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**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons**

**Report submitted by Canada**

**Article I**

1. Canada continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this respect, Canada views reductions by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons inventories and the diminishment of the political and military value ascribed to nuclear weapons as playing an important role in discouraging further nuclear weapons proliferation. In his address to the General Assembly on 21 September 2006, the Prime Minister of Canada noted that nuclear proliferation continues to pose a threat to the world.

2. The Prime Minister also highlighted the need for members of the United Nations to ensure that Security Council resolutions are fully implemented, and that States work together to halt activities that have no reasonable purpose other than the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Canada is a member of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to establish a more effective basis for impeding and stopping shipments of, inter alia, nuclear weapons material and technology flowing illegally to and from States and non-State actors, consistent with national legal authorities and international law. Canada hosts a Proliferation Security Initiative website (<http://www.proliferationsecurity.info>) and in December 2006 hosted a working group meeting for Proliferation Security Initiative operational experts in Montreal. Canada is also a founding partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and in spring 2008 will be hosting a workshop on systems for the physical protection of high risk radioactive sources and on national systems for accounting and control of such sources. Canada is also an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the various G8 non-proliferation bodies, and has fully implemented Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1737 (2006).



**Article II**

3. Canada continues to abide by its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commitment not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. This commitment is implemented domestically through Canada's Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000 and corresponding regulations.

4. Canada also calls on other non-nuclear-weapon States not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, acquire or seek to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or explosive devices. In a statement delivered on 24 March 2007, Canada's Foreign Minister urged Iran to comply with the international obligations set out by the Security Council, including the full and verified suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water-related activities. He reminded Iran that doing so is key to the Security Council suspending measures against Iran and opening the way for negotiations on a mutually acceptable political settlement. He also noted that it was vital that Iran extend its full cooperation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is only through such cooperation that Iran can raise confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Iran's continued non-compliance with its international obligations will not be tolerated by the international community.

**Article III**

5. Pursuant to Article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The IAEA has provided annually a positive conclusion concerning the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Canada pursuant to this agreement. In support of IAEA efforts to strengthen safeguards, Canada concluded a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement, which entered into force on 8 September 2000. Canada continues to cooperate with the IAEA with regard to the Protocol's implementation. In September 2005, after five years of extensive collaborative effort by the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the Canadian nuclear industry, the IAEA reached the broad conclusion for Canada on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This broad conclusion provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its peaceful use commitments and is a necessary condition for the transition to integrated safeguards. With respect to the latter, there have been ongoing consultations with the IAEA and the Canadian nuclear industry, in both a bilateral and trilateral context, regarding the State-level approach for integrated safeguards in Canada, as well as the corresponding facility-level procedures for implementation. To date, an integrated safeguards approach has been implemented for transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at the multi-unit CANDU stations and for small research reactors, static spent fuel dry storages, and locations outside facilities, providing for significant savings in terms of IAEA effort. In addition, through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme Canada contributed to the development of advanced safeguards equipment and techniques aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency's safeguards. This effort resulted in a contribution of approximately Can \$1.8m over the last year. At the IAEA and at the General Assembly, Canada has urged States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and protocols additional to their safeguards agreements to do

so as soon as possible. Canada continues to encourage recognition of a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the safeguards standard required under article III.

6. Consonant with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Canada will only authorize nuclear cooperation involving proliferation-significant items with those non-nuclear-weapon States that have made an internationally legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, have accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities, and have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This policy has been in place since 1976. Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items, including, with respect to the specific requirements of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. It ensures that exports of nuclear items are not authorized where there is found to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or when an export would be counter to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations. Canada's export control legislation includes a catch-all provision. Canada's national system is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. All these measures serve to facilitate peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation without contributing to proliferation.

7. In response to the threat posed to the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Canada continues to cooperate actively with other like-minded States in a variety of international forums to develop new measures aimed at further strengthening the regime, particularly with regard to the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies associated with the production of special fissionable material suitable for nuclear weapons purposes, and the suspension of nuclear cooperation in cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

#### **Article IV**

8. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada maintains a robust nuclear power programme. It is the world's largest exporter of uranium, and is a world leader in the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications. Canada believes that nuclear energy can make an important contribution to prosperity and sustainable development, while also addressing concerns about climate change, for those countries that choose to use nuclear energy. To this end, Canada has nuclear cooperation agreements in force covering 42 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for the fullest possible exchange

of nuclear and other material, equipment and technology. Since the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Canada has held three official bilateral consultations with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) partner States, as well as six formal Administrative Arrangement (AA) consultations with NCA partner country authorities. Canada supports the IAEA Technical Cooperation programme, and for several years has met or exceeded the rate of attainment for voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.

9. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consonant with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV. In this regard, Canada participated in the IAEA Special Event on Fuel Assurances held last fall in conjunction with the IAEA General Conference. Canada and Australia have also jointly provided a paper to the IAEA suggesting elements for consideration in analysis of the various fuel supply assurance proposals. The 2006 G8 Statement on Non-Proliferation, released in St. Petersburg on 16 July 2006, is indicative of current diplomatic action by Canada and a number of other States on this issue. The statement notes that G8 States will continue reviewing multinational approaches to the fuel cycle, including international centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, with the IAEA, as well as relevant practical, legal and organizational solutions; facilitate developing credible international assurances of access to nuclear fuel-related services; and, for those States that have or are considering plans relating to the use and/or development of safe and secure nuclear energy, that they will promote research and development for safer, more efficient, more environmentally friendly and more proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems, including relevant technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle.

10. Canada has also been involved in efforts to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on Radioactive Sources. Effective 1 April 2007, Canada began full implementation of an enhanced export and import control programme for risk-significant radioactive sources covered by the Code. This encompasses full export controls, notifications and other control measures required under the Code and its Guidance. This step completes a key regulatory initiative undertaken to adopt the Code and Guidance. With this step, Canada has fully met its commitments to the IAEA and to the G8 to implement the provisions of the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

#### **Article V**

11. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirms that provisions of article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Canada signed that Treaty on 24 September 1996, when it opened for signature, and deposited its instrument of ratification on 18 December 1998. Canada was the first State signatory to that Treaty to sign a facility agreement with the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on 19 October 1998. Canada has played an active role in encouraging further signatures and ratification of the Treaty with a view to achieving its

universality. From 11 to 13 October 2006, Canada co-hosted a workshop with Mexico to encourage signature, ratification and implementation of the CTBT in the Caribbean region. In September 2006, Canada co-chaired with Japan, the Netherlands, Finland, Australia the “Friends of the CTBT” event on the margins of the General Assembly to reiterate support for the Treaty. Seventy-two countries have signed the Joint Ministerial Statement that was issued at the event.

12. Canada co-sponsored the resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. The resolution calls for the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty and urges the maintenance of unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapons test explosions until entry into force is achieved. Following the 9 October 2006 nuclear test by the DPRK, Canada’s Foreign Minister released a statement noting Canada was deeply concerned and that the actions were very provocative and unacceptable to Canada. Canada places a priority on the establishment of the Treaty’s verification system and, as such, is a leader among member States in contributing resources, equipment and expertise to the development of the Treaty’s International Monitoring System (IMS). Canada hosts 15 IMS stations and 1 laboratory. Only one radionuclide station remains to be built while six other stations require certification by the Secretariat. Data gathered by the radionuclide station in Yellowknife was key to determining the nature of the explosion in the nuclear test of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of October 2006.

#### **Article VI**

13. Canada continues to take very seriously the obligation of article VI and the commitments agreed upon in the 1995 Principles and Objectives and in the 13 steps at the 2000 Review Conference. These have been at the forefront of a number of activities and statements.

#### *Steps 1 and 2*

14. Canada’s action in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the moratorium on nuclear testing is described above under article V implementation.

#### *Steps 3 and 4*

15. At the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, Canada tabled a resolution which, inter alia, calls for negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Though the resolution was ultimately withdrawn due to a lack of consensus on the text of the resolution, it demonstrated Canada’s commitment towards encouraging negotiations on an FMCT. Canada also supports the Presidential proposal recently presented in the CD, calling for the appointment of a coordinator to preside over the negotiations of an FMCT. At the CD, Canada recently submitted a working paper “An FMCT Scope-Verification Arrangement” (CD/1819, 21 March 2007) discussing the interrelationship between the scope and verifiability of an FMCT and suggesting an approach for cost-effective verification of an eventual treaty.

*Step 5*

16. Canada emphasizes the importance of transparency, irreversibility, and verifiability in the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals and facilities. As noted above, Canada co-sponsored the resolution “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, which “emphasizes the importance of applying irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency” in the process of working towards nuclear disarmament.

*Step 6*

17. Canada reiterated its call on nuclear-weapon States to securely reduce and dismantle their nuclear weapons arsenals in an irreversible and verifiable manner in the First Committee during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. At that session, Canada voted in favour of the resolutions entitled “Towards a nuclear-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” and “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. Canada also called for a separate vote and voted in favour of paragraph 1 of the resolution entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*”, in order to support the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

18. Canada supports the reduced salience of nuclear weapons and the significant reduction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s nuclear forces that has taken place since the end of the cold war. As a member of NATO, Canada continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives through a continuous step-by-step approach, and Canada was one of the strongest and most vocal proponents of NATO’s decision to endorse the 13 Practical Steps towards Disarmament. NATO allies have significantly reduced the number of nuclear weapons in Europe: by 85 per cent since 1991, and almost 95 per cent since the height of the cold war.

*Step 7*

19. As noted above, Canada co-sponsored the resolution “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” at the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, which encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which would serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty. It also welcomes the progress made by nuclear-weapon States, including the Russian Federation and the United States, on nuclear arms reductions.

*Step 8*

20. Canada has encouraged Russia and the United States to implement the Trilateral Initiative by submitting surplus stocks of fissile material to IAEA control.

*Step 9*

21. Canada's support for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons was expressed by our vote in favour of the resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" at the sixty-first session of the General Assembly.

22. Under the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Canada will contribute up to Can \$1 billion over its 10 years, initially to non-proliferation, disarmament and counter-terrorism cooperation projects in Russia and countries of the former Soviet Union, to ensure the cold war WMD legacy cannot be acquired by terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. The Global Partnership, with 23 members, is a concrete means of implementing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament goals and the objectives of the NPT. Canada is contributing to projects in nuclear submarine dismantlement, chemical weapons destruction, nuclear and radiological security, redirection of former weapons scientists and biological non-proliferation. On nuclear-related projects, Canada has contributed \$32 million to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership to safely and securely manage spent nuclear fuel (including highly enriched uranium) from submarines in northern Russia. Canada has committed up to \$120 million to fund the dismantlement of 12 nuclear submarines in North-West Russia in the period 2004-2008, with 8 submarines (16 reactors) dismantled to date, and which will include one strategic missile submarine in partnership with the United States and the Russian Federation, and plans to subsequently move to the Russian Far East. Canada has committed up to \$20 million annually to funding physical protection upgrades at Russian facilities with nuclear material, with 5 projects under way and several more in development, and has funded multiple projects to secure highly radioactive sources in Russia. Canada has also contributed \$8 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund to strengthen nuclear and radiological security in countries of the former Soviet Union, and is working to secure key border crossings in Ukraine to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. As a member of the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, Canada funds various research projects and other programmes and activities and thereby redirects former weapons scientists towards sustainable peaceful employment opportunities.

*Step 10*

23. Through its Global Partnership Programme, Canada is contributing to the elimination and disposition of fissile material, ensuring that it cannot be acquired by terrorists. Canada has pledged \$65 million towards Russia's plutonium disposition programme, which will convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into forms not usable for weapons. Canada made a major contribution towards the permanent closure of the last operating weapons-grade plutonium producing reactor in Russia, to take place in 2011.

*Step 11*

24. At the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, Canada tabled a decision entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", which was adopted by consensus. This decision welcomed

the work of the government panel of experts on verification and encouraged them to bring their work to an agreed conclusion as soon as possible. In the interests of general and complete disarmament, Canada is also a State party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty. Canada has provided financial support to mine clearance and related activities in over 25 States, as well as to small arms and light weapons disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, collection and destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Africa and Asia.

#### *Step 12*

25. At the 2005 Review Conference, Canada submitted a working paper on the concept of “permanence with accountability” for the NPT, which among other proposals, supported the practice of submitting annual reports on treaty implementation prior to such meetings. This followed up on a number of previous papers submitted by Canada at earlier Preparatory Committee meetings on this topic. Canada commends the nuclear-weapon States for the information they have provided to date, and would encourage them to submit information about their efforts and activities as an official report.

#### *Step 13*

26. In early 2005, the Department of Foreign Affairs of Canada submitted a major study on weapons of mass destruction verification and compliance to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which has been published as part of the Commission’s series of papers and studies and is available at <http://www.wmdcommission.org>. As noted above, Canada tabled a resolution entitled “Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification” at the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, which was adopted by consensus. This resolution welcomed the work of the government panel of experts on verification and encouraged them to bring their work to an agreed conclusion as soon as possible.

### **Article VII**

27. Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While not itself a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Canada welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally agreed criteria. At the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, Canada supported resolutions calling for the establishment or consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

### **Article VIII**

28. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 enshrined the concept of permanence with accountability. In accordance with the commitments arising from



the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, Canada delivered at the 2005 Review Conference its fourth report on its implementation of the Treaty.

29. Canada has been active in promoting measures to reinforce the authority and integrity of the Treaty and ensure the implementation of its obligations. At the 2005 Review Conference, Canada presented a working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39) with recommendations for a revamped NPT process, making suggestions on meeting frequency and structure (including possibility for emergency meetings), reporting, the participation of civil society, and the creation of a standing bureau. Canada's opening statement in the First Committee at the sixty-first session of the General Assembly underlined continuing support for these proposals, noting that "Canada has in the past set out several suggestions for a revamped NPT process that would entail at least annual meetings of an authoritative gathering of States Parties, and a standing bureau to provide stewardship and continuity".

#### **Article IX**

30. Canada has consistently worked for the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored the resolution "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which reaffirms the importance of the universality of the NPT and calls upon States not party to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions. Canada views its position in this regard as conforming with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which calls on all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

#### **Article X**

31. Canada has continued to coordinate a core group of countries at the IAEA General Conference responsible for a resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As in past years, in September 2005 and 2006 the Canadian lead core group facilitated the adoption by consensus of a resolution which sought to promote the resumption of that country's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

32. Canada welcomed the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted without a vote in 1995. Negative security assurances provided in 1995 by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) furnished part of the basis for this indefinite extension, as paragraph 8 of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

#### **Article XI**

N/A