MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

ENGLISH ONLY

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CONSIDERATIONS, LESSONS, PERSPECTIVES, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS DRAWN FROM THE PRESENTATIONS, STATEMENTS, WORKING PAPERS AND INTERVENTIONS ON THE TOPICS UNDER DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING

(As of 15:30 on 23 August)

Implementing the Articles of the Convention

| State | Proposal Text | Source |
|-----------------------|--|------------|
| | | (e.g. WP.1 |
| | | or |
| | | Statement |
| | | 22/08 AM) |
| Cuba (on behalf | Review national regulations of States Parties governing | Statement |
| of the NAM and | international exchanges and transfers in order to ensure their | 20/08/07 |
| Other States) | consistency with the objectives and provisions of Article X | AM |
| China | [Create] national implementation mechanisms[s] with [a] | Statement |
| | clear division of responsibility and effective coordination. | 20/08/07 |
| | | AM |
| China | [Ensure the existence of] Effective measures [for] national | Statement |
| | implementation legislation, law enforcement, | 21/08/07 |
| | institutionalization and international cooperation. | AM |
| China | Establish an implementation legal system in accordance with | Statement |
| | the Convention and respective constitutional process and in | 21/08/07 |
| | light of national situations. | AM |
| China | Reviews, assessment and updates should be carried out in a | Statement |
| | timely manner. | 21/08/07 |
| | | AM |

| China | A series of effective administrational measures should be | Statement |
|--------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| | adopted to ensure the strict law enforcement and punish violations accordingly. | 21/08/07 AM |
| Netherlands | An overview of BWC ways of implementation in BWC States would be useful | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| Netherlands | Stress the need for coordination of inspection and enforcement of existing legislation and guidelines | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| Switzerland | A review process of the national laws crucial to ensure that national framework[s] on the control of biological substances is in tune with the international developments | Statement 21/08/07 PM |
| Switzerland | Implementation [is] not only about enacting laws, enforcing legislation and putting in place oversight mechanisms. In addition, raising awareness of the Convention's provisions among the relevant stakeholders – be they from academia, defense or otherwise is crucial | Statement 21/08/07 PM |
| Germany | National implementation of the BTWC does not only mean to transform legally binding BTWC obligations into legislative and administrative measures. It also includes the full implementation of measures agreed at BTWC Review Conferences | WP.4 |
| Republic of Korea | [National implementation measures] can be categorized into three mechanisms: Prohibition, Management and Implementation. | WP.6 |
| United States | The goal of early disruption and prevention of bioterrorist acts is greatly advanced by criminalizing the conduct that leads up to the deployment of a biological agent through criminal offenses such as attempts and conspiracies. | WP.11 |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | Laws and regulations [should be] subject to periodic update, taking into account the progressive nature of the developments in the field of science and technology and according to the country's needs. | WP.18 |
| Japan | National measures need to ensure appropriate legislative, penal, administrative, security and policy measures | Statement 22/08/07AM |
| India | States Parties should fully implement their obligations under the Convention and adopt national measures, including the enforcement of legislative and administrative measures, to ensure their compliance with all the provisions of the Convention. | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Netherlands and United Kingdom | All BTWC States Parties need to assess regularly the adequacy and effectiveness of their existing national measures to enforce the Convention and adopt and enforce any additional measures that may be required. | WP.3 |
| Australia | Bring science closer to the law enforcement agencies. | WP.12 |
| Australia | Improve the level of technical expertise available to law enforcement agencies. | WP.12 |

| A 4 1. | | WD 10 |
|-------------|---|-----------|
| Australia | National implementation [could] cover enactment of penal | WP.13 |
| | legislation, ensuring the safety and security of biological | |
| | materials, strengthening disease surveillance capacities, and | |
| | promoting training and awareness-raising. | |
| Libyan Arab | Apply the Convention totally and transparently, with the only | Statement |
| Jamahiriya | exception that no constraints must be placed on countries | 20/08/07 |
| | using such technology for peaceful purposes | AM |
| Russian | Full implementation of measures agreed at past review | Statement |
| Federation | conferences includes timely and regular submissions of | 20/08/07 |
| | CBMs | AM |
| Australia | Provision of biosafety and biosecurity training to other States | WP. 13 |
| | Parties helps fulfil Article X obligations. | |
| Australia | Preference for Checklist and drafting elements rather than | Statement |
| | 'model legislation'. | 23/08/07 |
| | | AM |
| Turkey | Comprehensive provisions for penalizing acts of producing, | Statement |
| | importing or exporting, transporting from one place to | 21/08/07 |
| | another, keeping, selling, buying or processing nuclear, | AM |
| | radiological, biological and chemical weapons (WMD) | |
| | should be enforced. Accordingly, national laws should ensure | |
| | that violation of such provisions would constitute a | |
| | punishable criminal office. Effective export controls and | |
| | enhanced security in customs and ports are complementary to | |
| | the implementation of the BTWC. | |
| Brazil | Establish a legal framework aimed at appropriately | WP.21 |
| | addressing all aspects of the Convention and adopt practical | |
| | implementation of such legal dispositions. | |

Scope of national implementation measures

| State | Proposal Text | Source (e.g. WP.1 or Statement 22/08 AM) |
|-------------|---|--|
| China | Cover the whole range of prohibition articles of the | Statement |
| | Convention, export control, biosafety and biosecurity, public | 20/08/07 |
| | health, [and] infectious disease surveillance | AM |
| Republic of | Enactment and effective enforcement of appropriate legislative | Statement |
| Korea | measures to prohibit and prevent the development, | 20/07/08 |
| | production, acquisition, transfer, retention, stockpiling and use | AM |
| | of biological and toxin weapons[, including] penal | |
| | legislation[, as well as] tightened national export control and | |
| | regulations of biosafety and biosecurity are essential elements | |
| | for enhancing national implementation mechanisms | |
| Pakistan | [National implementation measures can include] a stringent | Statement |
| | biosafety and biosecurity regime. | 20/08/07 |
| | | AM |

| Saudi Arabia China | [Establish a] regulatory framework [to] respond to all the concerns and issues referred to in the text of the Convention, such as legal, regulatory and administrative measures, prohibition and control procedures, the promulgation of legislation conducive to their implementation, and the question of security, surveillance, supervision and related issues. Stipulate in detail the classification and management of | Statement 20/07/08 AM Statement |
|-----------------------|--|--|
| | pathogens and microorganisms, the storage and transport procedures [for] bacteria, virus[es] and [associated] specimens, examination and grant procedures regarding the qualifications of laboratories and their activities, the supervision of liabilities, etc. | 21/08/07 AM |
| China | Establish detailed procedures on the registration, production, research and supervisions of the veterinary drugs and veterinary biological products, as well as punishment provisions. | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| China | Establish [an] infectious disease surveillance system and improves the system of reporting, notifying and publishing regime for infectious diseases | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| New Zealand | Biosecurity requires awareness, vigilance, incursion response, and sound and effective management procedures. To be effective, however, these measures need to be backed by legislation, transparency and commitment. | Statement 21/08/07 PM |
| United Kingdom | Clear guidance for industry and academia on the implementation of national export licensing regulations and procedures, especially on intangible technology is a vital principle for all States. | Statement 21/08/07 PM |
| Germany | Basic common principles are, <i>inter alia</i>,: licensing requirement for handling dangerous biological materials, complying with specific requirements for gaining a license, i.e. professional knowledge and personal reliability, classification of organisms and experiments according to risk assessment, availability of safe and secure infrastructure according to risk classification, transfer of biological materials only between licensees, regulations for safe rail, road, air and waterway/sea transport, control of licensees, experiments and facilities by respective medical, veterinary, phytohygiene and plant/facility safety agencies of the Federal States. | WP.4 |
| Germany | Legally binding implementing measures including penalties for violation of the prohibitions | WP.5 |
| Germany | Extraterritorial application of penal legislation contributes to | WP.5 |

| | international peace and security by preventing gaps in the enforcement of the prohibitions related to biological weapons. This is essential at least as long as the prohibitions related to biological weapons are not yet implemented on a global scale in an equally restrictive manner. | |
|---------------|---|-----------------------------|
| Japan | [Elements for national implementation measures include:] penal legislation overseas application duties and powers of responsible authorities | WP.7 |
| Switzerland | The implementation of appropriate biosafety measures through legislation regulating biological research, diagnostics and production facilities is a relevant obligation to the Convention. | WP.9 |
| United States | Deterrence of acts involving the illicit possession or use of biological agents (or toxins) is accomplished through clear legal prohibitions and resulting penalties commensurate with the dangerousness of the offense. | WP.11 |
| Poland | Implementation and enforcement of regulations [might cover:] Regulat[ing] possession, transfer and multiplication of listed (human, animal plant) pathogens or their toxins Listing scientists, laboratories and industrial facilities to perform research or practical use of those pathogens Obligations to report laboratory or industrial incidents involving release of those pathogens including obtaining, processing and transport of biological material from such cases | Statement 22/08/07 AM |
| Poland | Problems which remain to be regulated [include the] control and penalization of spread of know-how and propaganda related to production of biological weapons, including ban on certain web pages | Statement 22/08/07 AM |
| New Zealand | Effective biosecurity regime is essential | WP.15 |
| New Zealand | A comprehensive national biosecurity strategy [includes:] Government and public commitment to biosecurity; Capacity and capability to identify, prevent and manage biosecurity risks and threats; A cooperative and consultative approach to identify biosecurity risks; Government and stakeholder partnerships to ensure adequate funding for biosecurity activities (these include central, regional and local government, importers/exporters, industry, community groups, tertiary and science institutions, pest management companies); Clear accountabilities for biosecurity; A legislative framework that meets biosecurity needs; Ensuring that exotic biosecurity risks are managed off | WP.15 |

| | Consistent assessment of biosecurity risks across and within organisations with responsibilities for biosecurity; Consistent application of cost-effective risk-mitigating measures for identified risks; Communication programmes that increase the public's awareness, understanding and ownership of biosecurity; Biosecurity research; Ensuring that relevant international biosecurity obligations are met. | WD 10 |
|---|---|-----------------------------|
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | Appropriate guidelines for monitoring and conducting research activities on new substances and/or newly emerged viruses. | WP.18 |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) Pakistan | Legislative and executive organizations [could] consider the following principles in their work: Strengthening preparedness level as well as safety and security measures in dealing with toxic or dangerous substances (through issuing directives for safety of physical facilities where biological experiments are conducted, establishing national standards, issuing directives for monitoring and surveillance of biological experiments as well as determining administrative and executive roles and responsibilities for conducting such experiments), Taking maximum advantage of the active networks and existing potentials in the country (through expansion of training networks), Utilizing global scientific resources such as those offered by the UN Agencies, Close monitoring of any cases of violation of the Convention in different parts of the region and in any other part of the world as well as analysis of their human and environmental effects, Active participation in submitting the confidence building measures report, Scientific cooperation both in theoretical as well as practical aspects for upgrading relevant International health regulations, Holding training courses and specialized gatherings in order to establish scientific and ethical codes for scientists and experts. | Statement |
| rakistan | Salient features of biosafety rules [include:] Risk assessment and risk management Certification of high level containment laboratories Production of living modified organism can only commence with consent of National Biosafety | Statement 22/08/07 AM |

| | Committee | |
|---|--|-----------------------------|
| | • The Biosafety Guidelines conform to the international guidelines of UNIDO, FAO, WHO and UNEP | |
| Netherlands and United Kingdom | Penal provisions are required for example, for breaches of biosafety, biosecurity and transfer control requirements and preparatory and assistance activities that would violate the BTWC's Article 1 | WP.3 |
| Slovakia | [National implementation measures could address:] the rights and duties of individuals, natural-person entrepreneurs, and legal entities as regards the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, keeping and use of biological weapons and their destruction, when handling them and detecting highly hazardous biological agents and toxins that might be used in a manner infringing the prohibition of biological weapon; the conditions for handling highly hazardous biological agents; the role the State Administration in the field of compliance with the prohibition of biological weapons; criminal sanctions | WP.14 |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | Respect relevant World Health Organization guidelines and recommendations for organizing individuals and institutions directly or indirectly involved in any laboratory activities on biological agents and toxins | WP.18 |
| Cuba | Apply specific legislation in the areas of biosafety and bioprotection | Statement 22/08/07 AM |
| Cuba | Activities which involve biological risk [should be] subject to regulatory procedures which ensure safety in these activities, evaluating the risks that these activities may pose to human health and the environment | Statement 22/08/07 AM |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | Establish a control and inspection machinery for food products and ensure this is properly used [and] promulgate legislation on the control and inspection of food products | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Portugal (on behalf of the European Union) | While the implementation of the obligations contained in the Convention is first and foremost an obligation of States Parties, we consider that regional and sub-regional cooperation approaches complement and reinforce national measures | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Portugal (on behalf of the European Union) | Revitalize the interest in and the use of CBMs and increase the transparency in the implementation of the BTWC | WP.1 |
| Portugal (on behalf of the | The UN Secretary General's mechanism [is] a useful instrument in case of alleged use of biological weapons | Statement 20/08/07 |

| | | 436 |
|-----------------------|--|--------------------|
| European | [should] contribute actively to keeping the network of experts | AM |
| Union) | and laboratories up-to-date and on stand-by. | ~ |
| Russian Federation | Full implementation of measures agreed at past review conferences includes timely and regular submissions of CBMs | Statement 20/08/07 |
| | | AM |
| Russian | For the sake of enhancing the effectiveness of national export | Statement |
| Federation | controls give regular briefings to national exporters, in order to | 21/08/07 |
| | raise awarness and update them on new developments, and | PM |
| | engage them in consultations, conferences and seminars to | |
| | create an atmosphere of cooperation and partnership. | |
| Sudan | [National implementation measures can include:] | Statement |
| | • A well structured programme for capacity building | 20/08/07 |
| | through taking all the necessary national measures to | AM |
| | implement the Convention at the national level | |
| | • The establishment of a focal point | |
| | • The drawing up of national legislation, as well as | |
| | • Providing support to strengthen national scientific | |
| | institutions and national enforcement agencies | |
| OPCW | Primary Legislation [can] typically cover: | Statement |
| | Definitions | 23/08/07 |
| | Composition, mandate and powers of National | AM |
| | Authority | |
| | Prohibitions | |
| | • Penalties for violations | |
| | • Extraterritorial application to nationals | |
| | Requirement to submit data | |
| | Requirement to protect confidential information | |
| OPCW | Subsidiary regulations [can] typically cover: | Statement |
| | Licensing of production facilities | 23/08/07 |
| | • Import/Export controls | AM |
| | Procedures for submitting data | |
| Sweden | Areas of significance for successful implementation [include:] | Statement |
| | Legislation and guidelines for handling dangerous | 23/08/07 |
| | pathogens, including genetically modified organisms | AM |
| | • Lists of pathogens and toxins that are subject to | |
| | specific guidelines and legislation and | |
| | • The importance of stringent biosafety and biosecurity | |
| | regimes. | |
| Sweden | It is important to include dual-use and potential for misuse of | Statement |
| | research in the concept of biosecurity [as] this issue is not | 23/08/07 |
| | fully covered in guidelines, regulations and oversight of work | AM |
| | with pathogens and toxins including genetically modified | |
| | agents | |
| Sweden | It is important to bear in mind that it might be impossible to | Statement |
| | cover every possible situation by guidelines and registration | 23/08/07 |
| | it is important to stress that an element of self-governance is | AM |
| | important for implementation. | |
| | · - • | • |

| Brazil (on behalf of some Latin American states) | Create national lists and establish appropriate controls for sensitive assets in the biological area. | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
|--|---|-----------------------------|
| Brazil | Establish a national List of Sensitive Goods and Directly Linked Services in the Biological Area meant to define which microorganisms, toxins and equipments may have dual use and therefore must be monitored in the export, import and internal market areas. | WP.21 |

Managing National Implementation

| State | Proposal Text | Source (e.g. WP.1 or Statement 22/08 AM) |
|-------------|---|---|
| China | [Enhance] the publicity of relevant laws and regulations through various kinds of seminars and training courses, with a view to raising the awareness and self discipline of relevant enterprises, research and education[al] institutions and personnel. | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Republic of | Enhance and consolidate the mechanisms for the | Statement |
| Korea | management of the relevant laws | 20/08/07 AM |
| Pakistan | Faculties and students of leading universities and research institutions[can be] sensitised to their responsibilities for biosafety and biosecurity | |
| China | Stipulate the functions and responsibilities of relevant competent authorities responding to public health emergencies, and the classification, surveillance, reporting, emergency response, and damage control of such emergencies | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| China | Standardise the procedures for disease emergency response, stip[ulating] the responsibilities of the competent authorities, enterprises and individuals, and improve the emergency response mechanism. | |
| China | Publicity of relevant laws and regulations [can be] enhanced through organising regular training courses and lectures and distributing pamphlets, with a view to helping the enterprises rigorously implement relevant laws and regulations and run their business accordingly. | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| China | A national implementation mechanism with clear division of responsibility and effective coordination should be enhanced. | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| China | Publicity of relevant policies and laws should be enhanced with a view to raising the awareness and self-discipline of relevant enterprises, research and education institutions and personnel | Statement 21/08/07 AM |

| Philippines | A wholistic approach is needed to engage and involve | Statement |
|-------------------------------|--|----------------------|
| PP | government, civil society and the private sector. | 21/08/07 AM |
| Netherlands | An overall bio-preparedness approach is recommended. | Statement |
| | This includes awareness raising, for example on existing | 21/08/07 AM |
| | bio-security and biosafety legislation. | |
| Switzerland | Extension of education and training capacities and | Statement |
| | capabilities | 21/08/07 PM |
| New Zealand | [It is important to] Maintain of an effective inter-agency | Statement |
| | response process to deal with emergency situations, | 21/08/07 PM |
| | including those relevant to the work of [the] Convention. | |
| United Kingdom | Clear guidance for industry and academia on the | Statement |
| | implementation of national export licensing regulations and | 21/08/07 PM |
| | procedures, especially on intangible technology is a vital | |
| Destasel | principle for all States. | WP.1 |
| Portugal (on behalf of the | There are difficulties, in some cases, in creating domestic | WP.1 |
| European | BWC awareness given the need to mobilise diverse government agencies, parliaments, and other stakeholders to | |
| Union) | initiate ratification or accession or to introduce and | |
| Union) | implement legislation. Raising public awareness and | |
| | gaining support is also a major challenge. | |
| United Kingdom | Provide examples of best practice, including an illustration | WP.2 |
| enneu Innguom | of how companies might approach compliance procedures | |
| | to deal with [legislation] | |
| Netherlands & | Develop and institute BWC implementation plans | WP.3 |
| United Kingdom | | |
| Netherlands & | Need to raise awareness about BTWC compliance with a | WP.3 |
| United Kingdom | wider range of national stakeholders than are targeted by | |
| | standard diplomatic and other assistance activities, and the | |
| | benefits of conducting assistance activities at the sub | |
| | regional and national levels | |
| Netherlands & | States are frequently unaware that legislation already in | WP.3 |
| United Kingdom | force is relevant to implementing the Convention, | |
| D 11 / | particularly biosafety legislation. | G |
| Pakistan | Diversity of expertise present at the meeting of Experts is | Statement |
| Slovakia | valuable [for enhancing domestic cooperation] [to] identify an institution that would lead the process of | 20/08/07 AM WP.14 |
| SIUVAKIA | national implementation in a way that would result in | VV F.14 |
| | adopting meaningful legislation responding properly to the | |
| | requirements of the afore-said obligations and challenges. | |
| Slovakia | The functions of the National Authority are to: | WP.14 |
| NAU T WALL | collect, evaluate and process information and | **** |
| | requirements concerning domestic | |
| | implementation of the Biological Weapons | |
| | Convention; | |
| | • exercise, within the existing legislative | |
| | framework, supervision over substances and | |
| | activities that have a potential to be used for | |
| | development, production and use as biological | |

| | |] |
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| | weapons; identify fields requiring amendments in the existing legislation in conformity with the commitment to strengthen the BWC through domestic measures; cooperate with the Ministries of Finance, Economy, Defense, Agriculture, Justice, Education, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Environment; coordinate the preparation of relevant legislative proposals related to the prohibition of biological weapons; submit the relevant proposals to the Government for decision; process, within the Ministry of Health, the data for the annual CBMs reports and pass them on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; participate in the expert and annual sessions of the States Parties to the BWC and other relevant events related to the prohibition of biological weapons. | |
| Cuba | weapons. Strengthen the monitoring mechanisms of biological agents which are covered by the Convention as well as the equipment and technology that these involve[, including by:] The classification of biological agents into risk groups; A National Authority for biosafety and the Biological Weapons Convention; An inspection system to verify compliance with existing legislation; A system of licensing for all activities which involve the use of biological agents as well as for the construction and operation of facilities which entail a biological risk; Safe microbiological practices for the handling of biological agents, as well as animal and plant agents for experimentation purposes, whether these be natural, exotic or genetically modified organisms; Responsibilities have been established for the owners of facilities and the heads of laboratories which deal with biosafety and bioprotection; and A National System for Accounting and Monitoring of Biological Materials as well as the equipment and technology applied for these materials. | Statement 22/08/07 AM |
| Cuba | Stimulate the development of human resources which are working in the area of science in general and activities | Statement 22/08/07 AM |

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|-------------------|---|---------------|
| | related to the regulation and control of the monitoring of | |
| | science on the basis of the aim of enhancing the | |
| | technological level as well as the professional level and the | |
| | moral and ethical behaviour which is shown in actual daily | |
| | practice | |
| Italy | Compliance with the BTWC – ways and means to enhance | Statement |
| 5 | national implementation – strengthening of national | 21/08/07 |
| | institutions | 21/00/07 |
| Switzerland | Optimise national data collection processes to ensure | WP.10 |
| Switzerland | quality, comprehensiveness and punctuality of CBM | WI.10 |
| | submissions. | |
| ΟΡΟΨ | | Ctotom ont |
| OPCW | The National Authority and inter-ministerial coordination | Statement |
| | [can involve:] | 23/08/07 AM |
| | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
| | Ministry of Defence | |
| | • Ministry of Economy and/or Industry or Commerce | |
| | Ministry of Health | |
| | Ministry of Environment | |
| | Ministry of Agriculture | |
| | | |
| | • | |
| | Ministry of Justice or Attorney-General | |
| | Ministry of Finance and Central Bank | |
| | • Customs | |
| Sweden | Need to raise the awareness on [obligations under the | Statement |
| | Convention and dual-use research] among researchers. | 23/08/07 AM |
| Sweden | Need to raise the awareness not only among all currently | Statement |
| | involved scientific research like academia, institutes, | 23/08/07 AM |
| | industry, funding agencies and scientific journals. It is | |
| | equally important to include course on the obligations under | |
| | the BWC and dual-use research in the curriculum of higher | |
| | education. | |
| Sweden | Great value if member states shared their experiences and | Statement |
| | ideas of how to raise awareness of the convention and dual- | 23/08/07 AM |
| | use research. Like most topics relevant for the | 20,00,07 1101 |
| | implementation of the convention this is also an area where | |
| | regional and international cooperation would be highly | |
| | beneficial. | |
| Ukraine | | |
| | Set up national committees on bioethics. | Statamart |
| Brazil (on behalf | Support the ISU in the implementation of the Convention | Statement |
| of some Latin | and of measures related to it, by promoting office- | 20/08/07 AM |
| American states) | coordination and seminars on regional relevant aspects. | |
| Brazil (on behalf | Engage in multidimensional efforts, including with the | Statement |
| of some Latin | | |
| | participation of industry and academic sectors, as well as | 20/08/07 AM |
| American states) | the scientific community, civil society and non- | 20/08/07 AM |
| American states) | | 20/08/07 AM |
| American states) | the scientific community, civil society and non- | 20/08/07 AM |

| Brazil | Focal Point, national programs to promote the integration of government, industries and research institutions in the sensitive assets area. The program should aim at raising awareness about all international instruments regarding non-proliferation and disarmament, and reaching out to all actors involved with any aspect of dual-use assets. Provide legitimate non-state actors with information about the Government's controls for transfers of sensitive technologies and dual use materials and widen the State's cooperation and information exchange with such actors for anticipated detection and prevention of eventual prohibited transfers. Such goals could be achieved through a program devised to increase society's participation in controlling | WP.21 |
|--------|--|-------|
| Brazil | dual-use items and preventing biological accidents and prohibited activities. Urgently comply with Resolution 1540 of the United Nations Security Council, article 8 D, which "calls upon all | WP.21 |
| | States to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations [under such laws]". | |

Enforcing National Implementation Measures

| State | Proposal Text | Source (e.g. WP.1 or Statement 22/08 AM) |
|---------------|--|---|
| Pakistan | [Sharing] national experience in law enforcement to address the threats of bioterrorism would be particularly useful[, including] policies, practices and enforcement measures in this area | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| China | Adopt best practices for law enforcement and educating and training law enforcement personnel. | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| China | Law enforcement capacity improved. | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| United States | Successful bioterrorism investigations generally require two fundamental elements. First, because a bioterrorism event can affect national security, these investigations should be grounded in a national strategy. Second, from a law enforcement perspective, to prevent a deliberate or accidental release of a biological agent (or toxin), investigators may need to invoke legal process to apprehend would-be perpetrators. | WP.11 |

| United States United States United States | The national investigative strategy should answer three basic questions: (1) What are the procedures for threat assessment and domestic coordination? (2) What are the protocols for joint investigations and role responsibilities among various public health and law enforcement agencies? and (3) Is there a comprehensive set of laws that correspond to the strategy so that the likely scenarios involving the illicit use or possession of biological agents or toxins can be fully addressed by law enforcement and public health authorities? Establishing clear lines of communication among public health and law enforcement authorities before an outbreak or attack is crucial for successful joint investigations. Key aspects of effective investigations [include:] | WP.11 WP.11 Statement |
|---|---|-----------------------------|
| | Threat assessment and domestic coordinationJoint investigations and role clarity | 22/08/07 AM |
| Japan | Multi-sectoral approach is essential in preparing national plans for counter-terrorism | Statement 22/08/07AM |
| Japan | National measures need to be enforced so as to Designate and establish appropriate national authorities Establish a network among national institutions Coordinate with regional / international organizations Improve the capacity on counter-terrorism | Statement 22/08/07AM |
| Pakistan | Diversity of expertise present at the meeting of Experts is valuable [for enhancing domestic cooperation] | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| United Kingdom | It is no use having perfectly crafted legislation if it is not effectively enforced. Attention must therefore be paid to the practicalities of effective and sustained enforcement. | WP.2 |
| Cuba | Develop an Inspection System which makes it possible to verify compliance with the legislation in force | Statement 22/08/07 AM |
| Australia | Investigation by law enforcement agencies of counter- proliferation and bioterrorism issues can be very technical in nature. Scientific and technical support to the investigators is essential. | WP.12 |
| Australia | Agencies with specialised CBR technical expertise can greatly assist the prevention of CBR events | WP.12 |
| United States | Effective threat assessment must recognize that the deliberate or accidental release of a biological agent can manifest itself in one of two ways. First, an "overt release" describes a situation where the circumstances of the release plainly demonstrate a criminal intent (e.g., by the nature of the delivery system or the perpetrator announces the attack). Second, a "covert release" involves an unrecognized or unannounced release whereby the appearance of illness may be the first sign of a possible attack. | WP.11 |

| United States | In accessing the overall effectiveness of an enforcement | WP.11 |
|---------------|--|-------------|
| United States | In assessing the overall effectiveness of an enforcement | WP.11 |
| | strategy, it is useful to measure that strategy against the | |
| | likely scenarios law enforcement and public health | |
| | authorities may encounter concerning the release of | |
| | biological agents. Viewed collectively, the threats posed by | |
| | the illicit use or transfer of biological agents or toxins may | |
| | manifest themselves in one of five different scenarios. | |
| | Listed in order of decreasing frequency of occurrence (and | |
| | increasing severity of risk to public health), these scenarios | |
| | include (1) "hoaxes" or false reports of biological agents | |
| | being released; (2) illicit transfers involving certain | |
| | particularly dangerous pathogens; (3) possession of an | |
| | unreasonable quantity or type of a biological agent; (4) | |
| | possession of a biological agent (or toxin) with the intent to | |
| | use it as a weapon; and (5) the actual use or deployment of a | |
| | biological agent or toxin as a weapon of mass destruction. | |
| Interpol | Treat/Risks [assessments should:] | Statement |
| | Assess the intention | 23/08/07 AM |
| | • Assess the capability | |
| | Assess the vulnerabilities | |
| | Assess the consequences | |
| Interpol | Key considerations in quarantine decisions: [there are] 3 | Statement |
| _ | major questions examined within the specific context of a | 23/08/07 AM |
| | particular outbreak: | |
| | • Do public health and medical analyses warrant the | |
| | imposition of large scale quarantine? | |
| | • Are the implementation and maintenance of large- | |
| | scale quarantine feasible? | |
| | • Do the potential benefits of large-scale quarantine | |
| | outweigh the possible adverse consequences? | |

International and regional cooperation and assistance

| State | Proposal Text | Source (e.g. WP.1 or Statement 22/08 AM) |
|---|--|--|
| Cuba (on behalf of the NAM and Other States) | Adopt positive measures to promote technology transfer and international cooperation, in particular to the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Cuba (on behalf of the NAM and Other States) | Provide, upon request, where in a position to do so, assistance to other States Parties in enacting and enhancing national legislation to implement the Convention | Statement 20/08/07 AM |

| Cuba (on | Facilitate cooperation, where in a position to do so, in | Statement |
|---------------|--|------------|
| behalf of the | particular capacity building, as well as technology transfer in | 20/08/07 |
| NAM and | the area of custom control to facilitate the implementation of | AM |
| Other States) | relevant provisions of the Convention | |
| China | On the basis of equality, cooperation and mutual respect, | Statement |
| | provide assistance to those countries in need through | 20/08/07 |
| | technological exchange, financial support and regional | AM |
| | workshop[s], to help implementation capacity. | |
| Pakistan | More effective realization of the objectives in Article X of the | Statement |
| | Convention | 20/08/07 |
| | | AM |
| China | States Parties should actively support and take part in | Statement |
| | international and regional cooperation on implementing the | 21/08/07 |
| | Convention | AM |
| China | On the basis of equality, cooperation and mutual respect, | Statement |
| | States Parties should exchange successful experience and | 21/08/07 |
| | practice and provide assistance to those countries in need | AM |
| | through technological exchanges, financial support and | |
| | regional workshop, to help improve implementation capacity. | |
| Portugal (on | [It is important] to cooperate with countries to review | WP.1 |
| behalf of the | legislation and draft legislative or administrative measures | |
| European | related to the BWC. | |
| Union) | | |
| Netherlands & | Conduct assistance activities at the sub-regional and national | WP.3 |
| United | level among States that share language, legal and cultural | |
| Kingdom | traditions, have similar biotechnology industries and have a | |
| | history of co-operation | |
| Ukraine | International cooperation through international agreements, | WP.16 |
| | information exchange, further development and strengthening | |
| | of international cooperation in the area of biological and | |
| | genetic safety. | |
| Portugal (on | Representatives of several States expressed the need for | Statement |
| behalf of the | support in convincing their national key stakeholders of the | 22/08/07AM |
| European | importance of the BTWC. Creating interest in the Convention | |
| Union) | may be achievable when linked with assistance in improving | |
| | public health, e.g. the development of local diagnostic and | |
| | treatment capacities to deal with natural as well as unusual | |
| | outbreaks of disease, or with technical assistance in capacity | |
| | building for customs and immigration. | |
| | | 1 |

| Germany | Outreach projects [can include:] | Statement |
|---------|--|----------------------|
| | Exchange seminars | 22/08/07 |
| | • Study visits | AM |
| | • Legal review | |
| | Institutional capacity building | |
| | Industry outreach | |
| | Reference guidebook | |
| | • Internet information centre | |
| | • Feasibility study on electronic processing | |
| | Export control conference | |
| Japan | An effective approach to enhance regional cooperation | Statement |
| - | [includes measures to:] | 22/08/07AM |
| | • Ensure active participation from relevant countries | |
| | • Demonstrate the significance of participating in | |
| | regional cooperation | |
| | Take into account regional characteristics | |
| Japan | Informal cross-border network among experts, etc. can be | Statement |
| | useful | 22/08/07AM |
| Japan | Importance of capacity building for persons working in | Statement |
| | national authorities and in the health sector | 22/08/07AM |
| Japan | Regional and international cooperation are essential | Statement 22/08/07AM |
| India | International research and development collaboration | Statement |
| | objectives [could] foster international linkages in | 22/08/07AM |
| | biotechnology to: | |
| | • Assist in implementation of national programmes | |
| | through transfer of knowledge | |
| | • Open avenues for interaction in areas leading to | |
| | acquisition of knowledge not available within the | |
| | country | |
| | • Building bridges to promote and strengthen bilateral | |
| | ties though participation in joint research and | |
| | development programmes | |
| | • Capacity building in high-technology areas through | |
| | training and exchange programmes | |
| | • Share expertise in science and technology and large | |
| | scale facilities with developed and developing nations | |

| India | Regional and bilateral cooperation [could include:] | Statement |
|-------------|---|------------|
| | Joint research and development projects | 22/08/07AM |
| | • Exchange of scientists | |
| | • Training / fellowship of scientists | |
| | • Exploratory visits | |
| | Consultative visits | |
| | Joint workshops / seminars | |
| | International / global meetings | |
| | Exchange of information | |
| | Electronic informatic networks | |
| | Exhibitions | |
| | Biotech products and trade related activities | |
| Republic of | Need closer cooperation, not only in the global level but also | Statement |
| Korea | at the regional level | 20/08/07 |
| NUICa | | AM |
| Pakistan | ISU should collate information of expertise available with | Statement |
| 1 411134411 | States Parties. | 20/08/07 |
| | | AM |
| Japan | Due to cross-bordering nature of bio-terrorism. It is critical to | WP.8 |
| | ensure effectively prohibition and prevention against | |
| | biological weapons among neighbouring countries. | |
| Australia | Assist partner countries in the region to understand the threat, | WP.13 |
| | enhance the security of their high-risk biological materials, | |
| | and develop and implement enforcement legislation. | |
| Australia | Promote cooperation and coordination between traditional | WP.13 |
| | security (policy and operational) agencies and new players | |
| | such as health and agricultural agencies which, traditionally, | |
| | have had little counter-proliferation or counter-terrorism | |
| | involvement. These agencies have technical and | |
| | administrative expertise and practises to mitigate the effects of | |
| | natural diseases which can be adapted to protecting against | |
| A | deliberately propagated disease. | WD 12 |
| Australia | Further cooperation, particularly in respect of [the] region, to | WP.13 |
| | share information to counter the threat of bioterrorism and | |
| | build capacity to: (i) assess the risks posed by individual biological | |
| | (i) assess the risks posed by individual biological agents | |
| | (ii) develop and enhance laboratory biosafety and | |
| | biosecurity programs | |
| | (iii) develop and implement supporting legislation | |
| | (iv) detect, diagnose, contain and effectively report | |
| | disease epidemics; and | |
| | (v) ensure effective inter-agency and international | |
| | communication and cooperation. | |
| New Zealand | [There is] a need for tailor-made interventions in individual | Statement |
| | countries $-$ e.g legislative drafters doing separate country | 22/08/07 |
| | visits. | PM |

| Australia | Assistance to implement Article IV, including development penal legislation, ensuring the safety and security of biological materials, strengthening disease surveillance capacities, and promoting training and awareness-raising raises barriers to bioterrorism. | WP.13 |
|-----------|--|-----------------------------|
| Sweden | Great value if member states shared their experiences and ideas of how to raise awareness of the convention and dual- use research. Like most topics relevant for the implementation of the convention this is also an area where regional and international cooperation would be highly beneficial. | Statement 23/08/07 AM |
| Australia | Objectives of BWC regional workshops [can include:] Enable participants from regional BWC States Parties to meet and become involved in an ongoing regional dialogue and cooperation [Ensure] all States Parties in [the] region obtain the security benefits derived from full and effective implementation of the BWC Help States Parties in [the] region become better engaged with the Geneva-based BWC work programme Reduce the possibility of the inadvertent assistance by States in [the] region to biological weapons programmes being developed elsewhere Reduce the possibility of bioterrorism in [the] region | Statement 23/08/07 AM |

| Australia | [Follow-up activities from regional workshops include:] Encouraging bilateral and regional sharing of information on national implementation measures and the provision of technical assistance focusing on the capacity building of States Parties Establishing regional partnerships on enhancement of biosecurity Strengthening national and international efforts and broadening existing mechanisms for surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and combating infectious diseases Exploring the possibilities of adopting a regional code of conduct for scientists Exploring the possibilities of taking regional code of conduct for scientists Exploring the possibilities of taking regional concerted action to promote awareness among scientists Internet network of workshop participants Holding further workshops Raise awareness of the relevant BWC issues Encouraging consideration of the most useful approaches in the region to address the requirements Developing guidelines and concrete steps by participants to assist the States Parties in the full and affective implementation of the Root approaches in the region of the Root approaches in the states Parties in the full and affective implementation of the Root approaches in the states Parties in the full and affective implementation of the Root approaches in the states Parties in the full and affective implementation of the Root approaches in the states Parties in the full and affective implementation of the Root approaches in the states Parties in the full and approaches in the states Parties in the full and affective implementation of the Root approaches in the states Parties in the full and affective implementation of the Root approaches in the states Parties in the full and approaches in the states Parties in the full and approaches in the states Parties in the full and approaches in the states Parties in the full and approaches in the states Parties in the full approaches in t | Statement 23/08/07 AM |
|-----------|---|-----------------------------|
| Australia | effective implementation of the BWC Key lessons [from regional activities include:] | Statement |
| | Benefits of co-hosting Benefits of regional perspectives Inclusion of other organisations [everyone] on a steep learning curve no one size fits all tailor made solutions | 23/08/07 AM |

| Australia | Regional engagement activities [include:] 'Traditional' regional seminars / workshops 'Specific issue' BWC regional workshops – tailored to specific requirements or particular requests, including: legal requirements, security of pathogens and toxins, and bioterrorism prevention National workshops – awareness raising of issues among government officials from a range of departments and agencies who will have responsibilities for one or more of the various obligations under the BWC National conferences – awareness raising among the broader biological sector, ranging from academic researchers, government scientists, research institutes, biotechnology industry. Regional security meetings – broader regional security meeting, including: law enforcement meetings, counter-terrorism meetings, customs / border control meetings Other regional engagement activities – including ministerial level consultations, regular high-level bilateral conaultations | Statement 23/08/07 AM |
|---------------|--|-----------------------------|
| United States | The relationship between Article IV on national implementation and Article X on cooperation is synergistic – encouraging international cooperation in assisting States Parties in national implementation of the Convention. | Statement 23/08/07 AM |
| United States | Interpol plays a very important role in helping its member states, through their distinct channels, to strengthen their law enforcement capabilities in the bioterrorism area. We view Interpol's activities as complementary to those being pursued by BWC States Parties. Their activities demonstrate the urgency of our efforts, and as States Parties we are in a position to help Interpol in developing an accurate database of national legislation that underpins multinational efforts to catch and prosecute entities engaging in the use of biology as a weapon. | Statement 23/08/07 AM |
| United States | Continued liaison between Parties, the OPCW and our newly established Implementation Support Unit – as well as Interpol and other organizations active in the area – will be key to our collective security grounded in comprehensive national legal mechanisms. | Statement 23/08/07 AM |

| United States United States | The importance of regional coordination and support can hardly be emphasized enough. Each region is confronted with its own particular threats ad challenges. As coordination is ongoing through trade and cultural channels, the same should be true regarding weapons of mass destruction. Those of us gathered here are most aware that biological dangers can stem from many sources, both natural and man-made, and do not respect national boundaries. We also invest considerable resources in the areas of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and response. We firmly believe that it is in the interest of all countries to work together to address the threat of established as well as newly-emerging diseases | Statement 23/08/07 AM Statement 23/08/07 AM |
|--|---|--|
| United States | diseases. Strengthening preparedness for naturally occurring diseases is the best defence we can raise against the potential misuse of biological agents and toxins as weapons; thus, by helping other States Parties strengthen their health systems, we assist then in preparing for response to the use of biological weapons and therefore contribute directly to the objectives of the BWC. | Statement 23/08/07 AM |
| United States | In addition to legislative assistance in this area [pathogen security], resources have been provided to a number of countries, many of which are States Parties to the Convention, to enhance the security of laboratories that handle especially dangerous pathogens. The assistance has been in the form of upgrading security at facilities, development of institutional security programmes, staff training and development, risk assessment and mitigation, and consolidation of dangerous pathogen collections. | Statement 23/08/07 AM |
| Brazil (on behalf of some Latin American states) | Adopt regional and sub regional measures in order to identify better means for scientific cooperation and technological transfer, particularly by creating networks between the scientific and academic communities involved in peaceful activities regarding sensitive biological assets. | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Brazil (on behalf of some Latin American states) | Cooperate in order to promote peaceful activities related to public health, agriculture and cattle industry and the peaceful application of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other areas related to the BWC | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Brazil (on behalf of some Latin American states) | Cooperate with contact points and other national authorities in order to exchange national experiences regarding penal measures concerning the prohibited activities described in the BWC. | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| Brazil (on behalf of some Latin American states) | Establish contact between the ISU and regional and sub regional organizations in order to develop activities which allow the identification of best practices in the implementation of the BWC. | Statement 20/08/07 AM |

| Brazil (on | Cooperate with international and governmental organizations, | Statement |
|----------------|---|-----------|
| behalf of some | as well as the donor's community, in order to contribute to the | 20/08/07 |
| Latin | creation of regional debates for the identification of benefits | AM |
| American | and challenges posed by the implementation of the BWC. | |
| states) | | |

Transfers and export controls

| State | Proposal Text | Source (e.g. WP.1 or Statement 22/08 AM) |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| Pakistan | Strengthen controls over export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of goods, technologies, material and equipment | Statement 20/08/07 AM |
| China | Stipulate in detail the classification and management of pathogens and microorganisms, the storage and transport procedures [for] bacteria, virus[es] and [associated] specimens, examination and grant procedures regarding the qualifications of laboratories and their activities, the supervision of liabilities, etc. | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| China | The Chinese Government imposes effective export controls on dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technology. The Chinese Government attaches great importance to the establishment of effective [national] export control mechanism[s] | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| Georgia | Very important is the adoption and enforcement of effective export control measures by requiring all states to criminalise proliferation | Statement 21/08/07 AM |
| United Kingdom | Clear guidance for industry and academia on the implementation of national export licensing regulations and procedures, especially on intangible technology is a vital principle for all States. | Statement 21/08/07 PM |
| United Kingdom | Maintain records of electronic transfers | Statement 21/08/07 PM |
| United Kingdom | Important to keep export control legislation and regulations up- to date in light of changing circumstances. | Statement 21/08/07 PM |
| United Kingdom | [There is a] need for clear guidance for industry and academia on the implementation of national export licensing regulations and procedures, especially on intangible technology. | WP.2 |
| United Kingdom | Attention must therefore be paid to the practicalities of effective and sustained enforcement. | WP.2 |
| Kingdom United Kingdom | Provide examples of best practice, including an illustration of how companies might approach compliance procedures to deal with [legislation] | WP.2 |

| Republic of | All imports are [to be] regulated | WP.6 |
|-------------|--|-----------------------------|
| Korea | | |
| Poland | Implementation and enforcement of regulations [might cover:] Regulat[ing] possession, transfer and multiplication of listed (human, animal plant) pathogens or their toxins Listing scientists, laboratories and industrial facilities to perform research or practical use of those pathogens Obligations to report laboratory or industrial incidents involving release of those pathogens including obtaining, processing and transport of biological material from such cases | Statement 22/08/07 AM |
| Russian | For the sake of enhancing the effectiveness of national export | Statement |
| Federation | controls give regular briefings to national exporters, in order to | 21/08/07 |
| | raise awarness and update them on new developments, and | PM |
| | engage them in consultations, conferences and seminars to | |
| | create an atmosphere of cooperation and partnership. | |