



# Asamblea General

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## Consejo de Derechos Humanos

40º período de sesiones

25 de febrero a 22 de marzo de 2019

Tema 2 de la agenda

**Informe anual del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas  
para los Derechos Humanos e informes de la Oficina  
del Alto Comisionado y del Secretario General**

### **Nota verbal de fecha 19 de marzo de 2019 dirigida a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos por la Misión Permanente de Turquía ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra**

La Misión Permanente de la República de Turquía ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra y otras organizaciones internacionales en Suiza saluda atentamente a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos y tiene el honor de transmitir una copia de una carta del Vice Primer Ministro y Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Turca de Chipre Septentrional, Prof. Kudret Özersay (véase el anexo), en la que se expresa la opinión turcochipriota acerca del informe de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la cuestión de los derechos humanos en Chipre (A/HRC/40/22), que se ha presentado al Consejo de Derechos Humanos en su 40º período de sesiones.

La Misión Permanente de la República de Turquía agradecería que la presente nota verbal y su anexo\* se distribuyeran debidamente como documento del 40º período de sesiones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos.

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\* Se reproduce tal como se recibió, en el idioma en que se presentó únicamente.



*[Inglés únicamente]*

**Annex to the note verbale dated 19 March 2019 from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights**

**Letter dated 13 March 2019 of H.E. Prof. Kudret Özersay, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus addressed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights**

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's Report on the "Question of human rights in Cyprus", dated 6 February 2019 (A/HRC/40/22), covering the period from 1 December 2017 to 30 November 2018, and enclose, herewith, the factual comments of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) including our assessment of the various factual errors and omissions pertaining to this Report.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to emphasize that although the TRNC is not at present able to be a party to the international systems on human rights and freedoms due to the unacceptable and unjust status quo, we are ready to work with Your esteemed Organisation with a view to protecting and promoting human rights in the TRNC in line with the implementations and standards enshrined in international human rights instruments, which are also embodied in the TRNC Constitution. I believe that the direct channel of communication between Your Office and our authorities, which has enabled us to provide first-hand information regarding the situation of human rights in the TRNC, is a first step towards this end. I hope and trust that we will continue to build on this valuable working relationship as regards human rights issues.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Prof. Kudret Özersay  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

## Attachment

### **Factual comments of the Turkish Cypriot side regarding the report of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the question of human rights in Cyprus (A/HRC/40/22)**

- One of the most discernible features of the Report is the direct link made between the so-called “division” of the island and the difficulties faced on the implementation of international human rights standards throughout the island. This is too hasty an approach. The problem in the absence of a negotiated settlement on the island is, in fact, the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot administration to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriot side, the reason for its reluctance to communicate and cooperate on issues of mutual concern, including human rights issues. More importantly, the fact that the international organisations also fall short of communicating and cooperating with the Turkish Cypriot side, even on humanitarian matters, is contributing to the difficulties in this regard. References in paragraphs throughout the report, including paragraph 8, 11 and 64, omit to diagnose these reasons. The Turkish Cypriot side has repeatedly stated its intention to communicate and cooperate directly with the Greek Cypriot side on issues of mutual concern, within the spirit of solving problems and building trust.

The fact that the UN Secretary-General was inclined to urge the sides to develop mechanisms for cooperation in his most recent report dated 11 January 2019 (S/2019/37), which is also echoed in UN Security Council Resolution 2453 dated 30 January 2019, is testimony to this need. In the said Report, the UN Secretary General clearly states that “... I encourage the sides to consider developing, with support from UNFICYP, their own mechanisms for alleviating tensions, be they of a military, police or civilian nature”.

The establishment of such a mechanism enabling the direct communication and cooperation between the two sides on the island will undoubtedly help eliminate the existing and deep-rooted mistrust between the two peoples, create interdependency amongst them and act as an important factor facilitating a negotiated settlement. In this regard, instead of simply attributing human rights issues on the island to lack of a settlement, the international community should encourage the immediate establishment of the said mechanism. The Turkish Cypriot side is ready to take the necessary steps towards the implementation of such a mechanism, which would undoubtedly enable the sides to cooperate on human rights matters of mutual concern as well. The international community’s communication and cooperation directly with the Turkish Cypriot side would set an example and encourage the Greek Cypriot side in this regard.

- The Introduction section of the Report fails to provide an accurate assessment of the political situation on the island. Firstly, I wish to put forward our opposition to the reference in the Report to the so called “Government of the Republic of Cyprus”. This reflects neither the realities nor the legal situation on the island. Ever since the forcible expulsion in 1963 of the Turkish Cypriot co-founder partner from the Government of the 1960 partnership Republic, there has been no single constitutional Government representing both peoples of the island or capable of representing, legally or factually, the whole of Cyprus. Each side has since ruled itself, exercising sovereignty over its own territory, while the Greek Cypriot side has continued to unlawfully claim that it is the “Government of Cyprus”. The Turkish Cypriot people’s representatives are those who have been democratically elected by the Turkish Cypriots under the Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It is unfortunate that the UN, well-aware of these realities, is acting oblivious to them, thus reinforcing the imparity between the two sides on the island,

which is the main stumbling block in the efforts towards a fair and viable settlement in Cyprus.

The reference in paragraph 10 of the Report to a “bi-zonal bi-communal federation with political equality” is not in line with the aforementioned report of the UN Secretary General dated 11 January (S/2019/37) (as well as on his Good Offices Mission dated 15 October 2018 (S/2018/919)), which does not put the two sides in a straitjacket in terms of the type of settlement, but rather states that prior to resuming full-fledged negotiations, the sides should agree on terms of reference “which would constitute a consensus starting point for meaningful negotiations leading to a settlement within the foreseeable future” (paragraph 3), also encouraging “the development of novel ideas to help to bridge persistent differences of views” (paragraph 49).

The Turkish Cypriot side welcomes the approach which calls upon the sides, as part of “terms of reference”, to first agree on a consensus starting point, a common vision, regarding a settlement to the Cyprus issue.

Ultimately, to this day, it has been the lack of an overlapping vision between the two sides, namely the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side to share power and prosperity – the essential elements of a federation – which led to the overwhelming rejection of all efforts to reach a settlement by the Greek Cypriot side. Greek Cypriot leader Anastasiadis’ recent statements are testimony to the unchanged nature of the Greek Cypriot mentality, in which he has outwardly rejected the effective participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the decision-making mechanisms of a future partnership, going so far as to state in a television interview on 18 December 2018 that rotational presidency – the fundamental component of political equality – was no longer on the table.

- As regards paragraph 7 of the Report, reference to the Greek Cypriot side’s baseless claims of ‘illegal occupation’ is unacceptable and has no place in a report on human rights. In reality, the only occupation in Cyprus remains, after 50 years, the occupation of the seat of government of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot administration. Turkey rightfully and legally intervened on the Island in July 1974, in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, with a view to putting an end to violence and suppression perpetrated against the Turkish Cypriot people by the Cypriot side between 1963 and 1974 and preventing annexation of the Island to Greece. Moreover, there is no reference to “illegal occupation” in UN Security Council resolutions on Cyprus. Hence, this language, which is not used in any UN document, should not be employed in the report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- Paragraph 8, which refers to the information provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Cyprus constitutes a misrepresentation of the issue of refugees. There exists a good working relationship between our authorities and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Cyprus. In cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot side provides safe passage to refugees who arrive in North Cyprus with the intention of crossing to South Cyprus. Moreover, the refugees are granted the right to be interviewed by agents of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Cyprus in order to decipher their true intention upon coming to our country. Given the fact that the TRNC authorities are working with UNHCR authorities on the island, it is a misrepresentation to claim that limited information is available on the presence of asylum seekers.
- Paragraph 9 of the Report gives the impression that all “12 bicomunal Technical Committees” are operating smoothly. In fact, since the inception of these committees, the Greek Cypriot side has not shown the necessary political will to enable various works of the Committees to bear fruit. Following the collapse of the Cyprus Conference in 2017, however, the Greek Cypriot side has unilaterally halted the work of many of the Committees by using the lack of a political process on the island as an excuse. To give an example, the Greek Cypriot side made a unilateral

request to halt the work of the *ad hoc* Committee on EU preparation, arguably one of the most important Technical Committees. This has cast a shadow on the sincerity of the Greek Cypriot side to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriot side to elevate various sectors in North Cyprus to European standards and to build trust between the two sides. In fact, the only Committee which is working effectively is the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, likely because there is a mutual need on both sides of the island to restore the common cultural heritage on the island.

- The reference, in paragraph 10, to the Secretary-General's calls on the sides to achieve more economic and social parity through Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) should not be made to both sides, since it is the Greek Cypriot side which upholds policies aimed at further isolating the Turkish Cypriot people in all fields of life. As stated in the above paragraph, the Greek Cypriot side halted the work of the *ad hoc* Committee on European Union preparation, the aim of which was to achieve economic and social parity between the two sides on the island. In this regard, the Greek Cypriot side has created obstacles regarding implementation of the EU Green Line Regulation, which intended to enable trade and transfer of goods between the two sides, bringing the Turkish Cypriot economy on par with the Greek Cypriot side. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot side prevented the approval of the Direct Trade Regulation, which aimed at establishing direct trade channels between the Turkish Cypriot side and the European Union. Hence, the Report should not tie the issue of achieving greater parity between the two sides solely to the implementation of CBMs, which the Greek Cypriot side often blocks. While CBMs are one way to go about achieving parity, another way is the lifting of the inhuman isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot side. It is unacceptable that the isolation is referred in a report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as a mere "concern" of the Turkish Cypriots, when in fact, it is a violation of human rights which affects the Turkish Cypriot people in all fields of life ranging from trade to travel, from culture to sports and representation.

As it will be recalled, following the simultaneous and separate referenda on both sides on the island on the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan in 2004 (aka the Annan Plan), the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, stated in his Report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437) that "I would hope they (members of the Security Council) can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

## Section III

### A. Right to life and the question of missing persons

#### Demining

- Paragraph 14 accurately refers to the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side is ready to clear all four minefields adjacent to the Buffer Zone as a package, but omits to mention the constructive Turkish Cypriot proposal in this regard. In fact, the Turkish Cypriot side remains committed to cooperation for a mine-free island, as demonstrated by its constructive proposals, which were submitted via the UN in 2014 by the then President H.E Dr. Derviş Eroğlu in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2135 (2014), echoed in 2015 by the incumbent President H.E Mustafa Akıncı, and finally reiterated on 8 October 2018 by a letter sent to the H.E Elizabeth Spehar, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNFICYP in conformity with the Security Council Resolution 2430 (2018) for demining of the entire island, in a comprehensive manner, commencing with the Buffer Zone (Annex I).

- The Greek Cypriot side, however, did not even respond to any of our proposals and has, once again, opted instead to submit a request for an extension of its deadline to fulfil its mine clearance obligations stemming from Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, namely the Ottawa Convention, to 2022, which is testimony to the fact that it has no intention to clear the mines or for that matter cooperate with the Turkish Cypriot side on the matter. This very hypocritical approach of the Greek Cypriot side confirms that its main purpose is to exploit the political situation on the island even on such a sensitive and humanitarian issue, ignoring the danger and suffering the mines can cause as well as utilising this humanitarian issue positively to build confidence between the two sides on the island through cooperation.
- Most recently, since the Greek Cypriot side did not accept to clear all mines, the UN made a proposal for clearance of a certain number of minefields from both sides. The Turkish Cypriot side has agreed to the reciprocal clearance of 9 minefields on each side of the island as yet another testimony to our good will and constructive approach on this issue. The clearance of these minefields, however, is not adequate and the Turkish Cypriot side maintains its view that the entire island should be cleared of all mines. We hope that this step will be the first towards the eventual clearance of all mines and that it will not be used as a tool by the Greek Cypriot side to prevent demining of the whole island.

### Missing persons

- Paragraph 15 and 18 wrongfully refer to the Turkish Cypriot authorities as the “Turkish authorities”, as if to imply that the counterpart of the Greek Cypriot side in Cyprus is Turkey. This is factually incorrect and should be rectified in future reports. The reality is that the Turkish Cypriot authorities exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction within their own territory, i.e. North Cyprus. Moreover, the fact that the negotiations to find a settlement to the Cyprus issue are also conducted between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides is testimony to the fact that the only counterpart of the Greek Cypriot side is the Turkish Cypriot side.
- The wording regarding missing persons in 1963–1964 and 1974 gives the false impression that both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots equally went missing during these periods of heightened conflict. However, 1963–1964 were the years of mass atrocities targeted at the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot side. To be more specific, starting with 1963, the Turkish Cypriots were forcefully ejected from the state, killed on a mass scale, and forced into enclaves comprising 3% of the island. The persecution of the Turkish Cypriots at the hands of the Greek Cypriots continued for 11 years until 1974. Similarly, 1974 was the time when Greece staged a coup d’état in Cyprus with the aim of annexing the island to Greece (Enosis), which, again, led to mass killings of Turkish Cypriots, ultimately necessitating the rightful intervention of Turkey under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to stop the total extermination of the Turkish Cypriots on the island as well as Enosis. These emphases and distinctions should be made in future reports.
- While in paragraph 18 there is a reference to the decision of the Ministers’ Deputies of the Council of Europe dated 7 June 2018, unfortunately, the Report fails to acknowledge that the Greek Cypriot side has not been pursuing a proactive approach to providing the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) with all necessary assistance to contribute to the CMP in achieving tangible results. As the Ministers’ Deputies are responsible for the supervision of the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, it is not in the best position to assess what the other responsible parties are doing to help CMP achieve tangible results.
- In fact, when the jurisprudence of Greek Cypriot “courts” is examined, it becomes clear that the Greek Cypriot side denies its procedural obligation under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For example, in appeal no. 381/2010, the Greek Cypriot “Supreme Court”, held that the Convention did not impose any obligation on the Greek Cypriot side to locate, excavate and exhume the bodies of missing persons. In other words, the Greek Cypriot side denies the obligation to cooperate with the CMP to discover the bodies of missing persons and to assist with

exhumations and excavations when it comes to its investigations into the fate of missing persons. This outright rejection of obligation is now before the European Court of Human Rights as the relatives of the missing person brought an application before the Court and it was communicated to the Greek Cypriot side on 21 November 2017 (Application no. 58699/15, “*Georgia VASSILIOU and others v. Cyprus*”).

- The Greek Cypriot “court’s interpretation to deny responsibility about missing persons is in line with the practice of the Greek Cypriot “authorities”. In 2016, it was agreed that the Greek Cypriot side would allow the CMP to undertake excavations in various Greek Cypriot military zones, but this request was not accommodated for about 8 months. Also, the Greek Cypriot side is yet to give any response to the call of the CMP to search their military or police reports, log books, medical reports or any other document that may include information about burial sites or remains belonging to missing persons. None of the criminal investigations conducted into the deaths of Turkish Cypriot missing persons resulted in either the identification of the perpetrators or the prosecution of those identified. The Greek Cypriot side did not provide the families of the Turkish Cypriot victims with any redress, including adequate compensation and psychological rehabilitation.
- The Report should have referred to the calls of the Human Rights Committee as stated in paragraph 10 of its Concluding Observations in the Fourth Periodic Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights where the Human Rights Committee asked the Greek Cypriot side to “... provide support to the Committee on Missing Persons and take immediate steps to investigate all outstanding cases of missing persons from both the Greek and Turkish communities in an effective, transparent, independent and impartial manner” and “...also ensure that the families of the victims obtain appropriate redress, including adequate compensation and psychological rehabilitation, and that the perpetrators are prosecuted and punished as appropriate.”<sup>1</sup>
- On the other hand, the Report also ignores that the Turkish Cypriot authorities have been pursuing a proactive approach and further accommodating excavation requests of the CMP by providing it permission to excavate in an eleventh military area where the understanding reached with the CMP was to excavate in ten military areas per year on the basis of its work plan for the year 2017. Furthermore, the Report fails to state that an archive committee was established in Northern Cyprus, which is comprised of military authorities, police authorities, experts from the Ministry of Health and National Archives as well as other relevant units of the Government, to examine the relevant archives for the information requested by the CMP regarding the location of missing persons. This committee has been actively cooperating and in fact answering to the specific requests of the CMP for information in various cases. In this context, CMP was given the aerial photographs of parts of the island from 1974 which has provided very useful archival information to the CMP in its search for places of burial.
- The Report should also note that on 21 September 2017, Ministers’ Deputies in the Council of Europe (CM-DH) took note of these developments with interest.<sup>2</sup> It should also include that progress has been made in the criminal investigations conducted into the death of Greek Cypriot missing persons. So far, our Attorney-General’s Office completed 197 of the files and shared them with the families.
- Up to 30 November 2018, the CMP has exhumed the remains of 1,200 persons on both sides of the island as referred to in the Report. To date, the remains of 914 missing persons, of a total of 2,002, have been identified and returned to their respective families. Access to 30 military areas in North Cyprus was given by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Given this proactive approach of the Turkish Cypriot

<sup>1</sup> CCPR/C/CYP/CO/4, 30 April 2015, para. 10.

<sup>2</sup> CM/Del/Dec(2017)1294/H46-30.

side, reference to the call in paragraph 18 to provide unhindered access to various sites is unnecessary.

- Whilst referring to the *Varnava v. Turkey* case, the Report fails to point out that this is another solid example of how Greek Cypriot side displays clear intent to divert the focus of work undertaken by the Committee through politicising the issue before the European Court of Human Rights. This intent harms the whole mandate of the CMP, agreed by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders, by promoting a culture of distrust and serves the detriment of prospective constructive endeavours of the Committee which has achieved considerable progress since its establishment. It is clearly evident that the Turkish Cypriot side has demonstrated cooperation and due effort to accommodate any request of excavation by CMP.
- Moreover, the assertion in paragraphs 19 and 34 that Turkey decided not to participate in the discussions is misleading in the absence of the explanations advanced for this reasoned decision. As it was explained in the Committee's meeting of June 2018, in the case of Loizidou, even though it has been clearly established that the Turkish side has fulfilled its own responsibilities, a fact repeatedly confirmed by the independent assessment of the Secretariat and supported by the majority of member states, the Ministers' Deputies failed to uphold its collective responsibility which was to proceed to adopt a final resolution to close supervision. Putting political considerations above legal criteria thus obstructed fair conclusions and undermined the Convention system. As a result, the Turkish side decided to withhold its cooperation until this shortcoming is rectified.

### **Non-discrimination**

- In paragraph 22, it is stated that many “displaced” people moved in Cyprus, but it is not at all mentioned that these moves were based on the *Voluntary* Exchange of Population Agreement of 1975 between the two sides. As a result of the said Agreement, for more than 50 years, the Turkish Cypriot people, as well as the Greek Cypriot people, have been living peacefully side by side in their own areas.
- Moreover, it should be noted that some Greek Cypriots and Maronites chose to remain in North Cyprus, such as the Greek Cypriots and Maronites who currently reside in Karpaz, Karpasa, Koruçam, Sipahi, Hisarköy, and a number of Turkish Cypriots chose to remain in South Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot side attaches utmost care to their well-being. They have access to all the necessary facilities and services in North Cyprus that are afforded to TRNC citizens, including access to health, education, religious and municipal services.
- Paragraph 23 refers in passing to the case of the 11 Greek Cypriots who attacked Turkish Cypriot vehicles, but omits to mention the numerous other incidents, which will be enumerated below (pages 30–36). Furthermore, the fact that the prosecutions have been ongoing for 4 years since 2015 without any judgements yet shows the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side to punish these individuals.
- The wording employed in paragraph 24 to concerns regarding the situation of certain women and girls, “including those from the Turkish Cypriot community along with other minority groups” gives the false impression that the Turkish Cypriots are a “minority group”. According to the 1960 Treaties governing Cyprus, there are two politically equal communities in Cyprus, namely Turkish Cypriot people and Greek Cypriot people. On the other hand, Latins, Maronites and Armenians are religious groups. As a testimony to this fact, as is known, the negotiations to find a settlement to the Cyprus issue are conducted between the two politically equal sides on the island.
- We welcome the reference in paragraph 25 to the decision taken in May 2018 by the Turkish Cypriot Council of Ministers to lift the customs-duty on the aid delivered by UNFICYP to the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in North Cyprus. This decision was taken under the presumption that the consumables transported to Northern Cyprus would not be sold in our local markets or used for any other



commercial activity. Any acts as such are prohibited and punishable under our relevant laws and legislation.

- The Greek Cypriot administration unfortunately politicizes the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in North Cyprus by referring to them as the “enclaved”. In reality, the Greek Cypriots and Maronites who have chosen to reside in Northern Cyprus enjoy access to religious, educational and health facilities in the North and are able to benefit from all health, municipal, etc., services that are afforded to TRNC citizens. They themselves deny the claim that they are enclaved, as was voiced in an interview conducted with the Greek Cypriot residents in the Karpaz. When the reporter mentioned that the purpose of his visit was to see the “enclaved people” in the region, the subjects replied “Enclaved? We are not enclaved!” (Politis newspaper, 10 October 2017). Therefore, referring to this issue as “humanitarian” is factually incorrect.
- Another unfortunate development since last year’s report is that the present Report has removed the sentence “UNFICYP continued to engage with relevant authorities to identify issues regarding access to health, welfare and educational services for Turkish Cypriots residing in the south”, as if these issues have been resolved. In fact, they have not been resolved or even improved. (Please see section ‘Right to Education’)

### **Freedom of movement**

- This section of the Report, particularly paragraph 27, is alarmingly devoid of the facts which represent the true problems regarding freedom of movement on the island. It is the Greek Cypriot policy of discrimination against Turkish Cypriots and some third party nationals which is limiting this freedom. TRNC imposes no restrictions on the freedom of movement on anyone crossing to and from North Cyprus to South Cyprus.
- The inability of persons whose ethnic origins are from Turkey to cross to the South was included in last year’s Report. However, the same issue, which persists to this day, has been omitted from the present Report. The alarming reality is that many Turkish Cypriot citizens are prevented from crossing to South Cyprus with their Turkish Cypriot ID cards, whether for miscellaneous purposes or in order to fulfil their religious beliefs, on the basis of their ethnic origin or the origin of their ancestors, namely Turkey. This Greek Cypriot policy is not only discriminatory on the basis of ethnic origin, but also constitutes a violation of freedom of movement, freedom of religion and access to religious sites in South Cyprus as well.
- It should not be forgotten that all Turkish Cypriot citizens, regardless of their origins, voted at the separate and simultaneous referenda for the comprehensive Cyprus settlement plan (known as the Annan Plan) in 2004, and will also do so in an eventual referendum on a future settlement plan. This arbitrary Greek Cypriot policy which refuses crossings of the said Turkish Cypriot citizens to South Cyprus can only serve to damage confidence between the two peoples of the island.
- As the Turkish Cypriot side, within the framework of the call by the UN Secretary-General Report dated 6 July 2018 (S/2018/676) and UN Security Council Resolution 2430 (2018) to agree on CBMs, we made a proposal, through the UN to the Greek Cypriot side to cease this discriminatory policy which would contribute to the atmosphere between the two peoples on the island. However, the Greek Cypriot administration rejected this.
- The Report also ignores the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration also inhibits freedom of movement on the island, of third-country nationals who arrive in South Cyprus via Greek Cypriot airports and who declare intent to cross to and stay in hotels in North Cyprus. Hence, their freedom of movement is being prevented even before they reach the crossing points. A memorandum by the Greek Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as a circular of the Department of Migration, issued a strong warning to foreign nationals who wish to cross from South Cyprus to the TRNC if they intend to stay in North Cyprus.

- Regarding paragraph 28, the only reason EU citizens are able to cross from South to North and from North to South without any hindrance is because the EU Commission has warned the Greek Cypriot administration that it will not tolerate restrictions on freedom of movement of EU nationals in Cyprus. On the other hand, we welcome the reference that “Turkish Cypriot busses carrying European Union citizens were still not permitted to cross to the south of the island”.
- The Greek Cypriot administration also limits freedom of movement of third country nationals entering the island from North Cyprus, not allowing them to cross to South Cyprus and at times arresting them at the crossing points.

### Property rights

- It is extremely disappointing to observe that a human rights report refers to property rights of one of the peoples on the island, namely the Greek Cypriot people, whilst totally ignoring to mention the situation on the ground in South Cyprus concerning the property rights of the Turkish Cypriot people.
- The property issue does not solely affect the Greek Cypriot people. Since the events of the 1960’s, many Turkish Cypriots were forced to abandon their properties in South Cyprus, for which they are still unable to claim any sort of compensation or any other effective remedy due to the “Custodianship Law” in the South. Two such examples are the very land where the Larnaca and Paphos Airports in South Cyprus are built, on which Turkish Cypriot owners have property claims. It would be ironic if tourists were turned away from airports in South Cyprus based on claims of disputed property issues, while the Greek Cypriot side itself rejects any attempt to resolve this issue. Moreover, it is hypocritical that the Greek Cypriot side attempts to dissuade tourists from staying in the very hotels that so many of their own citizens frequently stay in without any problems.
- As regards references to property in paragraphs 30–38, it should be noted that in the absence of a political settlement, the Turkish Cypriot side established the Immovable Property Commission in 2005 as a gesture of good will, so that Greek Cypriots could apply for remedies for their individual property claims. The said Commission has been declared as ‘an effective local remedy’ by the European Court of Human Rights. On the contrary, there is no such comparable remedy offered for Turkish Cypriot properties in the South.
- Paragraph 36 gives the false impression that the Greek Cypriot side has made an opening regarding Turkish Cypriot properties in South Cyprus by issuing a publication of data regarding Turkish Cypriot properties. What is important is the real situation on the ground concerning Turkish Cypriot properties.
- The truth of the matter is that the Greek Cypriot side maintains complete control and alleged ownership of these properties under the “Custodianship Law”. This is a clear violation of the right to possession and property of Turkish Cypriot owners. Despite having previously conveyed our position and issues regarding our property rights in South Cyprus to the OHCHR, it is difficult to comprehend that the Report suffices to briefly skim over this issue and give the impression that opening a website is sufficient to address the serious violations against the Turkish Cypriots regarding the issue of property.
- With regard to the property claims of Turkish Cypriots in the Greek Cypriot side, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the amended version of the “Turkish-Cypriot Properties Law 139/1991”, which was passed by the Greek Cypriot Parliament, to be an accessible and effective framework of redress in respect of the complaints about interference with the property owned by Turkish Cypriots.<sup>3</sup> The Court also observed that in time the effectiveness of the amended Greek Cypriot law would be tested by further applications made by Turkish Cypriots. In declaring

<sup>3</sup> European Court of Human Rights, “*Kazali and Others v. Cyprus*” (application No. 49247/08), decision of 6 March 2012, para. 153.

the Turkish Cypriot applications inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the ECtHR said that the compliance of the amendment “Law” with the European Convention on Human Rights could not be excluded in light of the fact that the “amendment of 7 May 2010” enabled the Turkish-Cypriot property owner in the Greek Cypriot side to lodge a case in the Greek Cypriot District Court in cases of violation of Convention rights.

- Since the decisions of the ECtHR regarding the applications lodged by Turkish Cypriot property owners, no Turkish Cypriot property owner has been successful in obtaining a judgment from the Greek Cypriot “Supreme Court” that would enable them to exhaust domestic remedies which in turn would enable the ECtHR to assess the compatibility of the said “Law” with the European Convention on Human Rights.
- The absence of a judgment by the ECtHR or an inquiry by any other monitoring organ enables the Greek Cypriot side to continue to deny providing any redress for the violation of Turkish Cypriot property rights. This is because the said “Law” deprives the Turkish Cypriot property owner from the possession of their properties and transfers possession to the Greek Cypriot “Minister of Interior” as “Custodian”. The express provisions of the said “Law” prohibit payment of compensation for the value of the Turkish Cypriot properties, even in cases of requisition and expropriation, and payment of compensation for loss of use for deprivation of possession. The lifting of custodianship that would enable the return of properties to their Turkish Cypriot owners is being denied in an arbitrary manner. While the “amendment Law” empowers the Greek Cypriot Minister to deny lifting of Custodianship for ownership of former Greek Cypriot properties in the TRNC, it does not exchange the title of such properties in the North to the Turkish Cypriot owner.<sup>4</sup> Instead, Turkish Cypriots in such cases could even be prosecuted under section 281 of the “Criminal Law”. The few cases where the Greek Cypriot “Minister of Interior” lifted custodianship, on the other hand, was to enable the Turkish Cypriots to sell their properties, far below their market value, to Greek Cypriots without any payment of loss of use by the Greek Cypriot side. In the reporting cycle, for example, the Greek Cypriot “Administrative Court” in case no. 133/2013, delivered on 27 July 2018, denied to release control over the property of a Turkish Cypriot who had died years before the enactment of the 1991 “Custodianship Law”. The “Court” held the said “Law” enabled the Greek Cypriot “Custodian” to continue its control even though the owner died in 1960, yet two refugee heirs amongst others had to relocate to the North and live in a house that was formerly owned by a Greek Cypriot in the North. This is another example of a broad interpretation of the 1991 “Law”, as amended, to ensure the Greek Cypriot side continues to control Turkish Cypriot properties without exchanging the title of the properties held by the Turkish Cypriot refugees in the North, and face the risk of prosecution.
- The ECtHR found Law No/67/2005 which set up the Immovable Property Commission in the TRNC to be an accessible and effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference with the property previously owned by Greek Cypriots in the *Demopoulos* decision.<sup>5</sup> As of 14 December 2018, 6,503 applications have been lodged with the Commission and 928 of them have been concluded through friendly settlements and 32 through formal hearing. The Commission has paid GBP 296,547,921 – to the applicants as compensation. Moreover, it has ruled for exchange and compensation in two cases, for restitution in three cases and for restitution and compensation in six cases. In one case it has

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the “judgment” of the Greek Cypriot “Supreme Court” exercising its revisional jurisdiction, (Case No. 1079 /2012), dated 22 June 22, 2015.

<sup>5</sup> *Demopoulos v. Turkey*, App. Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), para. 127.

delivered a decision for restitution after the settlement of Cyprus Issue, and in one case it has ruled for partial restitution.<sup>6</sup>

- There has been also progress with respect to the property rights of Karpaz residents and their heirs. In September 2015, the Ministers' Deputies appreciated the measures taken in its decision 1236th meeting in the "Cyprus v. Turkey" case. The measures that were welcomed in the CM-DH decision were those taken by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to ensure the Greek Cypriot Karpaz residents keep their properties by maintaining minimum contacts upon permanent departure from North Cyprus, and to recognize the property rights of their heirs as well as, the redress provided by the Immovable Property Commission as a last resort. In its independent assessment, the Secretariat confirmed that this positive evaluation of the Ministers' Deputies of the Council of Europe made in 2015 continues to be valid today.<sup>7</sup>
- Moreover, the Custodianship Law in the South further hinders the rights of Turkish Cypriot property owners, because it relinquishes these rights to the Greek Cypriot administration as the "caretaker" of these properties pending a political settlement in Cyprus. We hope that this fact will take place in future reports, to draw attention to the real reason behind the current lack of claims to the ECtHR. These facts, as well as other legal arguments and positions of the Turkish Cypriot sides regarding the property issue have been duly conveyed to Your Office in the letter dated 20 April 2018.
- Claims in paragraph 38 that UNFICYP worked to defuse tensions between civilians in the Buffer zone is a misrepresentation of the situation on the ground. Firstly, it should be noted that many tensions occur in the Buffer Zone on a regular basis. Within the reporting period, a Greek Cypriot farmer, known very well by UNFICYP, has been violating the "1988 Agricultural Area use Principles Agreement" for many years by crossing to the north of the Farming Security Line and coming as far as up to the Cease Fire Line. While doing so, the said Greek Cypriot farmer creates security concerns and tensions for the military as he violates conditions of the said agreement. The said farmer also extends its activity over the plots farmed by the Turkish Cypriots. In late December 2018, the said Greek Cypriot farmer drove its tractor towards a Turkish Cypriot farmer while they were both in the north side of the Farming Security Line and deliberately caused injuries to him. This incident occurred while the UNFICYP patrols were only monitoring but not defusing any tensions. Instead of honouring the said 1988 agreement and preventing the Greek Cypriot farmer's entry into north of the Farming Security Line, UNFICYP's suggested solution was asking both farmers to abandon the said plot. Adding damage to the situation, both military and civilian representatives of UNFICYP defended that the said agreement had lost its validity due to lapse of time and that UNFICYP had unilaterally developed a new set of rules regarding farming activity in the buffer zone. The UN overlooks the fact that its argument that the passage of time is enough to justify the unilateral withdrawal from agreements would also put into question the validity of UNFICYP's presence on the island, which was established as far back as 1964.

This unilateral and biased attempt of the UN to create a *fait accompli* regarding established practice on farming in the buffer zone is totally unacceptable and a clear violation of the already existing Agreement on the issue. Moreover, the fact that the UN is only monitoring and observing such tensions between civilians from afar rather than actually acting to defuse tensions, even when there is a clear violation, puts into question the purpose of the presence of the Force. In fact, the inertia of the Force in terms of defusing such tensions serves only to further escalate these tensions between the two sides. For these reasons, the Turkish Cypriot side maintains its stance that UNFICYP should be reviewed in terms of mandate, just as much as its operations, in light of the changing circumstances on the island. This, however, cannot be done unilaterally on matters of overlapping interest with the

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/>.

<sup>7</sup> Ministers' Deputies, Notes on the Agenda, CM/Notes/1331 dated 20 November 2018.

Turkish Cypriot side. In fact, we remain adamant that the reaching of a formal agreement/framework which arranges and defines the relationship between UNFICYP and our authorities, such as a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), would resolve many of these issues.

### **Freedom of religion or belief and cultural rights**

- It is unacceptable that although the Turkish Cypriot side has facilitated large numbers of religious services in North Cyprus, the report still refers to “serious concerns” in paragraph 44 regarding access to religious sites. On the other hand, the Report welcomes the “increase of opening hours of Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque” (para. 42) in South Cyprus, which is far from adequate to address the needs of Muslim worshippers and hence hardly constitutes a noteworthy improvement. This, unfortunately, indicates a biased and unjust approach employed by the Report.
- The huge gap in the numbers of places of worship to which access is granted by the two sides on the island is a clear testimony of the Turkish Cypriot side’s readiness and willingness to promote and protect religious freedom in the TRNC. To reiterate, this was also acknowledged in the UNFICYP report dated 6 July 2018 S/2018/676, which state that “I note and welcome the increase of authorizations to UNFICYP-supported requests provided by the Turkish Cypriot authorities.” An increase was further indicated in the most recent UNFICYP report dated 11 January 2019 (S/2019/37).
- Irrespective of the political climate on the island as regards the Cyprus issue, the Turkish Cypriot side has always attributed utmost importance to inalienable human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as to building trust between the two sides, particularly on humanitarian matters.

### **Exercise of religious freedoms in North Cyprus by Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in South Cyprus**

- Moreover, although people residing in South Cyprus are free to carry out their religious beliefs within their own borders, the TRNC upholds a policy of additionally enabling people from South Cyprus who do not reside in the TRNC to come and practice their religious beliefs in North Cyprus to the greatest extent possible.
- In this regard, mass religious ceremonies to be conducted by the followers of different faiths on either side of the island are regulated by the relevant authorities of both sides, as part of the established practice.
- The related regulation in the TRNC is only applied for requests from persons living outside of the TRNC who wish to hold mass ceremonies. As stated above, there are no requirements for individuals who wish to fulfil their religious beliefs, whether they come from Southern Cyprus or are living in the TRNC.
- The Turkish Cypriot side facilitates the requests of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites coming from South Cyprus to conduct mass religious services at religiously significant Churches and Monasteries which are open for worship and the necessary facilitation is undertaken by the Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In this vein, the Turkish Cypriot side established a mechanism where permission is readily granted, provided that the application is in line with the determined objective criteria and the right channels are used.
- In this framework, the Turkish Cypriot side evaluates the requests by Greek Cypriots and Maronites from South Cyprus for mass religious ceremonies based on 6 objective criteria:
  - (i) The day of the requested service has to be a religiously significant day (Easter, Christmas or Name Day of the Church);

- (ii) The physical condition of the religious site should be suitable to host a religious service (whether it is safe and secure to accept visitors);
  - (iii) The site should not already be in use for another purpose (i.e. museum, cultural centre, library etc.);
  - (iv) The religious site should not be situated in a military zone. (However, there are many cases where access to religious sites in military zones are regularly granted);
  - (v) There should not be complaints from the local Turkish Cypriot residents living in the vicinity of the church where a religious service will be conducted (there are cases where requests are made to hold religious services in villages where mass ethnic-cleansing by the Greek Cypriots has taken place in the past, i.e. Taşkent and Muratağa Sandallar, thus Turkish Cypriot villagers, are very sensitive and refuse to have such services in their villages);
  - (vi) Security measures need to be taken in the vicinity in order to enable smooth delivery of the religious services. However, depending on the number of people attending the religious service, the Police Department might not be able to assign the required number of police officers to the vicinity each time. In these cases, permits shall not be granted.
- The number of religious services conducted by persons not residing within the TRNC which have been facilitated by the Turkish Cypriot side have increased each year. While a total number of 38 religious services were approved in the year 2013, this number was 71 in 2014, 96 in 2015, 109 in 2016 and 83 in 2017.
  - In addition to this, as it can be seen from the enclosed list, the number of approved religious services conducted in the religious sites situated in the Turkish Cypriot side within the reporting period reached 109 by 30 November 2018 (Annex II). Hence, the claim in paragraph 44 that only 84 requests were approved is misleading, since this only represents those which were facilitated by UNFICYP, not the grand total. The fact that the Report has opted to record the figure of 84 leads us to question the objectivity of the UN. This has also led us to question the priorities of the UN: whether to encourage as many religious services as possible, or simply to report on the ones which it has itself facilitated.
  - It is of utmost importance to highlight the fact that although there are 68 churches to which access is granted for worship in the TRNC (6 of which have been opened in 2018 for use for the first time) and this number is increasing each year.
  - Please refer to the table below in order to see the list of designated churches in North Cyprus which are not subject to the abovementioned criteria and which are open for worship by the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in North Cyprus as well as those coming from outside of the TRNC (ie. from South Cyprus):

	<i>Name of the Church</i>	<i>Procedure/Requirements</i>
1*	Monastery Apostolos Andreas (Dipkarpaz – Rizokarpaso – Greek Cypriot)  Saint Mamas Church (Morphou, Greek Cypriot)  Saint Barnabas Church (Famagusta, Greek Cypriot)	These sites are open for individual visits and prayers everyday (the hours of Apostolos Andreas are at the discretion of the Greek Cypriot priest who has a key to the site, while St. Mamas and St. Barnabas are open during working hours). Prior notification is required only for <i>masses</i> in order to enable preparations.
2	Church of Agia Triada (Sipahi – Agia Triada –Greek Cypriot)	Religious services in these Churches are not subject to notification.

	<i>Name of the Church</i>	<i>Procedure/Requirements</i>
3	Church of Agios Synesios (Dipkarpaz – Rizokarpaso – Greek Cypriot)	
4	Church of Agia Triada (Dipkarpaz – Rizokarpaso – Greek Cypriot)	
5	Church of Archangelos Michael (Özhan – Asomatos – Maronite)	Religious services are subject to prior notification on Sundays.
6	Church of Agios Georgios (Koruçam – Kormakitis – Maronite)	Religious services in these Churches are not subject to notification.
7	Church of Timios Stavros (Karpaşa – Karpasia – Maronite)	
8	Church of Panagia (Hisarköy – Kamyli – Maronite)	

\* These are three of the most religiously significant sites for Christians on the island.

- Moreover, we fully support the efforts to strengthen the Inter-Religious Dialogue under the Auspices of the Embassy of Sweden (RTCYPP), which is a peacebuilding initiative with the religious leaders of Cyprus who are committed to work together for human rights, peace and reconciliation. The Office of RTCYPP was established to encourage, facilitate and serve the religious leaders' dialogue and efforts for religious freedom and peace in Cyprus and to contribute positively and constructively to the Cyprus peace talks.

#### **Religious freedoms of people residing in the TRNC**

- As regards religious freedom, everyone residing in the TRNC, whether on an individual or mass basis, has freedom of access to places of worship regardless of their religious belief. For example, different religious groups in the TRNC, such as Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, Alevi, Jehovah's Witnesses, have their own places of worship. To name a few:
  - Maronite Roman Catholics: They worship at the Church of Archangelos Michael (Özhan), Ayios Georgios (Koruçam), Timios Stavros (Karpasha), Banaiyas Mariadis Church (Hisarköy).
  - Greek Orthodox: They worship at Apostolos Andreas Monastery (Dipkarpaz), Saint Mamas Church (Güzelyurt/Morphou), Saint Barnabas Church (Famagusta), Church of Agia Triada (Sipahi-Agia Triada), Church of Agios Synesios (Dipkarpaz), Church of Agia Triada (Dipkarpaz).
  - Russian-Orthodox: Saint Georgios Church in Kyrenia (Alsancak) and Saint Banaia Church in Arapköy are open for individual visits and mass services on Sundays without any prior notice or application. Saint George Church in Kyrenia (Old Turkish Quarter) is subject to prior notice only because it is located in a privately owned premise.
  - Latin Catholics: St. Elizabeth of Hungary Church in Girne are open for individual visits and mass services without any prior notice or application since 2004.
  - Anglicans: The Panaia/Trachonas Church in Lefkoşa (Kızılbaz) is open for individual visits and mass services on Sundays without any prior application. The Nigerian community regularly uses this Church.
  - Protestants: Saint Andrew's Church in Girne city centre has been open for individual worshippers and mass services without any prior application since 2003.

- Alevis: The Cemevi Culture Complex construction process is ongoing, funded by the TRNC Government under the direction of the Alevi Culture Foundation, an NGO which is fully recognized by our Government.
- Jehovah's Witnesses: The group has two designated places of worship in Nicosia and Famagusta assigned to them by the TRNC Council of Ministers decision dated 19 February 2003 (E-338-2003).

#### **Access to religious sites in South Cyprus and protection of Muslim cultural heritage**

- It is even more alarming that in paragraph 42 of the Report the increase in the opening hours of Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque is welcomed, since the reality pertaining to access to religious sites in South Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots remains vastly insufficient, as seen below.
- There are only 8 mosques that are open to worship by Turkish Cypriots in the Greek Cypriot side, albeit during museum hours, which is not enough to fulfil the requirements of the Islamic faith. Moreover, of these 8, 3 do not even have the ablution/bathroom facilities required by the Islamic faith in order to perform the ablution ritual prior to prayer.
- Despite our calls for reciprocal respect to the rights of Turkish Cypriots in South Cyprus, Greek Cypriot restrictions on freedom of religion and belief as well as access to religious sites in South Cyprus continue. As before, throughout 2018 including the Holy month of Ramadan, Turkish Cypriots had very limited access to Mosques situated in South Cyprus as a result of the Greek Cypriot preventive policies.
- Many Muslim places of worship in South Cyprus continue to be locked at all times with no known procedures for applying for individual or collective access and/or religious pilgrimages, as was also mentioned by the UN Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Ms. Karima Bennoune, in her preliminary conclusions and observations at the end of her visit to Cyprus on 6 June 2016. As mentioned, some Mosques in South Cyprus continue to lack the necessary ablution facilities, while others, instead of being registered as "places of worship", are registered as "ancient monuments", and yet continue to be treated as museums which large numbers of tourists can visit at any time, even during prayers.
- These small number of mosques to which limited access is given include the holy Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque, one of the holiest places of worship for Muslims around the world.
- Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque, registered by the Greek Cypriot Department of Antiquities as an "ancient monument" is treated as a regular "museum" with restricted access to the site within "working hours"; i.e. 08.30–17.00 in the winter and 08.30–19.30 in the summer. This treatment is in total contradiction to the true nature of the site, which is a place of worship. Needless to say, the current restricted working hours are far from satisfying the requirements of the Muslim faith, which calls for prayer five times throughout the 24-hour day.
- Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot side does not provide the designated Imam of Hala Sultan Tekke with a key to the site, the way that the Turkish Cypriot side provides a key to a designated Greek Cypriot priest, who resides in Karpaz, to access Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the TRNC – one of the holiest sites for the Orthodox faith – whenever he deems necessary. Furthermore, although Hala Sultan Tekke is a Muslim religious site, it is kept closed by the Greek Cypriot side on three religiously significant days for Christians, namely Christmas, New Years and Easter, unless one of these days falls on a Friday, in which case special permission must be received in order to open the site for worship. Needless to say, this limits our access to this site – which is one of the holiest sites for Muslims in the world – even further.
- Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration has constructed highways passing through the land belonging to the Tekke in total disregard of the fact that the land belongs to the Evkaf. When the Greek Cypriot side is challenged regarding the



issues related to Hala Sultan Tekke, it suffices to say that the situation is as such due to the lack of settlement of the Cyprus problem.

- This clearly political approach on the part of the Greek Cypriot side is in complete contrast of the existing policy in North Cyprus regarding religious services, which has been designed to enable as many religious service requests as possible, while taking into serious consideration the safety conditions at the sites of worship.
- Within the scope of the work of the bicommunal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage (TCCH), Turkish Cypriot side proved its continuing good will by approving the restoration of Ayia Marina Church in Gürpınar village despite the fact that it is located in a military zone and granted the necessary permission for the construction of an alternative road to reach the said Church as requested by the Maronites, which was completed by the Turkish Cypriot side in 2017. Moreover, in 2018, the Turkish Cypriot side continued to demonstrate its commitment to the protection of cultural heritage on the island, and supported the work of the bicommunal TCCH to complete the conservation of three medieval churches in Northern Cyprus, namely; the Saint Anne Church, the Saint Mary of Carmelite Church, and the Saint Mary Church in the historic walled city of Famagusta.
- On the other hand, it is unfortunate that the condition of Muslim cultural heritage in the South is not adequately respected. Field studies conducted by our experts and the information gathered from Turkish Cypriots visiting South Cyprus have indicated that out of more than 130 mosques in South Cyprus, 32 of them have simply disappeared while the majority of the remaining are in extremely poor condition. Furthermore, all the movable cultural objects from these monuments, namely hundreds of manuscript Holy Korans, prayer rugs, Holy Koran reading desks and pieces of Islamic iconography have been destroyed or looted.
- In paragraph 45, the work of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage is rightly applauded. However, the Report omits to include that, on 4 June 2018, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Ministry distributed a note verbale to foreign diplomatic missions in South Cyprus, urging them to refrain from visiting touristic or historical sites in North Cyprus, such as Othello Castle, and even other historic sites which have been restored by the bicommunal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage with funding from the EU. Additionally, this Note was distributed two weeks before the opening ceremony of the “Ravelin Bastion”, to which many Ambassadors and EU representatives were invited to attend, with the ceremony being held following the completion of conservation works by the bicommunal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage. This is unacceptable, as it contradicts the work of the said Committee which intends to also contribute to confidence-building between the two peoples on the island. Furthermore, this stance on the part of the Greek Cypriot administration intends to restrict the freedom of movement as well as perpetuating the isolation of Turkish Cypriots in all fields of life, including social and cultural fields. We expect such facts to be reported in the relevant Report, as they are undeniable examples of true human rights violations on the island. In the absence of such reporting, the impression is given that the UN refuses to report on anything that the Greek Cypriot side curtails or violates, hence that it has a biased stance.

### **Freedom of opinion and expression**

- Paragraph 48 of the Report mentions the threats against the Greek Cypriot journalist Maria Siakalli, one of the co-authors of the bicommunal glossary titled “Words that matter: a glossary for journalism in Cyprus”, without referring to the fact that the threats and criticisms came from the Greek Cypriot administration and other circles in South Cyprus. The creation of a bicommunal glossary titled “Words that matter: a glossary for journalism in Cyprus” to be used by journalists in their reporting, which was sponsored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was widely criticised by the Greek Cypriot leadership, including the Greek Cypriot Leader Mr. Anastasiadis himself, following a rejection by the “Cyprus Journalists Union”. On the other hand, we welcome the reference to the group of 238 Greek Cypriot journalists who signed a letter of protest against the glossary, a fact which

was omitted from the draft version of the Report. It should also be noted that the threats against the Greek Cypriot journalist were protested by the political circles in North Cyprus, including TRNC Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kudret Özersay.

### **Right to education**

- The reference to the divergent school curricula in paragraph 23 should have been detailed to express that it is the Greek Cypriot side which has refused to revise its school books to remove enmity and discriminatory language against the Turkish Cypriots. The TRNC has revised its school books a few years back, removing all elements of enmity and discrimination in the language of the textbooks.
- In line with the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 26, the TRNC authorities examine the content of the text books to be used at the Greek Cypriot school in Karpaz, North Cyprus, and the appointment of teachers are made to the Greek school in Karpaz region in order to ensure “full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups”.
- As for the reference in paragraph 52 to the rejection of a number of school books to be used at the Greek Cypriot school in Karpaz, the Report fails to denote the reason behind the rejection of some books. There are numerous cases where the textbooks included inappropriate content, archaic propaganda and enmity, as well as offensive, chauvinistic and racist language against Turks and Turkish Cypriots, which is clearly harmful to the development of young children and poisoning the perceptions of future generations towards the other community. In these cases, the books are requested to be revised accordingly to ensure the principles enshrined in the UDHR Article 26 are respected.
- To give an example, out of 310 school books presented by the Greek Cypriot side to be taught at the school in Karpaz in the 2018/19 school year, 34 contained animosity and hatred against Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people. One first-grade book contained the statement that the “Turks slaughtered the Greek Cypriots ... as they have done throughout history”. Another high-school book contained the statement “the Turks were horrible, they would kill Christians for the smallest reasons”. These statements are far from factual historic accounts and are clearly subjective and biased instead.
- Paragraph 51 of the Report rightly mentions that Turkish Cypriots have limited access to European Union exchange and educational programmes, however, it fails to specify that this limitation is very extensive, and includes total exclusion from access to the most important educational programmes of the European Union, such as the Erasmus Programme and Bologna Process, as a result of the Greek Cypriot side’s obstructionist actions which politicize the issue of education. Hence, this issue of exclusion from these important programmes should have been reflected in the Report, since there can be no justification for the prevention of anyone’s right to education.
- As for teachers, the Report contains factually incorrect information and misrepresentation regarding the number of teachers which were allegedly ‘refused appointment’ by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in paragraph 52. The Report has noted that a total of 4 teachers were refused appointment, whereas in reality, only 2 of the 10 applications were refused on the grounds that they have been known to use racist, offensive and chauvinistic language against Turks. It is unacceptable that the Report omits the just grounds for the refusal of the said teachers.
- We welcome the reference in paragraph 53 to the decision to introduce more Greek-language teachers will be introduced into the school system in North Cyprus.
- Paragraph 54 downgrades the issue of the lack of developments regarding the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot school in Limassol, whereas in fact, the Report

should make a call on the Greek Cypriot side to remedy this violation. In fact, Turkish Cypriot students' right to a school providing education in their mother tongue Turkish is non-existent in South Cyprus. Moreover, in spite of the official recommendation by the then UN Secretary-General and the acceptance by the Greek Cypriot authorities to follow his recommendation stated in the Report of the then UN Secretary-General dated 7 June 1996 (S/1996/411), a Turkish school has still not been established in South Cyprus for the past 22 years in complete violation of the right to education in one's mother tongue. Hence, it is clear that this right will likely never be afforded to Turkish Cypriots in South Cyprus.

- To elaborate, certain schools in Limassol in South Cyprus provide courses in the Turkish language, however, these are not Turkish schools where the curriculum, books and teachers are provided by our relevant authorities as is the case in the Greek Cypriot schools in the TRNC. I would like to emphasize that there is a Greek Cypriot school which provides primary, secondary and high education in the Karpaz area in North Cyprus where Greek Cypriot students are taught by Greek Cypriot teachers appointed by the Greek Cypriot Ministry of Education and teaching material and books are sent by the Greek Cypriot Ministry of Education.
- It is high time that the Greek Cypriot authorities are called upon to respect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot students residing in South Cyprus, which are in greater numbers than Greek Cypriot students in North Cyprus, and provide them with the option to study at a Turkish school in South Cyprus. We hope that this fact is addressed as a human rights issue in future reports.
- Paragraph 56 mentions the difficulty of certain groups in gaining access to high quality education, including Turkish Cypriots, but fails to mention that these groups are living in South Cyprus and not in North Cyprus, hence it is in fact the Greek Cypriot administration which is responsible for providing certain basic rights and access to freedoms to these groups. The Report should have made this clarification.

### **Gender perspective**

- The Turkish Cypriot side supports Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and welcomes the references in Resolutions 2398 (2018) and 2430 (2018) to the inclusion of women in peace processes, as well as a gender-sensitive approach, as mentioned in paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Report.
- The TRNC Government and the civil society in North Cyprus uphold a gender-sensitive perspective. The composition of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team are predominantly women. The Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which comprises mostly women, particularly in senior positions, provides support to the negotiation process, the various Working Groups, as well as the Technical Committees. Until now, utmost care has been given to ensure that a gender perspective is included in the negotiation processes.
- As for some of the notable efforts of the Turkish Cypriot side in relation to gender, despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side is politically isolated by the international community, CEDAW – the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – was accepted by the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly in 2011. In connection with this, a Gender Equality Directorate was established within the TRNC Prime Ministry to combat all forms of gender based violence and gender discrimination which would help to eliminate all forms of discrimination hence promoting women's empowerment. Moreover, a study on National Action Plan has been conducted under the auspices of TRNC Presidency which also set out the action plan and recommendations for any gender policy and programmes in order to bring our legislations and laws in congruence with international and European human rights standards, which would reflect a gender-sensitive standard in the case of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus.

## IV. Conclusions

- The concluding paragraphs of the Report refers to human rights issues faced by members of “all communities” in Cyprus, which is factually wrong. According to the 1960 Treaties governing Cyprus, there are two communities in Cyprus, namely Turkish Cypriot people and Greek Cypriot people, and Latins, Maronites and Armenians are religious groups which choose to belong to the Greek Cypriot community. The fact that the negotiations to find a settlement to the Cyprus issue are also conducted between the said two communities is testimony to this fact.
- With this understanding, the change made in the final Report which now refers to the need for full cooperation of “all parties concerned”, as opposed to with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities, is totally misleading. This phrase gives the impression that there are more than two relevant authorities on the island, whereas, in reality, there are two authorities, i.e. the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot authorities, with jurisdiction over their respective territories, ie. North Cyprus and South Cyprus. Hence, these are the two sole *authorities* with governing and policymaking capacity on human rights or any other matter in their respective sides on the island.
- The meagre references made throughout the Report to some of the human rights violations faced by the Turkish Cypriots are unacceptable since these references do not even come close to sufficing in terms of reflecting the gross human rights violations faced by the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, it is disappointing that in cases where the Turkish Cypriot side alone should be commended for initiatives it has taken, this credit is attributed to both sides, whereas in cases where the Greek Cypriot side has done the bare minimum, it is afforded unilateral praise for its efforts. Some examples are paragraph 14 (regarding demining), paragraph 23 (regarding racist incidents), paragraph 42 (regarding access to religious sites), and paragraph 36 (regarding property) to name a few.
- Such an approach leads to questions about the impartiality of the OHCHR report and gives the impression that the UN is “appeasing” the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus rather than objectively placing responsibility where it is due.

### **Examples of hate crimes and human rights violations against the Turkish Cypriots in 2018**

**Below are various examples of Greek Cypriot State-sponsored violations of Turkish Cypriots’ human rights, or cases of impunity in the light of such violations, which took place in the year 2018**

- The Cyprus Dental Association sent a letter to the Executive Board of the European Regional Organisation (ERO) of the Federation Dentaire International (FDI) in July 2018 regarding objections towards an event which was held in Northern Cyprus in March 2018, hosted by the Northern Cyprus Association of Dental Students (NCADS) – which is a member of the International Association of Dental Students (IADS). The aforementioned letter included a number of groundless claims and allegations about the political situation in Cyprus. This is another example of the Greek Cypriot side’s mentality which cannot even tolerate the interaction of dental students in international events.
- The Greek Cypriot side has sent letters in August 2018 to the Maritime Administrative Authorities of various countries which included allegations regarding the seaports in North Cyprus being “illegal” and closed to international navigation. The Greek Cypriot side also claims that ships which come to the ports of Northern Cyprus are breaching international law, and urges the Maritime Authorities to issue circulars and fine the companies and ship owners which have come to ports in North. In fact, the ports in the TRNC have not been deemed as illegal according to international law by any country or international organization, including the European Union. In this connection, we would like to refer to a statement by Mr.

Olli Rehn, the then European Commissioner responsible for Enlargement, dated 17 October 2007 (E-4901/2007), which reads: “The Commission is aware that in 1974, the “government of the Republic of Cyprus” has declared the sea ports in the northern part of Cyprus (Famagusta, Kyrenia, Karavostassi) prohibited and closed for all vessels. This was a unilateral decision of the RoC with consequences under domestic Cypriot law but with no apparent consequences under international law. In other words, it is the Commission’s understanding that there is no prohibition under general international law to enter and leave seaports in the northern part of Cyprus. Furthermore, neither the UN Security Council nor the European Community has ever imposed a trade embargo with respect to those areas”. Once again, the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot side, this time in the field of shipping and trade, violating the right of Turkish Cypriots to trade and to earn their livelihood.

- The Greek Cypriot administration expressed sheer outrage over the intended participation of members of the “Cyprus Symphony Orchestra” from South Cyprus, as well as its Artistic Director and First Violinist from Germany, in a music festival in Northern Cyprus between the dates of 21 September and 16 November 2018. Within the scope of the festival, several concerts were scheduled to take place at different venues in Northern Cyprus, including Bellapais Monastery, Girne Amphitheatre and Salamis Amphitheatre. The matter was heavily debated in Greek Cypriot Parliament, and the musicians have even been publicly named and shamed in the Greek Cypriot press. Some MPs have gone so far as to ask that the Greek Cypriot Foreign Ministry to take measures to “set the musicians straight”, despite the fact that they would be participating in their personal capacity alongside their fellow Turkish Cypriot musicians. Furthermore, numerous MPs have called for their dismissal from the orchestra, and they must now face the orchestra board to provide an explanation for their intended participation.
- On 12 November 2018, it was reported that there is a serious increase of content and statements spewing enmity and racism within the Greek Cypriot school system against the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey. In light of this, a prominent Greek Cypriot political party AKEL in South Cyprus wrote a letter to the Greek Cypriot Minister of Education and Culture, expressing the party’s concern regarding this increase in intolerance in the education system in South Cyprus.
- The Greek Cypriot Foreign Ministry, upon hearing that a Turkish Cypriot composer was scheduled to perform at an event on 4 October 2018 in Lithuania, sent an Official Note to the host country, making political claims and false propaganda, which led to the cancellation of the event at the last minute at the end of September. This is just one example showing that the Greek Cypriot leadership cannot even tolerate one Turkish Cypriot artist taking part in a concert/event in a third country.
- Between 31 May and 9 June 2018, the Turkish Cypriot national football team participated in the 2018 “Paddy Power” World Soccer Cup, a competition organised by the Confederation of Independent Football Associations (CONIFA) in London. However, the Greek Cypriot diaspora could not tolerate our national football team taking part in this sporting activity, and attempted to prevent – on multiple occasions – the team’s participation in the competition. In this connection, Greek Cypriot authorities, both at the administrative and civil society level, have communicated with the relevant UK authorities, including the Enfield Council, through letters and similar methods in an attempt to disqualify the Turkish Cypriot National Football Team from participating in this sporting event by citing political reasons. Such an intolerant and disrespectful mentality has once again proven the obstructionist attitude of the Greek Cypriots towards a humanitarian and entirely peaceful activity.
- In June 2018, the crossings of Greek Cypriots from South Cyprus to North Cyprus increased dramatically due to the favourable exchange rate in North Cyprus and it has been observed that most Greek Cypriots cross with the intention of purchasing cheaper petrol. As a reaction to this trend, the Customs Department of South Cyprus published a statement that “in the event of illegal transport of fuel from the occupied areas, irrespective of them being in portable tanks or the vehicle’s fuel tank, these

will be confiscated and those involved will be subject to the penalties stipulated by the law”. Moreover, it was stated that the vehicle itself could be subject to confiscation. This is yet another example of the intolerance of the Greek Cypriot political authorities against any action which might contribute to the Turkish Cypriot economy.

- As has become customary over the years, just days before the annual ceremony commemorating the Erenköy Resistance and the Turkish Cypriot martyrs on 8 August, the Greek Cypriot Administration has, once again, announced certain restrictions and retractions on the previous agreements, namely the June 2009 Erenköy Memorandum, putting preconditions and restrictions for allowing the facilitation of the crossing.
- On 25 October 2018, our request was conveyed to UNFICYP in order to facilitate the crossing of a group of elderly Turkish Cypriot former residents of the village of Denya – situated in the Buffer Zone – by passing through the old Serhatköy-Denya road, in order to conduct Friday prayers at the Denya Mosque on 9 November 2018. UNFICYP, upon the notification of the Greek Cypriot administration, proceeded to put forward a series of arbitrary preconditions, such as providing a list and ID numbers of the members of the group, muezzin and driver; requiring car insurance and meeting personally with the driver; and demanding proof that the area through which the road passes is mine-free. All of these preconditions were met in good faith by our side, despite that the Greek Cypriots have never been faced with any of these requirements in relation to their requests to cross to various religious sites in the Buffer Zone in the past. Ultimately, just 12 hours prior to the intended crossing, UNFICYP sent a harsh message to our authorities, denying access to the Buffer Zone through the aforementioned road (which has sentimental value for the elderly Turkish Cypriots), citing that they are concerned of prospective Greek Cypriot reaction against the crossing. This act is both against the fundamental principle – which the UN is meant to uphold – of remaining at an equal distance to the two sides, as well as a violation of the right to religious freedom, however, it is unfortunate that the UN bows down to Greek Cypriot pressure even on a humanitarian issue.
- November 2018 – ELAM, a political party which is represented in the Greek Cypriot Parliament, has collected 10,000 signatures and presented it to the Vasilis Palmas, Undersecretary to the President, demanding closure of the border crossing and claiming that the increase in criminal cases were due to opening of borders. They also stated that “Greek Cypriots crossing to the North finances the invasion”. ELAM also directed criticism to the government on opening of Derinya crossing point which is regarded as a CBM. Extreme right group ELAM, a sub-section of Golden Dawn in Greece, has directed attacks and also delivered public releases which contains hate and xenophobia mainly towards Turkish Cypriots. Subsequently on Members of ELAM turned out two days prior to the opening for a demonstration in Derinya against the opening of any more checkpoints under the slogan ‘Close all checkpoints NOW’.
- The tiles of the floor from a school in Limassol were removed after it was discovered that they were produced in North Cyprus (despite the fact that such practice is within the framework of the Green Line Regulation).
- The creation of a bicomunal glossary titled “Words that matter: a glossary for journalism in Cyprus” to be used by journalists in their reporting, which was sponsored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was widely criticised by the Greek Cypriot leadership, including the Greek Cypriot Leader Mr. Anastasiadis, following a rejection by the “Cyprus Journalists Union”. This incident has also been recorded in the Report of the UN Secretary-General dated 15 October 2018 (S/2018/919) as a group of 238 Greek Cypriot journalists signed a letter of protest against a bicomunal glossary of sensitive words and phrases.

- In August 2018, the Greek Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture sent a letter to the University of Oxford in England, requesting “the cancellation of the decision of collaboration” with the Eastern Mediterranean University in Northern Cyprus on women’s health research, and included in the letter false allegations regarding the status of the universities in Northern Cyprus. This action clearly is aiming to discredit the status of the institutions in Northern Cyprus, once again within the scope of its efforts to further the inhuman isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots even in the field of education.
- In 2018, there has been a clear increase in the number of people, such as from Israel, Russia, Egypt, and many other countries, travelling for touristic purposes via Larnaca airport in South Cyprus to North Cyprus who have been turned away from Larnaca airport. There was a particular increase in the number of deportations in spring and summer of 2018. For example:
  - A professor from a university in Cairo, who was supposed to give lecture in a TRNC university, was prevented from crossing to North Cyprus as he flew from Cairo to Larnaca. He was detained in a Larnaca hotel without being given any reason.
  - On 28 October, a Russian woman was arrested and mistreated when she arrived at Larnaca airport after expressing intent to visit North Cyprus for a vacation. On her social media account, she stated that she “experienced hell”, was unreasonably detained at the border, imprisoned, blackmailed and mocked after informing authorities of her intention to cross to North Cyprus. This unfortunate incident adds to the list of discriminatory incidents over detentions at the airport of persons wishing to cross to North Cyprus and of poor treatment by Greek Cypriot officers. The Russian Foreign Ministry sent a diplomatic Note Verbal to Greek Cypriot authorities in protest of this incident and the Greek Cypriot Ambassador in Moscow was called to the Foreign Office regarding this matter. Moreover, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that the Russian Embassy in South Cyprus will request Greek Cypriot authorities to provide official information on the non-admission and the detention of Russian citizens at airports.
  - Official representatives of the Greek Cypriot administration attempted to dissuade persons – via phone and letters through formal and informal channels – from Russia, Germany, South Africa and India from attending the International CEO Forum 2018 which took place in Northern Cyprus in October 2018 by making false allegations regarding the airport in North Cyprus, claiming that it is an illegal port of entry. They also made threats, claiming that if they came to North Cyprus, their professional lives would be affected.
  - The Greek Cypriot administration, through its Embassies around the world, has made attempts to prevent international participation at the International Universities Search & Rescue Council (IUSARC), headquarters of which is located in Northern Cyprus. Since 2012, the organization has been working with 52 universities from 22 countries in order to train university students to perform search and rescue operations in a professional manner when faced with the threat of natural disasters.

### **Other miscellaneous attacks and incidents perpetuated against Turkish Cypriots in South Cyprus**

**Below are the attacks and incidents which have occurred as a result of the ongoing mentality of intolerance against the Turkish Cypriots. This mentality is unfortunately further encouraged by the Greek Cypriot leadership's aforementioned policies of intolerance and isolation against the Turkish Cypriots, as well as the said leadership's indifference towards bringing the perpetrators to justice:**

- In February 2018, a car belonging to a Turkish Cypriot woman was attacked while parked at a parking space of a shopping mall. The rear windows of the car were hit and broken by unidentified attacker as she found out when returned to her car with her three-and-a-half-year-old toddler. The incident had been reported and complaints had been filed with the Greek Cypriot police at Metehan, but the perpetrators have still not been penalized.
- Once again in February 2018, two Turkish Cypriot women were followed and verbally assaulted (both in Greek and English) while shopping at the Ledras Street in South Cyprus. When the women went into a shop and asked for help from the security staff at the store, the security staff's response was "this issue is not our business" The two women finally started to run towards the border to cross to the Turkish side, until the Greek Cypriot men stopped following the women close to the border.
- In March 2018, a 59-year-old Turkish Cypriot man was attacked at the Eleftheria square where he was selling hand-made straw baskets as he always does every Wednesday at the bazaar. Two people physically assaulted the Turkish Cypriot man and verbally abused him while other people were watching at the bazaar.
- On 17 May 2018, the Cyprus Association of Pharmaceutical Companies issued a warning to the public not to buy medicine from North Cyprus as they claimed concern over safe storage, handling of the medicines and of the pharmacists' education and training in North Cyprus. This is a classic example of attaching national connotations to non-political issues so as to prevent any interaction between the two sides of the island and to dissuade Greek Cypriots from contributing to the Turkish Cypriot economy.



**Letter dated 8 October 2018 of H.E. Prof. Kudret Özersay, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus addressed to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Nicosia**

Excellency,

I would like to refer to your letter, dated 4 July 2018, and to propose, in conformity with Security Council Resolution S/2018/737 (2018), the demining of the entire island, in a comprehensive manner, commencing with the Buffer Zone.

Our proposal, which was initially put forth on 14 April 2014 and reiterated in May 2015, is to clear the remaining minefields, starting with the Buffer Zone by the UN, followed by demining operations to be conducted simultaneously in North Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriot side and in South Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot side.

As the Turkish Cypriot side, we are ready, within the framework of this proposal, to discuss the modalities and reach an agreement on the matter without further delay.

We believe that we can only achieve progress on the issue of demining as a Confidence Building Measure through a holistic approach rather than a partial one. This is the only way forward if the Greek Cypriot side is truly serious about demining.

We would be grateful for your assistance in conveying our proposal to the Greek Cypriot side, and urging their favourable response.

In concluding, I would also like to kindly request that His Excellency Mr. Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as the Members of the Security Council, are informed about this proposal, which will enable us to achieve a mine-free island as soon as possible.

Prof. Kudret Özersay  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

## Approved religious service requests (1 December 2017–30 November 2018)

1. 2 December 2017 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
2. 3 December 2017 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
3. 14 December 2017 – Church of Ayios Therisos – Yenierenköy/Yialousa (Greek Cypriots)
4. 17 December 2017 – St. Barnabas Icon and Archeology Museum – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
5. 25 December 2017 – Church of Saint Sinesios – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
6. 25 December 2017 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
7. 26 December 2017 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
8. 26 December 2017 – Church of Panagia Chryseleousa – Zümürtköy/Katokopia (Greek Cypriots)
9. 1 January 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
10. 6 January 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
11. 6 January 2018 – Church of Ayia Tria – Sipahi/Ayia Trias (Greek Cypriots)
12. 6 January 2018 – Church of Ayios Georgios Exorinos – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
13. 13 January 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
14. 14 January 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
15. 14 January 2018 – Church of Timios Prodromos – Akçay (Greek Cypriots)
16. 3 February 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
17. 4 February 2018 – Church of Ayia Marina – Gürpınar/Ayia Marina (Maronites)
18. 11 February 2018 – Church of Panagia Galaktotrofoussa – Balıkesir/Palaikythro (Greek Cypriots)
19. 11 February 2018 – Church of St. Charalambos – Türkmenköy/Kontea (Greek Cypriots)
20. 11 February 2018 – St. Barnabas Icon and Archeology Museum – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
21. 11 February 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
22. 18 February 2018 – Church of Ayia Marina – Gürpınar/Ayia Marina (Maronites)
23. 3 March 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
24. 4 March 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
25. 18 March 2018 – Church of St. Nicholas – Yayla/Syrianochori (Greek Cypriots)

26. 18 March 2018 – Church of Panagia Theotokou – Demirhan/Trachoni – Kythrea (Greek Cypriots)
27. 18 March 2018 – Church of Ayia Marina – Gürpınar/Ayia Marina (Maronites)
28. 25 March 2018 – Panagia Monastery – Ağıllar/Mandres (Greek Cypriots)
29. 25 March 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
30. 1 April 2018 – Church of St. Mamas – Güzelyurt/Morphou (Greek Cypriot)
31. 1 April 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
32. 4 April 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
33. 6 April 2018 – Church of Ayios Georgios Exorinos – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
34. 6 April 2018 – Church of Saint Sinesios – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
35. 7 April 2018 – Church of Saint George – Girne/Kyrenia
36. 7 April 2018 – Church of Ayia Marina – Gürpınar/Ayia Marina (Maronites) (cancelled by organizer)
37. 8 April 2018 – Church of Ayia Tria – Sipahi/Ayia Trias (Greek Cypriots)
38. 8 April 2018 – Church of Ayia Tria – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
39. 8 April 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
40. 9 April 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
41. 10 April 2018 – Church of Ayios Georgios of Xalona – Bostancı/Zodia (Greek Cypriots)
42. 14 April 2018 – St. Barnabas Icon and Archeology Museum – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
43. 15 April 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
44. 21 April 2018 – Church of Saint George – Girne/Kyrenia
45. 21 April 2018 – Church of Ayios Stylianos – Aydıncöy (Greek Cypriots) (cancelled by the organizer)
46. 22 April 2018 – Church of Saint George – Düzova/Exometochi (Greek Cypriots)
47. 29 April 2018 – Church of Ayios Georgios – Bafra/Vokolida (Greek Cypriots)
48. 29 April 2018 – Church of Ayios Georgios – Vadili/Vatyli (Greek Cypriots)
49. 5 May 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
50. 5 May 2018 – Church of the Christ the Saviour – Geçitkale/Lefkoniko (Greek Cypriots) (cancelled by organizer)
51. 6 May 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
52. 20 May 2018 – Church of Saint Sinesios – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
53. 27 May 2018 – Church of St. Mamas – Güzelyurt/Morphou (Greek Cypriot)
54. 27 May 2018 – Church of St. George – Girne/Kyrenia (Russian)
55. 28 May 2018 – Church of Ayia Tria – Sipahi/Ayia Trias (Greek Cypriots)
56. 2 June 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Geçitkale/Lefkoniko (Greek Cypriots) [first time]

57. 2 June 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
58. 3 June 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
59. 10 June 2018 – St. Barnabas Icon and Archeology Museum – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
60. 11 June 2018 – St. Barnabas Icon and Archeology Museum – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
61. 16 June 2018 – Church of Ayios Stylianos – Aydıncıköy (Greek Cypriots)
62. 7 July 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
63. 8 July 2018 – Church of Agios Prokopis – Sınırüstü/Syngrosis (Greek Cypriots)
64. 8 July 2018 – Ayia Marina – Değirmenlik/Kythrea (Greek Cypriots)
65. 14 July 2018 – Church of Timios Prodromos – Boğaziçi/Lapathos – Ammochostos (Greek Cypriots) Timios Prodromos Kilisesi (Boğaziçi (Rum))
66. 14 July 2018 – Church of Ayia Marina – Gürpınar/Ayia Marina (Maronites)
67. 21 July 2018 – Church of Prophet Elias – Serhatküy/Fylia (Greek Cypriots)
68. 22 July 2018 – Monastery of Prophet Elias – Mevlevi – İkidere/Kyra (Maronites)
69. 29 July 2018 – Church of Ayia Fotini – Yeşilköy/Ayios Andronikos (Greek Cypriots)
70. 1 July 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
71. 23 July 2018 – Church of Ayios Therisos – Yenierenköy/Yialousa (Greek Cypriots)
72. 22 July 2018 – Church of Ayios Sergios and Vakhos – Pamuklu/Tavros (Greek Cypriots)
73. 5 August 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
74. 6 August 2018 – Church of St. Mamas – Güzelyurt/Morphou (Greek Cypriot)
75. 13 August 2018 – Church and Monastery of Armenia – Sourp Asdvadzadzin Cathedral Lefkoşa Arabahmet/Nicosia Arabahmet (Armenian) [cancelled by the organizer]
76. 14 August 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
77. 15 August 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
78. 15 August 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
79. 26 August 2018 – Church of Ayios Fanurios – Sipahi/Ayia Trias (Greek Cypriots)
80. 27 August 2018 – Church of Ayios Fanurios – Sipahi/Ayia Trias (Greek Cypriots)
81. 27 August 2018 – Chapel of Ayios Fanurios – Karaoğlu/Kyrenia (Greek Cypriots)
82. 1 September 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
83. 1 September 2018 – Church of St. Mamas – Güzelyurt/Morphou (Greek Cypriot)
84. 2 September 2018 – Church of St. Mamas – Güzelyurt/Morphou (Greek Cypriot)
85. 2 September 2018 – Church of Ayios Ioannis Prodromos – Akova/Gypsou (Greek Cypriot)

86. 2 September 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
87. 2 September 2018 – Church of Ayios Mamas – Alayköy/Gerolakkos (Greek Cypriot) [first time]
88. 3 September 2018 – Church of Ayios Antonis – Değirmenlik/Kythrea (Maronite)
89. 5 September 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
90. 6 September 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Özhan/Asomatos (Maronites)
91. 8 September 2018 – Church of Panagia ton Pervolion – Aşağı Dikmen/Kato Dikomo (Greek Cypriots)
92. 8 September 2018 – Church of Panagia Chryseleousa – Zümürtüköy/ Katokopia (Greek Cypriots) [cancelled by the organizer]
93. 8 September 2018 – Church of Archangelos Michael – Yenierenköy/Ayialousa (Greek Cypriots)
94. 9 September 2018 – Church of Banayia Kilisesi – Boltaşlı/Lythrangomi (Greek Cypriot) [first time]
95. 16 September 2018 – St. Barnabas Icon and Archaeology Museum – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
96. 22 September 2018 – Church of Saint George – Girne/Kyrenia (Greek Cypriots)
97. 22 September 2018 – Church of Panagia – Kızılbaş/Trachonas (Greek Cypriots)
98. 6 October 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
99. 7 October 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
100. 7 October 2018 – Church of Ayios Andronikos and Athanasia Kilisesi – Yıldırım/Ammochostos [first time]
101. 13 October 2018 – Church of Ayios Loukas – Ötüken/Spathoriko (Greek Cypriots) [first time]
102. 21 October 2018 – St. Barnabas Icon and Archeology Museum – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
103. 1 October 2018 – Church of Ayios Sergios and Vachos – Yeniboğaziçi [first time]
104. 28 October 2018 – Church of Ayios Demetrios – Ziyamet/Leonariso
105. 3 November 2018 – Small Church of St. Barnabas – Gazimağusa/Famagusta (Greek Cypriots)
106. 3 November 2018 – Church of Ayios Georgios – Dört Yol/Prasteio (Greek Cypriots)
107. 4 November 2018 – Church of St. George – Girne/Kyrenia (Greek Cypriots)
108. 4 November 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)
109. 30 November 2018 – Church of Apostolos Andreas – Dipkarpaz/Rizo Karpasso (Greek Cypriots)