



General Assembly

Sixty-fourth session

First Committee

9th meeting

Tuesday, 13 October 2009, 3 p.m.
New York

Official Records

Chairperson: Mr. José Luis Cancela (Uruguay)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Agenda items 86 to 103 (continued)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairperson (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with the indicative timetable contained in document A/C.1/64/CRP.1, we shall begin our work's series of thematic meetings by taking up the issue of the follow-up to the resolutions and decisions adopted by the Committee during its previous session, as well as the presentation of reports by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. That exchange of views will take place in an informal context.

The Secretariat has asked to make an announcement before I give the floor to Ambassador Duarte, the High Representative. I now give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Allow me, on behalf of the secretariat of the First Committee, to express our condolences to Ambassador Cancela, Chairperson of the Committee, and the Permanent Mission of Jordan for the tragic accident and loss of life of Uruguayan and Jordanian peacekeepers and passengers. Their names will be forever engraved in the memory of a thankful humankind. At this time, our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the deceased. Please convey,

Mr. Chairperson, our sympathies to the Governments and peoples of Uruguay and Jordan.

The Chairperson: I thank the Secretary of the Committee very much for his kind words and condolences.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

I shall now suspend the meeting in order to continue our debate informally.

The meeting was suspended at 3.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The Chairperson (*spoke in Spanish*): As indicated in our programme of work, the Committee will now proceed to an exchange of views with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Executive Secretary for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament and the role of international organizations with mandates in that field.

I would like to welcome today's invitees. Due to a conflict in commitments, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency cannot be here today. The Director-General of the OPCW will address the Committee at Friday's meeting. At today's round table, we will begin by hearing statements in the context of the thematic group on nuclear weapons. I

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.



shall first give the floor to our panellists to make their statements. Thereafter, we will meet informally and delegations will have an opportunity to ask questions of the panellists.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to address the Committee.

Mr. Duarte (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs): I am very grateful for this opportunity to participate in this panel together with my distinguished colleagues Ambassador Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament. The Chairperson has already explained the absence of two other colleagues. I understand that Mr. Pfirter will be with us next week.

Of course, if this panel were truly representative of all international, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations that work in these fields — not to mention the countless other civil society organizations working worldwide for the same goals — we would require not only a longer podium but also a much larger room. We are fortunate indeed that there has been such growth in international interest in efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Those diverse organizations have proliferated more rapidly and extensively than the deadliest weapons themselves. That institutional growth has undoubtedly contributed to much of the progress that has been made in moving the world away from such weaponry.

This development has not received the attention it deserves, for it symbolizes a profound change that is under way both in the way that international relations are conducted and, more specifically, in the growth of widespread global recognition of how progress in disarmament and non-proliferation serves to benefit other global goals well outside the traditional realm of international peace and security.

Let us consider for just a moment the functional diversity of the following organizations, all of which are involved in some type of activity relating to the control or elimination of certain types of armaments or the armed violence associated with such weaponry, including terrorism. In addition to the organizations I have just mentioned, at the global level those would include the World Bank, the International Monetary

Fund, the International Police Organization (INTERPOL), the World Customs Organization, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization and countless other institutions in the United Nations system.

The interest of those organizations in matters dealing with weaponry and armed violence testifies to a growing appreciation throughout the world that disarmament and non-proliferation are what the Secretary-General has called global public goods that offer benefits to everybody. A similar awareness is growing that setbacks and failures to achieve those goals also have negative effects throughout whole societies and economies.

Working in partnership with several intergovernmental organizations — in some cases over several decades — the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and its predecessors in the Secretariat have long sought to promote the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, while also working to prevent their proliferation or acquisition by terrorists. Those efforts include our substantive and administrative support to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It also extends to our long-standing efforts to assist and promote the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. I very much look forward to the day, which may not be far away, when we can finally drop the term “Preparatory Commission” from the name of that vital organization.

My Office is also deeply involved in organizing workshops and seminars to promote the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) — an effort that seeks to assist States, at their request, in various regions through capacity-building, in particular with respect to preventing the illicit trade in deadly weapons-related materials and technologies. With funding from the European Union and the Governments of several States, my Office has organized workshops this year in Qatar, Vanuatu and Costa Rica. We are currently preparing a workshop to be held in Egypt in December. Those workshops have enabled officials of national and subregional organizations to have productive exchanges with representatives from intergovernmental organizations, including several traditionally represented on this panel.

UNODA is also an active participant in the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, whose current membership includes representatives from 24 organizations and offices throughout the United Nations system. By serving to ensure the overall coordination and coherence of United Nations counter-terrorism efforts, the Task Force plays a vital role in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted by Member States in 2006. At the heart of the Strategy is a determined effort to enhance cooperation against terrorism at the global, regional and national levels. One recent result of that cooperation was the development of a template of the Biological Incident Database to complement the biocrimes database being contemplated by INTERPOL.

Intergovernmental organizations at the regional and subregional levels have experienced similar growth over the years. As those organizations have continued to grow, we have also witnessed an expansion in the numbers, geographic scope, networking and diversity of countless additional organizations in civil society that share the common commitment to advancing the disarmament and non-proliferation agendas.

With respect to UNODA, our cooperation with intergovernmental organizations is by no means limited to those dealing with weapons of mass destruction. For example, we also work — literally on a daily basis — with local, subregional and regional organizations to promote efforts against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and to curb armed violence. Our Office is the coordinating focal point of such efforts within the larger inter-agency United Nations system.

In June and July, we conducted two regional meetings on small-arms issues in close collaboration with subregional and regional organizations. The meeting in the Pacific region was organized with the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat, while a separate meeting for States from eastern and southern Africa was organized with the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Both meetings produced substantive outcome documents that contribute to the follow-up process after last year's Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

I am very pleased that the Peace and Security Council of the African Union devoted a meeting in August to the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and issued a communiqué expressing its satisfaction with the recent efforts of the Centre to extend its operations to cover all of Africa. The Council also welcomed the increased collaboration between the Centre, the African Union and various other regional organizations.

I believe that the totality of those developments — namely, this growth and diversification of intergovernmental organizations, the burgeoning interest of civil society and the demonstrations of enlightened leadership by leaders of national Governments — are trends that significantly improve the prospects for eventual success in achieving disarmament and non-proliferation goals. That progress helps to advance other important goals, including the reduction of armed violence and the prevention of catastrophic acts of terror.

We have all heard that the lack of political will is ultimately responsible for the lack of greater success in achieving disarmament goals. Yet, as the world continues that process of organizational growth and cooperation, as the ties between those organizations strengthen over time and as the public becomes increasingly aware of the positive contributions of those organizations — and indeed their indispensability — it follows that additional institutional resources will become available to such organizations so that they can better fulfil their mandates.

Unfortunately, all of the organizations and bodies represented on this panel today — including my own Office for Disarmament Affairs — have experienced various capacity limitations that hinder their ability to accomplish all of those mandates. Some of those limitations are budgetary, some relate to the availability of specialized personnel and some are political in nature. As is the case in national bureaucracies, specific offices must compete for funds and resources against competing institutional interests. The danger in such an environment is that resources will be allocated on a zero-sum basis, where funds needed to advance one global public good will simply be taken from funds needed to advance another. That danger is especially serious when it comes to efforts to

eliminate the world's deadliest weapons or to control conventional arms.

Capacity-building among intergovernmental organizations, however, involves much more than just money and personnel. It is also a function of the level of cooperation, coordination and integration of efforts among such organizations. In recognition of that, the Secretary-General has agreed to participate in a joint meeting with heads of intergovernmental organizations that work on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. On a larger dimension, one might say that the greater challenge we collectively face relates less to the characteristics of specific organizations themselves than to the progressive development of international organizations as an ongoing process.

Our major handicap in UNODA is the gap we have been facing between rising expectations and the steady or declining state of the resources available to meet them. In such circumstances, we value all the more every opportunity to work closely with intergovernmental organizations in the nuclear field, especially with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, as well as with regional intergovernmental organizations in all areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We hope to expand that cooperation in the years ahead as the disarmament agenda moves forward.

We are actively continuing our efforts to promote the implementation of the global disarmament and non-proliferation agenda at the regional, subregional and national levels. Among those efforts, we are exploring joint programming and promoting exchanges of information, joint seminars and publications, assessments of lessons learned and the expansion of other forms of cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, as well as with civil society.

Under the Charter, one of the primary purposes of the United Nations is to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of their common ends. I view that as an especially important responsibility in pursuing common ends relating to disarmament, non-proliferation and the prevention of terrorist acts. I sense a new resolve among all Member States not just to reaffirm those historic ends but to redouble our collective efforts to achieve them. This is a grand collective enterprise in which intergovernmental organizations will have their own vital roles to play. I

hope that today's panel will help in clarifying just how important those contributions have been, and their limitless potential contributions to international peace and security in the years to come.

The Chairperson (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Ambassador Duarte for his statement.

I now give the floor to Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. Ordzhonikidze (Secretary-General, Conference on Disarmament): It is a real pleasure to participate in this debate because I believe that the Conference on Disarmament is one of the most important international bodies dealing with disarmament. It is not only international disarmament that depends upon the results of the work of the Conference, but also both the international climate and international developments, as well as even confidence among States and many more things. In fact, it is really geopolitical in nature.

The major success story at the Conference on Disarmament at the moment is the fact that, on 29 May, we managed to adopt a programme of work. That ended a decade-long stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. The important thing is that the programme of work for 2009 was adopted by consensus and issued as an official document. The adoption of the programme of work, which opened the way for the commencement of substantive work, was welcomed quite widely as a truly historic breakthrough. By adopting its programme of work, the Conference decided to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and substantive discussions on three other items on the agenda: nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances.

Moreover, the Conference decided to appoint three special coordinators for the other agenda items. Unfortunately, disagreement over procedural and organizational issues — mainly over the timetable for the implementation of the programme of work and, to a lesser degree, over the nomination of office-bearers — prevented the Conference from commencing its substantive work.

Although we have made a certain measure of progress, I would like to say a few words on the situation today, which I would characterize as including growing momentum for disarmament.

The historic breakthrough in the Conference on Disarmament did not happen, as I mentioned briefly at the very beginning, in a political vacuum. It came about within the larger context of the increasingly positive international political climate and revitalized multilateral diplomacy. Throughout this year, we have witnessed a sea change in the international security environment that has been increasingly conducive to advancing the disarmament agenda. That sea change was seen, of course, in multilateral and bilateral negotiations in different forums, in different cities and in different countries.

The Conference on Disarmament undertook the commencement of negotiations. The most important accomplishment of the Conference on Disarmament has been the reconfirmation of its decision to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons on the basis of the so-called Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. For years, negotiating a fissile material treaty has been recognized as a logical next step following the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and I think my colleague, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, will elaborate further on that. It has been considered a crucial measure in the global non-proliferation regime and an indispensable step towards nuclear disarmament.

Highlighting this importance, the Security Council, in resolution 1887 (2009) adopted at its high-level meeting last month, called on the Conference to start such negotiations as soon as possible. It is unprecedented that the Security Council should so elaborately support what we do at the Conference on Disarmament.

The programme of work adopted this year at the Conference on Disarmament also envisaged the establishment of three working groups to undertake substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances. This has been a clear reflection of members' strong desire to achieve progress on all four core issues and commence negotiations on these three issues down the road.

The adoption of the programme of work was the culmination of the progress achieved by the Conference on Disarmament over the past four years. Although the Conference on Disarmament has not

formally undertaken substantive work for more than a decade, it has engaged in thematic debates, and that is very important. We have had thematic debates on all seven agenda items since 2006.

For the past three years, the Conference has held structured debates on all agenda items — in 2006, as I said, under the guidance of its presidents, and since 2007 under the seven coordinators appointed by its presidents. The results have been recorded in the official documents of the Conference on Disarmament. Simply put, this means that over these years, the Conference has actually undertaken preparatory substantive work by deliberating on issues on its agenda, thus paving the way for real negotiations on its agenda.

In 2009, despite the adoption of its programme of work, the Conference on Disarmament was not able to proceed to the implementation of that programme of work due to the lack of agreement on procedural matters. This was very unfortunate, but it sometimes happens that positive momentum and positive developments are counterbalanced with less positive things.

For three months, the successive presidents — whom I would like to thank warmly — tried their best to address these concerns and search for a solution satisfactory to all members, but consensus on how to implement the programme of work proved elusive. Therefore, we have had a little dose of scepticism. The Conference on Disarmament's failure to implement the programme of work has caused tremendous frustration and disappointment among its members.

It has also raised questions regarding the validity of decision CD/1864, which has been a delicate project of compromise. These concerns have been amplified by the emerging reluctance to reflect the importance of decision CD/1864 in the annual report and the draft General Assembly resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/C.1/64/L.41). At the same time, however, I remain optimistic, and I believe that the overwhelming majority of the representatives of States members of the Conference on Disarmament share that optimistic mood.

As the 2009 session came to a close, Conference members were already preparing the ground for an early start to negotiations next year, in 2010. They therefore requested the current and incoming Presidents to start consultations with a view to ensuring a quick adoption of the programme of work next year.

After difficult negotiations, the Conference also drafted a substantive report to the General Assembly (A/64/27) in a spirit of cooperation. Despite substantial disagreement on how to reflect the importance of decision CD/1864, there was a strong desire to maintain the current positive spirit and carry forward the current momentum to the 2010 session.

There is therefore a way forward, and these positive signs underpin my optimism that the Conference will be able to overcome the current difficulties and start substantive work next year. But the Conference must sustain the current momentum. In this respect, I would like to offer a few suggestions.

First, we must maintain the high political and public profile of the Conference. As members know, during the 2009 session a number of political leaders, including foreign ministers and, in particular, the Secretary-General of our Organization, came to address the Conference on Disarmament. They greatly contributed to this trend, helping to raise the Conference's political and public profile. Their support for the Conference is crucial to sustaining the current momentum. Therefore, I urge all Member States to recommend to their respective political leaders that they address the Conference on Disarmament next year.

Secondly, we must preserve and strengthen the cooperation among the Conference's Presidents. The tradition of cooperation among Presidents of the Conference, known as the P-6 formula, has been maintained for a fourth year and greatly facilitated the successful adoption of the 2009 programme of work. The continuation of this practice is critical to maintaining the current momentum. There are signs that the incoming Presidents for 2010 are gearing up to continue this practice. That is why I would like to congratulate Bangladesh on its leadership in initiating and securing early cohesion among next year's six Presidents.

Thirdly, we must start early consultations on the 2010 programme of work. The most urgent challenge here is to forge an early consensus on a programme of work for 2010. It is also important to build on decision CD/1864. In so doing, the legitimate concerns of all members of the Conference should of course be taken into account. In this respect, I believe that this year's resolution should call upon the current President, Ambassador Strohal of Austria, and the incoming President, Ambassador Hannan of Bangladesh, to start

without delay consultations on the programme of work for 2010, including procedural issues relating to its implementation.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the 2009 session saw a marked increase in the intensity of the work of the Conference. The adoption of decision CD/1864 was the high point of its achievements this year. Despite disappointing developments thereafter, there are high expectations among members for another breakthrough, and this time the start of substantive work, including negotiations. I would like to emphasize that we need to start negotiations on the basis of the programme of work.

With the adoption of the programme of work this year, the Conference on Disarmament has entered a new phase, and there should be no return to the impasse of the past. For my part, I will do all I can to assist Conference on Disarmament members to attain this goal.

The Chairperson (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament for his statement.

I now give the floor to Mr. Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Mr. Tóth (Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization): It is nice to be back again. It is a privilege to sit up here on the podium together with Sergio Duarte and Sergei Ordzhonikidze. Members might have a feeling of *déjà vu*. We are back again. This is not the first year that we are having this interactive panel.

Allow me to start by making a point about the uniqueness of this composition. It is one-stop shopping, as it were. Members do not have to travel to Geneva, Vienna or The Hague. Organizations that have a mandate in the respective areas converge here and present, in a way convenient to members, a tour d'horizon that practically encompasses the whole spectrum. It is to be hoped that we can forge a dialogue in an interactive way. It is to be hoped that members will make points that we can take away as questions. I believe that this is a forum from which we can squeeze much more than we have until now.

I would like to touch upon three points. First, I would touch upon developments in the Preparatory

Commission. Secondly, I would like to touch upon capacity-building. Prior to this meeting, we had agreed that we might emphasize one issue that might be a thread connecting the different organizations, and I would like to do the same with capacity-building. Thirdly, I would like to speak a bit about the wider context and why the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the work of the Commission matter.

Allow me to start by saying that historically, the First Committee has been the forum to build consensus. It has been the forum to bridge gaps. It has been the forum to support the development of international norms that can lead to effective disarmament and non-proliferation. There can be no greater responsibility. It is no coincidence that, back in 1946, the very first resolution of the General Assembly called for

“the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” (*resolution 1 (I), para. 5 (c)*).

There have been some remarkable achievements since then, yet there have also been many setbacks. The legacy of the past few years has cast a dark shadow on the ability of this Committee to fulfil its historical role and potential as defined. Fortunately, we are witnessing a new era — an era in which a new world can and must be shaped. More than ever, the changing international climate promises a new beginning in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It shall be up to members and, if they wish, to all of us to finally realize the will of the community of nations expressed some 60 years ago.

The year 2009 has been a remarkable year. The events of this past month alone have created conditions almost undreamed of a few years ago. There has been a renewed, sustained revival of efforts towards global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Many world leaders, including the Secretary-General and highly respected non-governmental actors, have made concrete proposals to this end. Last month’s Security Council high-level meeting (see S/PV.6191) affirmed the commitment to work towards a world without nuclear weapons. Only last week, the world’s most prestigious peace prize was awarded, *inter alia*, for the vision of and work towards a world without nuclear weapons. The political will of the international community is evident. Now we will have to translate political will into concrete action.

We in the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization were particularly gratified with the results of the sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty. The Conference was held here in New York on 24 and 25 September, simultaneously with the high-level Security Council meeting. It was attended by more than 110 countries. Forty countries were represented at the ministerial level. Co-chaired by the Foreign Ministers of France and Morocco, the Conference was an unequivocal expression of the international community’s continued faith in the Treaty and the Commission. In a strongly worded Final Declaration adopted by consensus, hold-out States were called on to sign and ratify the CTBT so that it can enter into force. The Secretary-General, who is the depository of the Treaty, presented the news of the unanimously adopted Final Declaration at the doorstep of the Security Council. In turn, the Security Council called for the entry into force of the Treaty at an early date.

It was a transformational experience. Today, the question is not if but rather when the Treaty will enter into force. For that we need, three things: leadership, leadership and more leadership. We need high-level, determined action by the international community to go the very last mile. The First Committee has a special responsibility in this regard. The time is right for members of this Committee to engage in results-oriented dialogue and concrete action. It is time for the entry into force of the CTBT.

The CTBT is a unifying arrangement around which the international community can rally. The Treaty today boasts near-universal membership. In all, 182 countries have signed it. Ten years ago, there were only 50 ratifications, and 150 States have now ratified the Treaty. Despite the challenges of the past decade, this represents an additional 100 voices of support. This is indeed an outstanding achievement, yet there remain nine among 44 States whose ratification is needed for entry into force. We in the Preparatory Commission are gratified that the prospects for the entry into force of the Treaty appear much more positive than they have for many years. The Commission has come within sight of the fulfilment of its mandate. Through dedication, commitment and hard work, we are approaching the point of readiness for the entry into force of the Treaty.

The Commission has built up a \$1 billion verification regime. Almost 80 per cent of the

International Monitoring System's global monitoring stations are already sending operational-standard data to headquarters in Vienna. The volume of the data transmitted from the stations to the data centre in Vienna has tripled over the past five years. New global communication infrastructure for relaying that data has been installed. Important advances have been made in processing methods and software in all the verification technologies.

The System has been tried and tested, notably by the two test explosions carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006 and 2009. These tests were deplorable, but they proved the reliability of the system. The system has also gained the trust and approval of the scientific community in the context of a scientific studies project in which over 500 scientists participate.

This is not the whole story, and with your permission, Sir, I would like to touch upon the capacity-building issue. In the Commission, we recognize the true value of the investment with which we were entrusted by member States. We see this investment as a platform for scientific knowledge and capacity-building in member States. Member States from developing countries are the prime potential beneficiaries of the investment. The unique verification system that is being shaped offers a host of opportunities for applications in scientific research and everyday life. Whether in the area of early tsunami warning, aviation safety, climate change or marine life research, the monitoring technologies offer an obvious advantage.

As an organization operating at the cutting edge of scientific and technological knowledge, we are determined to share that knowledge with our member States. The Commission has offered hundreds of training opportunities in technologies associated with the verification system to researchers and scientists from member States. In order to ensure the readiness of member States for the entry into force of the Treaty, the Commission is providing them with assistance on the legislative and constitutional issues arising from the Treaty. The Commission is also working closely with member States to set up their national data centres. Through the provision of the necessary training, technical infrastructure and equipment, we ensure that member States reap the benefits of this unique organization. These new skills have a spillover effect on other areas of development.

Since its establishment, the Commission has trained 1,700 technicians and professionals from 147 member States. Lately, the Commission has been working with donors and international development funds to ensure the necessary funding. We are currently in the second phase of implementation of what we call the "pilot project" to finance the participation of technical experts from developing countries in official meetings of the Commission for a whole year. The project is financed by 17 donors from both developed and developing countries and organizations. This is an act demonstrating their conviction in the noble values of multilateralism, and we are grateful to all of those partners.

We are currently working with the European Union on a multi-year project to assist member States from Africa in establishing their national data centres. The second phase of the project will include countries from the Latin American and Caribbean region. These centres are necessary to efforts to access and analyse the invaluable data and other products generated by the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre. Through a combination of training, e-learning modules, regional workshops and the provision of equipment, we hope to enable 29 African member States and eight countries in Latin America to be fully on par with the rest of the member States.

Entry into force can really be a priority only if the international community believes that the Treaty matters. Entry into force will close the door once and for all on testing and make the de facto international norm legally binding. It will operationalize the verification regime. It will allow us to address compliance issues properly. This is extremely important in its own right, but the Treaty is of great significance beyond its own terms of reference. It is a catalyst for nuclear disarmament. It provides a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing, thereby curbing the development of new types and designs of nuclear weapons. It is a strong confidence- and security-building measure that ensures that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy remain peaceful.

As we prepare for the May 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), I would like to leave members with the following thought. Many believe that there has to be significant progress on the CTBT by 2010 if the Review Conference is to be successful. There is little doubt that progress

towards entry into force is crucial to the success of the Review Conference. The early entry into force of the CTBT may be the needed catalyst to mark the beginning of a new paradigm for the entire non-proliferation system.

Progress on the Treaty would pave the way for progress on other measures necessary to strengthening the non-proliferation regime across the board. The Treaty is one of the measures around which an effective international consensus can be built in advance of 2010. Those measures are very few, and this measure is achievable. It means progress on each of the three main pillars. In some ways, it bridges the divide between the different emphases placed on each of these pillars by the different parties to the NPT. It signals commitment to disarmament, it strengthens non-proliferation and it facilitates the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is not sufficient by itself, but it is necessary for success.

A new consensus has to be found ahead of 2010. The Treaty is not the answer to all of the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime, but its entry into force may pave the way to solving many of the most critical challenges.

The Chairperson (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Tóth for his statement.

I would now like to provide the Committee with the opportunity to have an interactive discussion with our panellists by having an informal question and answer session. I thank our three panellists for their statements, which, I believe, were truly useful for the work of this Committee. I therefore invited representatives to actively participate in the question-and-answer session. I believe that we must make the most of the opportunity of having these three public figures with us in order to delve deeper into the subjects that are of interest to our Committee. Before proceeding to the informal part of the meeting, I will suspend the meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 4.20 p.m. and resumed at 5.20 p.m.

The Chairperson (*spoke in Spanish*): We shall now begin our thematic discussion on the issue of nuclear weapons. I now give the floor to delegations that wish to make statements on the subject under consideration.

Mr. Hellgren (Sweden): I speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate country the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Serbia, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

In order to respect the time limits, I will deliver a slightly abbreviated version of my statement. The full official text is now being circulated in the room.

Despite the renewed positive momentum in global arms control, international security continues to be compromised and threatened, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as the risk of non-State actors gaining access to such weapons. The European Union welcomes the Security Council's important adoption of resolution 1887 (2009).

The EU is committed to working to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its article VI, and an important element in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We must preserve and strengthen its authority and integrity. The EU will continue to promote all the objectives contained in the Treaty. The EU reiterates its call on all States that are not yet parties to the NPT to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The EU continues to support the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and shall bear in mind the current situation.

The EU warmly welcomes the fact that the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference managed to take the necessary procedural decisions. While much work remains to be done before consensus on the outcome for the 2010 Review Conference can be successfully built, the constructive atmosphere of the Committee's session this year has given us some reason for optimism.

At the Committee's meetings, the European Union presented its vision for the 2010 review cycle and made concrete proposals to that end. The current review cycle should help us to reaffirm a sense of common purpose and create a more secure

international context by expressing full support for the NPT's goals and obligations, by addressing the main issues at stake within all three pillars of the Treaty, and by demonstrating the capacity to give appropriate responses to the current challenges.

A balanced approach to the three pillars is essential. The 2010 Review Conference should adopt a set of concrete, effective, pragmatic and consensual measures for stepping up international efforts against proliferation, pursuing disarmament and ensuring the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to develop their capacities in that field. To achieve those goals, the EU has presented a set of forward-looking proposals on all three pillars of the NPT, to be part of an action plan adopted by the Review Conference.

In the area of non-proliferation, the EU has proposed, inter alia, resolute action in response to proliferation crises, the determination of the consequences of a State party's non-compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations, the universalization and strengthening of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), improvements in nuclear security and the physical protection of nuclear materials, the strengthening of export controls, cooperation to develop multilateral schemes as viable and credible alternatives to the development of exclusively national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, the adoption of national criminal sanctions against acts of proliferation, and the development of proliferation-resistant and safeguards-friendly technologies.

The European Union also recalls the disarmament initiatives that we submitted to the General Assembly in 2008 and continues to encourage the international community to promote in particular the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the completion of its verification regime and the dismantling, as soon as possible, of all nuclear testing facilities in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community; the opening without delay and early completion of negotiations on a fissile-material cut-off treaty on the basis agreed in decision CD/1864, and the introduction of an immediate moratorium on the production of such materials, as well as the dismantlement of facilities dedicated to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; the establishment of transparency and confidence-building measures by the nuclear

Powers; the early completion of the negotiations between the United States and Russia on a legally binding post-START agreement and an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the NPT, in particular by the States that possess the largest arsenals; the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, by those States that have them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination; the start of consultations on a multilateral treaty banning short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles; adherence to and implementation by all of The Hague Code of Conduct; and continuing to stress the need for general disarmament mobilization in all other areas of disarmament.

The European Union has equally ambitious proposals in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those include, for example, assisting countries in planning and assessing their energy needs; assuring the responsible development of nuclear energy in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions; supporting IAEA assistance programmes and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; encouraging States to join all the relevant major nuclear conventions; promoting the responsible management of spent fuel and nuclear waste; and actively promoting multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including our decision to financially support the initiative to launch an IAEA nuclear fuel bank with up to €25 million. The EU has also proposed that the NPT Review Conference establish a framework for dealing with the consequences of any decision to withdraw from the Treaty.

The international non-proliferation regime faces major challenges. The European Union strongly condemned the test of a nuclear explosive device carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 May 2009, as well as its launch of a long-range missile in April 2009, which constituted clear breaches of Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006). Such actions undermine the stability of the Korean peninsula and represent a threat to international peace and security. The EU strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from any further such activities, to renounce its nuclear weapons programme and to return to the Six-Party Talks. The EU calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to compliance with the

NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. The EU fully supports resolution 1874 (2009) and calls for its swift and robust implementation. The letter sent by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Security Council on 4 September 2009, which strives to challenge the implementation of resolution 1874 (2009), contains further provocations to the international community.

Iran, like any other State party to the NPT, has the inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But the international community has to be sure that Iran complies with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement. Iran's clandestine nuclear activities, including the construction of a covert uranium enrichment facility in Qom, the composition of its nuclear programme and its refusal to effectively cooperate with the IAEA in all respects have cast serious doubts on the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We stress that Iran has the responsibility to restore international confidence in that regard. We urge Iran to follow up the meeting in Geneva on 1 October with concrete measures, including providing full transparency on the Qom project.

The EU reaffirms its unequivocal support for efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The EU urges Iran to fully comply with all those resolutions and to fully cooperate with the IAEA by providing the Agency with the access and information that it has requested. The EU remains firmly committed to a dual-track approach. We call on Iran to work seriously with the international community in a spirit of mutual respect in order to find a negotiated solution that will address Iran's interests as well as the international community's concerns.

The EU emphasizes the essential role of the IAEA in monitoring States' fulfilment of their nuclear non-proliferation undertakings. The EU expresses its sincere appreciation to Director General ElBaradei for his successful tenure at the helm of the IAEA and congratulates his successor, Ambassador Amano.

The EU remains fully committed to the fight against nuclear terrorism and supports all measures designed to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery or connected materials. In particular, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) plays a crucial role in

that respect. The EU is also encouraged by the United States initiative with regard to a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world and is ready to work towards that aim.

The EU reaffirms its commitment to strong and internationally coordinated export controls to complement our obligations under the NPT. We support the further strengthening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The EU attaches the greatest importance to the entry into force as soon as possible of the CTBT and the completion of its verification regime. The CTBT is crucial to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The EU salutes the new momentum towards further ratifications created by the announcement of President Obama that the United States Administration will immediately and aggressively pursue that country's ratification. The EU will spare no effort in promoting the early ratification of the Treaty by the few remaining Annex 2 States.

The EU warmly welcomes the decision taken earlier this year in the Conference on Disarmament to open negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in accordance with decision CD/1864. Such a treaty is long overdue, and its successful conclusion would constitute a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament efforts. While the subsequent delays in the actual start of the negotiations are profoundly disappointing, the EU trusts that all States members of the Conference will engage constructively in those negotiations, as well as in the substantive work on the other issues included in the programme of work, when the Conference resumes its work in January 2010.

Positive and negative security assurances can play an important role in the NPT regime and can act as an incentive to forego the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. The European Union is committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances.

The EU continues to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1999.

The EU also remains committed to the full implementation of the resolutions on the Middle East

adopted by the Security Council and by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The EU calls on all States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. All States of the region that have not yet done so should accede to the NPT and to the conventions banning biological and chemical weapons, and conclude with the IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. Regional confidence-building measures are needed. In that context, we recall our proposal presented in May of this year to hold a seminar on Middle East security, WMD non-proliferation and disarmament prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Serious threats and challenges remain, and we must face them with resolve. However, we note with satisfaction the growing momentum for progress towards achieving the goals enshrined in the NPT. The EU calls on all States to seize this opportunity.

Ms. Millar (Australia): Australia has a history of determined activism in support of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Rudd, reaffirmed Australia's commitment to working with other nations towards that goal in his statement to the General Assembly last month.

That commitment led Australia, with our close friend and partner Japan, to establish the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The Commission aims to create the political and policy consensus necessary to elicit real results on non-proliferation and disarmament in advance of and at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and beyond.

We look to States that possess nuclear weapons to exercise leadership. We were greatly encouraged by the bold restatement of a commitment to a world without nuclear weapons by President Obama in his speech in Prague on 5 April. Support for that goal by the United States and the Russian Federation, which hold some 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons, has helped to generate greater momentum towards nuclear disarmament than at any time since the burst of international activity in the 1990s following the end of the cold war. That momentum was increased by the Security Council's consensus adoption on 24

September of resolution 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Australia warmly welcomed the announcement in June 2009 by the United States and the Russian Federation of their intention to negotiate a legally binding and verifiable successor agreement to the START agreement before its expiration at the end of this year. Intensive negotiations are under way. We hope that they will be successful and lead to continued bilateral arms reductions between the two countries and further such action by others.

Australia has also been encouraged by the decisions of other nuclear-weapon States — by the United Kingdom's decision to reduce its fleet of Trident submarines and its number of nuclear warheads, by France's decisions to reduce its nuclear warhead capacity to less than 300 and to dismantle facilities that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, and by China's statement that it is committed to a world free of nuclear weapons.

As positive as all those steps are, Australia seeks deeper, faster and more transparent and irreversible reductions in nuclear arsenals in the nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with their obligations under article VI of the NPT. We look to States that possess nuclear weapons, both within and outside the NPT, to reduce the numbers of those weapons, to reassess and limit the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, and to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear weapons in ways that promote global security and stability.

But the burden of responsibility for nuclear disarmament is not the nuclear-weapon States' alone. A world without nuclear weapons requires an equally strong commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept stringent international safeguards on their civil nuclear facilities. The vast majority of the world's nations, including Australia, have made such commitments. They honour them scrupulously because they judge it in their national security interests to do so. But the actions of a few States are undermining the global consensus to contain the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear tests, most recently in May 2009, are strikingly at odds with the renewed momentum on nuclear disarmament. Those tests follow a history of that country's non-compliance with its International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards obligations and defiance of Security Council resolutions. Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) sent a clear message to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the international community expects it to abide by its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and the commitments it has made in the Six-Party Talks to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without delay and to work constructively towards denuclearization.

Iran's refusal to abide by binding Security Council resolutions and its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA are also deeply troubling. Recent disclosure of Iran's covert second enrichment facility reinforces Australia's concerns, and those of the international community, about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Further to the 1 October meeting in Geneva, we encourage Iran to work seriously with the international community to address these concerns.

All States need to take effective measures to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material. The possibility of nuclear materials getting into the hands of terrorists remains of deep concern. Australia warmly welcomes President Obama's planned nuclear security summit in 2010. We call on all States to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004).

Decisions taken in the First Committee can help build the necessary political support for practical steps to strengthen non-proliferation and disarmament. We hope this year's Committee will see increased support for the draft resolution presented annually by Japan on renewed determination towards elimination of nuclear weapons. Australia sponsors and strongly supports this draft resolution.

This year, Australia will be the lead sponsor on the annual draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We urge all states to support it. At the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in New York last month, we saw renewed impetus for the entry into force of the Treaty. Australia welcomed the participation of the United States in an Article XIV Conference for the first time in nearly a decade, and strongly supported President Obama's commitment to moving forward with ratification and working with others to bring the

Treaty into force so that nuclear testing is permanently prohibited.

Australia also welcomes recent expressions of support for ratification and entry into force of the CTBT by China and Indonesia. We continue to call on all States that have not yet done so, especially those nine States whose ratification is required for it to enter into force, to ratify the Treaty without delay.

Australia will sponsor the draft resolution on the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) at this session of the First Committee and urges all States to support a strong text. As one of the six Presidents of the 2009 Conference on Disarmament, Australia worked tirelessly with our colleagues in the Six Presidents initiative and with all members of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a balanced programme of work, including the commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT, a long-standing goal of the international community.

But despite the historic agreement on 29 May to adopt a programme of work after years of inactivity, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to implement it. The reasons for that would seem to be institutional inertia and, more significantly, a calculation by a very few that stopping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons may not be in their security interests. If true, such a calculation would seem to run counter to current international trends and would be deeply worrying. If it is not to be consigned to irrelevance, the Conference must move quickly in 2010 not only to adopt a programme of work but to start working and negotiating. For that to happen, we may also need engagement at political levels outside the Conference to convince hold-out States that stopping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons enhances the security of all.

Australia is pleased to support a number of nuclear-weapon-free zone draft resolutions this year. That reflects our historic support for nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at by regional States. We are proud of our founding role in the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We warmly welcome the 2009 entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which creates an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. By its entry into force, the Treaty of Pelindaba — in conjunction with the Latin American, South Pacific and South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zones — has

effectively created a Southern Hemisphere free of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide practical security benefits to their members, including through adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the protocols containing negative security assurances. We urge all nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to sign and ratify the protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. We look forward to the proposed second conference in 2010 of States parties and signatories to treaties by which nuclear-weapon-free zones are established.

This session of the First Committee takes place six months before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Given the renewed energy and focus world leaders have brought to the disarmament agenda, the Review Conference has the potential to shape future non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in a decisive and meaningful way. NPT parties must seize this opportunity.

The 2010 Review Conference must reaffirm the collective security benefits provided by the NPT and it must deliver results across all three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition to undertaking a detailed review of the Treaty, the Conference should issue some kind of blueprint for action. With respect to the first pillar, such a blueprint could be something along the lines of the 2000 Review Conference's 13 practical steps. We should use the opportunity afforded by this First Committee session to build strong support for good NPT Review Conference outcomes.

All States, NPT parties and non-parties alike, need to undertake non-proliferation and disarmament obligations and comply with them. Australia calls on those States outside the NPT — India, Pakistan and Israel — to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. In the meantime, we urge them to accept non-proliferation and disarmament disciplines to the maximum extent possible.

I referred at the beginning of this statement to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament established by Australia and Japan last year. That independent Commission, chaired jointly by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, aims to produce a comprehensive, practical and action-oriented report early in 2010. We

expect that the report will produce recommendations on disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the interconnections between them. The Commission has met across regions, with nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, with developed and developing countries, with NPT parties and non-parties. The Commission has held meetings in Washington, D.C., Moscow, Beijing, Santiago, Cairo and New Delhi, and will soon hold another in Hiroshima. Its inclusive approach and extensive reach have helped generate valuable new thinking which, it hopes, will help shape global thinking and build consensus both in the NPT Review Conference context and beyond.

Finally, Australia will promote strong outcomes in this Committee because they are intrinsically worthwhile, because they will help generate needed momentum to ensure successful outcomes at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and because they will enhance the security of all.

Mr. Yurdakul (Turkey): We highlighted the main elements of Turkey's position on nuclear weapons at the general debate last week. Today, I will further elaborate on various aspects of our position in this area.

Turkey, like many others, regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and is determined to uphold the viability of the Treaty. Turkey recognizes that the full and universal implementation of the Treaty would make a unique contribution to international peace and security. We remain fully committed to the implementation of the Treaty with all of its three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

We advocate a balanced treatment of these pillars. We are pleased to observe that this approach has gained increased support over the years. However, there is still a need to further bolster the integrity and credibility of the NPT regime through the universal recognition of the importance of the equal treatment of these three dimensions.

We underline the essential and unique role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying States' nuclear non-proliferation commitments and in ensuring the development of peaceful uses of

nuclear energy by those countries that aspire to develop their capacities in this field. Hence, we are dedicated to full compliance with IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the additional protocols, which in our view constitute the current verification standards, and we call upon all States parties that have not done so to ratify and implement these instruments without delay.

As one of the three pillars of the NPT, nuclear disarmament requires an incremental but sustained approach. The unequivocal undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals is one of the greatest achievements of the NPT. This responsibility must now be upheld and operationalized, building on article VI of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed upon in 2000. In that context, we welcome the steps that nuclear-weapon States have taken so far to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In particular, we welcome and encourage the efforts aimed at replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new legally binding instrument by the end of this year.

We would like hereby to recall the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. We believe that irreversible progress on nuclear disarmament will also reinforce the other two pillars of the NPT. In particular, nuclear non-proliferation should go hand-in-hand with nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation is essential to maintaining international peace and security and an indispensable step towards achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

In that understanding, Turkey continues to call for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the context of the Conference on Disarmament. We also advocate strengthening the IAEA safeguards system and promoting the Agency's role in advancing the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We also urge all States to implement resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions of the Security Council on non-proliferation.

It is our firm belief that States in full compliance with their safeguards obligations should enjoy unfettered access to civilian nuclear technology, as provided for in the NPT and the statute of the IAEA. In our view, that could only contribute to the further

strengthening and universalization of the NPT regime. Having said that, we must also ensure that all requisite steps are taken to guarantee that there is no diversion of peaceful nuclear programmes. In that sense, the right to have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes entails a strict responsibility and obligation on the part of every NPT State party with regard to non-proliferation.

We are encouraged by the positive and constructive atmosphere that prevailed in the NPT Preparatory Committee earlier this year. We earnestly hope that the 2010 Review Conference will also lead to a successful outcome. Turkey will continue to work constructively towards that end. The commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and the early entry into force of the CTBT could contribute to the success of the Review Conference next year.

It is our conviction that neither nuclear weapons nor any other weapons of mass destruction can provide additional security for any country in this era. On the contrary, the possession and pursuit of such weapons undermine regional security and stability. Turkey therefore attaches great significance to and endorses all meaningful steps towards the establishment of effectively verifiable zones free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, in particular in the Middle East. Turkey is also convinced that legally binding security assurances provided by the five nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We consider the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula to be a regional and global priority. As the current Chair of Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we attach the utmost importance to the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Turkey hopes that conditions can be created for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the NPT at the earliest possible date as a non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as for the resumption by the IAEA of comprehensive safeguards. By the same token, we are committed to a negotiated solution and recognize the importance of encouraging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks, which we consider to be the best vehicle for concrete and irreversible progress towards lasting peace, security and stability in the region.

Treaty-based nuclear arms control and non-proliferation are indispensable for promoting international peace and security. We call on all parties to renew and reaffirm their commitments to the principles and objectives of these instruments and to redouble their efforts towards the codification of new instruments so that future generations can enjoy a greater sense of safety and security around the world.

The Chairperson (*spoke in Spanish*): I wish to remind delegations once again that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is 12 noon on Thursday, 15 October. I urge delegations to meet that deadline in order to allow the Secretariat to process documents in a timely manner.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.