



**Assemblée générale**

Distr.  
GÉNÉRALE

A/HRC/2/G/8  
25 septembre 2006

FRANÇAIS  
Original: ANGLAIS

CONSEIL DES DROITS DE L'HOMME  
Deuxième session  
Point 2 de l'ordre du jour

**MISE EN APPLICATION DE LA RÉOLUTION 60/251 DE L'ASSEMBLÉE  
GÉNÉRALE DU 15 MARS 2006 INTITULÉE «CONSEIL  
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME»**

**Note verbale datée du 20 septembre 2006, adressée au secrétariat du  
Conseil des droits de l'homme par la Mission permanente du Soudan  
auprès de l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève**

La Mission permanente de la République du Soudan auprès de l'Office des Nations Unies et des autres organisations internationales à Genève présente ses compliments au secrétariat du Conseil des droits de l'homme et a l'honneur de lui faire tenir ci-joint, pour information, un document intitulé «Background to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 on Darfur)»<sup>\*</sup>.

Tout en priant le secrétariat du Conseil des droits de l'homme de bien vouloir faire distribuer le texte de la présente note et de son annexe comme document officiel de la deuxième session du Conseil des droits de l'homme, la Mission permanente du Soudan saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au secrétariat du Conseil les assurances de sa très haute considération.

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<sup>\*</sup> Reproduit dans l'annexe tel qu'il a été reçu, en anglais seulement.

Annex

Background to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1706  
on Darfur

1. On 30<sup>th</sup> August, 2006, well before the resolution 1706 of the Security Council on the replacement of the troops of the African Union in Darfur by international troops, the Sudan sent to the President of the Council a letter informing of its openness to conducting talks on Darfur prior to the issuance of any resolution.
2. But the Security Council opted for adoption of the aforementioned resolution instead of concentrating on consultation with all of the concerned parties, a matter which is necessitated by the requirements of taking the right decision that can be implemented in a manner conducive to the prevalence of peace and security.
3. The facts reveal that preparations for the adoption of the resolution commenced long before the decision by the Council. It was in November 2005, six months before the conclusion of the Abuja Agreement, when some donor countries discontinued payment of their obligations towards the AU troops. Also, in December 2005. Assistant to the US Secretary of State shuttle-toured Africa in pursuit of postponing the convocation of the African Summit and excluding Khartoum to be venue for it.
4. In a meeting of the African Council of Peace and Security that was held on 12<sup>th</sup> January, 2006, an item on the transfer of the mandate of the AU troops to the United Nations was included unexpectedly in the agenda. The decision taken on the item was that the Council accepted in principle the transfer on three conditions:
  - a) that this takes place if no peace agreement is reached,
  - b) if funding is not procured,
  - c) that the Government of Sudan agrees to the transfer.
5. On 10<sup>th</sup> March, 2006, the African Peace and Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the African troops until 30 September, 2006, angering the US representative in the Security Council who issued a statement contending that this Council would authorize the transfer irrespective of the position of the African Council of Peace and Security.
6. On 30<sup>th</sup> April, 2006, Tanzania proposed a draft resolution to the Security Council calling for support to the peace negotiations and encouragement of the parties to reach agreement. Instead of passing the draft resolution, it was postponed and another draft resolution containing sanctions against Sudanese officials was proposed. These manoeuvres posed real obstacles to the peace negotiations in Abuja. But due to the solid African position, the negotiations were concluded successfully and the Abuja peace agreement was signed on 5th May, 2006.
7. However, the negative signals from some members of the Security Council encouraged some of the armed groups to refrain from signing the agreement.

8. Following from the signing of the agreement, the Security Council issued an ultimatum to the parties rejecting the agreement to sign it or face sanctions. Four months have now elapsed without either the Security Council or the peace partners ever moving to effect the said sanctions. On the contrary, attempts are now made to supply the intransigent groups with arms and funds, besides the de facto recognition, political support and disregard of the serious violations perpetrated by these groups, including, for example, the recent killing of one of the officers of the ICRC.
9. The Sudan persevered in its cooperation with the United Nations and the international community to reinforce the Abuja peace agreement. During the AU summit of Banjule, the President of Sudan met with Secretary-General Kofi Anan and they agreed that the Sudan submit to the United Nations a specific plan for Darfur by 1<sup>st</sup> August, 2006. The Sudan did submit this plan on time. Yet, before its being studied by the United Nations and replied to by the Secretary-General, statements had been issued by US officials, bearing the judgement that the plan was rejected.
10. Nine days after receipt of the mentioned plan, i.e. on 9<sup>th</sup> August 2006, the Secretary-General requested to conduct consultations on it with the Sudan Minister for Foreign Affairs. A few hours later, the UK tabled its draft resolution, preempting the results of the consultations.
11. The President of the Security Council addressed messages to the Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the African Commission, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Secretary-General of the OIC. Some of these distinguished addressees requested more time for consultation on the matter in New York, but this was denied. The draft resolution of the UK was put to vote hurriedly, and the representative of the UK alleged in the Council that the Sudan was adamant and uncooperative with the international community. She even told the absolutely false incident of the refusal of the President of Sudan to grant audience to a British Minister then present in Khartoum to discuss the issue.
12. The aforementioned Darfur plan of Sudan, which was never discussed, includes an integrated programme for the restoration of stability and protection of civilians.
13. The conditions of the AU for the transfer of the mandate of the African troops have not been satisfied, which lends credibility to and justifies the Sudanese position that the African troops continue their noble mission. As concerns funding, it should be noted that the cost of deploying international troops in Darfur, according to the United Nations Secretary-General, amounts to US dollars 1.7 billion, whereas that of maintaining the African troops is but US dollars 460 million, a sum the communications to secure which, have already been made. In this regard, it should be recalled that the root cause of the conflict in Darfur is economic and development related. Were the sum needed for the international troops spent on the economic development of the region, the conflict would have been done away with effectively.

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