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CONTENTS

| | Page |
|---|------|
| Agenda item 9: | |
| General debate (<i>continued</i>) | |
| Speech by Mr. Muller (South Africa) | 1 |
| Speech by Mr. Khoman (Thailand) | 3 |
| Speech by Mr. Eban (Israel) | 6 |
| Speech by Mr. Kirchsclaeger (Austria) | 12 |

President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (*continued*)

1. Mr. MULLER (South Africa): Mr. President, I am glad to have the opportunity today of congratulating you on your election to the office of President of the General Assembly, one which my delegation is sure you will fill with great distinction.

2. I should like at the same time to pay a tribute to your predecessor, who guided our deliberations so successfully during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly and the special commemorative session.

3. When I addressed the General Assembly last year [*1857th meeting*], I referred in some detail to the progress made by the South African Government in implementing and promoting the ideal of self-determination for all the different nations which comprise the population of South Africa. Since then I have been encouraged by the display of interest in these developments in many quarters, including countries in Africa. I have, therefore, decided to expand on my remarks of a year ago.

4. Last year I outlined to this Assembly our programme in the political field. I stressed that for a number of years my Government had been developing the political institutions of the various nations in South Africa. As early as in 1951 and again in 1959, legislation was passed to provide for various types of Bantu authorities on the regional and territorial level. A number of such authorities was established, and provided valuable experience in the art of government. In the Transkei, self-government was conferred as far back as 1963. Since then the Transkei has held two general elections. During 1969 and 1970 eight additional territorial governments were established. I said, therefore, that each of the nations living in South Africa had acquired some form of self-government.

5. During the past year we continued on this road, seeking to accelerate the progress towards self-determination,

moving forward step by step in consultation with the nations concerned. Ministers and officials were constantly engaged in discussion with the Bantu, the Coloured and the Indian peoples.

6. Arising from these consultations, legislation was passed enabling the Government to proceed with the constitutional development of the various homelands in the light of prevailing circumstances.

7. Legislative assembly status was granted to the Tswana, Lebowa, Ciskei, Venda, Machangana and Basotho homelands. Some of these territories will shortly advance to the stage of full self-government. They will attain the same political status as the Transkei and will be that much closer to the eventual goal of full and sovereign independence.

8. The South African Prime Minister himself very recently held discussions with the members of the Coloured People's Representative Council, representing the Coloured population group, and the governing bodies of the Ciskei, the Tswanas, the Basothos, the Zulus and the Tsongas. In company, *inter alia*, with the Minister of Finance, he also recently visited the Venda, Lebowa, Tswana and Machangana homelands, with a population of some 4.5 million, in order to confer with their representatives and to gauge at first-hand the extent of their progress towards self-determination.

9. These visits are an integral part of our policy of consultation with the different population groups and have been warmly welcomed as such by all concerned. Indeed, as the *Sunday Times*, a South African newspaper, which opposes my Government's policies, wrote on 1 August of this year:

"From all accounts Mr. Vorster's tour has been a great success in the sense of fostering dialogue with homeland leaders and making personal contact with the various populations which turned out in their thousands at each function . . .".

10. The *Rand Daily Mail*, another South African paper, which is also opposed to our policies, commented in similar vein. It reported that the Prime Minister's visits had improved the relationship between black and white in South Africa.

11. The road to self-determination is not always an easy one. However, the South African Government is doing all it can to assist the peoples on this road. It is still too early to say exactly when the Bantu peoples will attain their full independence, when they will become sovereign and be able to play their part in the world at large and also in this Organization. It depends in large measure upon themselves

and the progress that they make. But they have the right to negotiate at any time with us for the attainment of independence. We do not impose conditions on their right to approach us. We shall listen to them at any time that they feel the moment has arrived to ask for independence.

12. In this way we shall achieve our ultimate aim of making it possible for the various nations to be associated with one another in mutual harmony and acceptance of each other in a South African constellation of independent nations where no nation would be governed by another.

13. Consultation fosters co-operation, and without co-operation there can be no real progress on either the internal or the international level. Internally it is necessary for the smooth realization of self-determination and for the material as well as the moral well-being of the various nations. Internationally it is necessary for the greater prosperity and peace of nations, especially for those of us on the African continent.

14. I have already outlined how this co-operation is being achieved through consultations within South Africa itself. The political development of the various homelands to which I have referred is not something imposed arbitrarily upon those nations. Each one plays an active part in this development.

15. I have emphasized the importance of consultation in our efforts to co-operate smoothly within the borders of South Africa because there are those who condemn our policy of dialogue and contact with other African States on the alleged ground that my Government should rather first conduct a dialogue with its own peoples. As I have indicated, that is precisely what we are doing.

16. It is our firm policy to co-operate to the fullest extent possible also with all other countries, including those of Africa. For South Africa is as much a part of Africa as any other African State and we have a vital interest in our continent's peace and prosperity.

17. During recent years the emphasis in Africa has been placed more and more on the need for development. The developing States have had to contend with various problems in the economic, health, educational, technical and agricultural fields. And where South Africa has in some instances been able to co-operate in the solution of those problems, it has been happy to do so.

18. We have, for example, assisted various other African States by way of famine relief, we co-operate with them in respect of the supply of electricity, health and welfare services, the marketing of agricultural produce, the provision of low-interest loans and the planning and construction of various long-term development projects. The private sector in South Africa has also played its part by assisting African countries in the field of tourism, for instance, with the opening of hotels and, in the field of industrial development and transport, with the establishment of factories, plants and works and the construction of railways.

19. There are no strings attached to our co-operation; we have tried to help others to help themselves. We believe that

progress and economic growth lead to greater stability at home and hence throughout the continent.

20. We welcome discussions with any State in Africa which desires to talk to us. We have much to discuss and discussion could well be the first step towards co-operation in many fields of mutual interest. My Prime Minister has said that he is prepared even to discuss our internal policies with those genuinely interested in conducting a dialogue with us.

21. Throughout our history we have firmly believed in living in friendship and harmony with our neighbours and with those further afield. We do not interfere in their internal affairs. We pose no threat to anyone. We are willing at any time to conclude solemn treaties for the preservation of peace with any African country. We believe in communication with our own peoples and with the peoples of Africa. Without communication we cannot hope to solve our problems. Proof of our sincerity in this respect is to be found in our action in the past year. Thus we have continued to make contact with other African States. My Prime Minister, for instance, last year visited Malawi at the invitation of its President, Dr. Banda.

22. In November last I led a delegation to another neighbouring State to discuss with the Government concerned matters of mutual economic and technical interest and to conclude agreements in connexion with development projects. During this year an official delegation from the same country in turn visited South Africa. In addition, discussions were held with heads of government and ministers of other neighbouring States.

23. Less than two months ago we were proud to welcome to South Africa the Life President of the Republic of Malawi, H.E. H. Kamuzu Banda. The occasion was a historic and significant one, for it marked the first official visit of an African Head of State to my country.

24. President Banda has made it clear that there are aspects of our domestic policies which he cannot support. Nevertheless, he came to talk to us. As he said:

“I came here because I sincerely believe in co-operation not only in material things but also in spiritual things . . . co-operation of the spirit, co-operation of ideas. . . . The main reason why we should meet is because if we do not agree and we do not meet, how are we going to resolve our problems?”

25. The visit of President Banda was an unqualified success. He received a most enthusiastic—indeed, tumultuous—reception from all the South African peoples. President Banda himself remarked on the warmth of the welcome accorded him by the entire population. That, he said, contrasted sharply with what he had been told in certain circles, namely that the black peoples of southern Africa disliked the idea of an African statesman co-operating with the South African Government. In other words the policy of contact and communication between the South African Government and other African Governments is welcome also to the black peoples of South Africa, contrary to what has been alleged.

26. President Banda saw his visit as a mission to build a bridge between the peoples of our respective countries. His mission captured the imagination of black, Indian, Coloured and white alike. In welcoming him we were honoured to receive a great and far-sighted son of Africa.

27. Our domestic and foreign policies are founded on the principles of mutual respect and tolerance for the other man's point of view. We believe that South Africa has a considerable contribution to make to Africa's development and prosperity. By the same token, we realize that we have much to learn from other States of Africa. Although our social, political and economic systems may differ, experience has proved that there need be no barriers to co-operation between parties with a common interest in Africa's welfare. Lack of knowledge and policies of isolation inevitably magnify difference. And we are glad to hear more and more of the voices of Africa calling for a departure from the sterile pattern of the past and for a new approach to the issues which seemingly divide us.

28. In the words of the South African Prime Minister:

"I know of nothing . . . that stands in the way of better understanding between South Africa and other nations who seek peace and prosperity for the peoples of the world and especially for Africa."

29. Surely, policies of communication, co-operation and accommodation such as I have outlined are appropriate to the spirit of *détente* and reconciliation which is meeting with increasing acceptance by the international community. Surely, those policies are essential for Africa, if Africa as a whole is to prosper and inherit the greatness which should be its destiny. Surely, those policies are the policies of peace which inspired the Charter, which are the essence of the Charter and which should continue to inspire us all.

30. Mr. KHOMAN (Thailand): Mr. President, it augurs well for the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly to have you in the Chair to preside over its deliberations. The overwhelming endorsement which the world body gave to the unanimous recommendation of the Asian countries bears irrefutable testimony to its esteem for you, as well as its confidence in your great ability and ultimate wisdom. For we all know in Asia of your dedicated efforts to promote regional understanding and solidarity among the Asian nations, and, thanks to your sagacity, it has been possible to put an end to harrowing difficulties among a few South-East Asian nations. I personally recall that, because of your keen qualities of understanding and persuasion, the differences between neighbour States were successfully composed. My country, Thailand, was fortunate to play host for South-East Asian reconciliation and for a neighbourly *entente cordiale*.

31. Mr. President, you have also won our respect and admiration for your effective conduct of the foreign affairs of your great nation, the Republic of Indonesia, through a crucial period of its history, which brought its presence back to the international scene with renewed vigour and strength. As one of Indonesia's closest friends and neighbours, Thailand is highly gratified at the honour bestowed by this Assembly on one of Asia's most distinguished sons.

32. I should like also to convey our deep appreciation to the outgoing President, Mr. Edvard Hambro, for his deft guidance of Assembly deliberations in the past year. His efficient manner, coupled with his genial charm and sympathetic understanding, enabled the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly to proceed to its conclusion on a productive and harmonious note.

33. The delegation of Thailand has great pleasure in extending its sincere congratulations to the delegations of Bahrain, Bhutan and Qatar, whose countries were, on the opening day of the present session, unanimously admitted to membership in the United Nations. We are indeed proud and happy to have the representatives of those three Asian States seated among us, and we are confident that their contribution to the future work of the Organization will redound to the credit of their respective nations.

34. Nearly a year ago, the hopes and aspirations of the international community were raised and strengthened by the commemorative part of the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The session itself was recognized as a significant milestone in the Organization's history, as it was attended by a large number of heads of State or Government, who pledged their continued loyalty to the purposes and principles of the Charter and renewed their determination to make the United Nations a more effective instrument of peace and progress.

35. The twenty-fifth session also produced a string of declarations and resolutions which may, we hope, produce results in practical and concrete terms.

36. In the Middle East, a tenuous cease-fire is still preserved, but, despite a number of initiatives and probings in past months, prospects for a long-lasting and just peace remain uncertain. The main suffering continues to fall on the Palestinian refugees, whose daily existence and future well-being should be the central problem of all concerned. While we are conscious of the fact that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, and the four big Powers, together with the parties directly involved in the conflict, have assiduously attempted to make a forward move in line with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), we sincerely hope that the relevant resolutions, including the latest one on the status of Jerusalem, resolution 298 (1971), will receive adequate implementation.

37. In Viet-Nam, the tempo of the war has slowed down considerably. However, the related wars in Laos and the Khmer Republic, which have known a lull during the monsoon season, may be intensified again with the arrival of the dry season. Foreign troops which were sent in to help defend the Republic of Viet-Nam are being withdrawn at a faster rate than in years before, as that country is increasing its defence capability. But the North Viet-Nameese regular troops continue to remain in Laos, in the Khmer Republic, and in South Viet-Nam, against the wishes of the peoples concerned, and there is as yet no indication when those foreign troops will be withdrawn, if at all.

38. The talks in Paris also remain at a deadlock. While new proposals and meaningful adjustments of positions have come mostly from one side, willingness to negotiate

seriously has not clearly emerged from the other side. What we can hope for is that significant developments in Asia in the next few months may give an impetus to a movement toward peaceful discussions of the problem by the parties directly concerned.

39. In East Pakistan, humanitarian concern should be directed towards relieving the tragic hardship facing the refugees. The international help which has been generously forthcoming may strengthen the role of this Organization and its specialized agencies.

40. However, all is not lost in Asia. Wherever there is a dark cloud, there may also be a silver lining. The announcement, both in Peking and Washington last July, of a forthcoming visit by the President of the United States to the People's Republic of China has engendered widespread comment and expectation. Euphoria seems to prevail in certain quarters, while caution has been voiced by the more seasoned elements on both sides of the Pacific. We in Thailand also entertain hopes that the commendable steps taken by the leaders of those two countries will contribute to the relaxation of tensions and produce salutary effects on the peace and security of Asia and the world.

41. However, we dare hope that that meeting and the ensuing discussions will carefully avoid affecting the interests of those who will not be present at the gathering. Rather, the dialogue may profitably aim at seeking to resolve problems of peaceful coexistence and constructive co-operation, and thus constitute a turning-point in the tumultuous state of the world. Particularly the nations in Asia will feel reassured if no understanding or agreement which may result from the encounter is construed, tacitly or otherwise, to imply recognition of any party's paramount power or influence over a given area, as was customary in the past. What Asia urgently needs is to erase and do away with the obsolete concepts of domination and spheres of influence and substitute for them the healthy and beneficial principle of mutual co-operation among equal partners, encompassing all nations, large and small. The interests of all should be safeguarded, and the furtherance of the interests of some should not be at the expense of others. Only in such manner would the cause of international peace and security be truly served.

42. As we are all aware, this session of the General Assembly will witness an important event. I am referring, of course, to the question of the representation of China in our Organization. In this connexion, I am pleased to state that my Government has decided to support the representation of the People's Republic of China in both this Assembly and the Security Council. In so doing, the Thai Government is prompted by the desire to see the relaxation of tensions throughout the entire length and breadth of Asia and particularly in South-East Asia. It is also our hope that many Asian, and indeed world, problems will thus have a better chance to be resolved and consequently that the prospects for peace in our part of the world will be further enhanced. Once the People's Republic of China joins the United Nations, it will, like the rest of the membership, have to uphold the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, particularly the obligations to respect the sovereignty and independence of other Members, as well as practise the policies of neighbourliness and peaceful co-

existence, and refrain from interference in the internal affairs of others—for instance, by supporting the so-called national liberation movements in other countries.

43. While Thailand has reached an important decision to support the representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, my Government is also in favour of the continued membership of the Republic of China. This should not be construed as meaning that Thailand follows the so-called "two Chinas" theory. We do not. On the contrary, we strictly adhere to the generally accepted principle of international law that the principal attributes of a sovereign State are the integrity and unity of the sovereign entity. If, however, we support the representation of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, the reason is that Thailand has had friendly and normal relations with the latter and there is no valid justification to do away with them. On the other hand, Thailand up to now has not had any official relationship with the former.

44. In fact, as we see it, the situation of divided countries, either in Asia or elsewhere, stems from certain anomalies of international life. This, in our opinion, represents not a permanent situation but rather a temporary one which may in due course be settled and returned to normalcy in the future.

45. The China question is no different from questions concerning other divided countries. It is indeed a fact that both Peking and Taipei firmly adhere to the concept of "one China". Other countries, such as Thailand, likewise believe in the unity and integrity of all sovereign States, and it is to be hoped that time will bring an accommodation to the conflicting claims of the parties concerned. They are the sole competent parties to work out their own problem and strive to find a solution thereto. Consequently, the position of the Thai delegation should be explained solely by the requirements of present political realities and the existing facts of international life and not by any theoretical considerations.

46. On that basis, we have every reason to appreciate the efforts of the four big Powers in concluding the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of 3 September 1971. By such an agreement it is hoped that a solid basis for a satisfactory Berlin settlement has been established to the benefit of peace and stability in Europe and the world. It may also be a concrete step towards the strengthening of international security as enunciated in the Declaration on that subject adopted during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*]. This action by the four Powers seems to vindicate the hopes of the Thai delegation in initiating an amendment,¹ subsequently revised and approved as paragraph 13 of the Declaration, to the effect that permanent members of the Security Council would be called upon to intensify their efforts to discharge, in conformity with the Charter, the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Thai delegation is, therefore, gratified that the four Powers have carried out their obligations in a manner worthy of the confidence

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, First Committee, 1729th meeting, para. 93.*

reposed in them by the Charter of the United Nations. In this connexion, the Federal Republic of Germany should be commended for its efforts and determination to seek solutions and arrangements which may strengthen peace and stability not only in and around Berlin but for the central and eastern areas of Europe as well.

47. The question of disarmament continues to receive maximum attention from the international community, and yet world military expenditures have sky-rocketed to the awesome level of over \$200,000 million per year. There is, therefore, an urgent need to make even more determined and concerted efforts to adopt meaningful and effective measures, including prohibition of underground nuclear testing, which will contribute to both nuclear and conventional disarmament.

48. The work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not made too significant progress this year. The basic weakness of that body, of course, lies in the absence of two nuclear Powers, the People's Republic of China and France, from its deliberations. However, we are pleased at the concrete steps taken in connexion with an agreement on bacteriological weapons.

49. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America appear to have made some progress. The sober and congenial atmosphere surrounding the Talks gives an impression that some of the unwarranted fears and suspicions between the two super-Powers may slowly and gradually be diminishing. This is indeed a welcome sign and augurs well for the future arms-control negotiations. If such an atmosphere can be maintained and coupled with the more positive and co-operative attitudes of other nuclear Powers, a world disarmament conference, as proposed by the Soviet Union, certainly deserves the active support of all countries of the world.

50. While there has been a perceptible slowing down in the pace of decolonization in the past few years, the world Organization can justifiably be proud of its record in this important field of activity. The work is, however, still unfinished, and the situation in the southern part of Africa continues to defy practical solutions. The Manifesto on Southern Africa, which was endorsed overwhelmingly by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session [*resolution 2505 (XXIV)*], provided a much-needed impetus to the movement towards resolution of the problems. The efforts, however, produced no result. The colonial Powers remain adamant in the face of very strong views held by the international community against racial oppression and the denial of the right of self-determination.

51. The advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia² is a new element. Now that the illegality of such presence has been established by the international tribunal, it is hoped that this new development will encourage the Security Council,

which is at present considering the question, to devise a fresh and effective approach to the problem.

52. As we are entering the Second United Nations Development Decade, we remain conscious of the extent and gravity of the economic and social ills which are still plaguing the developing countries. Such basic problems as the technological gap, the population explosion, international trade and development and the transformation of traditional societies into modern ones continue to exist and to grow into almost unmanageable proportions.

53. The problem presented by technology is that, in spite of the growth of modern techniques and ideas, there remains an increasingly wide gap between the industrially developed countries and the rest of the world. In fact, technology in the advanced countries is now developing so fast that it is outstripping the ability of any but the most advanced nations to keep up.

54. The two resources which the less developed countries have hitherto been able to offer, namely, their raw materials and their cheap but unskilled labour force, are precisely two of the commodities which modern technology is rapidly replacing. No one can tell how much more difficult these basic problems will become in the future. Therefore, the United Nations should pay greater attention to this problem and see what course of action should be pursued in order to narrow the technology gap.

55. It is regrettable to note from past experiences that a deeper commitment to international assistance and a more positive attitude towards international trade and development have not been forthcoming from a large number of the developed countries. In the field of shipping, for instance, the liner conferences should take into account the views of the developing countries and co-operate more genuinely in working out a truly equitable pattern based on the principles of equality and mutual consultation. Particularly, they should accept the principle of equality of treatment in regard both to the shippers and to the shipping lines of the developing nations.

56. Furthermore, some developed countries continue to encourage the uneconomic production and sale of commodities which compete unfairly with those emanating from developing countries. They should be persuaded to discontinue government subsidies which introduce elements of unfair competition into normal commercial transactions, resulting in serious harm to the interests of poorer nations. Again, some developed countries should make genuine efforts to see to it that the trade and economy of developing countries are not adversely affected and a depression of world market prices is not brought about by the continual and untimely disposal of production surpluses or strategic reserves. We believe that only through the sincere demonstration of political far-sightedness on these matters can international understanding and mutual co-operation between developed and developing countries be achieved in consonance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

57. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to be held in Stockholm in June 1972 promises to be a world-wide campaign and an international and inte-

² *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

grated plan of action to avert an environmental crisis. While the ecological ill effects are more keenly felt in industrialized countries, it would indeed be inadvisable for developing countries to maintain a complacent attitude towards their own environmental problems. Population explosion, unplanned deforestation, urban problems and the polluted countryside are encountered in the underdeveloped world as well as in the industrialized nations. At the same time, the planners of the Conference should also be mindful of the legitimate desire of the developing States that any measure, national or international, to combat environmental problems, should in no way impede the economic development process in those countries.

58. This year may indeed be called the year of the Asians. My delegation has already extended its warmest welcome to you, Mr. President, and to the representative of the three new Asian Member States. There is, however, another Asian personage whose name evokes sincere esteem and deep admiration around the world. U Thant, the distinguished Secretary-General, has been in the service of the United Nations for 10 years. His tenure of office is said to be coming to an end. And while many of us here would be happy to see him continue in his important position, the Secretary-General's personal wishes will have to be respected.

59. The delegation of Thailand would like to take this opportunity of expressing its most grateful thanks to the Secretary-General for the services he has unselfishly and devotedly rendered to the Organization. U Thant's integrity, independence and charm have indeed endeared him to all of us, and the prestige of the office of Secretary-General has been further enhanced by his personal attributes and dedication to the cause of international peace, understanding and co-operation. We wish him all the best and a well-earned rest after a decade of tireless efforts in discharging the responsibilities of an office that U Thant himself has referred to as one of the most difficult and most rewarding in the world.

60. Mr. EBAN (Israel): Mr. President, you come to the leadership of the General Assembly at a time when eastern Asia stands in the centre of international concern. It is in that region alone that war still rages day by day. It is there that a burden of suffering, unparalleled elsewhere, weighs heavily on the conscience of mankind. And it is to Asia that our eyes will turn when we come to take decisions on the future of this Organization and the principles underlying its structure.

61. It is right at such a time that an Asian statesman of high capacity and repute should preside over our deliberations. Israel wishes you success and pledges itself to your support. You will be fortified by the high example of your eminent predecessor, Edvard Hambro of Norway, and by the experience and patient skill of the Secretary-General, who is completing a full decade of service to the international cause.

62. Last year the United Nations marked its twenty-fifth anniversary by an act of celebration. I suggested then that the occasion could have been more wisely used for scrutiny and self-criticism [1851st meeting]. There is a manifest decline in the influence of the General Assembly on the

main issues affecting human welfare and destiny. Its resonance has diminished. The central currents of international life and policy flow outside its walls. The frustration arises, not so much from defects in the Organization's work, as from discord and contention amongst the Powers. Yet there are some causes which lie within our capacity of correction. I shall mention one.

63. In the work of the United Nations there is a strong accent on public controversy and a relative neglect of private conciliation. A report by the Secretary-General 11 years ago contained a plea to give greater emphasis to the United Nations as an instrument for negotiation of settlements as distinct from this world debate of issues. The advice was not heeded. Debate, not negotiation, still dominates the United Nations practice. Resolutions are adopted in great numbers, but their texts bear witness to the parliamentary advantages of fragmentation rather than to a balanced view of rights or realities.

64. For example: in a dispute in the Middle East between two parties one of which has a single vote and the other 16 or, in practice 40, the preordained triumph of automatic majorities has no moral value, little practical effect and a very short life in the world's memory. The same is true of the Security Council, a third of whose members have their diplomatic relations and their ethnic or sentimental predilections exclusively on one side.

65. This difficulty would not exist if the organs of the United Nations would regard it as their main function to seek consensus which would include the interested parties. They would be better employed in encouraging agreement between the parties at issue, than in sharpening controversy between them by attempts at adjudication. In short, the United Nations should aspire to a diplomatic rather than to a parliamentary role. The test of achievement should be not how many resolutions we have voted but how many solutions we have advanced.

66. And, indeed, wherever free, direct negotiation has taken place across the world in the past year there has been fruitful issue. There have been the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union and Poland with the Federal Republic of Germany, based, as Mr. Gromyko significantly told us, "on recognition of European realities, especially on the inviolability of frontiers" [1942nd meeting, para. 101]. He was referring to the frontiers established after the war by negotiation and agreement. There has been the four-Power agreement on Berlin where, as Mr. Gromyko again correctly said, it is now up to the two parties directly concerned "to complete the negotiations between them" [ibid., para. 98]. There has been the normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany. There has been direct contact between the United States and the People's Republic of China, to be followed at an early date by a meeting at the highest level of responsibility. The Paris talks on Viet-Nam, with the direct participation of all the parties at issue, have been accompanied by a constant de-escalation of the fighting. There is grave tension between India and Pakistan, as is evident from the general debate here earlier this week; but the two Governments have direct relations which they can apply to the solution of their differences. Many hearts are heavy at the reports coming from the boundary between Ireland and

Northern Ireland; but there is also news that the heads of Government concerned have met each other and agreed on a process of political reconciliation. In Washington, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union are being signed today for modernizing the "hot line" and strengthening safeguards against accidental war.

67. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the settlements reached and attempted this year? Surely they show that the air is alive with a spirit of innovation. Attitudes of hostility which once seemed to be an organic part of our generation's life are now yielding to a strong impulse for peaceful settlement. Above all we are learning lessons about the immense importance of communication. Time and again the decision of Governments to abandon their cold separation and make contact with each other develops from a procedural advance into a change of substantive positions and thence into binding agreements. The central themes of international life in 1971 are direct contact, the abandonment of traditional conflicts, and flexible, pragmatic negotiation.

68. There is also a move away from dogmatic attachment to documents. If old formulas and texts have reached deadlock, new ones are sought. There is a particular recognition that after wars the need is to build new systems of relations and not to reproduce the conditions and situations out of which war erupted. This new empiricism affects the juridical domain as well. Governments which seriously seek peace do not hesitate to confer directly with Governments which they do not yet recognize and with which they have no legal relations.

69. If there is frustration in the Middle East it is because our region is still the exception to all the positive rules which have been applied elsewhere. Whatever is tried successfully in other regions is avoided in the Middle East. Here alone there is still no contact between the parties at issue. Here alone the Governments which will have to live side by side with each other have still not come face to face at a table of negotiation. Here alone we are often told that the only way to get peace is to restore the situations which erupted in war. Here alone it is said in many places that the resumption of an important peace mission is wholly dependent on a single memorandum on which there is deadlock, and that there is no room for any innovation or any versatility of formulas and techniques.

70. It is true, despite these failures, that the situation in the Middle East today is less explosive than a year ago. The flow of events has not been backward. The cease-fire along the Suez Canal has been effective, with rare and isolated exceptions, for 14 months. Israel does not propose to bring it to an end and Egypt would achieve nothing by violating it. Indeed, the only certainty in the Middle East is that resumed hostilities would serve no interest and advance no settlement. The absence of fighting along the Suez Canal line has released the Middle East and the world from the daily prospect of escalation involving the Soviet forces which were irresponsibly introduced into the region with the effect of aggravating and enlarging a local tension. There has been a sharp decline in the strength and prestige of the terrorist groups and the pirate organizations that loomed so large a year ago. There has been peaceful movement across open bridges into Israel and the admin-

istered territories of scores of thousands of Arabs from neighbouring Arab countries which are officially "at war" with Israel. Thus new patterns of coexistence have grown up between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs in daily life and work. Side by side with a violent and incendiary Arab rhetoric there seem to be here and there some beginnings of a greater realism in Arab thinking on the problem of Israel's sovereignty and Israel's deep roots in the life and history of the Middle East. Finally, there are three separate availabilities of good offices which, although not all in active course today, are mutually accepted by the parties: the Jarring mission; the good offices of the United States in pursuit of an agreement concerning the Suez Canal; and the intention of ten African Presidents to authorize four eminent heads of State to go to Jerusalem and Cairo on a mission of information and goodwill.

71. Yet, with all these consolations the peace efforts are not sufficiently intense. The talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, which began in high promise in January, have been at a standstill since the end of February. An exchange of views and positions on a special Suez Canal agreement was inaugurated through the good offices of the United States in April. This effort is still under way, but its pace is slow. In discussing the obstacles to peace it would be easy, but sterile, to fall into recrimination. Nothing would be easier. One of the few things that all Members of the United Nations have in common is the ability to discuss each other's imperfections. Yet what mankind longs to hear is not how deadlocks arose, but how it is proposed to overcome them. The general debate will be well used if Middle Eastern States will give precise definition to what they are prepared to do in order to bring a peaceful settlement into view. All who seek an understanding of Israel's policies must come face to face with two elements in the national mood. There is a sharp preoccupation with security; and there is a vivid memory of the horror and dark peril from which we emerged four years ago.

72. In reflecting on the theme of security, Israel cannot easily forget the immense loss and burden it has borne through the hostility directed against it for over two decades. Our danger in 1967 was the climax, but not the whole story, of our predicament. No other people has had to live all its days with a mark of interrogation hanging over its collective and individual survival. Israel's insistence on genuine and stable security takes particular depth from the hideous legacy of Jewish massacre in the European slaughter-house. No people in history has undergone an experience of such tragic depth and scope. And no other State has grown for 23 years amidst such a comprehensive effort to deny it every breath of life.

73. In particular, Israel's mind preserves a permanent and unfading image of the danger and solitude from which it emerged in the summer of 1967. To forget or ignore these memories is to renounce all true understanding of the Middle Eastern reality today. It was only by exceptional vigilance and cruel sacrifice that we repelled a monstrous design that would have ended our people's historic journey and cast all Israel's life and achievement into the flames. Maritime blockade, terrorist incursions, military encirclement, declarations of overt war, a frenzied torrent of threats and a formal announcement from Cairo that the battle was joined for Israel's destruction—all these came

together in cumulative assault. We recall the outrageous silence and apathy with which the Security Council, between one adjournment and the next, calmly observed the only attempt in modern history to wipe a sovereign State off the map of the world. Mr. Gromyko indulges his sense of humour when he tells us that guarantees by the Security Council are among "the firmest guarantees that can be imagined in the modern world" [*ibid.*, para. 135]. The truth has been and is that, largely as a result of Soviet policy, the Security Council for 20 years has refused to defend any Israeli right including the right not to have its citizens killed, its ports blockaded, its existence threatened. The policy of the Security Council has been to refuse to adopt any decision of which a single word is unpalatable to the Arab Governments. It has thus surrounded every assault on Israeli lives, Israeli rights and Israeli security with indulgence. At the highest point of tension and of Israel's danger in May 1967, with Israel blockaded and encircled on every side, with all mankind gripped by the apprehension of approaching war, the suggestion of the Soviet Union was that the Security Council should go home and refuse to discuss such an "artificial" matter as the declaration of active war and the formal imposition of a blockade against a Member State. It is largely because of Soviet policy that the Security Council cannot be a guarantor of any Israeli rights. And the future development in the composition of the Security Council, however essential for other reasons, is bound to emphasize its inability to guarantee or even to express an Israeli interest, whatever the majority of its members may think or say.

74. There are few effective guarantees of peace beyond those inherent in the nature of the peace itself. The greatest danger is lest through lassitude of spirit or impatience or imprecision of diplomatic craftsmanship we again revert to fragile, false and ambiguous solutions, which carry in them the seed of future wars.

75. But the work of peace, however complex, must be attempted. Israel's deepest aspiration is to take part in a new deployment of energies in the service of a peaceful order of relations in the Middle East. Accordingly I ask the crucial questions: Is the slow rhythm of the peace efforts inevitable? Can nothing be done or at least attempted to set some dialogue in swifter motion? Do Israel's policies offer openings through which roads to peace can be discerned and actively explored? My answer is that if the Arab States, and especially Egypt, sincerely desire an honourable and lasting peace, there are many roads leading to that goal.

76. The first road lies in a Suez Canal agreement. There are many reasons for giving priority to this attempt. A sudden transition from a conflict of more than two decades to a total settlement has proved difficult. It may be more rational to expect progress by stages. Each stage would bring about a solution of a specific problem while opening the way to further agreements and thus to final peace.

77. The Suez Canal sector calls urgently for disengagement. It is there that the regional tension is compounded by the military presence of a great Power. Disengagement of forces here is an urgent international interest.

78. The President of Egypt proposed on 4 February an attempt to open the Suez Canal ahead of a total settlement.

Israel's Prime Minister responded on 9 February. Both Governments subsequently agreed that the United States should use its good offices to explore the prospect. We therefore have an agreed objective and an agreed modality. We believe that the effort to bridge the gulf between the positions of the parties should be pursued in the general interest of peace. If agreement cannot be reached on such a clearly defined issue in which Egyptian advantage is so strong it would appear to be even more difficult to advance in one step towards an over-all settlement in which all the complex issues would fall into place. But the contrary is also true. A concrete result in this matter will accelerate and inspire negotiation and agreements on other issues. The peace effort will acquire momentum. It will be surrounded for the first time by an air of confidence and promise.

79. Having been invited to give its views on this matter, Israel developed a proposal that an arrangement be agreed upon with a view to the opening of the Suez Canal to be cleared and operated by Egypt. Israel would make a withdrawal of its forces from the water-line to an agreed distance. The fighting would not be resumed. Egypt would clear and open the Canal. It would be agreed that there be free passage for all ships and cargoes, including those of Israel. Effective and agreed supervision procedures would be established. Means of deterrence against the danger of violation of the agreement would be assured. The agreement would stand on its own feet, but it would not affect or annul the undertakings which the parties gave in August 1970 to hold discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in conformity with his mandate under Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The line to be held by Israeli forces in accordance with that Canal agreement would not be considered final. When agreement on a final boundary is reached in the framework of the peace settlement Israeli forces will withdraw to it.

80. We hope that Egypt will give this proposal the detailed and careful consideration which seemed to be its intention in April. It represents far-reaching concessions on Israel's part. It involves a movement from the cease-fire line ahead of peace. It mitigates the accepted legitimate principle that no withdrawal need take place ahead of a contractual and mutually agreed peace. The prestige, benefits and revenues from the Canal, the possible return of three quarters of a million people who live near the Canal in peaceful times, as well as the crossing of the Canal by Egyptian civilian personnel, would all be Egyptian, not Israeli, gains. A new impetus would be given to the Jarring mission, which is now in abeyance. The undertakings which I have given refute the idea that the Canal agreement would be the last word. On the contrary, its conclusion and observance would create a favourable channel for further agreements.

81. It is true that neither Egypt nor Israel would attain its final objective in this interim framework, but Egypt's right to present its claims in the over-all peace negotiations would remain intact, as would Israel's freedom to present its own proposals and reservations.

82. A second road to peace lies through the resumption of negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. Israel agreed to resume these talks in January 1971 despite Egypt's refusal to rectify its violation of the missile-standstill agreement. At a meeting with the Prime Minister

and myself in January, Ambassador Jarring was requested to communicate to the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon a list of principles which, in our view, should be embodied in the peace agreements to be concluded and signed between Israel and each of the Arab Governments concerned. These principles were, at first, vehemently rejected by the Egyptian Government. Subsequently, on 15 February, the Government of Egypt commented [A/8541, annex II] on an aide-mémoire submitted a week before by Ambassador Jarring [A/8541, annex I]. It did not accept Mr. Jarring's precise formulations on navigation in the Suez Canal, on the Straits of Tiran, nor indeed on the definition of the scope of withdrawal. But the Egyptian reply did contain an expression of readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel provided that all the Egyptian terms for the agreement were met. One of these terms was the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza strip and all territories beyond the armistice line existing on 4 June 1967.

83. In its reply on 26 February 1971 [A/8541, annex III] the Israel Government viewed favourably the expression by Egypt of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiation on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

84. Why then are the Jarring talks in abeyance? The reason is plain. The Security Council resolution, 242 (1967), requires that the withdrawal and boundary clauses of the peace agreement, like all its other provisions, must be determined through agreement, which of course implies negotiation. Egypt declines to hold any dialogue or negotiation whatever on this point. It lays down its own position as an ultimative condition to which Israel must submit before negotiation begins. Indeed it is not clear why negotiation would be needed at all if the Egyptian view has to be accepted in advance. In a recent declaration of which President Sadat was a signatory, three Arab Governments, including that of Egypt, reiterated that there can be no negotiation with Israel, no conciliation and no bargaining over the Palestinian issue. This is a more recent and presumably more authoritative statement of Egypt's policy than the one that Mr. Riad, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicated to Mr. Jarring six months ago. Together with other declarations in the same mood and spirit, it raises the question whether the February memorandum has the significance that we chose to attach to it at that time.

85. But on one point alone the February communication from Cairo and the Damascus tripartite statement are one: they both rule out the free, precise and detailed negotiation of the boundary and withdrawal questions. Our policy is that, instead of cease-fire lines or armistice lines, we should establish secure, recognized and agreed boundaries as part of the peace-making process, and withdraw our armed forces to those boundaries once they are determined. It is important to break away from the temporary and unresolved territorial concepts which have prevailed since 1948 in order to develop for the first time a permanent structure of boundaries and security agreements.

86. There is no need to be apologetic about the doctrine that peace boundaries may be different from armistice

lines. The Arab Governments wrote into the 1949 Armistice Agreements a provision stating that the armistice lines are not the final boundaries and these must be worked out by agreement in the transition to peace. We are now embarked on that transition. Israel's size and strength are smaller than those of the European Powers which insisted on secure and agreed boundaries after the Second World War; but the right to negotiate boundaries that would release Israel from a chronic and desperate vulnerability belongs to it as to every other sovereign State. In this matter we are not in a position of juridical defence.

87. I shall summarize under three headings the reasons and justifications which give Israel the right to have negotiation on boundaries and security arrangements. The first, as I have already pointed out, is the provisional character of the lines now held as well as those which existed before. Several years before the 1967 war the Deputy Foreign Minister of Egypt correctly said: "There is no legal boundary between Israel and Egypt but only a line that was fixed in the pursuance of the Armistice Agreement."

88. On 31 May 1967 the representative of Jordan said in the Security Council:

"There is an Armistice Agreement. The Agreement did not fix boundaries; it fixed a demarcation line. The Agreement did not pass judgement on rights—political, military or otherwise. Thus I know of no territory; I know of no boundary."³

89. A second and more contemporary reason in support of Israel's claim to a negotiation on withdrawal and boundaries lies in the Security Council's resolution 242 (1967), which has been accepted by some Arab States and by Israel and which is the constitutive document of the Jarring mission. That resolution was adopted after all attempts to require a withdrawal to the 4 June armistice lines had been defeated by vote or discarded for lack of support. The term "secure and recognized boundaries" was an innovation in the United Nations vocabulary. It first appeared in a United States draft resolution submitted on 7 November 1967⁴ and later embodied in a United Kingdom draft⁵ which was presented for unanimous vote. I must state with full solemnity and knowledge that Israel's adherence to the Security Council resolution and acceptance of the Jarring mission were secured on the most explicit understanding that the resolution offered an opportunity to negotiate agreements on boundaries and withdrawal. Secretary of State Rogers stated for the United States in October 1969:

"Those boundaries were armistice lines not final political borders. The rights, claims and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were reserved by the Armistice Agreements. The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor precludes those armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries."

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year*, 1345th meeting, para. 84.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1967, document S/8229.

⁵ Document S/8247 (adopted without change as Security Council resolution 242 (1967)).

90. In a public statement on 12 July 1970, Mr. Sisco, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, declared that he had taken an active part in the formulation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). He added:

“That resolution did not say withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines. The resolution said the parties must negotiate to achieve agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders. In other words the question of the final borders is a matter of negotiation between the parties.”

91. The United Kingdom Government, which sponsored Security Council resolution 242 (1967), put itself on record on 17 November 1969, when its Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, was asked:

“What is the British interpretation of the wording of the 1967 resolution? Does... it... mean that the Israelis should withdraw from all territories taken in the late war?”

He replied:

“No, Sir. That is not the phrase used in the resolution. The resolution speaks of secure and recognised boundaries. Those words must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal.”⁶

A month later, on 9 December 1969, in the House of Commons he said:

“... There is reference, in the vital United Nations Security Council resolution, both to withdrawal from territories and to secure and recognised boundaries. As I have told the House previously, we believe that these two things should be read concurrently and that the omission of the word ‘all’ before the word ‘territories’ is deliberate.”⁷

I repeat: “... the omission of the word ‘all’ before the word ‘territories’ is deliberate.”

92. It was in the light of these clear undertakings that the Israel Government informed Mr. Jarring in August 1970 that it accepted the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) for implementation in all its parts and that on the establishment of a just and final peace in accordance with the resolution it would withdraw its forces from the cease-fire lines to secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the negotiations.

93. The political and juridical aspects of the questions to which I have referred are the expression of a deeper, more concrete reality. Israel does not have a policy of expansion or annexation. In the negotiations on boundaries and withdrawals it will seek those modifications which are essential to ensure security and to prevent another war.

94. The war of 1967 did not arise exclusively from the vulnerability of the armistice lines. But there is no doubt

that some topographical and strategic situations were a permanent temptation to assault. If they are not corrected and adjusted Israel, on withdrawing from the cease-fire lines, would find itself again in a position of intolerable vulnerability. There could be no more horrifying error than to revert, through lack of precise and detailed negotiation, to a territorial structure and security balance capable of reproducing the peril which exploded four years ago.

95. In the framework of a peace settlement with Egypt, Israel would withdraw from the cease-fire lines. We have never asserted that in a condition of peace it would be necessary for our troops to remain in all of the Sinai peninsula or even in most of it. But there are vital interests affecting security, peace and navigation which impel us to reserve the right to attempt in the peace negotiations to secure a contractual basis for such continued presence as is necessary to protect security and navigation. There are several juridical expressions and precedents for such an arrangement. Our emphasis is on practical security conditions, not on any particular juridical formula. The post-war map of the world is replete with instructive parallels. The peace treaties in Europe and Asia did not bring about a return to the exact military and territorial dispositions that existed before.

96. Now Israel does not ask Egypt to accept any of its positions as a condition of negotiation. The proposal for the withdrawal of all Israeli troops to the previous positions is legitimate as an Egyptian proposal. It is equally legitimate for Israel to insist on an opportunity of free negotiation in which its own reservations and counter-proposals could be made. And our request from the world community is modest. We do not present specific Israeli proposals for endorsement by other Governments; we ask only that our right to negotiate the issues vital to our future, to our peace and to our security, should not be cut off in advance.

97. Our position, then, is this: We have taken note of the Egyptian proposal on withdrawal. Israel would withdraw its armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Now that both parties have presented their basic positions, they should pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior condition to cover all the points I listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement. I continue to adhere to the view which I expressed at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in October 1968 that

“It is possible to work out a boundary settlement compatible with the security of Israel and the honour of Arab States. . . . The majority of the United Nations have recognized that the only durable and reasonable solutions are agreed solutions serving the common interests of our peoples. The new peace structure in the Middle East, including the secure and recognized boundaries, must be built by Arab and Israeli hands” [1686th meeting, para. 111].

Thus if Egypt will present its position for negotiation without the unprecedented request for Israel's acceptance of it in advance, we shall be ready for detailed and concrete negotiation on all the matters mentioned in the Egyptian

⁶ See *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, n.d.), Fifth Series, Vol. 791, pp. 844-845.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 793, p. 261.

memorandum of 15 February and the Israeli document of 26 February.

98. Effective and versatile conciliation must include a capacity to move from one direction to another in a tireless pursuit of peace. In March 1968, Ambassador Jarring suggested a formula for the convening of meetings between the parties in Nicosia on the basis of an agreed term of reference. Egypt rejected that proposal. Those concerned with the conciliation effort did not say that the mission had to be held in suspense until Egypt gave a positive reply to something which its policy did not then allow it to endorse. It would be wrong now to affirm that such a vital objective as the establishment of a negotiated peace between Israel and Egypt will never be possible except on the basis of a working paper which did not happen to secure the agreement of the parties. Egyptian-Israeli peace is too great a cause to be tied and tethered for all time to a single optional memorandum. If Egypt will agree to pursue negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions on all the points listed in the Israeli and Egyptian memoranda of February 1971, this road to meaningful negotiation will lie open.

99. There are other roads to peace. The Suez Canal agreement and the discussion of an over-all settlement are not the only options available for negotiation. The problem of refugees requires a broad acceptance of regional and international responsibility. We have therefore proposed the convening of a conference of Middle Eastern States, together with Governments which have contributed to refugee relief and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem and the integration of refugees into productive life.

100. This problem would now be considered against the background of some alleviating developments in recent months. There is a growing disillusion with the irredentist pretensions of the terrorist groups and the air pirates. The dividing wall which once prevented all human contact between Israelis and Palestine Arabs is falling. It is true that this is due so far to Israeli initiative. Last year not a single Israeli set foot in any Arab land, but 110,000 Arabs from countries "at war" with Israel came into contact with Israel across the open Jordan bridges. An open frontier between Israel and its eastern neighbour similar to the community frontiers in Europe would do much to give human reality to a peace settlement, and indeed might help the settlement to be achieved.

101. There is a fourth possibility. The problems of boundaries and security are usually considered to be the crux of the negotiation. But there are other unresolved matters in the memoranda presented by Egypt and Israel in February. At first sight there seems to be some proximity between the peace, non-aggression, recognition and navigation clauses suggested by the two Governments. On closer inspection the disparities are substantial, and could become crucial. We suggested in January and later in March that it might be profitable to attempt to draft some of the clauses of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty relating to the principles of peace. It is an accepted negotiating technique to begin with problems in which divergences are less broad and thus to create a favourable atmosphere in which to confront the more acute problems.

102. There is a fifth road towards negotiating procedure and activity; it concerns the negotiating procedure, but its weight is intensively substantive and not at all procedural. I have said that in the early months of 1968 Ambassador Jarring suggested meetings between the parties, under his auspices, in Nicosia, in accordance with a text setting out the terms of reference for the conferences. On 10 March 1968, Ambassador Jarring informed me that Egypt had rejected that proposal. As the Secretary-General's report of 4 January 1971 reveals, Dr. Jarring "was informed of Israel's official acceptance, without conditions, of the text".⁸

103. Now that was the negative turning-point in the history of the Jarring mission. Since then it has been limited, through Egyptian insistence, to a bizarre procedure under which Israeli documents are presented to Ambassador Jarring, and by him to the Egyptian representative. If the Israel document contains the words "for communication to the Government of Egypt", the Egyptian representative refuses to take it into his hands; or if he has inadvertently accepted its delivery, he comes back to relinquish it with panic-stricken haste as if it were a hot coal. The Israel document is then divulged by the Egyptian representative to the press, accompanied by a burst of invective. Egyptian replies are published without any hint of an intention to communicate them to Israel. The Egyptian position is that Israel may not talk to Egypt directly, may not talk to Egypt indirectly and may not communicate anything to Egypt in writing.

104. If no other method is available my Government will communicate its views to Egypt by whatever channel or technique is possible. But we cannot conceal our conviction that there is an element of farce in the idea that the word "negotiation" can honestly be applied to the extraordinary procedure followed so far. How can a Government which alleges that it wants a peace agreement with Israel refuse to negotiate the terms of that agreement by a rational method of contact? To say that one is prepared to enter into a peace agreement but not to meet or negotiate even under international chairmanship is to make a mockery of the international community. One thing is clear: No international agreement has been reached on any subject between any States at any time by the methods to which the Jarring mission has so far been confined through Egypt's insistence.

105. I am convinced that the strongest chance of breaking out of the deadlock lies in a transition to a rational negotiating procedure. The hour is ripe. The gap between the parties is wide, but may not be impossible to bridge. Negotiation is the agent which would transform the potentiality into action.

106. One of the most important things said about the Middle East in recent days is Sir Alec Douglas-Home's statement yesterday that "distrust... of this depth... cannot [easily] be removed by long-distance correspondence" [1944th meeting, para. 98] and that "those who are in confrontation must actively help to promote a

⁸ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1971*, document S/10070, para. 13.

dialogue" [*ibid.*, para. 97]. If all those who hold that view would express it with equal candour, an international movement in favour of abandoning the illusion of long-range correspondence would come to effective expression.

107. There is no weight or value in the argument that the Arab Governments would be negotiating from weakness if they accepted direct contact under international chairmanship. Their point of reference would be, not the military situation, but the political forum in which the Arab side would speak from a position of numerical and geographical predominance.

108. I therefore propose to the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Riad, that we take our guidance from the spirit which inspires the international life of our age. Let us meet here this month under the auspices of the United States to discuss the details and principles of a Suez Canal settlement; or under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jarring to discuss the establishment of peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) on the basis of our respective memoranda of February 1971. Let us break out of devious procedures and sterile polemics into a new vision and a new hope.

109. In a recent statement the President of Egypt, Mr. El-Sadat, declared that he would sacrifice a million men to achieve a military victory. What he and we should be considering is how to ensure that the 33 million Egyptians, the 3 million Israelis and the other millions in the Middle East are saved from sacrifice and preserved for the construction of a peaceful regional order. The task will not be served by war or by threats of renewed hostilities which command our vigilance but which are, in effect, an echo of ill-fated bombast in the recent past. Nor will our task be fulfilled by living out the rest of 1971 in ineffective debate or inflammatory resolutions. The Arab States may have enough voting strength to secure the adoption of virulent, unbalanced texts or to give a biased interpretation to the Security Council resolution, which would then cease to be an agreed documentary consensus available as a basis for the ultimate and inevitable negotiation. But what will it profit to gain an Assembly majority, but to lose Israel's adherence to a set of principles common to it and to neighbouring States? The roads to peace do not have their starting point in war or in polemical debate. They branch out from one of the many avenues and by-ways of negotiation on which we shall meet Egypt when its choice is made and declared.

110. This session could mark a recuperation in the career of the United Nations if the Organization made this the year of negotiation, the year of negotiation in all outstanding disputes. It has other tasks. The Second United Nations Development Decade can be saved from the frustrations of the First if the advanced countries turn aside from the perils of monetary war towards an expanding vocation in the development of emergent societies.

111. And in the last resort this Organization will be judged according to the role it has played in defence of human welfare and dignity. The call of kinship and of dark memory will bring us to refer at appropriate stages in Committees and in the plenary meetings to two dramas of great intensity and pathos: the Jews of the Soviet Union, of

whom some have reached us but of whom the great majority are still restrained from the expression of their cultural identity and their national hope; and the captive remnants of helpless Jews in Arab lands, especially in Syria, whose anguished voice cries out for liberation from terror and despair. This Organization, for all its imperfections, is still the only organized expression of the planetary spirit. It may be bearing within itself the seed of a universal order in which men will come together to save their environment from pollution, their society from disruption, their economy from decline, their life from the stress and grip of violence. There is no room for fatalistic despair. There is still time for men and nations to be inspired by a new and spacious vision and to invest their thought and labour in defence of the "common heritage of mankind".

112. Mr. KIRCHSCHLAEGGER (Austria): Mr. President, I am happy to convey to you our sincere congratulations on your election as President of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. We are fortunate that our work will be carried out under the guidance of a man who plays an active part in present-day political developments as Foreign Minister of his country and whom we esteem as an experienced statesman.

113. I further wish to associate myself with the expressions of appreciation by previous speakers to the outgoing President, Edvard Hambro. The distinguished and dignified manner in which he directed the commemorative session of the General Assembly of the United Nations last year confirmed the feelings of gratification with which we had welcomed his election.

114. I should also like to pay a sincere tribute to Secretary-General U Thant for the devotion and dedication with which he has continued to work for the cause of international peace and co-operation.

115. May I take this opportunity to convey our best wishes to the delegations of Bhutan, Bahrain and Qatar? We welcome the admission of those three States as a further step towards the achievement of universality of the United Nations.

116. It is our firm conviction that the high goals and purposes of the United Nations can be reached only on the basis of universality. It is in this spirit that the Austrian Government firmly supports all measures conducive to bringing about, without any further delay, the participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations.

117. We sincerely hope that it will also be possible in the near future to admit the divided countries to membership in the world Organization.

118. Last year's commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of our Organization afforded the opportunity of a retrospective appraisal. A review of the first 25 years has revealed with great clarity the limitations imposed on the Organization by political and historical realities. At the same time, we have become even more clearly aware of the potential and value of its work.

119. An appraisal carried out in retrospect over a longer period of time enables us not only to grasp the complex

problems facing the United Nations when confronted with the urgency of taking rapid, effective decisions in acute political crises, but also to realize the constructive role that it can and indeed does play in the long run as an agent and element in the process of international politics.

120. At the beginning of this session of the General Assembly, our attention is focused once again upon the great unsolved international conflicts. We realize with a sense of frustration how limited the contribution of the United Nations has been towards the peaceful settlement of the military confrontation in Indo-China. As in past years, we express our deep concern at the continuation of the conflict and voice our sense of shock at the human suffering that every new day of war brings to the population of Indo-China. This year, however, we believe we see some sign of a turn of the tide, indicating a de-escalation of the confrontation. Convinced that a solution to this conflict can be found only through negotiations and not through military means, we renew our appeal to all parties to the conflict to create conditions that will facilitate a peaceful settlement.

121. Nor has it been possible to neutralize another dangerous crisis area of recent years, one which affects Europe directly—the Middle East. I should like to express our profound concern at the serious situation prevailing in that region, which was recently even aggravated by the flare-up of military activities.

122. Although the United Nations has not been able to find a solution to this deep-rooted conflict, it has taken a number of steps in the Middle East crisis which, we are convinced, could be of considerable help in settling the conflict. In its resolution 242 (1967), the Security Council has established the basis for a solution in the Middle East. Austria fully supports that resolution and considers it imperative that conditions should be created which would enable Ambassador Jarring, whose impartiality and objectivity are universally recognized, to activate his mission in order to pave the way for a settlement of the dispute. During the past year repeated efforts to reach a solution in the Middle East conflict have been undertaken but we regret that these efforts have not produced tangible results. In view of the complexity of the problem, we feel that partial arrangements could constitute a valuable first step on the road to a comprehensive solution.

123. The current year has brought into the forefront of our concern another crisis with grave consequences and, inevitably, with international repercussions. The tragic succession of events in East Pakistan gives cause for deep dismay. Millions of people have sought refuge in India. The immense sufferings of the population of this region must prompt generous international aid. We appreciate the efforts of the Secretary-General in this context. Austria is to be counted among those that have already contributed to international humanitarian assistance for the people concerned, and we shall endeavour to continue our aid. Tragic events on such a vast scale call for combined assistance by all peoples and for purposeful action by the United Nations. Here, indeed, lies a genuine field of action for all members of the international community.

124. At the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that, as the Secretary-General has pointed out: "... the

basic problem can be solved only if a political solution based on reconciliation and the respect of humanitarian principles is achieved" [A/8401/Add.1, para. 191].

125. It is also extremely regrettable that there has been no improvement in the situation in the southern part of Africa where, as the result of a policy of racial discrimination raised to the status of official doctrine, a centre of unrest and conflict has been created. In view of the persistence of this situation, which has preoccupied the General Assembly for many years, I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate the firm rejection by the Austrian Government of any policy of discrimination, and of the *apartheid* policy in particular. We have full understanding for the concern felt by the African States at this problem and for the efforts of the United Nations aimed at eliminating this policy by peaceful means.

126. In my statement before the General Assembly last year [1855th meeting], I welcomed the decision of the Security Council, as reflected in its resolution 284 (1970), requesting an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding "the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia"⁹. The position which the Court has now taken in its advisory opinion⁹ flows logically from earlier decisions of this Organization which placed Namibia under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The highest judicial organ of the United Nations has thus clearly established the illegality of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. The Security Council and the General Assembly will have to take the Opinion of the Court into very serious consideration. I am convinced that, ultimately, justice and equality, rather than the doctrine of racial inequality and racial prejudice, will come to bear also in southern Africa.

127. I have already emphasized the merits of a retrospective review over a longer period of time in assessing the work of the United Nations. This appears to be of particular relevance for the efforts regarding disarmament and the control and limitation of armament.

128. Recent years have brought us a series of concrete and significant, though admittedly marginal, international agreements on the limitation and control of armaments: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex], the partial test-ban Treaty,¹⁰ the outer space Treaty,¹¹ and, last year, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [resolution 2660 (XXV), annex].

129. Hopefully, we shall be able to take a further step at this year's session: a convention on the prohibition of the

⁹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

¹⁰ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹¹ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction. Austria supports the efforts to bring about such a convention and will advocate the adoption of a final draft by the General Assembly at its current session.

130. Nevertheless, we consider it essential that such a convention should be followed by an early agreement on a similar convention on chemical weapons. The 1925 Geneva Protocol¹² constitutes a good basis in this respect.

131. In this context I wish to stress the importance of fully implementing all disarmament agreements that have already been concluded. Of particular importance is the activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only recently, on behalf of the Austrian Government, I signed in Vienna an Agreement between Austria and the IAEA on Safeguards as called for in article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, making Austria one of the first States to conclude such an agreement with the IAEA.

132. I should like to appeal to the nuclear Powers to honour the obligations they have accepted in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to engage in negotiations on effective measures relating to a cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. We do recognize, however, the determined efforts made by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks held alternately in Vienna and Helsinki. The hope seems to be justified that an agreement between the two Powers will promote confidence between them and in this way reduce the dangerous threat to the survival of mankind.

133. Austria has always supported and will continue to support all measures and initiatives aimed at achieving genuine disarmament and control of armaments. In this spirit we welcome the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference.

134. No continent throughout its history has had to suffer the terrible consequences of the use of force as much as Europe. It is therefore understandable that Austria, located at the centre of that continent and particularly affected by the conflagrations of past decades, should regard the maintenance of peace, stability and security in Europe as one of the principal concerns of its foreign policy. We consequently welcome all efforts towards strengthening security in Europe. We therefore welcomed last year the signing of the treaties between the Soviet Union, Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany and we now welcome the signing on 3 September of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin as significant steps in this direction.

135. The time now appears ripe to proceed to more active preparation of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe. We continue to give our full support to such a conference.

136. Austria's desire to create a climate of mutual confidence in its part of Europe has been and continues to

be the guideline for all its efforts to solve by negotiations all problems with neighbouring States.

137. In this spirit, a problem which particularly preoccupies Austria and which has for many years strained the relations between Austria and Italy could be brought closer to a solution by negotiation: the problem of South Tyrol.

138. It will be recalled that the General Assembly dealt with the problem in 1960 and 1961 and in its resolutions 1497 (XV) and 1661 (XVI) urged Austria and Italy to resume negotiations with a view to finding a solution for all differences relating to the implementation of the Paris agreement of 5 September 1946.¹³ The purpose of the Paris agreement is to guarantee the German-speaking inhabitants of the Province of Bozen complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants, within the framework of special provisions to safeguard the ethnical character and the cultural and economic development of the German-speaking population.

139. Last year, I was able to inform the General Assembly that, after nine years of efforts, Austria and Italy had agreed on a proposal for the solution of their differences, with each party reserving its legal position. The proposal provides for an extension of the autonomy of South Tyrol by the passing of a constitutional law, ordinary laws, executive regulations under the constitutional law and administrative decrees, in accordance with a time-table called "calendar of operations".

140. I am glad to be able to inform the Assembly today that Austria and Italy have made further progress in implementing the calendar of operations since the last session of the General Assembly. Thus, the constitutional law on the extension of the autonomy of South Tyrol was given its first reading by the Italian Parliament in June of this year. The second reading is under way. In July of this year the two Governments signed a treaty according to which the provisions of chapter I of the European Convention for the peaceful settlement of disputes¹⁴ should be applicable to disputes between Austria and Italy regarding the interpretation and application of bilateral agreements between the two States, even in those cases where the disputes involve facts or situations relating to a time prior to the entry into force of that Convention.

141. There is good reason to expect that the aforementioned constitutional law will be given final approval by the Italian Parliament in the course of the coming months.

142. The Italian Government has, with two exceptions, already introduced drafts of the ordinary laws provided for in addition to the constitutional law; I do not wish to dwell on these two exceptions at this moment, on the assumption that the relevant drafts will be introduced in the near future.

143. The progress so far achieved in the implementation of the calendar of operations has resulted in a noticeable further improvement in Austro-Italian relations. This found

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

¹³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 49 (1950), No. 747, annex IV.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 320 (1959), No. 4646.

clear expression during my official visit to Italy in July of this year. There is good reason to assume that the present development, based on the implementation, in letter and in spirit, of the still outstanding measures for South Tyrol, and a sympathetic attitude on the part of the Italian Government towards the needs of the South Tyrolean ethnic group, may lead to ever closer and more friendly relations between the two neighbouring countries, Austria and Italy. Austria is sincerely interested in such a development.

144. Permit me now to touch upon three subjects in regard to which I consider increased activity by the United Nations to be both valuable and necessary.

145. First of all there is the problem of international aid in natural disasters and similar cases. Repeatedly in past years we have been deeply moved by such events as they occurred in different regions of the world and in differing circumstances. We wish to pay a high tribute to the work of the International Red Cross and other national and international relief organizations in this field. We are also aware of the important assistance that many Governments render to the victims of such disasters. The United Nations has also been able to help in past years, though to a limited extent.

146. Yet it seems to me that the United Nations could play a more dynamic part whenever such disasters occur. Human tragedies on a scale such as we have experienced in the natural catastrophes of past years call for much more generous and effective international aid within the framework of our Organization.

147. The present session of the General Assembly will receive reports from the Secretary-General and recommendations by the Economic and Social Council in this connexion. The Austrian delegation will strongly support all efforts towards a fundamental reshaping and a considerable strengthening of the effectiveness of the role of the United Nations in international disaster relief and will advocate concrete measures to ensure that our objectives can in fact be achieved.

148. A second problem which would require a stronger involvement of the United Nations is that of the control of narcotic and other drugs. Austria fully supports recent initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General and designed to give the United Nations a more significant part to play in the international drive against drug abuse.

149. There is a third point which, in my view, demands particular attention by the United Nations. The problems of the younger generation have assumed increased importance for all Governments. For the United Nations it is imperative that youth should continue to feel involved in the work of the Organization, and it will be of special importance for the United Nations to seek a new commitment of the younger generation to the purposes and the ideals of the United Nations. Austria intends to submit specific proposals to this effect in due course.

150. In recent years the United Nations has considerably widened the scope of its activities. The Organization has directed its attention to a series of technical and scientific areas which require new and imaginative patterns of international co-operation. Austria supports this trend, as we believe that it will in turn favourably influence the political scene by eliminating possible areas of friction.

151. We are happy that two world-wide organizations which have produced such new approaches to international co-operation in the fields of atomic energy and industrial development have their headquarters in Vienna. In acting as host country to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO] we have given concrete proof of our belief in and our support of the United Nations. Let me recall here that the Austrian Government has put provisional accommodation at the disposal of those two organizations thus enabling them to become fully operational.

152. As to the planning and the construction of the permanent headquarters of the IAEA and UNIDO in Vienna, the Austrian Government and the City of Vienna, after consultation with the two organizations, have made a final decision on the most suitable design. The size of the project has also been decided upon. Planning in detail, which is done in contact with the two organizations, has already started. Construction is expected to begin in the near future. The Austrian Government and the City of Vienna will provide, at their own expense, office accommodation for a total of 4,500 persons by 1981. With the completion of the construction project in the above-mentioned size—which represents approximately a doubling of the original Austrian offer—the Austrian Government considers its obligations towards the United Nations in this respect as fulfilled.

153. In adopting the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade [resolution 2626 (XXV)] the United Nations last year enacted a bold and forward-looking global concept for economic and social development. We have now entered the phase of giving shape and effect to the programme as set out in that historic document, and of devising the necessary machinery to review and appraise the progress achieved. This task will require the streamlining of action and the increased deployment of the United Nations machinery as well as maximum co-ordination within the United Nations system. In dealing with the various and complex organizational aspects of implementing the Development Strategy, our main preoccupation must be to ensure that the momentum which has been engendered by the adoption of the Strategy is not lost. My Government is ready to support all measures which will enable the United Nations to meet the challenge of this decade. We pledge this support in our firm belief that economic and social progress form the indispensable basis for peace, freedom and justice.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

