



# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
29 September 2004

Original: English

---

## Fifty-ninth session

Agenda item 155

### Financing of the United Nations Stabilization

### Mission in Haiti

## **Proposed budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005<sup>1</sup>**

### **Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions**

Proposal submitted by the Secretary-General 2004/05	\$379,046,800 <sup>a</sup>
Recommendation of the Advisory Committee 2004/05	\$379,046,800 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Requirements for 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005.

1. In the paragraphs below the Advisory Committee has identified reductions totalling \$9,312,400, but for the reasons given in paragraph 36 below, the Advisory Committee is recommending approval of the full amount proposed by the Secretary-General for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, as well as appropriation of the amount committed for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004. The Committee makes a number of observations and recommendations with regard to the structure of the Mission and its administration and management, as well as with regard to opportunities for further savings.

2. The documents used by the Advisory Committee in its consideration of the financing of MINUSTAH are listed at the end of the present report.

---

<sup>1</sup> Includes commitment authority for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004 (see para. 9 below).

## I. Introduction

3. The Committee recalls that the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee (see A/58/809), authorized commitment authority with assessment of the amount of \$49,259,800, approved by the Advisory Committee under the terms of section IV of General Assembly resolution 49/233 A of 23 December 1994, for the establishment of the Mission (for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004), and of an amount of \$172,480,500 for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2004 (see General Assembly resolution 58/311 of 18 June 2004).

4. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, of the amount apportioned for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004, expenditures amounted to \$34,556,000. For the period from 1 July to 31 October 2004, expenditures, with the exclusion of field expenditures, amounted to \$57,794,900, as at 23 September 2004.

5. The Advisory Committee was provided with the following table showing incumbency as at 31 August 2004:

<i>Category of personnel</i>	<i>Authorized/proposed<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Incumbered</i>
Military contingents	6 700	2 761
Civilian police	872	320
Formed police units	750	-
International staff	482	191
National staff	549	334
United Nations Volunteers	153	50

<sup>a</sup> Represents the highest authorized/proposed strength for the period.

## II. Proposed budget for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005

### A. Mandate and planned results

6. The Advisory Committee commends the results-based budget presentation for MINUSTAH for 2004/05. The Committee is of the opinion, however, that there is room for further improvement, particularly as regards the measurability of indicators of achievement and the refinement of external factors.

7. The Committee notes that the overall objective of the Mission is to restore peace and security and to further the constitutional political process under way in Haiti. Furthermore, on the basis of the specific mandate of the Mission, as provided in paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004, and the supporting activities identified in the Secretary-General's report on Haiti (S/2004/300), five components are outlined, with specific expected accomplishments and related indicators of achievement and outputs: (i) secure and stable environment, (ii) political process, (iii) human rights, (iv) humanitarian and development coordination and (v) support.

8. The structure proposed for the Mission is discussed in paragraphs 17 to 26 below. The Committee notes that the Mission will establish offices in the 10

geographical districts, consisting of the Mission Headquarters in Port-au-Prince, three regional headquarters and six district offices (see A/59/288, para. 6).

## B. Resource requirements

9. The proposed budget for MINUSTAH of \$428,306,600 contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/59/288) comprises the commitment authority of \$49,259,800 granted by the Advisory Committee for the establishment of the Mission for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004 (see para. 3 above) and resource requirements in the amount of \$379,046,800 proposed for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005.

### 1. Military and police personnel

<i>Category</i>	<i>Authorized/proposed 2004/05</i>
Military contingents <sup>a</sup>	6 700
Civilian police <sup>a</sup>	872
Formed police units <sup>a</sup>	750

<sup>a</sup> Represents highest level of authorized/proposed strength.

10. The provision proposed for military and police personnel amounts to \$204,401,900 (including \$12,603,700 for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004). The requirement of \$148,850,200 for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 with respect to military contingents provides for the phased deployment of 5,844 military contingent personnel, with the full authorized strength expected to be attained in the period 2005/06. A 10 per cent delayed deployment factor has been applied. The Committee notes that at the time of its hearings, a total of 2,770 troops were deployed throughout the mission area, compared to the projected deployment schedule, according to which 4,947 troops were supposed to have been deployed by the end of August 2004. The Committee was informed that the delays were due to discussions relating to the memorandums of understanding and requests for evaluation teams in some cases. However, the deployed operational contingents from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay were expected to be joined by troops from Nepal, Sri Lanka, Peru, Spain and Morocco. **In view of the evident delays, the Committee recommends that the delayed deployment factor for military contingents be adjusted to a more realistic rate of 15 per cent.** The impact on the budget would be a reduction of \$5,927,400.

11. The Advisory Committee notes that provision is made for \$17,664,200 for rations, at a cost of \$8.40 per day per person, whereas in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) their cost has been closer to \$5 to \$6 range. The Committee requested an explanation for the variance and was informed that since the time of preparation of the budget, a rations contract had been signed that reflected an actual cost of \$7 per day per person, thus reducing requirements for expenditures on rations by \$2,270,400. **The Committee requests that efforts be made to reduce future costs so that they would be more in line with those of other missions.**

12. The estimated requirements for civilian police amount to \$26,136,700 for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, based on a phased deployment of 872 police officers, reflecting a 40 per cent delayed deployment factor. At the time of its hearings, the Committee was informed that 429 civilian police had been deployed and that the delays in deployment were mostly due to the language requirements.

13. Provision of \$16,811,300 for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 is also made for the costs of 750 formed unit police, to be deployed in 6 teams of 125 officers each, reflecting a 30 per cent delayed deployment factor. At the time of its hearings, the Committee was informed that a Jordanian team of 125 formed unit police was already present, and that a Chinese team (30 formed unit police) and a team from Nepal (6 formed unit police) were expected before the end of September.

## 2. Civilian personnel

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed 2004/05</i>
International staff	482
National staff <sup>a</sup>	549
United Nations Volunteers	153

<sup>a</sup> Includes National Officers and national General Service staff.

14. The estimated requirements for civilian personnel for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005 amount to \$62,877,400 (\$3,767,200 for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004 and \$59,110,200 for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005). They provide for a staffing establishment of 1,184 personnel, consisting of 482 international personnel, 549 national staff and 153 United Nations Volunteers.

15. The related staff costs include a delayed deployment factor of 35 per cent for international staff, 45 per cent for national staff and 30 per cent for United Nations Volunteers. The Committee was informed that the process of recruitment of local staff had been initiated with the advertisement of 551 posts, for which 14,100 applications had been received. At the time of the Committee's hearings, 482 local staff had been approved by the local Appointments and Postings Committee and recommendations for 69 National Officers had been referred to the Personnel Management and Support Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for final endorsement. The Committee was also assured that approximately 50 per cent of the international staff had been recruited and were on travel status. **The Committee believes that the deployment factor for national staff, which will most certainly result in over-expenditures under that budget line in view of the timely recruitment, may be offset by the delays in the deployment of international staff. This should be reported in the context of the performance report.**

16. **The Committee encourages greater use of national staff, where possible, as has been requested by the Committee and the General Assembly in the past, particularly in the area of administration, where, the Committee was informed, in view of the advertisement and recruitment efforts locally, a skilled workforce had been identified.**

### Structure of the Mission

17. The Committee was informed that MINUSTAH is organized as a “multidimensional and integrated mission in order to enable it to respond to the various needs in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council”. The Committee notes from the organizational chart, that under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the structure of the Mission is comprised of two main areas or pillars: a civilian affairs pillar, headed by a Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which includes sections concerned with justice, human rights, security, the police, civil affairs and electoral assistance; and a humanitarian affairs and development pillar, headed by a Deputy Special Representative, who is also the Resident Coordinator, concerned with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, humanitarian and development coordination, child protection, gender issues and HIV/AIDS.

18. In addition to the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General mentioned above, the Force Commander, responsible for the development of the concept of operations, deployment and all military activities, and the Chief Administrative Officer, who heads the support component of the mission, report directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.<sup>2</sup> The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General also has a direct link to the Political Affairs and Planning Division, the Legal Affairs Section, the Office of the Resident Auditor and the Communications and Public Information Section.

19. The Advisory Committee had an exchange of views with representatives of the Secretary-General on what appears to be the application of a structure with certain commonalities in such missions as MINUSTAH, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and UNMIL. The Committee had previously referred to an earlier form of such a structure in its report on the financing of UNOCI (A/58/806, paras. 26-29), as well as its reports on UNMIL (A/58/591, paras. 15-17) and MONUC (A/58/447, paras. 30-37). In the case of UNOCI, the Committee pointed out the “fragmented and top-heavy” structure and recommended that a review be undertaken with a view to “streamlining the structure by combining smaller units or integrating them into larger sections and eliminating some posts for heads of units and other higher-level posts, including in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representatives”. In the case of MONUC and UNMIL, the Committee has called attention to the proliferation of small sections and units with chiefs at the P-4 and P-5 level, overseeing small numbers of staff, which tends to inflate the grade structure and lead to a duplication of functions.

20. The Committee was informed that the structure now being proposed has evolved as a follow-up to the Brahimi report, in response to the multidimensional character of recent operations, which reflect the changes in the nature of the problems or conflicts in which the Organization is now called to play a role, as well as lessons learned. However, this structure or model, which is being applied on an experimental basis, is not rigid; it can be adapted to the specificities and complexities of each mission and will be adjusted to adapt to changes in mandates.

---

<sup>2</sup> The budget document (A/59/288) indicates that the Chief Administrative Officer reports to the Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. During the Committee’s consideration of the Secretary-General’s report, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General indicated that current arrangements provide for direct reporting.

In complex missions, a Principal Deputy would relieve the Special Representative from the day-to-day management tasks of the operation, while allowing a second Deputy, usually the resident representative, to concentrate on the coordination of humanitarian and development affairs, thus ensuring an integrated and coordinated approach which would involve the rest of the United Nations system from the onset of the missions. This second deputy is thus, in many cases, assigned a role in mobilizing required resources related to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration activities and ensuring the emplacement of a sustainable exit strategy.

**21. The Committee appreciates the work that has been done so far, but it is of the opinion that the concerns indicated in paragraph 19 above have not been fully addressed, particularly with regard to the need to avoid fragmentation, to establish clear lines of authority and to avoid the potential for grade inflation.**

**22. Consistent with the views expressed in its report on ONUCI (A/58/806), the Committee recommends that the level of the Deputy Special Representative (Humanitarian and development coordination), which is given at the Assistant Secretary-General level in the common structure now being put forward, be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the existing grade of the Resident Coordinator and in consultation with the funds and programmes represented in the mission area. It is the view of the Committee that, unless a clear case based on function and responsibility is made otherwise, this post should normally be established at the D-2 level. Moreover, it is the understanding of the Committee that this post would usually be funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), up to the grade level of the existing Resident Coordinator; any difference would be paid by the mission concerned. In this connection, the Committee was informed that this arrangement will be reflected in the next budget of MINUSTAH. This funding arrangement should be applied to other missions.**

**23. The Committee notes that there is direct reporting to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of certain units such as those of legal affairs, public information and communications and political affairs in this Mission, as well as in UNMIL, MONUC and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Committee was assured that this responds to lessons learned and reflects the direct support to some of the functions of the Special Representatives in these multidimensional missions. The Committee cautions, however, against a tendency to replicate functions of the Mission itself in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The aim should be to increase efficiency and accountability and to improve management; it should not result in an increase in the number of posts or the grade level of the posts proposed either in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or in other units.**

**24. In the case of MINUSTAH, the Division of Administration currently also reports directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as indicated in paragraph 18 above. The Advisory Committee questioned this line of reporting in the case of ONUCI (see A/58/806). The Committee is of the opinion that the reporting function of the Division of Administration should be carried out through the Principal Deputy of the Special Representative of the Secretary-**

General, thus ensuring a system of checks and balances for all elements of the Mission.

25. The Committee also cautions against the duplication of functions in different units or a tendency to fragment functions into very specialized units, particularly where resources could, more efficiently, be pooled or merged, as is the case with the Child Protection, Gender and HIV/AIDS Units. In addition, the Committee notes that the Security Section in MINUSTAH is currently placed under the pillar of the Principal Deputy Special Representative. The Committee points out, however, that the reporting lines of security responsibility may shift or be adjusted after a decision is taken on the Secretary-General's comprehensive report on security to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.

26. While the Committee is aware of the need for flexibility in the model structure being applied on an experimental basis to these complex missions, the Committee recommends that an evaluation of that structure, on the basis of experience in these missions, be provided in the context of the submission of the peacekeeping budgets for the period 2005/06.

#### **Recommendations on posts**

27. In view of the paragraphs above, the Advisory Committee makes the following recommendations for adjustments regarding the staffing establishment in MINUSTAH:

- In the Office of the Special Representative, the post of the Director, proposed at the D-1 level, should be at the P-5 level and the Director should be assisted by a P-3, instead of a P-4. The Committee does not see the need for a Special Assistant (P-5) or a Protocol Officer (P-4); the latter functions can be carried out by the P-3. In view of the proximity of the Political Affairs and Planning Division to this office, the Committee does not see the need for a Political Affairs Officer (P-4).
- The level of the Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian and Development Coordination should be set at the D-2 level (see para. 22 above). For the reasons given in paragraph 23 above, one P-5 and one P-4 post in the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General should be eliminated owing to duplication of functions with other units reporting to this Deputy.
- Both the Legal Affairs Section and the Communications and Public Information Section should be headed at the P-5 instead of the D-1 level, in view of the available support from Headquarters. In both sections this should be achieved through the elimination of the D-1 post. The head of the Communications and Public Information Section could also act as spokesperson.
- The level of the post of the head of the Political Affairs and Planning Division should be reclassified downward from D-2 to D-1.

These recommendations are made on the understanding that the staffing of MINUSTAH would be revisited in the light of the evaluation called for in paragraph 26 above. The impact on the budget would be a reduction of \$1,114,600.

### 3. Operational costs

28. The proposed operational costs for MINUSTAH are \$161,027,300. Of this total, an amount of \$29,000,000 constitutes the replacement cost of equipment transferred from the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi since 1 May 2004.

29. The Committee notes a provision of \$64,056,600 under facilities and infrastructure (including \$9,980,200 for the period from 1 May to 30 June 2004). The resources provide for the acquisition of prefabricated facilities (\$20,067,100) and the reimbursement for self-sustainment of the military contingents and the formed police units (\$13,973,200), as well as \$3,387,000 for site construction and the upgrading of roads, airports and seaports. The Committee also notes an amount of \$2,027,200 for requirements for water treatment and bottling plants, of which \$1,839,800 relates to the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005. **The Committee expects that once completed, this should lead to savings in the amount budgeted for the supply of bottled water.**

30. The proposed requirements under communications amount to \$24,503,700 for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005. This would cover acquisition costs for communications equipment related to the establishment of the Mission's communications network, requirements related to commercial communications, specialized technical support and the self-sustainment of the military contingents and the formed police units, including the replacement cost of equipment transferred from the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base (\$1,901,900) and an amount of \$373,800 for the acquisition of public information equipment.

31. An amount of \$11,695,100, for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005, is proposed for information technology requirements, reflecting total acquisition costs for equipment of \$9,083,700, including \$712,500 in replacement costs for equipment transferred from the strategic deployment stocks.

**32. The Advisory Committee recommends that requests for resources for communications, information technology, and facilities and infrastructure include a time frame for the completion of projects and that the status of implementation of tasks undertaken be reflected in the performance report (see also A/57/772, para. 102).**

33. The requirements of \$24,842,800 for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005 under ground transportation provide for the operation and maintenance of a fleet of 764 vehicles. The purchase cost for the fleet of \$19,201,800 includes an amount of \$11,686,250 for the replacement cost of 468 vehicles transferred from the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base. It also includes a provision for spare parts (\$476,300). The Committee requested clarification as to the level of the provision for spare parts. The Committee was informed that the established practice is to make provision for the acquisition of certain critical spare parts in view of delays in getting equipment repaired under warranty or in obtaining replacement parts from the supplier. While, in established missions, spare parts and supplies are estimated at a standard rate of 10 per cent, in the case of MINUSTAH, where most of the equipment is new, they are estimated at 5 per cent.

### **Electoral assistance**

34. In its resolution 1542 (2004) the Security Council called upon the Mission to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to organize, monitor and carry out municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections “at the earliest possible date”. The Committee was informed that the Transitional Government is aiming to hold elections in the middle and at the end of next year. The Advisory Committee notes that the Electoral Assistance Section is responsible for the related tasks (A/59/288, para. 40), thus contributing to expected accomplishment 2.3 and supporting the related outputs in component 2 of the results-based framework of MINUSTAH. The related resources consist of 23 staff (8 international, 2 national and 13 United Nations Volunteers). The Committee was also informed that additional staff were not envisaged for this purpose, in view of the fact that the Section has been involved in the process since the start and the monitoring activities would be carried out by other entities.

### **Quick-impact projects**

35. Resources amounting to \$1,000,000 are included in the budget for quick-impact projects, of which \$970,000 relate to the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 for the requirements of 20 projects in support of civil society initiatives and public institutions, facilitating United Nations peacekeeping efforts. The Committee was informed that 300 submissions had been received, of which 83 projects had been evaluated and 31 had been approved.

## **III. Conclusions of the Advisory Committee**

36. The Advisory Committee, taking into account its observations and recommendations in the paragraphs above, is of the opinion that a reduction of \$9,312,400 is possible. During its consideration of the Secretary-General’s estimates, the Advisory Committee inquired as to the effects of Hurricane Jeanne on the conduct of the Mission. The Advisory Committee was informed that the impact is significant both upon the facilities and infrastructure of the Mission itself and with regard to the additional tasks the Mission is being called upon to perform in relation to humanitarian assistance and security for food distribution. The Committee was further informed, however, that it is not the intention of the Secretary-General to request additional resources at this time. Bearing the foregoing in mind, the Advisory Committee is recommending appropriation of the full amount requested by the Secretary-General, notwithstanding the adjustment in respect of the delayed deployment factor (see para. 10 above), the cost of rations (see para. 11 above) and the Committee’s views on the staffing of the Mission and the numbers and levels of posts required ( see para. 27 above). The financial impact of Hurricane Jeanne on the mission should be disclosed in the relevant performance report for MINUSTAH.

**Documentation**

- Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2005 (A/59/288)
- Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2004/698)
- Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti (S/2004/300)
- Security Council resolution 1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004