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy went hand in hand with obligations to comply fully with articles I, II and III. It had also not been possible to agree on how to address the serious issue of withdrawal from the Treaty. His delegation was committed to ensuring that any State deciding to withdraw could not subsequently benefit from nuclear technologies obtained while a State party, or seek to use them to further an illegal nuclear weapons programme.

33. His delegation called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to compliance with all its international obligations, including those under the Treaty and its IAEA safeguards agreements, and to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions. It continued to be seriously concerned about the proliferation implications of Iran's nuclear programme, in the light of its history of IAEA safeguards violations and the recent steps it had taken to reduce cooperation with IAEA. He called on the Government of Iran to suspend enrichment-related activity and allow negotiations to begin. Confidence in the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme would permit a new chapter to be opened in its relations with the international community, not only in the nuclear field, but in the political, economic and technological areas as well.

34. His Government reaffirmed its support for IAEA in all areas. It urged all non-nuclear-weapon States to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements, which should be accepted as a condition of supply for all sensitive nuclear items. With regard to the secure provision of nuclear fuel, his delegation looked forward to an IAEA paper seeking to balance the legitimate desires of those wishing to develop nuclear energy against a set of robust non-proliferation criteria that should include adherence to IAEA safeguards.

35. As a nuclear-weapon State, the United Kingdom was aware that it had particular responsibilities to fulfil. His Government remained fully committed to a safer world, free of nuclear weapons and to the accomplishment of the relevant disarmament measures contained in the decisions of the 1995 Review Conference and in the 2000 Final Document. The United Kingdom had decided to begin concept and design work required to replace its current ballistic missile submarine fleet and to maintain the option of using the D5 missile beyond its current life expectancy, but that decision was not an irreversible commitment to possession of nuclear weapons forever. The circumstances did not currently exist, however, for it to safely choose to renounce nuclear weapons unilaterally. Nevertheless, progress must be made on the disarmament and non-proliferation tracks in parallel, and his Government had therefore decided to reduce its stockpile of operational warheads by a further 20 per cent. Since the end of the Cold War, the explosive power of its nuclear weapons had been reduced by 75 per cent, and accounted for less than 1 per cent of the global inventory. Further, it had reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons to one system, submarine-based Trident missiles, the only nuclear-weapon State to have done so.

36. The United Kingdom reiterated its commitment to abide by its moratorium on nuclear testing and on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and would work towards the early entry into force of the CTBT. It hoped that the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament could be overcome and that a fissile material cut-off treaty could be negotiated as another concrete step towards disarmament.

37. The United Kingdom reaffirmed its support for nuclear-weapon-free zones, and had signed and ratified protocols in respect of three such zones. It thus had given treaty-based negative security assurances to some 100 countries. The ambiguous nature of the

security arrangements in the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone had meant that the United Kingdom was unable to ratify the protocol to that treaty, but it was working with States of the region to resolve those issues.

38. **Ms. Dengo** (Costa Rica) called for renewed effort and commitment to the goal of achieving irreversible nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The development of new categories of weapons and technology was a destabilizing factor that undermined full observance of the terms of the Treaty. Although nuclear-weapon States bore the main responsibility for that grave situation, it was shared to some extent by all parties.

39. The current session of the Preparatory Committee provided an opportunity for in-depth consideration of whether the Treaty could meet its objectives exclusively through the five-year review conference cycle, without active and ongoing implementation and review mechanisms. The Treaty currently had no verification mechanisms of its own, relying on the system of IAEA safeguards agreements with individual countries and the authority of the IAEA Board of Governors to refer specific situations to the United Nations Security Council, which could act only in specific situations endangering international peace and security.

40. Additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements guaranteed transparency and mutual confidence by allowing inspections; yet 11 of the 71 States with significant nuclear programmes still did not have an additional protocol in effect. The international community could not allow special cases to escape verification, and any limitations would undermine mutual confidence. Therefore, Costa Rica called on those States still operating nuclear facilities without safeguards to join the Treaty.

41. She reiterated the concern at the lack of commitment by the nuclear Powers to meet their disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States must make a genuine commitment to achieve disarmament by deactivating their nuclear weapon systems, dismantling their arsenals and destroying both weapons and delivery systems. Costa Rica rejected any justification or postponement based on deterrence.

42. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had set an example to the world by establishing the first inhabited area of the

planet free of nuclear weapons. She welcomed the establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and called for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, South Asia and Central Europe.

43. The CTBT established global norms against nuclear testing which had been severely violated when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had conducted a nuclear test in October 2006. The strong reaction against that test demonstrated the importance attached by the international community to the prohibition of nuclear testing, as well as the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT. As Chairperson of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for 2007, she appealed to all States to show their commitment to the CTBT by participating in the Conference on Facilitating its Entry into Force to be held in September 2007. Its early entry into force would represent an initial step towards general and complete disarmament.

44. Costa Rica had been the first country to comply fully with General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 on principles governing the general reduction and regulation of armaments, when it had disbanded its armed forces in 1948. It had thus welcomed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and regretted that neither the resolution nor the advisory opinion had been implemented. Therefore, her delegation wished to revisit the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on their Elimination (Model Nuclear Weapons Convention), which it had first submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1997. It was circulating an updated draft reflecting the changes in the world since its original submission, which could be a useful tool in the debate on the common objective of the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals.

45. **Mr. Mackay** (New Zealand) said that his delegation firmly endorsed the views of the New Agenda Coalition, as expressed by the representative of Ireland. The beginning of a new review cycle provided an opportunity to move forward in strengthening the Treaty regime against the many challenges of the current security environment. Its

status as the cornerstone of the global security regime made the preservation of the balance of interests inherent in related negotiations all the more vital.

46. Some States argued a unique security benefit derived from the possession of nuclear weapons, while insisting that no more States should be allowed to acquire them. That contradictory argument had even been used to claim that it would be irresponsible for some States to relinquish nuclear weapons in the current geopolitical environment. In other treaties on weapons of mass destruction, however, biological and chemical weapons had been rejected by all States because of their abhorrent and indiscriminate effects. Humanity would also be safer in a world where nuclear deterrence was universally outlawed as a security doctrine for all States. New Zealand took its obligation never to acquire or facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons very seriously and, through the Proliferation Security Initiative, was working with a network of States to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials.

47. New Zealand shared the concern about Iran's nuclear programme. It strongly preferred a peaceful, negotiated solution to the matter, but Iran must do its part by complying with Security Council and IAEA resolutions and suspending its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. New Zealand was also extremely disappointed at the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to conduct a nuclear test, and urged it to implement its commitments under the Six-Party Talks, return to active membership in the Treaty and resume cooperation with IAEA.

48. All States parties in compliance with their safeguards obligations had the right to access to peaceful nuclear technology. In order to ensure that the safeguards regime remained current in a constantly evolving global environment, adoption of the Additional Protocol, which represented the contemporary verification standard, should be a condition of nuclear supply.

49. Significant work had been done on many topics at the 2005 Review Conference, which had been hindered in reaching definite conclusions only by the inability to agree on an overall outcome for the Conference. There was merit in revisiting some of that work, which could be updated and incorporated into the current

deliberations. The process of moving forward collectively would require due recognition and implementation of the commitments negotiated in the past. For example, negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament or the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would both constitute concrete gains for the Treaty regime. Constructive engagement on measurable and practical objectives would provide a useful confidence-building dynamic for the next Treaty review cycle.

50. **Mr. Zniber** (Morocco) said that the Treaty had helped to stem nuclear proliferation for decades, and with the IAEA had laid the foundation for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which were essential for all countries hoping to use that technology in their development. The indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 had ended the uncertainty surrounding the non-proliferation regime and had resulted in a new form of review conference, where the nuclear-weapon States had the responsibility to report on their efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

51. The failure of the last Review Conference, the lack of concrete progress on disarmament, increased terrorism and challenges to non-proliferation from ambiguous statements by Israel regarding its possession of nuclear weapons illustrated the current threats to the regime. Unfortunately, the Treaty regime had lost credibility in its three basic areas: nuclear disarmament, combating proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The erosion of confidence in the pillars of the regime were a source of concern to his delegation and to the international community as a whole. Insufficient efforts to move towards disarmament under article VI of the Treaty were one of the main causes of that lack of confidence.

52. The main objectives established at the 2000 Review Conference had not been achieved, unfortunately. Morocco deplored the fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature in 1996, still had not entered into force. It renewed its appeal to all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay, and stressed the importance of observing the moratorium on nuclear testing.

53. The universality of the Treaty remained a goal to be achieved. Israel, which possessed nuclear

capabilities, remained the only State in the Middle East region which had not joined the Treaty and submitted its facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime. The 2000 Review Conference had stressed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty as a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which would prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in that highly vulnerable region.

54. His delegation reiterated the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, in particular through international cooperation under IAEA monitoring. Access to nuclear energy must be expanded through technology transfer and sharing of knowledge, in order to foster economic and social development. The best way to prevent nuclear materials and weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists was the complete eradication of nuclear weapons.

55. In the current international context, all parties should work to avoid the failure of another Review Conference through renewed commitment to consensus, negotiation and the rule of law. States parties did not have an effective mechanism to exercise their collective will in situations where the Treaty was violated, and the preparatory process could help to bring pressure to bear for the full observance of the Treaty.

56. **Mr. Othman** (Syrian Arab Republic) recalled that his country had been one of the first to accede to the Treaty, considering comprehensive nuclear disarmament fundamental to global security and stability. However, instead of a reduction in such weapons, there had been an arms race during the cold war. The main objective of the Treaty was to prevent proliferation and eliminate stockpiles. The mainstay of the non-proliferation regime was the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. Universal accession to the Treaty would lead to universal implementation of that system.

57. His country maintained strict border controls in accordance with national legislation in order to combat illegal trafficking in radiological and nuclear materials. National reporting, registration and licensing mechanisms for imported and exported nuclear and radiological equipment for peaceful purposes complied with international regulations.

58. It was essential to strengthen the role of IAEA in the facilitation of the transfer of nuclear knowledge and technology to Member States in order to achieve a balance between that sphere of activity and its monitoring activities. Article IV set out clearly the right of parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and stipulated that all States were to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information. The imposition of constraints on the transfer of nuclear or advanced technology to non-nuclear-weapon States parties constituted a violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

59. The establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones would strengthen regional and global peace and security and reinforce nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. On behalf of the Arab Group, his country had submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council in 2003 designed to free the Middle East region of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons (S/2003/1219, annex) and had declared its resolve to contribute actively to that end. He emphasized the need for nuclear disarmament in areas of tension and conflict and the manifest importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as a step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation and reduction of the risk of an arms race in conflict zones. He reiterated his country's serious concern over Israel's intransigence and ongoing refusal to accede to the Treaty or express its intention to do so and to submit its nuclear installations to international controls, and over the international indifference to Israel's failure to implement international resolutions. He called on the international community to end that double standard, which undermined the credibility of the Treaty.

60. His country had acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in March 2005, and signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in September 2005. Moreover, it had committed to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

61. The following recommendations would contribute to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and achievement of the aims and objectives of the Treaty and should be adopted by the Preparatory Committee:

(a) Nuclear-weapon States should be obligated under the NPT to show a genuine political will to take practical and effective steps to give up all their nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and dispose of them under strict international control;

(b) Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established and fostered throughout the world and priority should be given to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as a step on the road to eliminating nuclear weapons completely, preventing their proliferation and reducing the danger of arms races in regions of tension and conflict;

(c) Nuclear-weapon States should stop placing technical and commercial restrictions and obstacles in the way of non-nuclear-weapon States and allow them the opportunity to benefit from the various peaceful uses of nuclear energy in implementation of article IV of the Treaty;

(d) The authority and role of IAEA in addressing nuclear proliferation issues should be supported. The principle of transparency in the activities of States and cooperation between them should be firmly established, so that the Agency could fulfil its obligations and implement the tasks assigned to it with respect to non-proliferation issues and progress towards establishing an effective nuclear disarmament programme;

(e) Nuclear-weapon States should strive for universalization of the NPT;

(f) The resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review Conference and reaffirmed at the 2000 Review Conference, should be implemented;

(g) The Conference on Disarmament should be allowed to agree on an agenda placing nuclear disarmament at the forefront of its concerns;

(h) Impetus should be given to United Nations disarmament mechanisms, including the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission;

(i) The international community should recognize the grave concern on the part of the States of the Middle East over the dangers of the Israeli nuclear capabilities that had developed and increased in the absence of any international control;

(j) Nuclear-weapon States should to refrain from imposing limitations or restrictions on nuclear

technology transfer to other States parties bound by the IAEA safeguards system, on the pretext of security, safety and verification.

62. It was to be hoped that specific mechanisms would be identified in the final document that could deal with the various issues raised and lead to just, balanced implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, in order to affirm its credibility and universality.

63. **Mr. Duarte** (Brazil) said that the 2005 Review Conference, which he had chaired, regrettably had not concluded with a satisfactory outcome, despite the best efforts of all. The Treaty faced a decisive moment, in view of the growing threats to international peace and security posed by the possession of nuclear weapons and the risk of proliferation.

64. Disarmament and non-proliferation were interrelated and mutually reinforcing, and the implementation of a sustainable long-term non-proliferation strategy depended on the simultaneous adoption of measures regarding nuclear disarmament and fissile material. The possession by some States of weapons of mass destruction, particularly arsenals of nuclear weapons, created an asymmetrical international environment and jeopardized the credibility of non-proliferation efforts. Without effective, verifiable and irreversible progress in disarmament, non-proliferation regimes could not provide sustainable results. A balanced implementation of the Treaty, with substantive focus on its three pillars, was vital for the achievement of its objectives.

65. The inalienable right of States parties to develop and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes should by no means be restricted, but such development involved a risk of proliferation. Concerns had increased in recent years in view of the risk that weapons of mass destruction or radioactive material might fall into the hands of non-State actors. It should be borne in mind, however, that fulfilment by nuclear-weapon States of their commitments towards nuclear disarmament, assumed at the 2000 Review Conference, was essential in addressing those concerns. Notwithstanding recent changes in the international security environment, agreements reached at earlier Conferences remained valid.

66. Although there had been progress in the past few years in dismantling nuclear arsenals, the nuclear Powers had not shown a solid commitment to

disarmament, which would require them to review the role played by nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. Their leading role had even been revitalized by new rationalizations for the possession of nuclear arsenals and the development of new weapons, and could become a paradigm for other States to pursue the militarization of their nuclear programmes. Priority was placed almost exclusively on non-proliferation, at the expense of debate on disarmament, which had contributed to the lack of progress and the prevailing atmosphere of discouragement.

67. The universalization of the Treaty was a fundamental element in the quest to create a more stable and predictable international security environment. Adherence to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States by countries which had remained outside the Treaty was crucial. Any attempt to accommodate de facto nuclear status would contradict the letter and spirit of the Treaty. The disarmament and non-proliferation regimes would greatly benefit from the immediate entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the end of the deadlock which had long hampered the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

68. Confidence must be restored in the capacity of the Treaty to reach its objectives. Its strength, credibility and endurance rested on a fundamental trade-off that must be recognized and upheld for the Treaty to be effective and lasting.

Adoption of the agenda (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/1)

69. **Mr. Soltanieh** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the Preparatory Committee must start its discussion of substantive matters without delay, rather than dealing with procedural matters such as the agenda. The agenda of the 2005 Preparatory Committee contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/1, which represented agreed language, should be adopted as the agenda for the current session.

70. **Mr. Lüdeking** (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the European Union supported the Chairman's efforts to encourage the adoption of the provisional agenda and indicative timetable which had been submitted to members, and agreed that the time had come to move from procedural discussions to substantive debate. The delegations concerned were ready to accept the Chairman's

proposals, as a lengthy procedural debate would not be productive.

71. **Mr. Meyer** (Canada) said that his delegation was open to the Chairman's proposals, and wished to proceed to substantive discussion of the many important issues which had already been flagged in the general debate.

72. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation supported the efforts of the Chairman to seek a compromise. The Committee should avoid unnecessary procedural debates and begin substantive discussions as soon as possible. If any delegation had difficulties with the new wording of the agenda, the best option would be to return to the agreed text which had already been approved by all delegations. Such an approach would not rule out the possibility for each delegation to raise any issues which it considered should be the focus of attention. The sooner an agenda was agreed, the sooner the Committee could express its concerns about the current situation with respect to the Treaty. He therefore called on all delegations to seek a compromise and to carefully consider the agreed text of the agenda adopted in 2005 so that the Committee could begin its substantive discussions on that basis without delay.

73. **The Chairman** said that he would revert to the issue of the agenda at an appropriate time.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.