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**FORTIETH YEAR**

***SUPPLEMENT FOR JANUARY, FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1985***

**UNITED NATIONS**

**New York, 1986**

#### NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

**CHECK-LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD  
1 JANUARY - 31 MARCH 1985**

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- h The situation in the Middle East
- i Letter dated 28 January 1985 from the representative of Chad to the President of the Security Council [*Chad/Libya*]
- j Communications concerning the situation in South-East Asia and its implications for international peace and security
- k The question of South Africa
- l Communications concerning disarmament
- m The situation in Namibia
- n Communications concerning the strengthening of international security or bilateral and multilateral relations

## DOCUMENT S/16858/ADD.2

### Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus

(Original: English)  
[2 February 1985]

1. In my report of 12 December 1984 on the United Nations operation in Cyprus [S/16858, paras. 48-51 and 61], I gave an account of recent developments relating to the mission of good offices which the Council entrusted to the Secretary-General in its resolution 367 (1975) and subsequent resolutions, including, most recently, resolution 559 (1984). I also referred to the documentation that I had presented to the parties as an integrated whole during the final round of proximity talks, and to the joint high-level meeting which I had convened for 17 January 1985.

2. At the opening of the joint high-level meeting in New York on 17 January, I made a statement (see annex I). Throughout the joint high-level meeting I made every effort to assist the parties in resolving the differences that had arisen. In doing so, certain aspects of the substance of the draft agreement were touched upon and, in some cases, the gap between the respective positions appeared to be narrowing.

3. Since it did not prove possible at this time to overcome the difficulties, I made a statement (see annex II) on 20 January at the close of the joint high-level meeting.

4. My views concerning the situation that has developed at the joint high-level meeting in connection with the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council remain as indicated in the last paragraph of my statement of 20 January. It would however be unfortunate if the difficulties that developed were to weaken the resolve of the parties to search for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. It is essential to ensure that the advances that have been made should be preserved. I appeal to both sides and to all those concerned with the future of Cyprus to ensure that nothing is done in the island or elsewhere that would tend to make the search for a solution more difficult. I have no doubt that, given goodwill and determination, we could yet attain the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem that has so far eluded us.

#### ANNEX I

##### Statement by the Secretary-General on 17 January 1985 at the opening of the joint high-level meeting on Cyprus

I wish to welcome you to United Nations Headquarters for the joint high-level meeting that was announced at the close of our proximity talks and reported to the Security Council on 12 December 1984 [S/16858, para. 51]. This is a solemn occasion, indeed a landmark in the complex history of the search for a negotiated, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council. Our meeting in this room, which is usually reserved for the informal consultations of the members of the Council, serves to emphasize this link. I have no doubt that all of us are alive to the importance of the undertaking on which we have now embarked and to the great expectations that it has raised, not only in Cyprus.

I take it that our objective remains as stated in my report to the Security Council on 12 December, in which I expressed my expectation that the parties would, at this joint high-level meeting, conclude an agreement containing elements necessary for a comprehensive solution of the problem, aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus [ibid., para. 50]. On this occasion, I wish to pay a well-deserved tribute to you for the deter-

mination with which you have pursued the negotiations under my auspices. I am confident that both sides have come to the joint high-level meeting fully prepared to complete the task that they have so auspiciously begun, and that all concerned will continue to facilitate this process.

We must, of course, be realistic. Difficulties remain to be overcome, pitfalls to be avoided and mistrust to be dispelled. On the other hand, we obviously succeeded in clearing a large amount of ground during the proximity talks, with a view to constructing a formal framework to provide a solution to the problem, bearing in mind the relevant United Nations resolutions. I shall now address the question of what might be the most productive ways in which we might approach that task.

I have with me the documentation that we worked on during the proximity talks, and to which I referred in my report on 12 December. To move from this documentation to the conclusion of an agreement is the responsibility that now has to be faced. We all know that work needs to be done in order to accomplish that task within the outlines elaborated during the proximity talks.

It would be all too easy at this stage for our efforts to be derailed. I know that we shall all work to ensure that this will not occur. We are here to seek an agreement leading to the establishment of a Federal Republic of Cyprus. With goodwill, we can help one another to attain this goal. The progress made has been of such importance that it would be tragic to stop now. A new stage has been reached in the search for a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem, which for more than two decades has vitiated the political situation in the island and endangered the peace, not only among Cypriots, but also in the wider area.

In this enterprise, I know that you can count on the unanimous support of the international community. For my part, I pledge to you my fullest assistance and all the help that you may need to bring this task to a successful conclusion.

If you are determined to reach an agreement, a unique chance now exists. If this moment is lost, I am sure you will agree, it may not readily recur.

I shall now call upon you to give me your considered comments on the present stage of the diplomatic process.

#### ANNEX II

##### Statement by the Secretary-General on 20 January 1985 at the close of the joint high-level meeting on Cyprus

A joint high-level meeting on Cyprus took place at United Nations Headquarters, New York, from 17 to 20 January 1985. The meeting was held under the auspices of the Secretary-General in the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council. The meeting had before it the documentation which resulted from the high-level proximity talks held in New York in September, October and November-December 1984, and on which the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 12 December 1984 [see S/16858, paras. 48 to 50].

Both sides started from the above-mentioned documentation. The Turkish Cypriot side stated to the Secretary-General that "it fully accepts the draft agreement".

The Greek Cypriot side stated to the Secretary-General that "in conformity with its clear understanding it accepts the documentation presented by the Secretary-General as a basis for negotiations in accordance with the integrated whole approach aiming at a comprehensive and overall solution to the Cyprus problem, and that it came to the high-level meeting in absolute good faith with the view to having constructive and meaningful negotiations".

I believe that in the search for a solution of the Cyprus question the gap has never been so narrow, and that there is need to persevere. Accordingly, and as the parties are ready to continue their direct contacts within the framework of the good offices mission entrusted to the Secretary-General, I will remain in touch with both sides with a view to their meeting again at a joint high-level meeting, if possible before the end of February 1985.

## DOCUMENT S/16877/ADD.1

Addendum to annex I of the report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of  
Security Council resolution 552 (1984)(Original: English)  
[22 January 1985]

## ADDENDUM TO ANNEX I

Incidents reported by Governments and the International Maritime Organization  
1 June to 31 December 1984

Date of incident	Name of vessel	Type	Tonnage	Nationality of owner	Flag of registration	Location and time of incident	Additional information	Source of report
21 December . . . .	Thorshavet	Tanker	231 150	Norway	Norway	Lat. 28°06'N, Long. 50°51'E	No injuries	IMO
	Magnolia	Tanker	112 228	Liberia	Liberia	At approximately 31 miles south of Kharg Island	Two persons killed	IMO
25 December . . . .	Kanchenjunga	Tanker	276 744	India	India	At Ras Tanura terminal	One crew member injured	IMO
26 December . . . .	Aragón	Tanker	232 892	Spain	Spain	En route to Ras Tanura	No casualties	IMO

## DOCUMENT S/16878

Letter dated 31 December 1984 from the representative of the Islamic  
Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General(Original: English)  
[c. January 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the lists of the Iranian civilians martyred (annex I) and injured (annex II) in residential areas by Iraqi artillery fire between 27 May and 22 September 1984, contrary to the June agreement [see S/16609 and S/16610 of 10 June 1984].

It would be highly appreciated if these lists were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

[Signed] Fereydoon DAMAVANDI KAMALI  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX I

List of the names of the civilians martyred in residential areas by long-range Iraqi artillery since the agreement of 12 June 1984 on the non-attack on residential areas, period from 28 May to 20 September 1984

Date	Name	Surname	Area
28 May 1984 . . . . .	Khalaf	Rouhipour	Khorramshahr
29 May 1984 . . . . .	Parviz	Youssefi	Abadan
1 June 1984 . . . . .	Fatemeh	Zakeri	Abadan
7 June 1984 . . . . .	Mohsen	Torfi	Abadan
7 June 1984 . . . . .	Hossein	Moradi Zadeh	Abadan
9 June 1984 . . . . .	Abdolhamid	Aghayan	Abadan
29 June 1984 . . . . .	Yadollah	Parastou	Abadan
29 June 1984 . . . . .	Hayatollah	Moradi	Abadan
4 August 1984 . . . . .	Maryam	Farsanian	Abadan
4 August 1984 . . . . .	Khatam	Moarrefi	Abadan
11 August 1984 . . . . .	Mohammad Bagher	Zoghi	Khorramshahr
26 August 1984 . . . . .	Mohammad	Maddahi	Sabz Island
10 September 1984 . . . . .	Hayel	Devis	Khorramshahr
13 September 1984 . . . . .	Ali Mohammad		Khorramshahr
20 September 1984 . . . . .	Zobeideh	Enami	Abadan
20 September 1984 . . . . .	Mahmoud	Hajehi	Abadan
20 September 1984 . . . . .	Gholamreza	Nassiri	Abadan
20 September 1984 . . . . .	Zina!	Yaghoubi	Abadan

## ANNEX II

List of the names of the civilians injured in Abadan and Khorramshahr by long-range artillery of the Baathist mercenaries since the agreement of 12 June 1984 on the non-attack on residential areas, period from 27 May to 22 September 1984

## Takeghani Hospital, Abadan

Date	Name	Surname	Area	Injury
27 May 1984	Sabihe	Samimian	Minou Island	Splinters in the back
15 June 1984	Ahmad Safa	Bafandeh	Minou Island	Splinters in the thigh
18 June 1984	Farideh	Mahjouri	Minou Island	Splinters in the thigh
19 June 1984	Mansour	Rahimian	Minou Island	Splinters in the abdomen
20 June 1984	Karim	Hayavi	Firouzabad	Splinters in the lower back
20 June 1984	Soheileh	Mehregani	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the abdomen
20 June 1984	Abouda	Ebrahimdokht	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the chest
20 June 1984	Kheirollah	Soltani	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the arm and chest
20 June 1984	Samir	Matouri	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the arm
23 June 1984		Naghitami	Abadan	Splinters in the left shoulder
24 June 1984	Moussa	Baloukh	Abadan	Splinters in the right wrist
24 June 1984	Mohammad	Sammak	Abadan	Splinters in the thigh
25 June 1984	Seyed Rahim	Tabatatabai	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the lower back
26 June 1984	Mahour	Albounamish	Khorramshahr	Splinters in arms and legs
27 June 1984	Kakakhan	Kamali	Abadan	Splinters in thigh and fingers
28 June 1984	Ahmad Safa	Bafandeh	Abadan	Splinters in the leg
28 June 1984	Farideh	Mahjouri	Abadan	Splinters in the neck and hip
28 June 1984	Yadollah	Parast Goukaz	Abadan	Splinters in the chest, arm and leg
28 June 1984	Jamal	Farahani	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the left leg and arm
28 June 1984	Modir	Mohseni	Khorramshahr	Splinters and bullet in the head
28 June 1984	Modireh	Mohseni	Abadan	Splinters in the head
28 June 1984	Sadigheh	Ghaiyem	Aloushanak	Splinters in the head
28 June 1984	Habib	Moradi	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the head
28 June 1984	Pouran	Razmjou	Abadan	Splinters in the flank
2 July 1984	Ali	Hessari	Abadan	Injured by the blast
5 July 1984	Jassim	Talebi	Abadan	Splinters in the leg and abdomen
5 July 1984	Shaker	Matouri	Abadan	Splinters in the head under the ear
8 July 1984	Abdolhassan	Amirkhoda	Abadan	Splinters in the right hand
8 July 1984	Avazali	Habibi	Minou Island	Splinters in the head and eye
8 July 1984	Abdolrassoul	Younes Zadeh	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the leg
8 July 1984	Gholamhossein	Haddadi	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the ear and leg
8 July 1984	Mirza Ali	Cherksangar	Khorramshahr	Splinters in the knee
9 July 1984	Shaker	Farahani	Khorramshahr	Injured by the blast
21 July 1984	Ghorbanali		Abadan	Splinters in the nose
22 July 1984	Taleb	Himani	Minou Island	Splinters in the left thigh
24 July 1984	Asghar	Haj Dafin	Minou Island	Splinters in the left flank
24 July 1984	Hassan	Keshvarz	Abadan	Splinters in the right thigh
24 July 1984	Abdollah	Ahad Jordani	Minou Island	Splinters in the left leg
24 July 1984	Mehdi	Montazami	Minou Island	Splinters in the neck and right leg
24 July 1984	Rajab	Moinifar	Minou Island	Splinters in the left leg
28 July 1984	Habib	Dili Ahad	Abadan	Splinters in the leg
29 July 1984	Heshmat	Gharb	Abadan	Splinters in the left leg
2 August 1984	Khatoun	Tahi	Abadan	Splinters in the left leg
4 August 1984	Mehdi	Rahimi	Abadan	Splinters in the arm, leg and back of the head
4 August 1984	Safieh	Saberi	Abadan	Splinters in the abdomen and thigh
4 August 1984	Fereshteh	Adibi	Abadan	Splinters in the waist
4 August 1984	Khanom	Marazi	Abadan	Splinters in the abdomen
4 August 1984	Yaghoub	Zabolzadeh	Minou Island	Splinters in the left leg
7 August 1984	Saman	Salari	Abadan	Buried under debris
7 August 1984	Noushin	Salari	Abadan	Buried under debris
8 August 1984	Tehran	Yarmatouri	Abadan	Splinters in the thigh and waist
8 August 1984	Mohammad	Yarmatouri	Abadan	Splinters in the abdomen
8 August 1984	Said	Yarmatouri	Abadan	Splinters in the abdomen
10 August 1984	Mohammad	Daris	Abadan	Injured by the blast
17 August 1984	Mohammad Ali	Moroud	Abadan	Suffocation
18 August 1984	Ebrahim	Sales	Abadan	Splinters in the lower back and right flank
25 August 1984	Mohammad	Samian	Minou Island	Splinters in the arm and leg
25 August 1984	Jafar	Sari	Abadan	Injured by the blast
27 August 1984	Aziz	Moghaddam	Abadan	Splinters in the finger
27 August 1984	Khalaf	Bavi	Abadan	Injured by the blast
27 August 1984	Aboud	Kheirabadi	Abadan	Splinters in the face and arm

Date	Name	Surname	Area	Injury
4 September 1984	Gholamhossein	Oveissi	Abadan	Injured by the blast
4 September 1984	Abbas	Hayatian	Abadan	Splinters in the thigh
4 September 1984	Mansour	Khaji	Abadan	Splinters in the head and right arm
6 September 1984	Ali Asghar	Chegi	Abadan	Splinters in the shoulder and left leg
6 September 1984	Mohammad Ali	Fadahi	Abadan	Splinters in the shoulder
8 September 1984	Mohammad Reza	Fatvati	Abadan	Splinters in the abdomen
8 September 1984	Morteza	Sharifi	Abadan	Splinters in the face and left hand
11 September 1984	Ghodratollah	Soltani	Abadan	Splinters in the face and left hand
11 September 1984	Hassan	Bozorgnia	Abadan	Splinters in the left flank
11 September 1984	Dami	Salessi	Abadan	Splinters in the left hand
12 September 1984	Ali Asghar	Hosseini-pour	Abadan	Splinters in the neck and right arm
12 September 1984	Ali	Hosseini-pour	Abadan	Splinters in the arms and face
12 September 1984	Abdolhaghir	Mahlabi	Abadan	Splinters in the head and arm
12 September 1984	Seyed	Mostafavi	Abadan	Bullet in the left thigh
12 September 1984	Alireza	Shabestani	Abadan	Splinters in the fingers
12 September 1984	Zeinab	Ghanbari	Abadan	Bullet in the leg
12 September 1984	Tofigh	Vatavi	Abadan	Splinters in the fingers
14 September 1984	Ali	Hazineh	Abadan	Splinters in the shoulder and left leg
14 September 1984	Massoud	Mohammadpour	Abadan	Splinters in the right thigh
21 September 1984	Morteza	Zare	Abadan	Splinters in the right leg
22 September 1984	Esmail	Kefalat Nejad	Abadan	Splinters in the right leg

### DOCUMENT S/16879\*

#### Letter dated 2 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

*[Original: English]  
[2 January 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on 31 December 1984 and the following was pointed out to him by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"In the series of their accusations, the Pakistani authorities have recently once again claimed that an Afghan aircraft allegedly entered the airspace of that country in the district of Imam-e-Bostan, Baluchistan province, on 22 December 1984 and that six other Afghan aircraft entered the airspace of Arando on 25 December 1984 and bombed and fired rockets at that area.

"As per information acquired from the pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, no

such flight or attacks have been carried out by the aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on those areas and, as in the past, they consider these Pakistani allegations completely malicious and devoid of truth. The above-mentioned authorities strongly condemn these groundless charges and hostile propaganda against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which have been intensified of late."

I have the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/63-S/16879.

### DOCUMENT S/16881\*

#### Letter dated 3 January 1985 from the representative of Thailand to the Secretary-General

*[Original: English]  
[3 January 1985]*

Upon instructions of my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 13 December 1984 [S/16863], I have the honour to bring to your attention the latest act of aggression perpetrated by the Vietnamese forces in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand as follows:

On 31 December 1984, at approximately 1330 hours, a group of Vietnamese troops supported by heavy artillery made an incursion into Thai territory and ambushed Thai paramilitary troops which were on routine border patrol inside Thailand, south of Ban Kruat district, Buriram province, about 1 kilometre from the Thai-Kampuchean border. As a result, four Thai paramilitary troops were killed and two others were seriously wounded.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/66-S/16881.

The Royal Thai Government strongly condemns this unprovoked and blatant act of aggression deliberately committed by the Vietnamese troops against Thailand and, once again, reaffirms its legitimate right to undertake all necessary measures in order to safeguard Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Birabhongse KASEMSRI  
Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16882\*

Letter dated 4 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[7 January 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that, on 2 January 1985, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan said that:

"The military forces of Pakistan have once again, from 24 to 29 December 1984, conducted shellings on Barikot region in Kunarha Province with the use of heavy and long-range weapons, e.g., recoilless guns, mortars and heavy machine-guns, as a result of which, 11 Afghan soldiers and 8 civilians, including women and children, were wounded and considerable damage was inflicted on residential buildings.

"In connection with these aggressions, the officer in charge of the First Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul this afternoon at 3.15 p.m. and pointed out to him that, in spite of the repeated warnings and protests over the shellings and firing of

rockets from Pakistani territory against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Pakistani authorities not only have not stopped their hostile and provocative actions, but have also intensified them.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan once again lodges its strong protest over these armed aggressions and provocations of the Pakistani authorities and vigorously demands that the series of these aggressions be stopped immediately. Otherwise, the security forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will resort to a firm and reciprocal action, the responsibility of which will be borne by the Pakistani authorities."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/67-S/16882.

#### DOCUMENT S/16883\*

Letter dated 7 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[7 January 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 3.30 this afternoon, and the following was pointed out to him by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"In spite of the consecutive protestations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, frontier provocations and aggressions by the military forces of Pakistan against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have not been terminated, while pertinent authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan had assured the Chargé d'affaires of the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad that the armed forces of Pakistan

were under strict orders not to resort to any kind of armed provocations against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

"On 28 December 1984, an armed band of 250 strong—50 Pakistani militiamen were also among them—crossed the frontier from Pakistani territory and entered the Chamkani region of Paktia province and conducted repeated shellings on Bangash village and a frontier post with reactive ammunitions. As a result a number of residents of the village and military personnel of the frontier post have fallen victims to this incident.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan once again lodges its strong protest over these direct aggressions and provocations of the Pakistani military authorities and seriously demands the

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/69-S/16883.

termination of all interventions by frontier militia and armed forces of Pakistan against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, before the security forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are compelled to resort to firm reciprocal actions.”

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16884

#### Letter dated 7 January 1985 from the representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the President of the Security Council

(Original: French)  
[7 January 1985]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 21 December 1984 [S/16872], I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement of the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, dated 5 January 1985.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kithong VONGSAI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Lao People's Democratic Republic  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

Statement made at Vientiane by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on 5 January 1985

In recent days, the situation in the region of the three Lao villages, Bane May, Bane Kang and Bane Savang in Paklay district, Sayaboury province, has once again become extremely tense. On 2 January 1985, at 12.30 p.m., a unit of Thai troops stationed in Lao territory, in the vicinity of Hongkhap Pass on Phou Hang Mountain, launched an attack aimed at encroaching upon Lao territory approximately 2 kilometres south-west of Bane May, 600 metres inside the Lao border. However, the attack was repulsed by our militia in the region. Immediately thereafter, Thai troops pounded the region with artillery fire, using weapons of all calibres, including 155-mm guns.

On 3 January, troops of the first Thai cavalry regiment, with artillery support, launched another violent attack on the same region, but, once again, the attack was turned back. At the same time, Thai troops indiscriminately fired more than 200 155-mm and 105-mm shells on the three villages and the surrounding areas, including the hilltop of Phou Houat, the Kiou Nokseo pass, the Bane May post and the area around Bane May Noy and Bane Phoung.

It is common knowledge that, after being forced to withdraw their troops from the three villages in mid-October 1984, the ultra-rightist reactionaries among the Thai ruling circles ordered the occupation of nine hilltops situated in the vicinity of those localities, some 300 to 500 metres deep within Lao territory. The Thai side continues to refuse to allow the inhabitants of

three villages who were deported to Thailand to return to their villages of origin, evades responsibility for compensating the inhabitants for the damage they have suffered, and rejects Lao proposals concerning the resumption of negotiations between the two sides in Bangkok aimed at resolving the outstanding problems relating to the three Lao villages.

These events are fresh proof that the statements made by the Thai side at the United Nations on 2 October 1984<sup>1</sup> undertaking to withdraw completely its troops from the three villages; and the Thai side's reply of 3 December 1984 to the effect that "since 13 October, there are no longer any Thai troops in the area of the three villages; there is therefore nothing further to negotiate", are nothing more than cunning manoeuvres perpetrated by the ultra-rightist reactionaries among the Thai ruling circles, acting in collusion with the Beijing hegemonists and expansionists, against the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the other countries of Indo-China.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic condemns these hostile acts of the ultra-rightist reactionaries of the Thai ruling circles and demands that the Thai side cease forthwith its acts of aggression against and its occupation of Lao territory, withdraw all its troops from Lao territory, return to their villages of origin the Lao inhabitants who were deported to Thailand by Thai troops, compensate the local population for the losses it has suffered, and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Only in this way will it be possible to bring about a speedy normalization of the situation in the three villages, to restore the conditions obtaining before 6 June 1984 and to accommodate the interests and aspirations of the Lao and Thai peoples.

The Thai side alone therefore must accept responsibility for its acts.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic reiterates once again its unswerving position, namely, that it reserves its right of self-defence to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and that, at the same time, it stands ready to resume the negotiations between the two parties in Bangkok, as proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic appeals to the peoples and Governments of all countries, including the Thai people, to help stay the criminal hand of the ultra-rightist reactionaries of the Thai ruling circles and to support and demonstrate their sympathy with the Lao people's just stand in defending and building their country so as to promote the cause of peace and stability in South-East Asia.

#### DOCUMENT S/16885\*

#### Letter dated 7 January 1985 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[8 January 1985]

Further to my letter dated 27 December 1984 [S/16875], I have the honour to report to you a serious incident of violation of Pakistan's airspace from the Afghanistan side which occurred on 6 January 1985. On that date, four Afghan aircraft intruded into

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/71-S/16885.

Pakistan's airspace over Arandu in Chitral district and dropped two bombs and fired some rockets inside Pakistan territory.

I also take this opportunity to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected as entirely baseless the allegations made by the Kabul authorities that there had been incidents of firing by the Pakistan armed forces across the border towards Barikot from 24 to 29 December 1984.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/16886\*

### Letter dated 8 January 1985 from the representative of Nicaragua to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[10 January 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the note dated 6 January 1985 from Ms. Nora Astorga, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua, addressed to Mr. Edgardo Paz Barnica, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Honduras.

"I wish to refer to the illegal activities being directed against Nicaragua from Honduran territory by the mercenary groups bearing the names Misura and Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, which were the subject of your attention a few days ago, when you indicated at a press conference that these mercenary forces should be expelled from the territory of the Republic of Honduras.

"At that same press conference, you indicated that the mercenary leader Steadman Fagoth was going to be expelled from Honduras, and this prompted the Government of Nicaragua to seek his extradition, which was formally requested in a note sent to you yesterday.

"In order to assist in fulfilling the aims which you mentioned, I attach herewith a list of the bases and camps in Honduran territory operated by the above-mentioned mercenary organizations, so that they may be reduced, disarmed, and moved away from the frontier as a prior step to their expulsion from Honduras.

"The Government of Nicaragua wishes to show its confidence that what you have stated with regard to the mercenary groups operating illegally in Honduran territory may be made effective in the shortest possible time, which would redound to the benefit not only of relations between Honduras and Nicaragua but also of the peace efforts being made by the Contadora Group.

"For Nicaragua it is a reason for hope that the Government of Honduras, in an act of responsibility and maturity, has indicated through you its decision to put an end to the presence in Honduran territory of these mercenary groups, since such actions, in accordance with the requirements of international law, are conducive to the effective restoration of confidence and co-operation between the two countries and among all the brotherly countries of Central America.

#### "ANNEX

##### "Bases and camps of the Misura group

"Central camp of Misura: This is situated opposite the Nicaraguan town of San Carlos (on the river Coco) in Honduran territory. The camp leader is Hilton Fagoth, brother of Steadman Fagoth. This camp contains the general staff of the Misura mercenary group, as well as about 200 combatants.

"TEA (Tropas Especiales del Atlántico): This base is situated in Lasatigni, in Honduran territory, opposite the Nicaraguan town of Asang (on the river Coco). It is under the command of Eduardo Panting, one of the main officers of the Misura group, led by Steadman Fagoth. It contains about 200 mercenaries.

"Valencia operational base: It is located about 20 kilometres from the estuary of the river Wasbuk, in Honduran territory. It is one of the main logistical bases of Misura. It contains about 300 mercenaries.

"Rus-Rus: This is located in the Honduran town of the same name. It has become one of the main operational bases of Misura, and Steadman Fagoth was frequently to be found here.

"Leimus camp: It is in Honduran territory opposite the Nicaraguan town of Leimus. A Company, Fifth Battalion of the Honduran Army, is stationed close to this base. The camp contains 150 mercenaries.

"Prunzu camp: This is located upstream on the river Leimus, in Honduran territory. The leader Raúl Tobías operates out of this base, together with 200 mercenaries.

"Radio Miskur: The mercenary radio of this name, belonging to the Misura group, operates from the Honduran town of Rus-Rus. It is located very close to the house in which Fagoth lives in this area. The inhabitants of Rus-Rus call it by the name 'La Casa Blanca'. The operation of this mercenary radio transmitter is in the hands of Francisco Kino.

"In addition to the above-mentioned persons, the following belong to the Misura group and are conducting various illegal activities against Nicaragua from Honduras:

"Elmer Prado: He has functioned as the Misura group's official spokesman, taking part together with Steadman Fagoth in various press conferences in Tegucigalpa;

"Wicliif Diego: Political co-ordinator;

"Tito Tejada: Political adviser;

"Tilleth Mullins: Member of the so-called Consejo de Ancianos de Misura;

"Eduardo Panting, Raúl Tobías, Alejo Teofilo: These are all working within the military structure of Misura and are based in Honduran territory;

"Lejan Mora, Samuel Mora and Walter Carbajal: These are at present on a mission to recruit Misquitos of Nicaraguan origin living in Mocorón, for the purpose of sending them to fight against Nicaragua.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A.39.55-S/16886.

**"Bases and camps of the mercenary organization Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense in Honduran territory"**

"The mercenary organization Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense possesses a large number of bases and camps situated in the zone adjoining the Honduran-Nicaraguan frontier, from which it conducts much of its terrorist activities against our country. These bases include the following:

"*Las Vegas*: Situated in the Arenales sector, department of El Paraiso. It is one of the main bases. It is currently the staging point for mercenaries awaiting the order to infiltrate Nicaraguan territory.

"*Banco Grande*: Situated in the department of Olancho on the frontier with Nicaragua. This is the point from which the principal logistical supplies are sent to the mercenary groups operating within Nicaraguan territory.

"*La Lodoza*: This is located to the east of the Nicaraguan town of Teotecucinte, within Honduran territory. It is used as a sanctuary for the mercenary group Benito Bravo, alias Mack.

"*El Aquacate base*: This is located in Olancho. It is one of the main supply centres for the mercenary groups. It is from here that supplies

are flown to the mercenaries operating within Nicaragua. It is also the storage site for supplies destined to be sent later to the mercenary groups. One of the principal leaders at this base is the former Somozan guard Juan Gómez.

"*Radio 15 de septiembre*: This station, the official voice of the so-called Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, operates from the outskirts of Tegucigalpa, on the road to Hatillo. It is run by Frank Arana Icaza, a mercenary of Nicaraguan origin. This radio transmitter broadcasts continuously to Nicaragua."

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Julio ICAZA GALLARD  
*Chargé d'affaires a.i.*  
of the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/16887\***

**Letter dated 9 January 1985 from the representative of Thailand  
to the Secretary-General**

(Original: English)  
{11 January 1985}

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey to you the following message from Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

"I have the honour to inform you that on 8 January 1985, two days before the twenty-first session (plenary) of the Interim Mekong Committee was to begin in Hanoi, the Royal Thai Government made a decision to refrain from sending a delegation to participate in this plenary session. This decision stemmed from the fact that the Vietnamese forces operating in Kampuchea had made several and sustained incursions into Thai territory, resulting in the deaths of numerous Thai soldiers and extensive damage to the property of Thai citizens. These acts have greatly undermined the spirit of co-operation that has existed in the Committee.

"As a consequence, the Royal Thai Government has found it impossible to participate in this session of the Committee. This decision was conveyed to Mr. Somphavan Inthavong, Chairman of the Committee, and to Mr. Galal Magdi, Executive Agent of the Mekong Committee Secretariat, in notes from Mr. Prapath Premmani, Secretary-General of the National Energy Administration and member for Thailand on the Interim Mekong Committee. The text of the notes is reproduced herewith for your information.

"It is with deep regret that I have to inform you that the situation along the Thai-Kampuchean border has sharply deteriorated in the past few days, as a result of premeditated, blatant and continuing violations of Thailand's territorial integrity and sovereignty by the Vietnamese forces operating in Kampuchea. These violations have occurred near the Kampuchean encampments at Ampil and at Obok Pass. They have caused the deaths of numerous Thai soldiers and extensive damages to the property of Thai citizens.

"Although Thailand would wish to divorce the work of the Interim Mekong Committee from the political and military developments along the Thai-Kampuchean border, these incidents to which I have alluded have seriously undermined the co-operative spirit that has existed in the Committee. For this reason, which I feel sure you would understand, it is not possible for the Thai delegation to participate in the twenty-first session of the Committee, scheduled to take place in Hanoi on 10 January 1985."

"I would be appreciative if you could circulate this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council."

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Birabhongse KASEMSRI  
*Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/74-S:16887.

**DOCUMENT S/16888\***

**Letter dated 9 January 1985 from the representative of Thailand  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[10 January 1985]*

Upon instructions from my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 3 January 1985 [S/16887], I have the honour to bring to your attention the latest series of acts of aggression perpetrated by the Vietnamese forces in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand, as follows:

1. On 4 January 1985, a battalion of Vietnamese troops made an incursion into Thai territory to take control of an area in Nam Yuen district, Ubon Ratchatane province, 5 kilometres inside Thailand. On the same day, the Thai troops clashed with a Vietnamese unit in Ban Kruat district, Buriram province, 1 kilometre inside Thailand. As a result, one Thai soldier was killed and nine others were wounded.

2. On 5 January, around 400 to 500 shells fired by the Vietnamese troops landed in four Thai villages of Nam Yuen District. As a result, 1,000 Thai villagers and their livestock were evacuated to a safer area.

3. On 7 January, a Thai border police patrol unit clashed with the Vietnamese troops at Obok Pass, Ban Kruat district, approximately 1 kilometre inside Thailand. As a result, one Thai border policeman was seriously wounded.

4. On 7 January, two regiments of Vietnamese troops supported by 16 105-mm guns and 20 T-54 tanks launched heavy attacks on and succeeded in occupying Ampil, inside Kampuchea, opposite Ta Phraya district, Prachinburi province. As a result, 22,000 Khmer civilians were evacuated into Thailand. Some of the Vietnamese artillery shells landed inside Thai territory, 2 kilometres west of Ban San-

gae, Prachinburi province, causing injury to four Thai soldiers.

5. On 8 January 1985, the Vietnamese troops which had made the incursion into Thai territory fired an anti-aircraft missile at a Thai A-37 aircraft flying within Thai airspace. As a result, the A-37 aircraft crashlanded about 5 kilometres inside the Thai border. The pilot was killed and the other airman was injured.

The Royal Thai Government condemns these recurrent incursions into Thai territory by Vietnamese troops. Their unprovoked and blatant acts of aggression against Thailand once again reveal the true nature of the Vietnamese Government's attitude towards the international opinion which has overwhelmingly rejected its policy of continued military occupation of Kampuchea and has recently demanded that it refrain from indiscriminately attacking the Khmer civilians' camps inside Kampuchea and making incursions into Thai territory. These deliberate acts of terrorism further reveal Viet Nam's persistence in pursuing a military solution to the Kampuchean problem, which is doomed to failure.

The Royal Thai Government urges the Vietnamese Government to desist immediately from further acts of armed aggression which could only escalate the violent confrontation for the consequences of which the Vietnamese Government must bear the full responsibility.

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Birabongse KASEMSRI*  
*Permanent Representative of Thailand*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/75-S/16888.

**DOCUMENT S/16889\***

**Letter dated 10 January 1985 from the representative of Panama  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: Spanish)*  
*[10 January 1985]*

I have the honour to transmit the text of the declaration issued by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Contadora Group at the conclusion of the meeting held at Panama City on 8 and 9 January 1985.

I request you to have this letter and the annex thereto circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Leonardo KAM*  
*Deputy Permanent Representative of Panama*  
*to the United Nations*

**ANNEX**

**Declaration of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the  
Contadora Group, Panama City, 9 January 1985**

At the start of 1983, the situation in Central America threatened to trigger a widespread armed conflict.

Faced with that prospect, the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela decided to combine their efforts for the purpose of promoting a peaceful settlement of the Central American disputes, on the basis of conciliation and the recognition of the legitimate interests of all the States involved, and of ensuring that the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of the Central American peoples remained fully in effect.

Since that time, the Governments of the Contadora Group have stressed the socio-economic roots of the Central American crisis and have expressed

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/856-S/16889

their deep concern about the foreign military intervention in the area and the dangers of making the conflict part of the East-West confrontation.

The process initiated by the Contadora Group has achieved, *inter alia*, the following objectives, which are also its most important accomplishments:

1. It established regional political machinery which facilitated a process of dialogue and negotiation between the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
2. It identified the problems affecting the Central American countries and drew up an agenda listing the main subjects of controversy.
3. It promoted specific commitments among the Central American Governments, which were adopted in the Document of Objectives [S/16041, of 13 October 1983, annex] and in the document entitled "Measures to be taken to fulfil the commitments entered into in the Document of Objectives" [S/16262, of 10 January 1984, appendix].
4. It co-ordinated a broad process of consultations and negotiations between those Governments, which culminated in the elaboration of the Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America [S/16775, of 9 October 1984, annex], a legal instrument that will promote peaceful coexistence and the just and stable development to which the peoples of the region are entitled.
5. It triggered an international awareness of the Central American crisis and enlisted the support of the community of nations for a peaceful solution of that crisis and for the Contadora Group as the body capable of achieving that goal.

These achievements and other political contributions have helped to prevent the outbreak of an armed conflict in the region; the repercussions of such a conflict would be extremely grave for Central America, for Latin America and for international peace and security as a whole.

Despite the persistence of a variety of serious threats to regional stability, it is necessary to recognize some of the positive steps which have been taken recently in the search for détente. Foremost among the steps taken in 1984 were the establishment of the Commission for Supervision and Prevention of Frontier Incidents in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the initiation of bilateral talks between the Governments of the United States and Nicaragua, the setting up of the Committee for Action in Support of the Economic and Social Development of Central America and, finally, the meeting held at San José between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Economic Community, Spain and Portugal and their counterparts from Central America and the Contadora Group.<sup>2</sup>

It is also necessary to acknowledge the improvements that have taken place in the institutions and democratic life of a number of countries in the region, where elections have been held. In El Salvador, the dialogue between the Government and FDR-FMLN [*Frente Democrático Revolucionario-Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*], in addition to raising hopes for an end to the internal conflict, is fostering regional détente.

It is necessary also to draw attention to the decisions of the International Court of Justice, the United Nations General Assembly and the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, which reaffirm that it is essential for the international legal order to prevail. In the two latter cases, the community of States has also expressed universal and whole-hearted support for the Contadora Group and has called on the Central American Governments to endorse in the near future the Contadora Act as an instrument for the peaceful solution of disputes.

In the present context, it would be inadmissible to allow political intransigence and the use of force to stand in the way of dialogue and negotiation. Accordingly, it is deeply disquieting to observe the manifestations of intimidation and the destabilizing actions which are today disrupting coexistence in Central America, affecting the sovereignty of the nations of the region and impeding the peace process, key elements of which are the signing of the Contadora Act and the start made in fulfilling the commitments agreed to therein.

In order that the stated goal may be attainable, the Central American Governments are urged to demonstrate their political will unreservedly, by honouring the commitments embodied in the Document of Objectives which they signed on 9 September 1983. It is imperative to refrain from any action which would thwart the ongoing efforts to achieve peace, security and stability in the region and to expand every form of consultation and contact capable of fostering the negotiation process and averting any incident that might impede that process.

The Contadora Group calls on the Governments of the United States and Nicaragua to intensify the talks which they have been holding in Manzanillo, with a view to reaching agreements that will promote the normalization of their relations and regional détente. It likewise recognizes that it is important that the dialogue initiated between the Government of El Salvador and FDR-FMLN should acquire greater depth, with the aim of ending the conflict which is convulsing that country and of promoting national reconciliation.

A number of Central American Governments have made observations concerning the draft Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America. The Contadora Group has identified the observations which help to make the document more precise and will propose formulations for reconciling the positions that still diverge.

Today, the Contadora Group again affirms its determination to continue to work for the conclusion of a definitive agreement between the Central American Governments which will establish the basis for respectful coexistence in the region and will promote sustained economic and social development and the strengthening of democratic and pluralistic institutions.

The Contadora Group notes with satisfaction that the itinerary arranged on 7 September 1984 in connection with the delivery of the draft Contadora Act has now been completed. Accordingly, the round of technical discussion and observations on the Act within the defined framework having been accomplished and intensive bilateral consultations having taken place, the phase of political negotiations has now begun.

Therefore, the Contadora Group gives notice to the Governments of the Central American countries of a meeting of plenipotentiaries, to be held on 14 and 15 February for the purpose of deciding on the verification and control procedures and other outstanding questions that have to be resolved prior to the signing of the Contadora Act. The meeting would prepare the elements for a Conference at which the Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America would be signed.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Contadora Group will promptly forward the terms of the present declaration to their Central American counterparts. They express their appreciation at having been afforded the opportunity of a meeting with President Nicolás Ariño Barletta of Panama, who reaffirmed the unqualified support of his Government for the Contadora Group's peace démarches.

## DOCUMENT S/16890\*

### Letter dated 10 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[11 January 1985]

I have the honour to inform you of the following statement which was made this morning by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

"The concerned authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have informed that, in spite of the repeated protestations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, savage and provocative aggressions from beyond the frontiers against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan continue, and that further shellings of various weapons, including the use of reactive ammunition, on the residential area

\* Circulated under the double symbol A 40.79.S.16890.

and the garrison of Barikot region in Paktia Province have taken place.

"For instance, on 5 and 6 January 1985, Barikot came under massive fire three times from Arandu and Goshdandi areas, as a result of which six civilians, including two women and a child, as well as three military personnel were martyred; eight civilians and six military men were injured.

"In connection with these aggressions, the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at ten o'clock this morning and the officer in charge of the First Political Department conveyed to him that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan considers these repeated frontier aggressions and provocations by Pakistan as premeditated actions aimed at a

further intensification of tension in the situation and as another dimension of the undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs protests these actions and seriously demands that such aggressions and provocations be terminated; otherwise, the security forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan shall resort to firm reciprocal action, the grave consequences of which will be borne by the Pakistani authorities."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16891\*

##### Letter dated 14 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[14 January 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 11.30 a.m. on 13 January 1985 and the officer in charge of the First Political Department conveyed to him the following:

"In continuation of previous accusations, the Pakistani authorities have once again charged that at 11.45 a.m. on 6 January 1985, four Afghan aircraft allegedly entered the airspace of Pakistan and dropped two bombs and fired several rockets on the Arandu area which caused no damage.

"According to the information of the pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, no overflight or violation of airspace by the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan took place on

that day or at that place and this Pakistani claim is considered as totally malicious and void of any truth.

"While rejecting this baseless allegation of the Pakistani authorities, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan declares once again that it is a peace-loving country and has no intention of attacking other countries. It is the Pakistani military régime that always tries to give ever-extended dimension to its interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to increase tension in the situation along the frontier areas between the countries."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/80-S/16891.

#### DOCUMENT S/16892\*

##### Letter dated 14 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[14 January 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan today at 2 p.m. and the following was conveyed

to him by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"In spite of the protestations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, military forces of the Pakistani régime have not ceased their frontier aggressions and armed provocations against the

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/81-S/16892.

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and at the behest of military authorities of Islamabad, still continue their hostile activities against the garrisons of the frontier forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the Chamkani and Bangash areas.

"For instance, on 9 January 1985, the arrival of 16 motor vehicles with personnel dressed in Pakistani frontier militia uniforms in the Patan residential district has been observed. Subsequently, on 10 January 1985, these formations participated in the shellings on the residential areas in Chamkani and Bangash, as a result of which civilians and military personnel of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have suffered loss of life.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, while strongly protesting these

repeated aggressions and provocations of the military authorities of Pakistan, once again reminds that the Pakistani authorities concerned must, as soon as possible, put an end to their hostile actions against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; otherwise the grave consequences and heavy responsibility of these aggressions and provocations will rest totally with the Pakistani authorities responsible and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will be forced to resort to reciprocal actions."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
*Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations*

#### DOCUMENT S/16893\*

#### Letter dated 10 January 1985 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[15 January 1985]

Further to my letter dated 7 January 1985 [S/16885], I have the honour to report to you two serious violations of Pakistan airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side which occurred on 7 and 8 January. The details of the incidents are as follows:

On 7 January 1985, three Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan airspace in the Domandi area 45 kilometres north-east of Chaman and dropped two bombs which failed to explode.

On 8 January 1985, six Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and dropped four bombs 1 kilometre south-east of Arandu, in the Chitral district.

I take this opportunity to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected as totally false and baseless an allegation made by the Kabul authorities that, on 28 December 1984, 50 personnel of the Pakistan militia along

with a group of 250 armed persons entered the Chamkani region in Paktia and fired bullets on Bangash village and a border post, as a result of which a number of civilians and military personnel were killed. Pakistan's rejection of the allegation was conveyed to the Afghan Chargé d'affaires on 8 January 1985. He was told that on no occasion had the Pakistan armed forces committed any violation of Afghanistan territory and that, in levelling these tendentious charges, the Kabul authorities were trying to shift the blame onto Pakistan for events within Afghanistan for which Pakistan could not be held responsible in any manner whatsoever.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
*Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/82-S/16893.

#### DOCUMENT S/16894\*

#### Letter dated 15 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[15 January 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan announced the following today, 15 January 1985:

"The Pakistani authorities have once again claimed that Afghan aircraft allegedly attacked and bombed areas in Baluchistan and Arandu in Chitral on 7 and 8 January 1985. In connection with these allegations, the officer in charge of the First Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan summoned the Charge d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul at 11.30 this morning and pointed out to him that according to the information of the pertinent authorities, aircraft of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/83-S/16894.

Afghanistan did not conduct any flights along the frontier areas on those dates. The same authorities consider these Pakistani allegations, which were preceded by hostile and provocative propaganda against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, totally void of truth and therefore categorically reject and condemn them."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16895\*

#### Letter dated 15 January 1985 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[16 January 1985]

Further to my letter dated 10 January 1985 [S/16893], I have the honour to report to you a serious incident of violation of Pakistan airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side which occurred on 11 January 1985. On that date, seven Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan airspace 1 kilometre south of Arandu in Chitral district, dropped 12 bombs and fired some rockets.

I take this opportunity to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected as totally baseless an allegation made by the Kabul authorities that, on 5 and 6 January 1985, Barikot was subjected to firing three times from the Pakistan side from the Arandu-Goshdandi area, as a result of which six civilians and three military personnel were said to have been killed. The Government of Pakistan has similarly rejected as false and baseless another charge made by the Kabul authorities that, on 9 January, Pakistani border militia personnel were in the Patan area and that on 10 January these personnel fired on the residents of Chamkani and Bangash in the Paktia province, resulting in casualties to civilian and military personnel.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/86-S/16895.

#### DOCUMENT S/16896\*

#### Letter dated 15 January 1985 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[15 January 1985]

It is my obligation to bring to your attention still further action being taken by the Government of Israel in its continuing policy of annexing the occupied territories of the West Bank.

*The New York Times* of 11 January 1985 reports that sites for six new Jewish settlements were approved by the Israeli Government on 10 January 1985. Two of the approved sites are in the northern part of the West Bank, two in the Hebron area and one each in the Jordan Valley and the Jerusalem area. An official in the settlement department of the World Zionist Organization, which promotes the settlements, has said that each one would cost \$1 million. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/84-S/16896

People has noted that, as on previous occasions, there was public and parliamentary questioning of the decision within Israel itself.

It has also come to the attention of the Committee that the daily newspaper *Hatzetz*, in its issue of 31 December 1984, reported that the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, had requested the establishment of 20 new settlements in the occupied territories in addition to the six already approved.

As you are aware, during the past six years, some 100 new settlements were established in the occupied territories notwithstanding the illegality of such action, the censure of international opinion and numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. May I recall, in

this connection, that in its resolution 465 (1980), the Security Council strongly deplored the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and called upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

As on previous occasions, this information is being communicated to you in order that you may be kept aware of the persistent activities carried on against the Palestinians

living under Israeli occupation, and in order to express the concern of the Committee regarding constant violations of Palestinian rights, United Nations resolutions and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Accordingly, I should be grateful if you would be so good as to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Massamba SARRÉ  
Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights  
of the Palestinian People

## DOCUMENT S/16897

### Note by the Secretary-General on the report of the United Nations team in Tehran concerning an inspection carried out on 7 and 8 January 1985

(Original: English)  
[16 January 1985]

1. It will be recalled that, following the undertakings made in June 1984 by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran [S/16609] and the Government of the Republic of Iraq [S/16610] in response to the Secretary-General's appeal [S/16611] to end and refrain from initiating all deliberate military attacks by any means on purely civilian population centres in either country, effective 0001 hours (GMT) on 12 June 1984, the Secretary-General, in response to independent requests by each of the two Governments, set up two teams for the purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings.<sup>3</sup> A previous inspection report under these arrangements appears in document S/16750 of 19 September.

2. On 5 January 1985, the head of the team in Tehran received a request for inspection from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the inspection was carried out on 7 and 8 January. The team has submitted the following report to the Secretary-General.

\* \* \*

#### INTRODUCTION

3. On 5 January 1985, at 1115 hours local time, the head of the inspection team received from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran a request, both oral and in writing, to carry out an inspection of the villages of Bardieh, Dehlavieh and Alavaneh in the Susangerd area, in the province of Khuzestan. All three villages had allegedly been subjected to Iraqi air attacks on 4 January. United Nations Headquarters in New York was contacted immediately by telephone for authority to proceed with the inspection under safety assurances from the Iraqi authorities. Clearance to proceed with the requested inspection was received by the team leader at 0100 hours on 7 January and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed accordingly.

#### INSPECTION

4. After a delay of four hours in its departure from Tehran, due to adverse weather conditions, the team arrived on 7 January at 1540 hours at Susangerd, the administrative capital of the area to which the three villages belong. The team proceeded immediately to the hospital of Susangerd

which had administered emergency treatment to most of the casualties following the reported attacks on the three villages in question. It was informed that those seriously injured, who required further medical treatment, had been transferred to better-equipped hospitals in Ahwaz and Tehran. According to the testimony of the hospital director and the two attending surgeons who had been on duty on the day of the attack, the hospital received approximately 50 casualties during the afternoon of 4 January. Injuries, the team was informed, had been almost exclusively caused by shrapnel. Of the casualties, 9 were dead and 10 of the injured required major surgery. Copies of the death certificates, provided on request, showed that 6 of the deceased were from Alavaneh and 3 from Bardieh.

5. In order to interview the injured who had been transferred to other facilities, the team travelled to Ahwaz, where it arrived at 1700 hours. Ahwaz is the capital of Khuzestan province and as such also the main medical centre for the region. The team spent the whole evening of 7 January from 1815 hours to 2200 hours visiting three hospitals where it interviewed patients, doctors and hospital and provincial health administrators. The three hospitals visited were Razi hospital, Chamran hospital and Imam Khomeini hospital. According to the hospital authorities, casualties caused by the attack on the three villages had been received in Ahwaz from the hospital in Susangerd as well as others directly from the affected villages, in all totalling approximately 50. They reported that two of the injured had died of their wounds. The hospital records indicated that most of the injured were women and children. This seemed to be confirmed by the fact that of the six patients seen and interviewed by the team, only one was an adult male, aged 29. Medical authorities in all three hospitals and the observations made by the team indicated that almost all injuries had been caused by shrapnel. During interviews all patients stated that their respective villages had been attacked by aircraft on the afternoon of 4 January.

6. On 8 January, at 1020 hours, the team was taken to the office of the Governor in Susangerd in order to inspect different munition parts allegedly found and collected in Bardieh and Dehlavieh following the attack on 4 January. The team saw several parts of two distinctly different types

of bombs. The first group of parts, bearing the marking "CB-250-K", appeared to belong to a type of cluster bomb. The second group of parts bore the marking in Cyrillic "PPK-250-275/A", "O..ICU/A-IX-2" and "104-84" on the front canister and markings in Cyrillic on the tail piece. These latter pieces also appeared to come from cluster bombs. Two small unexploded but defused bomblets, approximately 30 cm in length, evidently part of one type of the cluster bombs, were also on display. There were also two smaller pieces apparently part of the detonating mechanism of the first-mentioned type of cluster bomb.

#### *Bardieh*

7. The team then travelled to Bardieh, where it arrived at 1115 hours on 8 January. Bardieh is situated 6 kilometres west of Susangerd on the road to Bostan and approximately 30 kilometres from the border with Iraq. According to provincial authorities the population before the attack was approximately 1,000 people, most of whom had left after the attack on 4 January, with only a small number of adult males remaining in order to attend to the livelihood of the village. While no village authorities were present at the time of the inspection, the team did manage to interview a number of villagers who claimed to have witnessed the attack. They informed the team that the village had been attacked at about 1600 hours on Friday, 4 January by four aircraft flying from a westerly direction. According to the authorities, 3 villagers had been killed and 19 injured in the attack, the dead being 2 males, aged 55 and 9, and 1 female, aged 35. The team was shown 2 dead cows which apparently had been killed by shrapnel in the attack.

8. The main economic activity of the village is agriculture and animal husbandry. The team found no evidence of any military or industrial installations in or near the village. No roads or communication lines of military utility were observed in proximity to the village. In the immediate area of the village the team was shown about 10 small unexploded bomblets, measuring 30 centimetres approximately in length, some of which were embedded in the ground. There were also numerous small craters approximately 60 centimetres in diameter which, in the opinion of the team, were caused by similar bomblets which had exploded. In addition, the team was shown bigger pieces measuring between 1 and 1.5 metres in length and bearing the marking "CB-250-K", identical to the first type of bomb which had been shown to the team in Susangerd. The team also saw three houses and one small agricultural building which had received direct hits. These buildings showed fresh evidence of having been struck by bomblets similar to those already mentioned, as borne out by the extent of shrapnel damage and crater size.

#### *Dehlavieh*

9. The team then proceeded to Dehlavieh, where it commenced its inspection at 1330 hours on 8 January. Dehlavieh is situated some 10 kilometres west of Susangerd on the Bostan road and some 25 kilometres from the border with Iraq. According to the provincial authorities accompanying the team, the village population was 573 persons before the alleged attack. According to the same authorities, nearly the whole population had evacuated the village following the attack, leaving only a few men behind to tend to the livelihood of the village.

10. The team interviewed a number of the remaining villagers, who informed it that the village had been attacked on Friday, 4 January, by five aircraft between 1400 and 1500 hours. There were no deaths. Four females aged 40, 22, 15 and 12 had been injured.

11. The main economic activity of the village seemed to be agriculture and animal husbandry. The team saw no evidence of any military or industrial installations, nor of roads or other communication lines of military utility, in or around the village. The team saw that 18 bombs had impacted in and around the village, the fall pattern and the angle of impact indicating a west to east axis. Of these, 12 were inside the village of which the central rods were found to be firmly embedded in the ground. No other parts were found *in situ* which could have helped in identifying the type of bomb. A number of craters approximately 15 centimetres in diameter and between 70 centimetres and 100 centimetres deep were seen. A large crater, approximately 3.5 metres in diameter and approximately 1 metre deep, was also observed in the western part of the village between two brick houses, both of which had sustained severe damage, being 50 per cent demolished. This large crater clearly had been caused by a high-explosive device.

12. The other six bombs were embedded in softer ground in fields and in a stream 200 metres to 600 metres east of the village. Their tail assemblies, which were above the ground, were fresh and intact, and bore markings in Cyrillic which were the same as those on the second type of bomb shown to the team in Susangerd.

13. The team also examined two canisters, one inside the village and the other on its outskirts, evidently from bombs which had exploded. These carried markings in Cyrillic corresponding to those on the second type of bomb seen by the team in Susangerd. The team left Dehlavieh at 1440 hours.

14. On 12 January the team interviewed the chief of the bomb disposal unit in Ahwaz which, it was told, had been responsible for dealing with the bombs in Dehlavieh. He explained that all the 18 bombs had exploded. The unit had dismantled the remnants of the assemblies of the 12 bombs which had fallen within the village and had removed the parts. The team was shown these parts, which were found to be similar to those seen embedded in the ground outside the village. The unit had not dismantled the remnants of the six remaining bomb assemblies outside the village, thus accounting for their intact tail assemblies.

#### *Alavaneh*

15. The team next was taken to Alavaneh, where it arrived at 1700 hours on 8 January. Alavaneh is situated approximately 25 kilometres east-south-east of Susangerd and approximately 65 kilometres from the border with Iraq. Even after repeated questions the team was not able to ascertain the size of the village population either before or after the alleged attack. There were no local or provincial authorities present in the village at the time of the inspection who could have provided authoritative and accurate accounts of events. Statements by persons claiming to be eyewitnesses of the attack indicated that between one and four aircraft, flying from a west-south-westerly direction at high altitude, had taken part in an attack on Friday, 4 January. The team was informed by local villagers that six people had been killed and eight injured in the attack.

16. The team saw some buildings of about five to six stories approximately 1 kilometre east of the village but was not able to determine their use. *En route* to and from Alavaneh (by helicopter) the team observed a military installation, which evidently was a supply depot, some 2 kilometres west-south-west of the village. The team could not determine precisely what the main economic activity of the village was, but clearly agriculture and animal husbandry were one major segment. The team observed about 18 small craters measuring some 60 centimetres in diameter and evidence of large quantities of shrapnel having impacted on the walls of buildings close to those craters. Many pieces of shrapnel were examined and found to be fresh. Three buildings had sustained direct hits. From the size of craters and the extensive shrapnel damage to the interiors, the team is of the opinion that these houses were struck by bombs of a cluster type. Two bomb canisters were deeply embedded in the ground, within 20 metres of village houses. These canisters were damaged, but appeared to be of the same type of cluster bomb as those already seen by the team in other places. The angle and depth of entry was consistent with the eyewitness accounts in relation to the flight path and altitude of the attacking aircraft.

#### CONCLUSIONS

17. From its inspection and the information and evidence presented to it, the team reached the following conclusions for each of the villages inspected:

*Bardieh.* Since there was no evidence, either within or in the immediate vicinity of the village, of any industrial or military installations, it is the opinion of the team that Bardieh village is a purely civilian population centre. The

team is of the opinion that the village was subjected to an aerial attack in which cluster bombs were used. Judging from the fresh condition of the bomb parts, craters and damage examined, the team estimates that the attack must have occurred three to four days prior to inspection, the claimed date of attack, i.e., 4 January 1985, thus being credible. The casualties reported and the extent of damage observed are consistent with the effects that can be expected from such an attack.

*Dehlovieh.* As there was no evidence, within or in the immediate vicinity of the village, of any military or industrial installations, the team is of the opinion that Dehlovieh village is a purely civilian population centre. Although the team was not in a position to determine the exact types of munitions used, it was obvious that the village had been subjected to an aerial attack of considerable magnitude. Judging from the fresh condition of the bomb parts, craters and damage examined, the team estimates that the attack must have occurred three to four days prior to inspection, the claimed date of attack, i.e., 4 January, thus being credible. The casualties reported and the extent of damage observed are consistent with the effects that can be expected from such an attack.

*Alavaneh.* The team is of the opinion that the village was subjected to an aerial attack, most probably from high altitude, in which cluster bombs were used. Judging from the fresh condition of the shrapnel, craters and damage examined, the team estimates that the attack must have occurred three to four days prior to inspection, the claimed date of attack, i.e., 4 January, thus being credible. However, in view of the relative proximity to the village of a military installation, the team was unable to determine whether the village itself had been the intended target.

#### DOCUMENT S/16898\*

#### Letter dated 15 January 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English/French)*  
*[17 January 1985]*

I have the honour to send you herewith a document on the current situation in Kampuchea, consisting of excerpts from the New Year's message addressed to the people and National Army of Democratic Kampuchea by Mr. Khieu Samphan, Vice-President of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of foreign affairs.

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

*(Signed)* THIOUNN Prasih  
*Permanent Representative of*  
*Democratic Kampuchea*  
*to the United Nations*

#### ANNEX

**Excerpts from the New Year's message of Mr. Khieu Samphan, Vice-President of Democratic Kampuchea in Charge of Foreign Affairs, addressed to the people and the army of Democratic Kampuchea on 1 January 1985**

During the year 1984, thanks to our national unity, we have overcome all obstacles and have won greater victories than in the previous years, in all fields at home and abroad. We can say that, thanks to these 1984 victories, our struggle for national survival has reached a new turning point.

#### MILITARY SITUATION

Since early 1984, the resounding news of our victories won over the Vietnamese enemy in the towns of Battambang, Siem Reap, Kompong Thom and Pursat have shown that these four provinces of the Tonle Sap region have now become hot battlefields. Since then, our forces have remained there. Furthermore, we have sent successive military reinforcements and our forces are now active in the province of Kompong Chhnang.

The guerrillas and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) are intensifying their "five targets" attack in the five provinces, in the Tonle Sap region and elsewhere in the country. They cut the enemy's transportation lines, especially the railroads. They wipe out the Vietnamese

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/88-S/16898.

administrative apparatus in the villages. They assail the Vietnamese military strongholds. They disintegrate the units of Kampuchean soldiers forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese aggressors. They attack the Vietnamese mopping-up forces. They assault the enemy in district and provincial towns.

The development of the military situation can be clearly summed up as follows:

In 1979, when the 250,000 Vietnamese aggressors were mobilized in order to capture the capital, Phnom Penh, they seemed very mighty. But later on, these forces had to spread far and wide so as to defend themselves from the attacks of our guerrillas and the NADK. Thanks to their lofty heroism and ardent patriotism, the latter have worn out the Vietnamese forces, protected and strengthened themselves to the point where now they force the Vietnamese aggressors to flock together and not to spread out any more.

Now that we are entering on 1985, we are almost in the middle of the dry season. We have kept the initiative in the military field by attacking the Vietnamese aggressors along the western border and in the Tonlé Sap region, which is the most important battlefield for us, according to the principle "attack is the best defence". We have launched attacks round the towns of Battambang, Mongkolborey, Sisophon, along the Mongkolborey river and the Sangker river, along national roads Nos. 5 and 6, round the towns of Kompong Thom, Siem Reap and Pursat and along the Tonlé Sap. We have attacked and cut the railways, especially from the east of Pursat town to the villages of Kdol, Kraing Skea, Romeas, Kraing Lovea, south of Kompong Chhnang town, and carried out our military activities north-west of Phnom Penh.

Being thus bogged down in the Tonlé Sap area and along the railway east of Pursat all the way to the south of Kompong Chhnang and north-west of Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese aggressors no longer have strong enough forces to launch powerful attacks against us in the Thai border area of western Kampuchea. On the contrary, our forces have been able to bring the first stage of the Vietnamese plan of aggression for the seventh dry season—the aim of which was to recapture a series of positions and some strategic hills so as to be able to attack us all along the border—to nothing in every battle that has been fought along the Thai border.

They sent regiments supported by 105-mm, 120-mm and 130-mm guns and by tanks and armoured vehicles to attack us south of Sisophon and highway No. 5 at Pailin and Samlaut, but we repulsed all those attacks one after another.

Recently, on 21 December 1984, the Vietnamese aggressors, four regiments strong, launched attacks from the front and from the rear on the north Koh Kong front, following a barrage from their heavy artillery. Thousands of shells were fired but our forces succeeded in repelling these enemy attacks and disabling hundreds of Vietnamese soldiers.

One thing that has become apparent during the current seventh dry season is that the Vietnamese are using heavier barrages of artillery, both on the battlefields along the western border of Kampuchea and in the Tonlé Sap area. In the Tonlé Sap area, the Vietnamese have stepped up their machine-gunning and bombing. The reason for this is that they are facing increasing difficulties as the morale of the troops is falling lower and lower all the time.

In short, our military situation is more favourable for us this dry season than it was in 1984. The Vietnamese aggressors are facing bigger difficulties than they have been hitherto.

#### POLITICAL SITUATION

As to the political field, our situation here too is better than in previous years. As we have wiped out the Vietnamese administrative apparatus in the villages, especially in the Tonlé Sap region, we have succeeded in eliminating successively their entire system of administrative machinery. Our people can now move about more easily to make their living. Therefore, they give us more support, put more trust in our struggle and cooperate with us, in various forms, in the struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors, according to their capabilities and possibilities.

As a result, the Vietnamese enemy has increased the severity of its repressive measures against our people. In the provinces of Kratié (north-east region), Svay Rieng (south-east) and Takko (south), they have mobilized many people, young and old, and forced them to abandon their homes and property, their villages and their crops still in the ricefields, and sent them to the western region to build and defend the Vietnamese transportation lines at the western border. They have looted the crops and forced the population to give rice to their army.

They continue to pour toxic chemicals into pools and ponds and to use toxic gas shells.

The only effect of these barbarous acts of the Vietnamese aggressors has been to strengthen and unite our people in their patriotic struggle against the enemy. Their hatred of the enemy is reaching its peak.

The unity and solidarity of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) have also been strengthened. We have solved problems through consultations based on the Declaration of Kuala Lumpur (see S/15252 of 24 June 1982) and on the enhancement of our common duty to strengthen our national unity against the Vietnamese enemy.

During the year which has just elapsed (1984), as they were in an impasse in all fields—military, political and diplomatic—the Vietnamese enemy, the Soviet Union and their supporters carried out many deceitful manoeuvres, aimed at splitting our tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. But all these manoeuvres failed. Through its activities for the purpose of unmasking these deceitful manoeuvres, the CGDK has acquired experience and a better knowledge of the hypocrisy, perfidy and machiavellianism that are characteristic of the true nature of the Vietnamese enemy.

#### INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

In the international arena, the world community has given stronger support to the just struggle of the Kampuchean people and to the United Nations resolutions demanding the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. The number of countries voting for the most recent General Assembly resolution on Kampuchea (resolution 39/5) demanding the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces has risen to 110.

\* \* \*

To sum up, between 1979 and now, our struggle has made a big step forward thanks to our own efforts to overcome all difficulties in the military, political, economic and diplomatic fields, and thanks to the active support given us by our many friends the world over. In the war against the very stubborn and cruel Vietnamese aggressors, this is a big step forward. This progress in our struggle is no accident; it reflects a fundamental change in the situation in all fields which is like the steady and relentless rise of flood waters.

Through six dry seasons, six rainy seasons, and almost half of the seventh dry season, our army and people have acquired experience in fighting against the Vietnamese aggressors and in their struggle to foil all the Vietnamese manoeuvres. The international community has also acquired experience and a better knowledge of Viet Nam and of its expansionist aims. Viet Nam is nothing but an agent of the Soviet Union, which uses it as a military base. Thus, taking into account all the obstacles and complex problems we still have to overcome, we find the following conclusions inescapable:

- (a) There is no possibility of our being defeated by the Vietnamese aggressors;
- (b) There is no possibility of the war ending in a deadlock in which we should neither win nor lose;
- (c) Our people and the CGDK will inevitably triumph. The Vietnamese enemy will have to withdraw his forces of aggression from Kampuchea totally and unconditionally.

It is with that strong belief that all of us are determined to continue to hold aloft the banner of national unity, to overcome all obstacles in our multi-form struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors, until they are compelled to implement the United Nations resolutions and withdraw all their forces from Kampuchea.

#### VIETNAMESE CRIMES AGAINST REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE KAMPUCHEA-THAILAND BORDER

Lately, the Vietnamese enemy has mobilized his forces and heavy artillery for an attack on the Kampuchean refugee camp of Nong Chan. On 25 December 1984, they attacked the camp at Nong Samet, killing or wounding dozens of Kampuchean refugees who had fled their genocidal war of aggression, destroying the shelters and property of these refugees, forcing tens of thousands of them to flee.

We condemn most vigorously these Vietnamese attacks against the defenceless Kampuchean refugees and appeal to the international community and the United Nations to continue exerting any kind of pressure on the Hanoi authorities to compel them to implement the six United Nations resolutions (resolutions 34/22, 35/6, 36/5, 37/6, 38/3 and 39/5) demanding the total and unconditional withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces of aggression from Kampuchea so as to enable the people of Kampuchea to decide their destiny for themselves and live in an independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

The barbarous Vietnamese attacks on the Kampuchean refugee camps can do nothing to change the tremendous defeats of the Vietnamese on the battlefields of Kampuchea into victories.

The party of Democratic Kampuchea and the NADK wish to place on record their deep sympathy and strong solidarity with the people in the refugee camps of Nong Chan and Nong Samet. They are determined to intensify their attacks against the Vietnamese aggressors everywhere in the country so as to immobilize the enemy forces. Especially in the Tonlé Sap region, the NADK continues to cut the enemy's communication and supply lines, to wipe out the Vietnamese administrative apparatus and to attack the enemy in the political, military and economic fields, with the result

that the Vietnamese are having increasing difficulty in carrying out their criminal acts against the people of Kampuchea. The NADK is determined to develop its co-operation with the other parties of the CGDK and the refugees of Nong Chan and Nong Samet.

As they are in a worse deadlock than ever, it is to be expected that in 1985 the Vietnamese enemy and their supporters will continue their sinister manoeuvring to destroy the CGDK. But, based on the experience gained, especially in 1984, in successfully foiling the Vietnamese manoeuvres, one after the other, we are convinced that the CGDK will strengthen its ranks and its unity until we are successful in the sacred task of driving every Vietnamese aggressor out of Kampuchea.

## DOCUMENT S/16899\*

### Letter dated 15 January 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

(Original: French)  
[17 January 1985]

I have the honour to request you to circulate the annexed telegram, dated 12 January 1985, addressed to you by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith  
Permanent Representative of  
Democratic Kampuchea  
to the United Nations

jugates the Khmer people and country and shamelessly colonizes Kampuchea, a Member of the United Nations. Having been subjected to the extremely deadly attacks of the Vietnamese armed forces, the Khmer refugees had to leave their villages, houses, rice plantations and fields because of the many forms of oppression which the Vietnamese colonialists and their puppets, the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen group, have practised since 1979.

TELEGRAM DATED 12 JANUARY 1985 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

As you have always shown great compassion towards the Kampuchean people, I have the honour to request you to prevail upon the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, a Member of the United Nations, to put an end to the frequent attacks which its army has mounted against the Khmer civilian population living in the refugee camps on the border between Kampuchea and Thailand.

The civilian population in question has committed no crime against Viet Nam. The criminal is the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, which is contemptuous of the United Nations, insolently refuses to comply with the just resolutions on Kampuchea adopted by the United Nations, sub-

The United Nations is not yet able to help us to solve this grievous problem, for which the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is entirely responsible. I would, however, request you to do whatever you can to ensure that, first, the Vietnamese army in Kampuchea stops shedding the blood of and mutilating and killing the Khmer people, and, secondly, the rich and liberal-minded countries throughout the world see their way to accepting a larger number of the very unfortunate Khmer refugees every year. The Thai Government has already done more for them than was ever imaginable and, besides, must fulfil its duty towards the Thai citizens living close to the border with Kampuchea, whom the Vietnamese aggressors have not shrunk from attacking most cruelly and unjustly.

I thank you for anything that you are able to accomplish in order to make the lot of the Khmer people, who do not deserve all these misfortunes, a little more tolerable.

(Signed) NORODOM Sihanouk  
President of Democratic Kampuchea

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/89-S/16899.

## DOCUMENT S/16900

### Letter dated 17 January 1985 from the representative of Egypt to the President of the Security Council

(Original: English)  
[21 January 1985]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter addressed to you by Mr. Zehdi Labib Terzi, the Permanent Observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization, dated 16 January 1985.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed I. SHAKER  
Deputy Permanent Representative of Egypt  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX

### Letter dated 16 January 1985 from the Observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization to the President of the Security Council

I am instructed by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to refer to the announcement made by the Israeli Cabinet that it had approved a plan to withdraw the Israeli occupation army from Lebanon in three stages. Such a plan is nothing but a unilateral decision that does not take into consideration the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982).

I am further requested to recall that on 19 September 1984, a letter was addressed to the Secretary-General by Chairman Arafat [S/16749, annex], in which he expressed grave concern regarding the outcome of such an Israeli move, particularly in the bitter memory of the Sabra and Shatilla massacre of 17 September 1982. It should be recalled that the Secretary-General suggested a course of action which would make more effective the mandate of the United Nations Truce Supervision Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), specifically in southern Lebanon, in the context of the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from that area, and, in particular, in subparagraph 25 (b) of the report of 9 April 1984 [S/16472], in which the Secretary-General suggested:

"The immediate deployment of elements of UNIFIL in the Sidon area on Israeli withdrawal from that area, with a view to assuring the safety and security of the population, including Palestinian refugees in the camps in that area".

Chairman Arafat would like to reiterate that in the view of the PLO, the United Nations is fully responsible to provide adequate protection and safety to the Palestinians in southern Lebanon and, specifically, in the Palestinian refugee camps. The crimes perpetrated at Ein El-Helweh in May 1984 should not be repeated.

In addition, Chairman Arafat would like to express grave concern for the future of the detainees in the Al-Ansar detention camp, where the Israeli occupation forces are arbitrarily detaining more than 300 Palestinians.

We wish to recall that the General Assembly, in resolution 39/99 I, has urged the Secretary-General to "undertake effective measures to guarantee the safety and security and the legal and human rights of the Palestinian refugees in all territories under Israeli occupation". It is recalled that this was prompted particularly in light of the report of the Secretary-General on the conditions of the Palestinian refugees in these areas.

## DOCUMENT S/16902\*

### Letter dated 22 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)*  
*[22 January 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 9.30 a.m. on 19 January 1985 and the officer in charge of the First Political Department brought the following to his attention in connection with Pakistan's recent claim that Afghan aircraft have allegedly attacked the territory of that country:

"In continuation of their previous accusations, the Pakistani authorities have once again claimed recently that Afghan aircraft allegedly entered the airspace of that country on 11 January 1985 and dropped bombs and fired rockets on Arandu.

"While categorically rejecting these imaginary and baseless claims, the pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan once again draw the attention of the Pakistani authorities to the grave consequences of such hostile provocations which shall have no other result but increasing tensions along the frontier areas between the two countries, and point out that the Islamabad authorities should better deal with the matter with a sense of responsibility and terminate as soon as possible their poisonous propaganda and groundless charges."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF*  
*Permanent Representative of Afghanistan*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/94-S/16902.

## DOCUMENT S/16904\*

### Letter dated 24 January 1985 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)*  
*[24 January 1985]*

Further to my letter dated 15 January 1985 [S/16895], I have the honour to report to you two serious violations of Pakistan's airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side which occurred on 21 and 22 January 1985, respectively. The details of the incidents are as follows:

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/95-S/16904

On 21 January, two Afghan aircraft intruded three kilometres into Pakistan airspace in the Arandu area and dropped two bombs which fell 500 yards inside Pakistan's territory, 1 kilometre south-east of Arandu.

On 22 January, two Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan airspace in the Arandu area. The aircraft made several passes over Arandu and also dropped two bombs 1 kilometre south of Arandu.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

#### DOCUMENT S/16905\*

**Letter dated 24 January 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)  
[24 January 1985]*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, the text of a statement dated 20 January 1985 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea asserting the right of the people of Kampuchea to fight the Vietnamese aggressors and the right of the world to support the just struggle of the people of Kampuchea.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the statement circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith  
Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea  
to the United Nations*

#### ANNEX

**Statement dated 20 January 1985 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea**

It is well known to the world that the Hanoi authorities have committed a blatant act of aggression against the State of Democratic Kampuchea, an independent, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned State that is a Member of the United Nations. This constitutes a gross violation of the United Nations Charter and of international law that cannot be condoned.

Therefore, the problem of Kampuchea must be settled in accordance with the United Nations resolutions successively adopted by an overwhelming majority for six consecutive years already [resolutions 34/22, 35/6, 36/5, 37/6, 38/3 and 39/5], that is, the Hanoi authorities must unconditionally withdraw all their aggression forces from Kampuchea.

But the Hanoi authorities are obstinately carrying on their aggression against Kampuchea. Therefore it is the sacred right of the whole people of Kampuchea to fight the Vietnamese aggressors until the last of them pulls out of Kampuchea, as it is also the sacred right of all countries committed to independence and peace the world over to defend the United Nations Charter and international law, and to support the just struggle of the people of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese aggressors can no longer deceive people. They must unconditionally withdraw all their forces of aggression from Kampuchea.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/96-S/16905.

#### DOCUMENT S/16906

**Letter dated 25 January 1985 from the representative of Chad to the President of the Security Council**

*(Original: French)  
[25 January 1985]*

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that Libya is continuing its ill-advised meddling in the internal affairs of Chad. Libya is illegally occupying 550,000 square kilometres of Chadian territory in violation of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. This military occupation constitutes an act of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Chad, as well as a constant threat to peace and security in the subregion.

I note that the Libyan Government refuses to follow the terms of the statement made public by the President of the Security Council on 6 April 1983,<sup>4</sup> in which the members of the Council called on Chad and Libya to discuss their differences and to settle them without undue delay and by peaceful means.

In addition, the Libyan Government has taken another step to escalate matters by planning an attack on the President of the Republic, El Hajj Hissein Habré, and members of the Chadian Government. Luckily this terrorist attack was foiled. Libyan responsibility was clearly established by the investigation, which was conducted with the utmost discretion.

In the light of the above, I should be grateful if you would convene the Security Council so that it may resume consideration of the complaint against Libya made by the Chadian Government on 2 August 1983 [S/15902].

*(Signed) Ngaré KESSIEY  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Chad  
to the United Nations*

**Letter dated 24 January 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[25 January 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, regarding the Iraqi régime's violations of the agreement of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610].

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Fereydoon DAMAVANDI KAMALI  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

**LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF  
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-  
GENERAL**

You are aware that the aggressive régime of Iraq, in the course of its imposed war on the Islamic Republic of Iran, has frequently proved its utter disregard for all humanitarian values and international laws. The Islamic Republic of Iran, to the contrary, has, out of belief in the exalted teachings of Islam as well as deep respect for humanitarian norms and international laws, been committed to the full observance of these norms and laws. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently brought to the attention of the international community, including the United Nations and yourself, the violations, unscrupulous aggressiveness and resort to inhumane methods on the part of the Iraqi régime and has urged the adoption of effective international measures in order to prevent further continuation of its crimes.

You are also aware that the Iraqi régime has thus far refused to respond to your appeal [S/16611 of 9 June 1984] for the non-use of chemical weapons, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has, on numerous occasions, warned the international community that such a refusal only points to the Iraqi régime's determination to use these inhumane weapons again. Repeated and continuous violations by the Iraqi régime of the undertaking of 12 June 1984 for the cessation of attacks on civilian and residential areas, numerous cases of which have been brought to your attention, clearly manifest that this régime not only does not respect international principles, laws and public opinion but also violates its own undertakings and commitments. The report of the United Nations inspection team in Tehran [S/16897], dated 16 January 1985, established a clear violation of the 12 June undertaking and reaffirmed the correctness of the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran as to the total and full-fledged unreliability and untrustworthiness of this aggressive régime.

While expressing its deep concern as to the criminal practice of the Iraqi régime and serving notice as to the destructive and unpredictable consequences of such a practice, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran declares that as long as you have not officially announced the implementation and preservation of the 12 June undertaking impossible, the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue its policy of commitment to and full observance of the said undertaking.

*(Signed)* Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Islamic Republic of Iran

## DOCUMENT S/16908\*

**Letter dated 24 January 1985 from the representative of China  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Chinese/English]  
[25 January 1985]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a statement made by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China on 23 January 1985 and the background paper on the Vietnamese authorities' recent military provocations along the Chinese border as an appendix to the statement. I would be grateful if you could arrange for the circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* LING Qing  
Permanent Representative of  
the People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX

**Statement made on 23 January 1985 by the spokesman for the  
Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China**

Since last November, while launching a new round of dry-season offensive along the Kampuchean-Thai border, the Vietnamese authorities have intensified their military provocations and incursions in areas along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The Vietnamese troops have been shelling Laoshan and other areas of Yunnan province of China almost every day. Altogether, they have fired more than 137,000 shells of various types and made more than 40 sneak raids and attacks on the platoon, company or battalion scale in an attempt to occupy Chinese territory. They have met with head-on counter-attacks by the Chinese frontier forces.

At the same time, the Vietnamese troops have fired shells at many other border areas in Yunnan and Guangxi of China, disrupting the normal production and life of the border inhabitants there.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/858-S/16908.

The Vietnamese side has also frequently dispatched spies and agents across the border to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage activities, lay mines, make sneak raids upon the posts of the Chinese frontier forces and militia, kidnap innocent border inhabitants and loot them of their belongings. They have killed and wounded several hundred Chinese border inhabitants and caused heavy losses to the life and property of the local people.

Over the past few days, while putting up a smokescreen by suggesting the "Spring Festival cease-fire" on the one hand, the Vietnamese authorities have stepped up their military attacks on Chinese border areas on the other, sometimes making as many as nine attacks and firing thousands of shells in one single day. This has thoroughly exposed the hypocritical and deceptive nature of the so-called "Spring Festival cease-fire" proposed by the Vietnamese authorities.

In face of the reckless provocations by the Vietnamese authorities, the Chinese frontier forces were forced to counterattack in self-defense and gave the trouble-makers and invaders their due punishment. We strongly demand that the Vietnamese authorities stop forthwith their military provocations and incursions so that the tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border will be eased and the normal production and life of the border inhabitants can be restored.

## APPENDIX

### Vietnamese authorities' recent military provocations along the Chinese border

The Vietnamese troops have since the last two months and more intensified their military provocations and armed incursions into China's Yunnan and Guangxi border areas while the Vietnamese authorities have mobilized their propaganda machines to fabricate lies and make false counter-charges against China to befuddle world opinion.

According to incomplete statistics provided by the relevant departments, Vietnamese troops have since last November fired more than 137,000 shells of various types at and launched more than 40 sneak raids against Chinese territories. Furthermore, they have dispatched spies and agents across the border on scores of occasions to carry out harassment and sabotage activities, having killed or wounded hundreds of Chinese frontier guards, militiamen and civilians. They have kidnapped eight border inhabitants from China.

The military provocations by the Vietnamese troops against the Chinese border can be summed up in three patterns:

1. *Launching attacks in an attempt to occupy Chinese territory.* Since November last year, Vietnamese troops have frequently shelled Laoshan

and other areas of China's Yunnan province. They have fired a total of over 100,000 shells of all kinds and launched sneak raids and attacks on the platoon, company or even battalion scale, attempting to seize Chinese territory by force. They have met with head-on blows by the Chinese frontier forces. Of late, Vietnamese troops have further intensified military attacks against the Laoshan area under the smokescreen of the "Spring Festival cease-fire" proposal. They have been firing thousands of shells, sometimes 10,000 shells, at Laoshan every day, and making incessant attacks against the Chinese border on the platoon, company and battalion scale. On January 16, 1985 alone, such attacks were launched as many as eight times.

2. *Firing at Chinese border villages and towns, killing and kidnapping innocent Chinese border inhabitants, causing thereby heavy losses to the life and property of the local people.* Vietnamese troops have frequently fired shells at the border areas of China's Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, disrupting the normal production and life of the border inhabitants there. In Yunnan, the Vietnamese troops fired at Zheyinshan and Punong and other areas on December 4. They wounded a Chinese road maintenance worker the same day while firing at Hekou. On December 20, the Vietnamese troops fired across the Hong Ha River at an ambulance of a Chinese form at Hekou, Yunnan, and damaged it. Earlier this year, they twice opened heavy-calibre artillery fire at Changtian and Malin, two villages in Malipo county. In Guangxi, the Vietnamese troops ambushed 12 Chinese peasants on January 9 who went with some daily use articles to do business at the invitation of the Vietnamese border inhabitants, killing six of them and wounding another. The next day, the hidden Vietnamese troops attacked some 20 Chinese inhabitants from Youyi Town of Pingxiang who were doing business at a local market on the Chinese side, killing one Chinese youth and wounding another. They also kidnapped four Chinese inhabitants who came to rescue the wounded. On January 12, the Vietnamese seriously wounded Mr. Deng Qiwen, a Chinese peasant from Naliang of the Fangcheng Multi-Nationality Autonomous County, who was then working in a bamboo forest on the Chinese side.

3. *Dispatching spies and agents across the border to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage activities, lay mines and make sneak raids upon the posts of the Chinese frontier forces and militia.* On December 16, 1984, a mine laid by Vietnamese agents on the highway in Tianpeng District, Funing county, Yunnan province, blew up a Chinese lorry. On December 17 and 21, the Vietnamese troops made sneak raids upon a militia post in Malibao village of Yunnan and a post of the Chinese frontier guards in Nonghe of Guangxi. They were repulsed soon after they were discovered by the Chinese militia and frontier soldiers. On December 28, the Vietnamese agents attacked Mr. Wu Shengmin, a Chinese peasant from Malibao village, wounding him and robbing him of his horse and property.

## DOCUMENT S/16909\*

### Letter dated 22 January 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 January 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report on the savage patterns of treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war carried out by the Iranian régime.

It would be highly appreciated if this report could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zuhair I. MOHAMMAD  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Iraq  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX

### Savage patterns of treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by the Iranian enemy

#### Use of threats and torture

This is one of the methods of changing the ideological structure through a series of cruel measures involving the threat to kill, physical and psychological torture and sham trials. Through this method, many ugly crimes were committed including the killing of 30 prisoners of war and the injuring of 70 others. For the mere reason that those prisoners expressed their discontent over their maltreatment by the guards. Other prisoners witnessed similar executions in Karj, Barandak, Tarziya, Tawanda, Meshhad, Simran and Anzali. The use of this method is aimed at destabilizing the emotional balance of the prisoners by suggesting to them that a horrible fate awaits them if they do not accede to the demands of the enemy.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/859-S/16909.

### *Sectarian isolation*

The enemy also resorted to isolating the prisoners of war according to sect and religion. The Shiites, for example, were kept away from the Sunnis and the Christians. According to this isolation, the enemy brought clergymen from each sect and sought to change the inclinations of the prisoners in keeping with their sectarian sentiments. The aim behind this measure is to address the prisoners, each according to his religious belief, which makes it easier to achieve control over them. As to the Christians, they were subjected to heavy pressures aimed at converting them to Shiism and forcing them to perform Islamic religious rites.

### *Daily coercive measures*

These include forcing the prisoners of war to listen to lengthy religious preachings charged with hatred for Iraq and its leadership, forcing them to carry photographs of Khomeini, to shout slogans against the political system in Iraq and to perform collective prayers. This measure is also aimed at accustoming the prisoners of war to such conduct, and this leads, through repetition, to what is called in psychology "force of habit", under which the prisoner feels no sense of guilt as a result of shouting slogans against the régime or carrying a photograph of Khomeini, etc.

### *Method of hiding prisoners of war*

The enemy has hidden large numbers of prisoners of war from the International Committee of the Red Cross. Such a method heightens the anxiety of the prisoner who has been entirely cut off from news about his family. It also increases his fears about his undetermined fate and makes him feel that he is exposed to death at any moment. This may lead him to accede to all the wishes of the enemy in order to preserve his life and to hear news about his family.

### *Changing the location of prisoners of war*

Under this measure, the enemy continually transfers the prisoners of war, in groups or individually, from one place of detention to another. This leaves the prisoner in a state of continuous anxiety which denies him the opportunity to adapt himself to the circumstances around him and to form close relations with his fellow prisoners. This often leads to weakening the psychological resistance of the prisoner and consequently the enemy achieves his aim of making the prisoner receptive to anything in return for stability. This also makes the prisoner more pliable and more receptive to ideological suggestion, at least on the surface, in order that he may be left alone.

### *Solitary confinement*

The enemy distributes the prisoners of war in such a way as to make it easy to deal with them in accordance with his aims. He isolates the officers from the enlisted men. He also tries to break up the unity of the group by dispersing friends and colleagues. The enemy practises solitary detention of individuals who enjoy a good standing among the prisoners and who resist the methods and programmes of the enemy. This measure aims at creating barriers to the psychological unity of the prisoners which may

arise in a group living in one place. It also aims at punishing the prisoners who offer resistance in order that others may not consider emulating them.

### *Placing agents among the ranks of prisoners of war*

This measure places elements from the puppet "Dawa" party among the ranks of prisoners in order to gain knowledge about their political leanings and loyalties. The agents are selected from various areas of Iraq and are charged with writing accurate reports on the affiliations and allegiances of the prisoners and presenting such reports to the administration of the cage. In the light of such reports, tortures, solitary confinements and murders are carried out.

### *Intimidation of pilots*

In view of the active role of pilots in the war, the enemy has intimidated them by such methods as telling them they would be tried after the war as war criminals. This method makes the prisoner of war very anxious about his future and fate, and may lead to the same results referred to elsewhere in the present report.

### *Poisoning of food*

This is done by adding to the food poisonous substances or substances loosening the bowels in order to make the prisoners of war suffer from collective severe pain or defecate on themselves. This measure aims at making the prisoner feel humiliated and weak and at bringing him ultimately to a state of psychological exhaustion which makes him accept what is imposed on him voluntarily in order to ensure his safety.

### *Sexual assault*

The administration of the cages of the prisoners of war encourages those co-operating with them to assault unco-operative prisoners sexually, particularly juveniles. This leads to weakening the moral deterrent of the prisoner and to turning him into a pliable tool in the hands of the enemy and his agents.

### *Night raids*

This is done intermittently. At various times of the night, the guards of the cages of the prisoners of war emit alarming cries calling on the prisoners to assemble and go outside. During these intervals, individual and collective punishments are imposed on the prisoners, such as making them crawl in the snow, or leaving groups of them until the morning gathering piles of snow opposite the gates of the prison. This is aimed at depriving the prisoner of rest and leaving him in a state of psychological instability in order to win him over.

### *Withholding letters*

For the prisoner of war, the greatest joy is receiving letters. The enemy plays a trump card with this measure. He withholds letters from the prisoner after telling him that his letters have arrived. This measure entails a great deal of psychological torture. It is also aimed at winning over the prisoner by signalling to him that all his needs will be met if he co-operates. Otherwise, he would be deprived of those needs.

## **DOCUMENT S/16910**

### **Letter dated 25 January 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[25 January 1985]*

I have the honour to forward to you the letter of Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding attacks on neutral mercantile ships in the Persian Gulf.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Fereydoon DAMAVANDI KAMALI  
*Chargé d'affaires a.i.*  
*of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations*

### **LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

In response to your telex No. 777/116, in which you informed me of the concern of the Secretary-General of the International Transport Workers' Federation about attacks on neutral mercantile ships and the casualties among their crews, I wish to bring the following to your notice.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran also shares this concern and extends its sympathy to the families of those crew members who have lost their lives. As a matter of fact, since the time the Iraqi régime found itself unable to encounter Iranian soldiers in the war fronts, and decided

to churn unrest in this international waterway, thus setting the stage for more extensive plots in the region, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran started to feel concerned about the spread of the war to the Persian Gulf waters, and attacks on non-belligerent ships which were sought by the Iraqi régime.

It was in fact due to her awareness of the true intentions and nature of the Iraqi régime that the Islamic Republic of Iran put the United Nations Security Council and the supporters of the Iraqi régime on alert against the adoption of the one-sided resolution 552 (1984). Unfortunately the support for this régime bore its fruit much sooner than was expected, turning the Persian Gulf waters into the scene of Iraqi attacks that disturbed economic life in this waterway.

Being fully aware of your humanitarian intentions, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran welcomes and supports any measure taken to ensure the freedom of navigation and security in the Persian Gulf.

Through its medical and other kinds of emergency assistance to the casualties of such wrecks, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has in the past displayed its good intentions.

*(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Islamic Republic of Iran*

#### DOCUMENT S/16911

**Letter dated 28 January 1985 from the representative of Chad  
to the President of the Security Council**

*(Original: French)  
[28 January 1985]*

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter dated 25 January 1985 [S/16906], I have the honour to request you to convene the Security Council as a matter of urgency in order to consider the serious situation prevailing in my country.

In addition to the occupation of the northern region, covering 550,000 square kilometres, and the constant acts of interference in the internal and external affairs of the Republic of Chad, the terrorist régime in Tripoli has just gone one step further by organizing a plot aimed at physically eliminating the President of the Republic and all the members of the Chadian Government.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, who has come especially for this purpose, wishes to make a statement to the Security Council.

*(Signed) Ngaré KESSELY  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Chad  
to the United Nations*

#### DOCUMENT S/16912

**Letter dated 28 January 1985 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
to the President of the Security Council**

*(Original: Arabic)  
[28 January 1985]*

With reference to the letter addressed to you on 25 January 1985 by the representative of Chad [S/16906], I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The above-mentioned letter contains only unfounded allegations and slander and is aimed solely at harming the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and diminishing the importance of the legitimate Government of Chad, which exercises its authority over the larger part of the territory and has its forces and administration in the northern part of the country.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in no way intervenes in the internal affairs of Chad and has committed no act of hostility against the Chadian people. On the contrary, it has constantly worked to achieve security and stability in that neighbouring brother country and at one time helped the legitimate Chadian Government headed by Goukouni Weddey at its

request, to restore security and stability and to protect legitimacy.

There is no Libyan presence in Chadian territory and the statements to the effect that there are Libyan forces there are completely unfounded. In fact, the only elements actually present in the northern zone are the forces of the legitimate Government and the population of northern Chad.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is constantly endeavouring in all international and regional forums to restore peace and legitimacy in Chad; this led it to support and encourage the holding of the Conciliation Conference at Addis Ababa at the request of the former Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), just as it supported the Brazzaville meeting convened by the President of the Congo to reconcile

the warring Chadian parties. It was the rebel Hissein Habré who refused to attend those two meetings, invoking false pretexts and setting as a pre-condition that the other factions and the legitimate Chadian Government headed by Goukouni Weddey against which he had previously rebelled, should recognize him as head of State.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not wish to deal with the so-called Government of Hissein Habré. What is happening in Chad is simply a civil war and an internal conflict resulting from the blow at legality struck by Hissein Habré. There is a legal Government in Chad, resulting from the Lagos Agreement [S/14378 of 19 February 1981, annex], which was endorsed by the Organization of African Unity. Consequently, Hissein Habré is considered as a rebel and does not have the right to speak on behalf of Chad. It is with the legal Government of Chad that he really has a score to settle.

The allegation that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya attempted to assassinate Hissein Habré and his clique is part of a campaign to mystify the Chadian people and world public opinion, fuelled by American imperialism and the reaction-

ary forces in its thrall. The Security Council has too many serious concerns to have time to deal with this lying assertion, from which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dissociates itself completely.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is convinced that the clique of Hissein Habré at N'Djamena is the first to know how false are the allegations and slander which it is directing at the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, at the instigation of American imperialism and of the reactionary forces of the region.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya therefore hopes that the N'Djamena clique and those who support it will not be allowed to make the Security Council waste its time, to exploit it for their own purposes and to distract it from its serious concerns regarding the grave international issues that concern world peace and security.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rajab A. AZZAROUK  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of  
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16914\*

#### Letter dated 29 January 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[29 January 1985]

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, the text of a statement dated 25 January 1985, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, denouncing and condemning the policy of famine pursued by the Hanoi authorities in Kampuchea.

I should be most grateful if you would arrange for this text to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith  
Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

##### Statement made on 25 January 1985 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

This year, the people of Kampuchea face a serious food shortage due to the deliberate policy systematically pursued by the Hanoi authorities to starve them. To this end, the Vietnamese aggressors put their barbarous policy into practice through the following measures:

1. With their weapons, they force the population to live in concentration villages along the roads, far from their lands and rice-fields. These villages are enclosed and watched over to prevent the population from leaving to engage in production activities. Anyone who dares to do so is shot or arrested and imprisoned, charged with being in contact with the Democratic Kampuchea guerrillas.

2. They round up all the population—men, women, children and old people—to make them clear the forest along the national roads, railways and waterways, forcing them to abandon their lands and rice-fields. Even

when the ploughing season starts, the Vietnamese aggressors do not allow them to return to their villages or districts. In the villages where the population manages to grow some food, the Vietnamese aggressors prevent them from harvesting it and loot the paddy in the fields to supply their armed forces.

The population living in the eastern part of Kampuchea, in the provinces of Siem Reap, Prey Veng, Kratié, Kompong Speu, Takeo, etc., have been rounded up and brought by the Vietnamese aggressors to clear the forest along national roads Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 and along the railway up to the western border of Kampuchea, along road No. 12 from Kompong Thom to Preah Vihear, from Kralanh to Samrong-Oddar Meanchey, along road No. 10, from Battambang to Pailin, including the forest surrounding the monuments of Angkor.

3. Concurrently with these measures, the Vietnamese aggressors have forced the population of all the provinces to supply them an average of 10 kilograms of rice per house per month. Failure to do so is penalized by the destruction and looting of houses and villages.

Such is the barbarous policy of the Vietnamese aggressors who do everything to starve and loot our people so as to supply their forces in Kampuchea. This is the policy of genocide pursued by the Vietnamese enemy in Kampuchea with the aim of swallowing and annexing Kampuchea.

The serious food shortage which our people are now facing does not stem from climatic calamities, drought or flood, as is fallaciously claimed by the Vietnamese aggressors.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea denounces and condemns with the utmost vigour and indignation this barbarous policy of the Vietnamese enemy towards the people of Kampuchea. It calls on world public opinion, and in particular the international humanitarian organizations, to take duly into account the Vietnamese aggressors' crimes and to stop providing humanitarian aid to the Vietnamese aggressors, who will not fail to use it to supply their army and continue their genocidal war in Kampuchea.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/109-S/16914.

**DOCUMENT S/16915\***

**Letter dated 29 January 1985 from the representative of Pakistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[30 January 1985]*

Further to my letter dated 24 January 1985 [S/16904], I have the honour to report to you a serious violation of Pakistan's airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side which occurred on 23 January. On that date, between 1200 hours and 1245 hours, two Afghan aircraft intruded into Pakistan's airspace in the Arandu area. The aircraft made several passes over Arandu and dropped two bombs 1 kilometre south of Arandu.

I also take this opportunity to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected as totally baseless an allegation<sup>2</sup> made by the Kabul authorities that the armed forces of Pakistan had fired across the border towards Barikot between 19 and 21 January 1985, as a result of which 16 persons were said to have been killed and two helicopters damaged. On 28 January, Pakistan's denial was conveyed to the Afghan Chargé d'affaires in Islamabad, who was told that the armed forces of Pakistan were under strict orders not to commit violations anywhere along Pakistan's borders and that, by fabricating baseless charges, the Kabul authorities were merely trying to shift the blame on to Pakistan for events within Afghanistan.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

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\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/110-S/16915.

**DOCUMENT S/16916\***

**Letter dated 29 January 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[30 January 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 2 p. m. on 27 January 1985 and the following was brought to his attention by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"According to the information of pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, on 19, 20 and 21 January 1985 shellings were conducted from inside the territory of Pakistan by various kinds of weapons, such as recoilless guns, mortars and machine-guns, on the residential areas of Barikot district in Kunarha province. These savage and irresponsible attacks have resulted in the martyrdom of 16 persons, including women and children, and considerable damage to the dwellings of the innocent population of that area. Likewise, as a consequence of these repeated attacks, hindrances and difficulties have been created for the transportation of prime commodities for the population and damage has been

inflicted on two helicopters of the DRA Air Force that were carrying medicine and food items to Barikot. The damage inflicted on one of the helicopters was enormous.

"The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan vehemently condemns and denounces these inhuman aggressions and strongly protests to the Government of Pakistan over them, and points out that those in charge of the affairs of Pakistan must terminate this series of aggressions and provocations. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan reserves its right to take necessary measures in order to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and will resort to firm and reciprocal actions if these aggressions continue, the heavy and grave consequences of which will be borne by the responsible authorities of Pakistan."

Also, according to another report, the officer in charge of the First Political Department has mentioned to the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul that recently the Pakistani authorities, in continuation of their previous accusations and allegations against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, have once again claimed that Af-

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\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/111-S/16916.

ghan aircraft allegedly attacked the Arandu area on 21 and 22 January 1985.

The competent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan consider these claims of the Pakistani authorities baseless and void of any reality. While categorically rejecting them, they demand that the Pakistani authorities refrain, as soon as possible, from levelling provocative allegations and spreading hostile rumours against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and prevent the threat and

danger of increasing tensions along the frontiers of the two countries that would be imminent in the event of further continuation of these hostile actions.

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16917\*

##### Letter dated 30 January 1985 from the representative of Malaysia to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[31 January 1985]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement issued on 9 January 1985 by Mr. Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, in his capacity as current Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Association of South-East Asian Nations with regard to the recent Vietnamese attacks against Kampuchean refugee encampments along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

I have further the honour to request that this note and the attached text be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) SYED ARIFF Fadzillah  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of Malaysia  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

Statement issued on 9 January 1985 by the Foreign Minister of Malaysia, in his capacity as current Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Association of South-East Asian Nations

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) deplores the escalation of the fighting along the Thai-Kampuchean border, which has

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/112-S/16917.

led to the exodus of tens of thousands of Kampuchean refugees into Thailand, thus exacerbating further the already adverse refugee situation in that country, and inflicting untold suffering and hardships on these unfortunate refugees. The Association further deplores the recurrent incursions into Thai territory by Vietnamese forces, in violation of Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity and established rules of international relations.

Current military actions by Viet Nam once again reveal the utter disregard by Viet Nam of the weight of international opinion, which has overwhelmingly rejected Viet Nam's policy of continued military occupation of Kampuchea. They demonstrate Viet Nam's single-minded but futile pursuit of a "military solution" of the Kampuchean problem and belie its protestations of peaceful intentions and desire to seek a negotiated settlement of the problem. Notwithstanding, ASEAN will not give up efforts to achieve a political solution of the Kampuchean problem, and ASEAN is convinced that the aspirations for justice for the Kampuchean people and for peace in the region will prevail.

ASEAN once again calls on Viet Nam to take heed of the clearly expressed desire of the international community for an early and comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem through negotiations and to abandon its policy of military occupation of Kampuchea once and for all. Only if Viet Nam abides by the expressed will of the international community and the wishes of the Kampuchean people for the restoration of their rights as a sovereign, independent and non-aligned nation would Viet Nam be able to end its present isolation and redeem its much-vaunted credentials as a champion for independence and freedom.

#### DOCUMENT S/16918

##### Note verbale dated 29 January 1985 from the Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]  
[31 January 1985]

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in connection with his note of 21 December 1984, has the honour to communicate the following.

Guided by its position of principle regarding the racist policy of *apartheid* pursued by the Republic of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics maintains no economic, military or other relations with South Africa.

The Soviet Union supported Security Council resolution 558 (1984), abides strictly by its provisions and accordingly does not import arms, ammunition of any type or military vehicles produced in South Africa. That resolution supplements previous decisions by the Security Council regarding the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. It is

extremely important in that connection to take specific and effective steps to eliminate existing loopholes in the embargo in order to make it as comprehensive as possible.

In view of the fact that the racist régime of South Africa threatens general peace and security, pursues a policy of aggression, destabilization and State terrorism against the independent States of that region, continues to build up its military capability and is trying to acquire nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union continues to stress the urgent need for the Security Council to take all necessary measures to combat racism and *apartheid* in southern Africa.

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations requests that this note should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/16919\***

**Letter dated 31 January 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[31 January 1985]*

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to reject the content of document S/16909 dated 25 January 1985 and to regret that such cheap, unfounded and totally false allegations by the aggressor régime of Iraq were circulated in the United Nations document on precisely the day that your distinguished team of experts concluded their visits to Iraq and Iran and have seen, for themselves, the conditions of the prisoners of war in both countries. I believe that this frivolous act by the régime of Iraq is designed to divert the attention of the world community from the incoming report of your team of experts which is due shortly.

I would appreciate it if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Fereydoon DAMAVANDI KAMALI*  
*Chargé d'affaires a.i.*  
*of the Permanent Mission of*  
*the Islamic Republic of Iran*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/860-S/16919.

**DOCUMENT S/16920**

**Note by the Secretary-General on the report of the United Nations team in Baghdad  
concerning an inspection carried out on 28 January 1985**

*(Original: English)*  
*[30 January 1985]*

1. It will be recalled that, following the undertakings made in June 1984 by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran [S/16609] and the Government of the Republic of Iraq [S/16610] in response to the Secretary-General's appeal [S/16611] to end and refrain from initiating all deliberate military attacks by any means on purely civilian population centres in either country, effective at 0001 hours GMT on 12 June 1984, the Secretary-General, in response to independent requests by each of the two Governments, set up two teams for the purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings.<sup>3</sup> Previous inspection reports under these arrangements appear in document S/16750 of 19 September 1984 and document S/16897 of 16 January 1985.

2. On 26 January 1985, the head of the team in Baghdad received a request for inspection from the Government of the Republic of Iraq, and the inspection was carried out on 28 January 1985. The team has submitted the following report to the Secretary-General.

\* \* \*

**INTRODUCTION**

3. On 26 January 1985, at 2145 hours, Baghdad local time, the head of the inspection team received from the Government of Iraq an oral and written request to carry out an inspection of the villages of Al-Jawaber and Saregah in the area of Al-Thaghr in the province of Al-Qurnah, 98

kilometres north of Basra. The two villages allegedly had been shelled by Iranian forces between 0800 and 1030 hours on 26 January. United Nations Headquarters in New York was contacted immediately for authority to proceed with the inspection under safety assurances from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Clearance to proceed with the requested inspection was received by the team leader at 1250 hours on 27 January, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq was informed accordingly.

**INSPECTION**

4. The team departed from Baghdad by road at 1700 hours on 27 January and arrived at Basra at 2320 hours. The team proceeded to the inspection site on 28 January, arriving there at 1030 hours, and departing at 1400 hours.

5. The villages of Al-Jawaber and Saregah face each other diagonally across the main highway linking Baghdad and Basra about 98 kilometres north of Basra and 17 kilometres west of the border with Iran. The combined population is approximately 4,000. The Iraqi military liaison officers informed the team that the nearest Iraqi troop positions were 7 kilometres to the east of the villages, the area between this line and the border being swampland.

6. The main economic activity of the villages is agriculture. The villages are part of expanding housing devel-

opments of durable, modern residential houses. The team found no evidence of any military or industrial installations in or around the village. However, a heavy artillery unit could be heard firing about 3 kilometres north of the village. Although the highway is a main communications link, the team observed no military traffic on it during the time of its inspection.

7. According to accounts provided by several villagers to the team, there had been an unascertained number of shellings prior to 26 January 1985, the shells being said to have landed in and around the villages but without any reported casualties. The team was informed that in an attack alleged to have occurred on 26 January 1985 between 0830 and 1030 hours, about 25 shells had hit in and around the villages. One shell had impacted in the compound of the Nahrawan Primary School, which is located 15 metres from the highway, immediately north of Al-Jawaber. The Headmaster and two teachers of the school stated that 12 persons had been injured, of whom 10 were boys aged about 10 years and two were adult males, one a gardener and the other a handyman at the school. All the injured had immediately received first aid at the medical clinic, which was nearby, and then been released.

8. The team interviewed a medical assistant and a number of nurses who had treated the injured on 26 January. They showed the medical records to the team and stated that all the injuries had been caused by flying broken glass, except for one, which was from shrapnel. All the injuries had been minor in nature. The team also saw the 10 schoolboys and the two adults, who had returned to the school. Their injuries were found to correspond to the description given by the medical staff at the clinic.

9. The school was found to be a solid building constructed of brick and cement, and showed little sign of structural damage. There was minor shrapnel damage to the inner walls and ceilings of two classrooms, and window glass in these rooms as well as in the teachers' room had been shattered. The team observed one crater, measuring approximately 1 metre in diameter and 1 meter deep, which apparently had been caused by a shell impact about 5 metres from the school. The direction from which the shell had been fired could not be determined because of the soft earth and trees and shrubbery into which it had impacted. In particular, a tree near the crater, which evidently had been

hit by the shell, gave, upon examination, a smell of cordite, leading the team to conclude that it had been hit by a high explosive projectile. The team could find no pieces of shrapnel at the site and was informed that they all had been removed prior to inspection.

10. On an inspection of the villages, the team saw another shell crater approximately 50 centimetres in diameter and 50 centimetres deep in Al-Jawaber near a house which showed some shrapnel damage to the façade. No pieces of shrapnel were found. The crater appeared to be at least two weeks old. The angle of impact indicated that this projectile most probably had been fired from an easterly direction. A third crater, measuring approximately 20 centimetres in diameter and 15 centimetres deep, was found on the main highway 1 kilometre south of the school. No shrapnel pieces were found. This crater appeared to be about one week old. The angle of impact indicated that this projectile had been fired from an easterly direction. A fourth crater approximately 50 centimetres in diameter and 25 centimetres deep was found in the village of Saregah but could not be determined as having been caused by a shell. During its inspection of the area, the team found no further evidence of the shelling reported to have occurred two days previously.

#### CONCLUSIONS

11. From its inspection of the villages of Al-Jawaber and Saregah, and the information and evidence presented to it, the team reached the following conclusions:

(a) It is the opinion of the team that, while the two villages themselves are purely residential areas, the Baghdad/Basra highway passing between them could constitute a line of communication of military utility. The impact near the school causing the first crater could have occurred on the date and at the time claimed. Since no parts or fragments of the shell could be inspected, the team could not determine the type of munition that had been used. However, the extent of the damage and casualties observed are consistent with the effects that can be expected from such an impact.

(b) The dates of the impacts causing the second and third craters could not be determined, but it was evident that they had been caused before 26 January 1985.

(c) On the basis of all the evidence examined, the team is unable to state that a deliberate attack on a purely civilian population centre occurred on 26 January 1985.

#### DOCUMENT S/16921\*

**Letter dated 30 January 1985 from the representatives of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[1 February 1985]*

We have the honour to request you to have circulated among Member States the Delhi Declaration adopted by Mr. Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, Mr. Andreas Papandreu, Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Mr. Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico, Mr. Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden,

and Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, on 28 January 1985 at New Delhi as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Carlos M. Muñoz*  
*Permanent Representative of Argentina*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/14-S/16921.

*(Signed) Mihalis DOUNTAS  
Permanent Representative of Greece  
to the United Nations*

*(Signed) Vinay VERMA  
Acting Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations*

*(Signed) Porfirio MUÑOZ-LEDO  
Permanent Representative of Mexico  
to the United Nations*

*(Signed) Anders FERM  
Permanent Representative of Sweden  
to the United Nations*

*(Signed) Shani O. LWENO  
Acting Permanent Representative  
of the United Republic of Tanzania  
to the United Nations*

#### ANNEX

**Delhi Declaration adopted and issued at New Delhi on 28 January 1985 by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania**

Forty years ago, when atomic bombs were blasted over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the human race became aware that it could destroy itself, and horror came to dwell among us. Forty years ago, also, the nations of the world gathered to organize the international community, and with the United Nations hope was born for all people.

Almost imperceptibly, over the last four decades, every nation and every human being has lost ultimate control over their own life and death. For all of us, it is a small group of men and machines in cities far away who can decide our fate. Every day we remain alive is a day of grace, as if mankind as a whole were a prisoner in the death cell awaiting the uncertain moment of execution. And like every innocent defendant, we refuse to believe that the execution will ever take place.

We find ourselves in this situation because the nuclear-weapon States have applied traditional doctrines of war in a world where new weapons have made them obsolete. What is the point of nuclear "superiority" or "balance" when each side already has enough weapons to devastate the earth dozens of times over? If the old doctrines are applied in the future, the holocaust will be inescapable sooner or later. But nuclear war can be prevented if our voices are joined in a universal demand in defence of our right to live.

As a result of recent atmospheric and biological studies, there have been new findings which indicate that in addition to blast, heat and radiation, nuclear war, even on a limited scale, would trigger an arctic nuclear winter which may transform the earth into a darkened, frozen planet, posing unprecedented peril to all nations, even those far removed from the nuclear explosions. We are convinced that this makes it still more pressing to take preventive action to exclude for ever the use of nuclear weapons and the occurrence of a nuclear war.

In our Joint Statement of May 22, 1984 [S/16587, annex] we called upon the nuclear-weapon States to bring their arms race to a halt. We are encouraged by the worldwide response to our appeal. The international support we received and the responses of the nuclear-weapon States themselves have been such that we deemed it our duty to meet here in New Delhi to consider ways to further our efforts.

The nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility for the dangerous state of the arms race. We urge them to join us in the search for a new direction. We welcome the agreement in Geneva on January 8, 1985, between the Soviet Union and the United States to start negotiations

on "a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship". We attach great importance to the proclaimed objective of these negotiations: to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, ultimately to eliminate nuclear arms everywhere. We expect the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to implement, in good faith, their undertaking and their negotiations to produce, at an early date, significant results. We will follow their work closely and we expect that they will keep the international community informed of its progress. We stress that the agenda for and the outcome of these negotiations is a matter of concern for all nations and all people.

We reiterate our appeal for an all-embracing halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Such a halt would greatly facilitate negotiations. Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Outer space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not as a battle-ground of the future. We, therefore, call for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. An arms race in space would be enormously costly, and have grave destabilising effects. It would also endanger a number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

We further urge the nuclear-weapon States to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear weapon test ban. Such a treaty would be a major step towards ending the continuous modernization of nuclear arsenals.

We are convinced that all such steps, in so far as necessary, can be accompanied by adequate and non-discriminatory measures of verification.

A halt to the nuclear-arms race is at the present moment imperative. Only thus can it be ensured that nuclear arsenals do not grow while negotiations proceed. However, this halt should not be an end in itself. It must be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces, leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the final goal of general and complete disarmament. Parallel to this process, it is urgently necessary to transfer precious resources currently wasted in military expenditure to social and economic development. The strengthening of the United Nations must also be an essential part of this endeavour.

It is imperative to find a remedy to the existing situation where hundreds of billions of dollars, amounting to approximately one and a half million per minute, are spent annually on weapons. This stands in dramatic contrast to the poverty, and in some cases misery, in which two thirds of the world population lives.

The future of all peoples is at stake. As representatives from non-nuclear-weapon States, we will not cease to express our legitimate concern and make known our demands. We affirm our determination to facilitate agreement among the nuclear-weapon States, so that the required steps can be taken. We will seek to work together with them for the common security of mankind and for peace.

We urge people, Parliaments and Governments the world over to lend forceful support to this appeal. Progress in disarmament can only be achieved with an informed public applying strong pressure on Governments. Only then will Governments summon the necessary political will to overcome the many obstacles which lie in the path of peace. The world disarmament campaign launched by the United Nations represents a very important element in generating that political will.

For centuries, men and women have fought for their rights and freedoms. We now face the greatest struggle of all—for the right to live, for ourselves and for future generations.

Forty years ago, in Hiroshima and San Francisco, the horror of nuclear war was matched by the hope for peace. We would like this year of 1985 to be the year when hope begins to prevail over terror. We dare to hope that by October 24, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, we might see the first concrete steps to avert the threat to the survival of humanity.

**DOCUMENT S/16922**

**Letter dated 1 February 1985 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original: Arabic]  
[1 February 1985]*

With reference to the provisional verbatim record of the 2567th meeting, I have the honour to inform you of the following.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya categorically denies the remarks made by the President of the Council, considering that they represent the viewpoint of France alone.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya notes with regret that this is the second occasion on which the President of the Council has exceeded his or her power and used the presidency of the Council to express in an underhand way the point of view of his or her country. In this connection, we refer also to the statement made by the President of the

Council in April 1983, reproduced in the record of the 2430th meeting.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya believes that this behaviour may have adverse consequences for the work of the Council and for its credibility as a neutral organ that merely transmits the decisions of its members.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Rajab A. AZZAROUK  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of  
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
to the United Nations*

**DOCUMENT S/16923**

**Note verbale dated 4 February 1985 from the Mission of Chad  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: French]  
[5 February 1985]*

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Chad to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to transmit to him the White Paper on "Le Terrorisme de Kadhafi au Tchad" (Kadhafi's Terrorism in Chad)<sup>6</sup> for the purposes of publication in accordance with the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad to the President of the Security Council [see 2567th meeting].

**DOCUMENT S/16924**

**Letter dated 22 January 1985 from the representative of Peru  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: Spanish]  
[4 February 1985]*

I have the honour to address you in connection with Security Council resolution 558 (1984), adopted unanimously on 13 December 1984 at the 2564th meeting of the Council.

In strict compliance with the provisions of the above-mentioned resolution, I wish to inform you, on instructions from my Government, that Peru does not carry on any arms trade with South Africa.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Javier ARIAS STELLA  
Permanent Representative of Peru  
to the United Nations*

Letter dated 5 February 1985 from the representative of Nicaragua  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[5 February 1985]

I have the honour to bring to your knowledge the text of the note addressed to Mr. George Shultz, Secretary of State of the United States, by Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, and dated 30 January 1985:

"I am writing to you with reference to the large-scale joint military manoeuvres named 'Big Pine III' which are being carried out from 11 February to 3 May 1985 by the armed forces of the United States and the army of Honduras, with the participation of forces specialized in counter-insurgency, armoured and anti-tank units and combat engineering battalions.

"According to public information, the military manoeuvres will take place in three stages. The first stage will include the movement of the "exercise" joint task force, with its logistical material, to the different areas of operation, which include the southern, western and north-central zones of Honduras. During the second stage, a task force of combat engineers will move to fill the dirt tracks of San Lorenzo and Cocayagua, as well as the anti-tank defence posts situated in the Choluteca valley. Lastly, the counter-insurgency training stage will take place in Yoro province, to the north of Tegucigalpa.

"It is a cause for special concern to the Government of Nicaragua that, in these manoeuvres, in which more than 4,500 United States soldiers will participate, for the first time United States tanks of the type M-68 A-3 and M113 armoured vehicles will be used, which would be moved to within a few kilometres of the frontier between Nicaragua and Honduras.

"These manoeuvres are proof of a foreign military presence in the region of tremendous magnitude and presage an increase in conflicts and tensions in the area, as well as an increase in the pressures on and the illegal armed aggression against Nicaragua directed and financed by the Government of the United States.

"It should be pointed out that these manoeuvres have been used for supplying and providing logistical and military support to the mercenary forces of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, who are daily carrying out terrorist attacks against the Nicaraguan civilian population and the production infrastructure of the country.

"Similarly, I must stress that these manoeuvres are being carried out at the precise moment when the United States Government has systematically blocked the existing machinery for dialogue by suspending indefinitely the bilateral talks at Manzanillo and pressuring Central American Governments to keep up the 'effective blockade' of the Contadora peace negotiations.

"These coincidental facts seem to indicate that your Government has decided to disregard peaceful channels

for the settlement of disputes, openly urging a position of force, as was demonstrated by the refusal of the United States Government to continue participating in the proceedings initiated by Nicaragua before the International Court of Justice and by the request to the United States Congress for new funds for continuation of the illegal war of aggression which has been imposed on us for more than four years, in open violation of international law and the order delivered by the International Court of Justice on 10 May 1984.<sup>7</sup>

"These militant manoeuvres also constitute a direct attack on the Contadora peace negotiations and contradict principles accepted by the Central American States in the Document of Objectives [S/16041 of 13 October 1983, annex], which proscribe any kind of foreign military presence, and a frank rejection of the proposed Contadora Act of 7 September 1984 [S/16775 of 9 October 1984], which proscribes the staging of international military manoeuvres.

"In view of the facts set forth, the Government of Nicaragua registers its most formal and vigorous protest with the Government of the United States at the staging of these military manoeuvres aimed at intimidating and pressurizing Nicaragua, strengthening the interventionist military infrastructure which supports the mercenary forces in the service of the CIA and continuing to maintain the "effective blockade" of support for the peace proposal submitted by the Contadora Group on 7 September 1984, a blockade in which the United States Government expresses pride in the unfortunate National Security Council document dated 30 October 1984.

"The Government of Nicaragua also appeals for reflection and prudence, which would make it possible for the United States to rejoin the community of nations that respect the international legal order and honour the obligations freely undertaken in the Charter of the United Nations and many other international instruments.

"The rejection by the world's major military Power of the international legal order constitutes the greatest threat to international peace and security, inasmuch as it means repudiation of all the norms of civilized coexistence among States and rejection of the means of the peaceful settlement of disputes, the rejection, in short, of the rule of law and the imposition of the rule of force."

I should be grateful if you would have this note circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Julio CAZA GALLARD  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/863-S/16939.

Letter dated 5 February 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea  
to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
{5 February 1985}

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, the text of a communiqué dated 3 February 1985 of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the communiqué circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith  
Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX

Communiqué dated 3 February 1985 of the Council of Ministers  
of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

The fifth meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was held on 3 February 1985 under the high chairmanship of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, with the participation of Mr. Son Sann, Prime Minister of the Coalition Government, and Mr. Khieu Samphan, Vice-President of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of Foreign Affairs.

The Council of Ministers expressed its satisfaction at the favourable development of the situation in Kampuchea in every field: military, political and diplomatic. In particular, the military situation in the current seventh dry season is better than in the last, the sixth dry season. The Vietnamese enemy's military situation has been regularly declining over the past six years. The morale of their troops keeps falling and Viet Nam can no more be the support base of the Vietnamese war of aggression in Kampuchea. As for the resistance forces, they strike at the enemy everywhere inside Kampuchea. In the Torlé Sap area, our forces hit more strongly the Vietnamese enemy along the banks as well as deeper inside Kampuchea, seriously threatening them. If they try only to check our resistance forces inside Kampuchea, they are sure to lose their war of aggression in Kampuchea. That is why they are striving to concentrate their troops and attack us on the western border of Kampuchea for the purpose of checking us as well as propaganda. But their efforts will be of no avail as their concentration of troops on the border leaves inside Kampuchea rather empty, which offers a golden opportunity for our resistance forces to strike deeper and deeper to the east. Moreover, by coming to the border front, the Vietnamese enemy have entered our lines of defence enabling us to inflict heavy casualties upon them.

The Council of Ministers was of the view that the Vietnamese last-ditch military efforts against the three parties of the Coalition Government during the current dry season proved that the Coalition Government was gaining strength militarily as well as wider political influence in Cambodia and abroad. The Council also took note that the current murderous attacks by the enemy against the armed forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and against the civilian population, far from loosening the bonds which unite the three factions of the Coalition together, have contributed to further reinforce these bonds, not only among the three parties but more and more between them and other Khmer patriots everywhere.

The Council of Ministers is therefore determined to further enhance the unity in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with Sam-

dech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea in order to carry on the struggle against the Vietnamese enemy until their total withdrawal from Kampuchea in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

The Council of Ministers then proceeded to examine a wide range of issues and problems confronting the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and agreed to adopt a number of measures which would lead towards increasing the effectiveness and efficiency in all aspects of its struggle against the enemy.

The Council of Ministers once again strongly condemned:

- The Vietnamese manoeuvres to split the tripartite Coalition;
- The most inhumane crimes of genocide perpetrated by the Vietnamese enemy against the people of Kampuchea through their policy of starvation and brutal levy of the population to clear the jungles along their supply lines throughout the country;
- Their cowardly attacks against the civilian camps of refugees along the border with Thailand;
- Their base policy of "Vietnamization" of Kampuchea through the massive influx of Vietnamese settlers with a view to swallowing Kampuchea.

The Council of Ministers once again declared that only with the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces of aggression from Kampuchea in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations adopted by an overwhelming majority for six consecutive years already, can the problem of Kampuchea be solved.

The Council of Ministers also acknowledged with satisfaction the growing support which the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea enjoys from the international community, a vibrant and undeniable testimony of the rightness of its cause.

The Council of Ministers welcomed the declarations made by various Governments condemning the latest crimes perpetrated by the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam against population centres under the administration and care of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. By deciding to attack civilian centres, the Vietnamese aggressors confirmed their nurtured hope to eventually impose a military solution on the Khmer people despite the desire of the international community for a political settlement of the problem of Kampuchea as witnessed by the United Nations resolutions on Kampuchea adopted every year by an ever increasing number of countries. Viet Nam's action also brought to light its insincerity as to its oft-repeated proposition to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Kampuchean problem. It also showed Viet Nam's difficulties in the pursuit of its annexationist ambitions: it is diplomatically isolated, is having serious economic difficulties at home, is plagued with internal political problems, etc. The Council of Ministers therefore called upon the international community to continue to keep up all sorts of pressure on Viet Nam in order to force it to earnestly seek a political solution to the Kampuchean problem.

The Council of Ministers expressed its most sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his part in the common effort to find a peaceful solution to the problem of Kampuchea on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations despite the obstinate refusal of the Vietnamese aggressors to accept them.

The Council of Ministers availed itself of this opportunity to renew its deepest thanks to all independence- and peace-loving countries the world over for granting their support and assistance to the just struggle of the people of Kampuchea against the Vietnamese aggressors under the leadership of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/117-S/16940.

**Letter dated 5 February 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[5 February 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the letter of Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding the failure of the Iraqi régime to respond to your appeal to refrain from using chemical weapons [S/16611 of 11 June 1984].

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Fereydoon DAMAVANDI KAMALI  
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

**LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE  
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

More than ten months have elapsed since the preparation of the report of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the Islamic Republic of Iran [S/16433 of 26 March 1984].

Moreover, seven months have passed since your appeal to the Governments of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran to refrain from using chemical weapons [S/16611].

As you are aware, Iraq continued to use chemical weapons even after the publication of the report of your delegation. This matter was brought to your attention in our letter of 28 June 1984 [S/16652]. While we have never reciprocated the Iraqi resort to such weapons, we promptly responded in the positive to your appeal. And furthermore, despite having suffered tremendous human and property losses as a result of Iraq's inhumane chemical attacks, we gave assurances as to our continued commitment to the Geneva protocol of 1925.<sup>8</sup>

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/118-S/16941.

The Iraqi régime, on the contrary, has paid no heed to your appeal and the officials of this régime have frequently reiterated their determination to re-deploy chemical weapons. Iraq's continued silent attitude clearly indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran is still in danger of being subjected to chemical attacks. Certainly, you can have no doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran has tried, with good intentions, through international forums and by resorting to acceptable international legal procedures, to prevent Iraq from using chemical weapons.

Unfortunately, as you have witnessed, owing to the obstructionist policies of certain countries that prefer the preservation of their imperialist interests to the upholding of international law, such a course is of no avail. Surely, there are more effective ways to stop Iraq from using chemical weapons, but the Islamic Republic of Iran is not yet willing to consider the last resort.

Are there any legal ways and means in international law, through which this goal, in essence an international goal, could be achieved? It is hoped that you will deal with this matter in earnest and furnish us with a reply. There is no doubt that were the reply not to guarantee a practical option, it would be considered as negative. Such a reply would only mean that not only the Islamic Republic of Iran but the international community, as a whole, is entirely defenceless against the violations of Geneva Protocol of 1925, thus leaving the responsibility for the prevention of chemical attacks with individual States. I am sure that the catastrophic consequences of such a situation are thoroughly clear to you and the members of the international community.

*(Signed)* Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Islamic Republic of Iran

## DOCUMENT S/16942

**Letter dated 5 February 1985 from the representative of France to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English/French]  
[5 February 1985]

I took cognizance of the letter dated 1 February 1985 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representative of the Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [S/16922].

As that letter referred to the position which I adopted at the 2567th meeting as President of the Security Council on the representation of Chad, I requested the Secretariat to inform me of its legal opinion on that question, and it transmitted that opinion to me by the attached note from the Office of Legal Affairs, dated 4 February 1985.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Claude de KÉMOULARIA  
Permanent Representative of France  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX

**Note dated 4 February 1985 by the Office of Legal Affairs  
regarding the representation of Chad in the United Nations**

1. On 12 October 1984, the Credentials Committee of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly submitted its first report<sup>9</sup> to the Assembly. Among the credentials which were covered in that report were those of the delegation of Chad. These credentials were signed by Hissein Habré, President of the Republic of Chad, Chief of State, and they named as head of delegation Mr. Gouara-Lassou, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation.

2. The report of the Credentials Committee reveals that no member of the Committee raised any question whatsoever regarding the credentials of Chad, and that the Committee adopted without a vote a resolution accepting all the credentials then before it, including those of Chad.

3. The first report of the Credentials Committee was taken up by the General Assembly at its 32nd plenary meeting, on 17 October 1984. On that occasion, a number of delegations (including that of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) placed on record their reservations concerning certain creden-

tials approved in the report of the Committee, but none of these delegations entered any reservation whatsoever concerning the credentials of the delegation of Chad or the legitimacy of the Government which had issued those credentials.

4. It follows from the foregoing that at its current, thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly has accepted, without any dissent, credentials for Chad signed by President Hissain Habré and appointing, as head of delegation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Mr. Gouara-Lassou. The Assembly has therefore recognized the right of the Government concerned to represent Chad in the United Nations at the present time.

5. In the light of the foregoing, and in view of the letter of 1 February 1985 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the President of the Security Council, attention is drawn to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950, regarding "Recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State", which reads as follows:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Considering that difficulties may arise regarding the representation of a Member State in the United Nations and that there is a risk that conflicting decisions may be reached by its various organs,*

*"Considering that it is in the interest of the proper functioning of the Organization that there should be uniformity in the procedure applicable whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations.*

## DOCUMENT S/16943\*

### Letter dated 5 February 1985 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English/French)  
[7 February 1985]*

As Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish to bring to your attention yet another instance of intensification of the planned policy of annexation of the occupied territories of the West Bank by the Government of Israel.

According to reports in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* of 20 December 1984, a plan for the establishment of a national road grid for the entire area of the occupied West Bank was promulgated recently by the occupying authorities.

A recent study prepared by Law in the Service of Man, a West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists, a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, provides a thorough analysis of the project and is enclosed for your information.

According to the study, the scheme, designated "Road Plan 50", provides for 555 kilometres of new roads in the West Bank that will create an east-west grid (in contrast to the existing north-south grid) and will thus greatly increase integration of the West Bank road system into that of Israel.

It is estimated that the construction of these new roads will entail the seizure of 78,000 dunums (one dunum = approximately 1,000 square metres) of private Palestinian land by the military authorities and that large areas of cultivated land, as well as refugee camps, will be bulldozed. The plan will also entail the destruction of various buildings

*"Considering that, in virtue of its composition, the General Assembly is the organ of the United Nations in which consideration can best be given to the views of all Member States in matters affecting the functioning of the Organization as a whole,*

*"1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case;*

*"2. Recommends that, when any such question arises, it should be considered by the General Assembly, or by the Interim Committee if the General Assembly is not in session;*

*"3. Recommends that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies;*

*"4. Declares that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question shall not of itself affect the direct relations of individual Member States with the State concerned;*

*"5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the other organs of the United Nations and to the specialized agencies for such action as may be appropriate."*

and facilities (irrigation and other projects, private houses, schools and factories).

The study recalls that, beginning in 1970, the Israeli Government had already expropriated thousands of dunums of land in the occupied territories for the construction of east-west roads with Israel.

The study mentions that the plan was the subject of judicial review before the Israeli High Court of Justice, which, under the present system imposed on the West Bank, is the court of last resort for appeals against the activities of the military authorities. The Court rejected the appeal, expressing the opinion that the plan is in the interest of the local population.

However, the study points out that the proposed system will serve none of the 20 major Palestinian towns and cities in the West Bank, but will skirt around them, cutting them off from municipal land earmarked for development or from land now in agricultural use on which the towns are dependent. In no case have any of the inhabitants of the land through which the proposed roads will pass been consulted about this scheme.

The study concludes that the plan must therefore be seen as the most significant step of recent times towards Israel's eventual annexation of the West Bank as well as a direct physical threat to the lands, communities and livelihood of the Palestinian population, thus serving the purpose of encouraging their emigration. The conclusion of the study calls for a request to be addressed to the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion that the new plan is in violation of international law.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/119-S/16943.

On behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish, in the light of the above, to express the utmost concern at this new step taken by the Government of Israel towards annexation of the West Bank, which in the Committee's view is yet another grave violation of Palestinian rights, with ominous implications for the future of the occupied territories and for international efforts to facilitate a peaceful solution of the question.

May I recall once again that both the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly condemned measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories. The Security Council in particular,

by resolution 465 (1980), has declared that such measures have no legal validity and are in flagrant violation of the fourth Geneva Convention<sup>10</sup>, as well as constituting a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and has called on Israel to rescind them.

In conclusion, I would like to request that this letter, together with the enclosed study,<sup>6</sup> be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Massamba SARRÉ  
Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights  
of the Palestinian People

#### DOCUMENT S/16944\*

#### Letter dated 7 February 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[7 February 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan lodged a protest with the Government of the People's Republic of China on 31 January 1985. The text of the protest note is as follows:

"In recent months, the armed and security forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have seized a large quantity of Chinese-made weapons, including ground-to-air rockets and rocket launchers, reactive rockets, mines, light machine-guns, high calibre anti-aircraft artillery and assorted arms and ammunition, during the defeating of counter-revolutionary bands in the suburbs of Kabul City.

"The facts show that these weapons have been used every time against the civilians, including the citizens of Kabul, and the result has been the killing of the civilians and destruction of economic and cultural projects.

"According to the available information, some of the counter-revolutionary camps have been transferred from the territory of Pakistan to the People's Republic of China. In these camps, Chinese instructors train the Afghan counter-revolutionaries in the use of arms provided by the Chinese authorities, as well as teach them how to carry out terrorist operations.

"In addition, Chinese advisors and instructors are working in the Afghan counter-revolutionary camps located on the soil of Pakistan. The mass media of the People's Republic of China have launched an extensive and hostile propaganda campaign against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Its objective is to distort the facts inside the country and around it, as well as to discredit the internationalist fraternal assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to the people of Afghanistan in their

struggle with the enemies of revolution and the motherland.

"All these facts provide ample proof of the increase in the direct intervention of the People's Republic of China in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign country and its active contribution to the undeclared war unleashed by world imperialism and reactionary forces acting against Afghanistan.

"In reality, there exists direct co-operation in the expansion of military aggression against Afghanistan from the soil of Pakistan between China and the United States and their Western allies, Pakistan and the reaction of the region. Such acts of the Chinese authorities are naturally contrary to their claims that China is desirous of a political solution of the situation around Afghanistan. It also causes difficulty in the work of seeking ways for a peaceful solution of the situation between Afghanistan and its neighbours.

"These acts evoke the indignation and hatred of the people of Afghanistan, who have become the victims of armed intervention from abroad.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan lodges a severe protest with the Chinese side as to the hostile Chinese actions and demands that the People's Republic of China stop its armed aggression and other forms of intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which are against the international principles and the existing norms of diplomatic relations between the two countries."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/120-S/16944.

DOCUMENT S/16945\*

Letter dated 31 January 1985 from the representative of Italy  
to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English/French)*  
[8 February 1985]

On behalf of the 10 States members of the European Community, the Presidency of which is currently held by Italy, I have the honour to send you herewith the text of the declaration of Viet Nam's offensive in Kampuchea and incursions into Thailand, adopted at the meeting on European Political Co-operation held at Rome on 23 January 1985.

I should be grateful if you would have this Declaration circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Maurizio BUCCI*  
*Permanent Representative of Italy*  
*to the United Nations*

ANNEX

**Declaration of the 10 States members of the European Community on Viet Nam's offensive in Kampuchea and incursions into Thailand, adopted on 23 January 1985**

The 10 States members of the European Community are following with

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/122-S/16945.

very great concern the latest developments in the situation in the border area between Thailand and Kampuchea. They condemn the serious violations of human rights and of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations that are occurring as a result of the increasingly intensive attacks made by Vietnamese troops on refugee camps in this area. The Ten also condemn the violations of Thailand's territorial sovereignty committed by Vietnamese troops during the course of their operations.

The development could lead to an extension of the conflict, which might further aggravate the tensions existing in South-East Asia. In the circumstances, the Ten once again stress the urgent need for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean crisis, which still remains unresolved more than six years after its inception. While confirming the contents of the statement issued by the fifth meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community and the Association of South-East Asian Nations, held at Dublin on 15 and 16 November 1984, the Ten make a further appeal to the Vietnamese Government to call a halt to the military activities on the border between Thailand and Kampuchea and to seek a political settlement of the crisis in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions—adopted by an overwhelming majority of the members of the international community—which call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea and the restoration of the right of the Khmer people to self-determination.

DOCUMENT S/16946\*

Letter dated 7 February 1985 from the representative of Qatar  
to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)*  
[8 February 1985]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States in the United Nations for the current month, I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter of Mr. Riyad Mansour, Deputy Permanent Observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations, dated 6 February 1985, concerning the recent transgressions of the Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the circulation of this letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Hamad Abdelaziz AL-KAWARI*  
*Permanent Representative of Qatar*  
*to the United Nations*

ANNEX

**Letter dated 6 February 1985 from the observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Secretary-General**

I am instructed by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/123-S/16946.

of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), to bring to your most urgent attention the following.

Yesterday, 5 February 1985, Israeli occupation troops opened fire on Palestinians near the Burj Ash-Shamali refugee camp, wounding several Palestinian refugees, including women and children. Israeli occupation troops then proceeded to surround the camp, seal it off, cut off the electricity, and impose a curfew. Shortly thereafter, Israeli occupation troops stormed the camp and carried out mass arrests of Palestinian refugees.

Today, 6 February at 7.15 a.m., Israeli occupation troops, in an armoured vehicle passing through the Tyre area with an Israeli military convoy, opened fire on civilians, hitting a passenger car and seriously wounding the six Palestinians inside.

The situation in and around the Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon is extremely tense, and there is mounting anxiety among the Palestinians that Israel and her mercenaries in the area are on the verge of a new wave of massacres with the aim of liquidating, or terrifying into flight, the remaining Palestinian civilian population in the south, and cowering into submission their Lebanese neighbours.

The PLO insists that the United Nations do everything in its power to provide all the necessary measures to guarantee the safety and security of our people in Lebanon.

DOCUMENT S/16947

Note verbale dated 6 February 1985 from the representative of China  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese/English]  
[8 February 1985]

The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note of 21 December 1984, has the honour to reply as follows:

The Government of the People's Republic of China has consistently condemned the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination pursued by the South African authorities, resolutely supported the South African people in their just struggle for basic human rights and racial equality, and refused to have any political, economic, military or cultural relations with the South African authorities.

The Chinese Government has always been firm in implementing the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the question of South Africa. As a member of the Council, China voted in favour of resolution 558 (1984). The Chinese Government will strictly abide by and carry out the provisions contained in the said resolution, never import arms, ammunition or military vehicles of any type manufactured in South Africa and continue to implement strictly all the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) on the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

It would be much appreciated if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/16948

Letter dated 8 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[10 February 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose the text of a statement by the official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq in response to the allegations made by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a speech he delivered today, 8 February 1985, that Iraq had again started shelling Iranian cities, and his threat to shell the city of Basra and other Iraqi cities.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter and the annex thereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement made on 8 February 1985 by the spokesman of the  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq

President Khomeini, head of the Iranian régime, alleged, in a speech he delivered today, that Iraq had again started shelling Iranian cities. He threatened to shell the city of Basra and other Iraqi cities.

It is well known that already in 1983, Iraq suggested the signing of an agreement between the two sides to avoid the shelling of purely residential centres, and it has reaffirmed this suggestion on many occasions.

It has been the Iranian side that has refused to sign such an agreement and has persisted in its aggression on Iraqi cities and their peaceful inhabitants.

Under the pressure of strong Iraqi punitive blows and the pressure of the Iranian peoples who are suffering under the aggressive policies of this criminal régime, the Iranian régime had to accept the proposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to conclude an agreement whereby the shelling of civilian centres would be avoided, under the supervision of representatives of the United Nations Secretariat. This agreement has been in force since 12 June 1984. It was also agreed, through the United Nations Secretariat, to delimit the areas to which this agreement applied and to determine how to detect any breaches of it.

Iraq took the initiative in this agreement, and in accordance with its principles and firm approach in calling for a comprehensive peace, in respecting international charters and in keeping to its pledges, wholeheartedly bided by this agreement, while the Iranian régime continued to violate it. Iraq therefore rejects the allegations of the President of the Iranian régime and confirms that it did not, and it will not, resort to shelling civilian centres, except in order to retaliate. The allegations of the head of the Iranian régime are a clear indication of the severe dilemma in which this criminal régime finds itself, having insisted for years and years on war and aggression, and gaining only defeat and failure.

After the Iranian régime's painful defeat on the battlefield and its inability effectively to provide aerial protection for its armies positioned near our borders for the purposes of aggression but bombarded by our heroic air force: in the face of great pressure from the Iranian peoples who want peace; as a result of the severe isolation of this régime at the regional as well as international levels because of its insistence on continuing with this war and its threat to the security and stability of the region: for all these reasons the Iranian régime is trying to get out of its dilemma and cover its defeat and failure by telling these outright lies and committing more crimes against the peoples of Iraq and of Iran.

We strongly and emphatically warn the Iranian régime that we will respond twice as violently against those who want to harm our towns and our people.

In spite of our supremacy in land, air, naval and rocket forces, we have accepted the initiative of the Secretary-General and have avoided the shelling of civilian areas as an expression of our desire for peace and our approach to it.

But if the Iranian régime wants to try its bad luck once more and to

continue shelling Iraqi cities and their peaceful inhabitants, we shall, with the help of God, direct destructive strikes against it. We bring this to the attention of the Iranian people, world public opinion and the United Nations Secretariat.

He who warns is not to be blamed.

## DOCUMENT S/16949

### Letter dated 9 February 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

*[Original: English]  
[10 February 1985]*

Pursuant to my letter of 24 January 1985 [S/16907], I have the honour to transmit to you the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, regarding the Iraqi régime's violations of the agreement of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610].

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Fereydoon DAMAVANDI KAMALI  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission  
of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

#### LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Pursuant to my letter of 24 January 1985 [S/16907], once again I would like to draw your attention to the repeated and continuous violations of the undertaking of 12 June 1984 by the aggressive Iraqi régime.

I am sure that you are aware of the utter disregard of the Iraqi régime for all humanitarian values and international laws, and even its own undertaking and commitments.

Resort to unsubstantiated claims against the Islamic Republic of Iran mentioned in documents S/16750 and S/16920, in addition to manipulation of the United Nations inspection team in Baghdad, cannot but be considered as an excuse for the full-fledged violation of the 12 June undertaking, which is no doubt a significant and valuable achievement on your part.

The recent Iraqi threats as to bombardment of seven Iranian cities are therefore not coincidental. Iraqi air attacks on the civilian and residential areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 3 and 5 February 1985 clearly point to its determination to materialize such threats.

You are aware that, as in the past, there are practical and effective ways to put an end to inhuman Iraqi attacks on the civilian and residential areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is still hopeful that resort to final options could be avoided.

*(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Islamic Republic of Iran*

## DOCUMENT S/16950

### Note verbale dated 7 February 1985 from the Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Secretary-General

*[Original: Russian]  
[11 February 1985]*

The Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in reply to his note dated 21 December 1984, has the honour to state the following.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic supports all decisions of the Security Council concerning action to combat the criminal *apartheid* policy pursued by the racist régime in South Africa.

South Africa's disregard of United Nations decisions, its illegal occupation of Namibia, its ceaseless acts of aggression, its State terrorism and threats against independent African States, the continual buildup of its military capacity and its plans to produce nuclear weapons constitute a direct threat to international peace and security. In view of the seriousness of this threat, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic supports the request that the Security Council

adopt all the necessary measures against the *apartheid* régime, including comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic voted in favour of Security Council resolution 558 (1984), which supplemented the Council's earlier decisions regarding the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has strictly implemented the provisions of that resolution, as it has previous relevant decisions of the Council, and maintains no relations with South Africa in the political, economic, military or any other fields.

The Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations requests that this note be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/16951\***

**Letter dated 7 February 1985 from the representative of Pakistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[11 February 1985]*

Further to my letter dated 29 January 1985 [S/16915], I have the honour to report to you a serious violation of Pakistan's airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side that occurred on 5 February. On that date, four Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace in the Arandu area and fired 20 rockets two kilometres south-east of Arandu.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

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\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/124-S/16951.

**DOCUMENT S/16952\***

**Letter dated 12 February 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[12 February 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 2.00 p.m. on 9 February 1985 and the following was brought to his attention by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"The Pakistani authorities have recently once again claimed that the aircraft of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan allegedly conducted raids on the south-east areas of Arandu on 23 January and 5 February 1985. The pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, after investigating these charges have categorically rejected them as totally malicious and void of reality, and have pointed out that the Pakistani authorities had better forgo the levelling of such groundless accusations, which have no other purpose but to conceal the overt and repeated aggressions and interferences of that country in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and put an end to their hostile propaganda and provocations which result in further tension in the situation along the frontiers of the two countries."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations*

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\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/126-S/16952.

DOCUMENT S/16953

**Letter dated 12 February 1985 from the representative of Lebanon  
to the Secretary-General**

*{Original: Arabic/English}  
[12 February 1985]*

Further to our letters concerning Israel's practices in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, and on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

On the morning of 12 February 1985, the Israeli army attacked the village of Toura, one of the seven villages in the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and surrounded it with more than 90 tanks and military vehicles. We fear that a massacre could take place in Toura in view of the heavy firing that is being heard from outside the village. The Israeli army has prevented the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from entering the village, and is still preventing all citizens from leaving it.

While drawing the attention to the gravity of the Israeli practices in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, the Lebanese Government considers it necessary to intervene quickly, in order to have the siege of Toura lifted, and allow the ICRC delegates to enter the village immediately, and in order to stop such abusive Israeli practices.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Rachid FAKHOURY  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/16954\*

**Letter dated 12 February 1985 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the  
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General**

*{Original: English/French}  
[13 February 1985]*

I wish once again to bring to your most urgent attention the grave situation and growing tension in and around the Palestinian refugee camps, both in southern Lebanon and in the occupied West Bank.

The latest reports which have reached the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People indicate that a number of extremely serious incidents have taken place in recent days. In southern Lebanon, on 5 February 1985, Israeli occupation troops opened fire on Palestinians near the Burj Ash-Shamali refugee camp in the Tyre area, wounding several refugees, including women and children. The camp was subsequently surrounded, sealed off and stormed by the troops, which carried out mass arrests of Palestinian refugees.

The following day, Israeli troops opened fire on civilians, also in the Tyre area, hitting a passenger car and seriously wounding the six Palestinians inside.

A very grave situation has also been reported from refugee camps in the West Bank. In Dheisheh, near Bethlehem, all roads into the camp have been blocked by stacks of cement-filled barrels topped by sharp iron bars and coils of barbed wire. Only one narrow pedestrian entrance remains open,

affecting the provision of services to the camp and aggravating the atmosphere of living under siege caused by the almost daily incidents of provocation and harassment against the camp residents by the Israeli settlers. On 1 February, the police, reinforced by military troops, arrested scores of residents in the camp and villages in the vicinity.

In the past few days, Israeli planes have also repeatedly attacked Palestinians in southern Lebanon, causing casualties among the civilian population.

In the light of the above, I wish to express the utmost concern of the Committee with regard to the mounting tension in the refugee camps in southern Lebanon and the West Bank, which arises from the continued illegal occupation by Israel and the absence of a just and comprehensive solution to the question of Palestine.

The Committee has on several occasions in the past expressed its belief that tension and violence will continue to prevail in the area, increasingly endangering international peace and security, as long as the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people remain unattained. These latest incidents provide clear but tragic confirmation of this belief.

I wish therefore to reiterate the Committee's conviction that, at this critical juncture, a concentrated international effort to find a just solution to the question of Palestine and

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/28-S/16954.

to end the unacceptable plight of the Palestinian people must be given to a new momentum. To this end, the Committee attaches the utmost importance to the early convening of the proposed international peace conference on the Middle East.

In conclusion, I wish to request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Massamba SARRÉ  
Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights  
of the Palestinian People*

#### DOCUMENT S/16955\*

#### Letter dated 14 February 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)  
[14 February 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 11.30 a.m. on 13 February 1985 and the following was brought to his attention by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"According to the information provided by the pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the armed and irresponsible aggressions of the Pakistani forces stationed in the vicinity of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan against the residential areas of Barikot district of Kunarha province, Bangash area and Chamkani district of Paktia province are still continuing. As a result of these attacks and aggressions, which are conducted by various kinds of weapons such as reactive rockets, recoilless guns, mortars and heavy machine-guns, a large number of the local population and other residents of those areas, including women and children, have been martyred and enormous material losses were inflicted.

"Such raids have particularly escalated during the last month. For instance, on 7 February 1985, an Afghan helicopter, which was transporting food items to the residents of Barikot, was fired on. Also, around 200 reactive

ammunitions were fired at residential areas of Bangash on 5, 7 and 8 February 1985. According to undeniable evidence, the Pakistani militia directly participated and collaborated in the recent attacks on Chamkani and Bangash garrisons.

"The pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan strongly condemn the repeated and constant aggressions of the Pakistani military forces, the ever-increasing arming and infiltrating of bandits into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for murder and destruction, and the direct collaboration of the Pakistani militia with the bands of murderers and plunderers, and seriously protest to the Government of Pakistan over such actions. They further point out that the Pakistani authorities must immediately cease their armed aggressions and interferences which have endangered the security in the frontiers; otherwise, the grave and heavy consequences of them shall be borne by the military authorities of Pakistan."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/129-S/16955.

#### DOCUMENT S/16956\*

#### Letter dated 14 February 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)  
[15 February 1985]*

As you are no doubt aware, the Baathist régime of Iraq once again attacked the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 12 February 1985, causing both human and material losses.

In this connection the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mr. Reza Amrollahi, dispatched a letter to Vienna, addressed to Mr. Hans Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the

text of which I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information and the exercise of your good offices.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A.39.865-S/16956.

## ANNEX

### Letter from the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

At 1900 hours on 12 February 1985 once again the Baathist enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrated their complete disrespect for all internationally accepted codes of conduct by attacking the site of Bushehr nuclear power plant with two missiles which caused the martyrdom of one of its personnel, and also causing significant material losses.

Considering that on the occasion of the complaint of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concerning the previous missile attack of the Baathist régime of Iraq on the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant on 24 March 1984 the representative of the said régime had denied the occurrence of any attack in a letter dated 10 May 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to IAEA on the grounds that: "... a seemingly important event was left unannounced from March 24 until April 12 1984."

Considering that again in the course of the last General Conference, during which you were also present, the Permanent Representative of Iraq to IAEA blatantly denied, once again, the missile attack of 24 March 1984

in spite of all the evidence presented by the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran to IAEA.

Therefore, now that the missile attack has been repeated, we feel obliged to notify you of the attack immediately so that no objections as to the untimely notification can be raised. Furthermore, I would like to state the following:

1. This time, unlike the last, we request that your representative(s) should be allowed to inspect the site of the latest attack as soon as possible and preferably within one week following the receipt of this notification, in order to verify the human and material losses;
2. The body of our martyred brother is currently being preserved at the site of the hospital for any post-martyrdom examinations;
3. With respect to article 56 of the 1977 Protocol I<sup>11</sup> additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and considering the resolution GC (XXVII) RES/407 of the General Conference, we request the implementation of appropriate measures against the repeated aggressions of the Baathist régime of Iraq.

We kindly request your personal attention to the above, the negligence of which matter will seriously undermine all the principles for which IAEA stands.

## DOCUMENT S/16957

### Note verbale dated 13 February 1985 from the Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]  
[15 February 1985]

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in connection with his note of 7 November 1984 concerning steps taken by States to combat *apartheid*, has the honour to communicate the following.

The Soviet Union resolutely condemns the inhuman policy and practice of *apartheid* carried out by the racist régime of South Africa against the majority of that country's population, and maintains no relations with South Africa in the political, economic, military or other spheres.

Consistently following its fundamental foreign-policy line for the complete and final elimination of all forms and manifestations of colonialism and racism, the Soviet Union supported Security Council resolution 556 (1984) and other decisions by the Council which state that the *apartheid* policy pursued by the Pretoria régime is a crime against humanity, is contrary to human rights, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and constitutes a violation of international peace and security.

In accordance with this Security Council resolution and with resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, the Soviet Union condemns and rejects the political manoeuvring of the racist South African régime over the "new constitution", which has been declared null and void by the General Assembly.

The Soviet Union also condemns the course of the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization towards the expansion of military and political support for the racist régime, as well as the United States policy of "constructive engagement" with the Pretoria authorities and its attempts to remove the South African régime from a position of political isolation.

Bearing in mind that South Africa is continuing a policy of *apartheid*, aggression, destabilization and State terrorism against independent sovereign States of southern Africa, and is also building up its military potential and seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union supports the demand of the African countries for the Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Soviet Union has provided and continues to provide all-round support to the national liberation movements in southern Africa.

The Soviet Union considers that it is the duty of the United Nations to promote in every way the implementation of the decisions taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the policy and practice of *apartheid* in South Africa and to work towards their complete elimination at the earliest possible date.

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations requests that this note be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/16958\*

Letter dated 15 February 1985 from the representative of the German Democratic Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[15 February 1985]

I have the honour to request you to circulate the enclosed message dated 7 February 1985 addressed by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, to Mr. Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, Mr. Andreas Papandreu, Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Mr. Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico, Mr. Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden, and Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dietmar HUCKE  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of  
the German Democratic Republic  
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Message dated 7 February 1985 addressed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, to the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania

With great attention and sympathy I have taken note of the Delhi Declaration [S/16921, annex]. I share your view that the future of all peoples

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/130-S/16958.

is at stake and that it is now imperative to overcome the many obstacles which lie in the path of peace. Let me assure you that the German Democratic Republic will support the concern of the Delhi Declaration.

I strongly reaffirm that outer space must be kept free of any type of weapon. Equally important would be the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the cessation of the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Today, international peace and security can be ensured only through the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems.

It is my deep conviction that it is not only imperative but also feasible to remove the threat of nuclear war. This requires that all those concerned for peace join in efforts and unite their strength for safeguarding it, for this is the key task of our time.

Like you, I welcome the start of new negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which should encompass the entire complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range. I trust that these negotiations will help rid the world of nuclear weapons.

You may rest assured that the people and Government of the German Democratic Republic are working steadfastly for peace the world over. This is a constitutional mandate to which we have been committed since the German Democratic Republic's foundation. This year, the peoples of the world will observe the fortieth anniversary of the victory over Hitler fascism. The German Democratic Republic will solemnly commemorate the occasion as Liberation Day.

The Delhi Declaration is a bold and inspiring move towards a worldwide coalition of common sense and realism for peace.

DOCUMENT S/16959\*

Letter dated 15 February 1985 from the representative of Honduras to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[15 February 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the joint communiqué signed by the Ministers for External Relations of Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica on 14 February 1985 at San José, Costa Rica.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the annex thereto, the content of which has already been transmitted to the Organization of American States, circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hernán Antonio BERMUDEZ  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Honduras  
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Joint communiqué issued on 14 February 1985 by the Ministers for External Relations of Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica

On 13 and 14 February 1985, the Ministers for External Relations of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, meeting at San José, at the invitation of the Costa Rican Minister for External Relations, to make a comprehensive analysis of the situation in Central America at the present time, agreed to issue the following communiqué:

1. They pointed out that the decision of the Governments of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica not to participate in the meeting convened by the Contadora Group, which was to have taken place on 14 and 15 February at Panama City, is due to the support by the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras of the position adopted by the Government of Costa Rica in legitimate defence of the right of asylum, a basic institution of American international law, which was violated by the Government of Nicaragua, and to the fact that a meeting could not be held in the absence of one or more Central American countries.

2. They expressed regret concerning the circumstances which had compelled the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela to postpone that meeting.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/866-S/16959.

3. They expressed deep concern about the attitude of the Government of Nicaragua in having violated the right of asylum of young José Manuel Urbina Lara and in having failed to comply with the requests of the Government of Costa Rica, the Organization of American States and the Contadora Group itself to solve the problem which Nicaragua had created.

4. They reiterated the firm support of their Governments for the peace process undertaken by the Contadora Group and the praiseworthy efforts which it had been making to that end since January 1983, and reaffirmed the decision of their Governments to continue working towards a peaceful solution to the Central American crisis.

5. They declared that, together with the talks held by the Advisory Group of the three participant Governments, working meetings had been held, and would continue to be held for another day, in order to produce a document on international verification and control machinery for the eventual commitments, thus reaffirming the willingness of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica to contribute positively to the negotiation process, since it is the final responsibility of the Central American countries themselves to agree upon, endorse and comply with the compromise formulas which will ensure a stable and lasting peace in the region. The advances

made during this meeting will shortly be submitted to the Contadora Group for consideration and appropriate analysis.

6. They appealed to the Government of Nicaragua to find a satisfactory solution, as soon as possible, in the case of the asylee Urbina Lara.

The Ministers for External Relations of El Salvador and Honduras thanked the Minister for External Relations of Costa Rica for the courtesies extended to them during their stay at San José.

Issued at the Casa Amarilla at 6 p.m. on 14 February 1985.

(Signed) Edgardo PAZ BARNICA  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Honduras

(Signed) José Eduardo TENORIO  
Minister for External Relations  
of El Salvador

(Signed) Carlos José GUTIÉRREZ  
Minister for External Relations  
of Costa Rica

#### DOCUMENT S/16960\*

#### Letter dated 15 February 1985 from the representative of Thailand to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[15 February 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 9 January 1985 [S/16888], I have the honour to bring to your attention a review of recent acts of aggression perpetrated by the Vietnamese forces in violation of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Thailand, as follows:

In early February 1985, despite numerous appeals for respect of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Thailand issued earlier by a number of countries including an appeal by you, Viet Nam has remained adamant and the Vietnamese troops have made incursions into Thai territory at five different points along the Thai-Kampuchean border, namely Bok Pass and An Mah Pass in Ubon Ratchathaw province, Pra Palai Pass in Si Saket province, Obok Pass in Buriram province and Khao Din in Prachinburi province.

Furthermore, in Trat province Thai troops clashed with Vietnamese troops in several incidents in which one Thai soldier was killed and four others were seriously wounded. Vietnamese troops also attacked a Thai military base at Obok Pass, causing the death of one Thai soldier.

The Vietnamese military actions along the Thai-Kampuchean border have further exacerbated the hardship and the misery not only of the Kampuchean civilians who have been victims of their fierce and ruthless attacks, but also of the Thai villagers living along the border. At least 30 shells fired by Vietnamese 122- and 130-mm guns landed in Wattana Nakorn district of Prachinburi province causing

two deaths and wounding one Thai villager. About 160 Thai villagers had subsequently to be evacuated from the area. Another 16 shells from Vietnamese guns destroyed two houses and a large number of livestock in Aranyaprathet district of Prachinburi province.

The Vietnamese military offensive against Dang Rek civilian encampment during your official visit to Thailand has driven more than 17,000 Kampuchean civilians and 4,000 Vietnamese civilians into Thailand. Furthermore, heavy fighting, which is still continuing at present, has so far forced more than 16,000 Kampuchean civilians to be evacuated to the Thai provinces of Trat and Prachinburi.

The Royal Thai Government demands that Viet Nam immediately cease its illegal and hostile actions against Thailand, which have exacerbated the hardship to both innocent Thai and Kampuchean people as well as increased tensions in the region. By ignoring the international appeals and intensifying its brutal military aggression against the Kampuchean people and Thailand, Viet Nam has clearly revealed its desire to continue to pursue a military solution in Kampuchea. Such actions clearly undermine any attempt to initiate a meaningful dialogue for a peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Birabongse KASEMSRI  
Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16961\*

#### Letter dated 15 February 1985 from the representative of Nicaragua to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[15 February 1985]

I have the honour to write to you for the purpose of conveying to you the text of an official communiqué issued

by the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua in connection with the suspension of the meeting of the Contadora

Group scheduled for 14 and 15 February 1985.

“The Government of Nicaragua hereby announces to its people and the international community that the Contadora negotiating process, sponsored by the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela for the noble purpose of achieving peace and security for the Central American countries through solemn international commitments and the strictest compliance with the principles of non-intervention, self-determination of peoples and refraining from the threat or use of force in relations between States, is at present seriously jeopardized by the irresponsible and militaristic policy of the Government of the United States, which, rejecting dialogue and negotiation, is attempting to impose its will through military force.

“The world as a whole has had an opportunity to observe throughout the difficult and protracted Contadora process the attitude of Nicaragua and the positive contributions made by the Nicaraguan Government in order to strengthen that process and ensure its successful conclusion.

“As soon as the Contadora Declaration of 9 January 1983,<sup>12</sup> by which the Contadora Group was constituted, had been issued, Nicaragua offered the Group its unqualified support and requested the representatives of the 88 countries assembled in Managua on the occasion of the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting concerning Latin America and the Caribbean of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to back that Declaration. Such backing manifested itself in the historic final communiqué [S/15628 of 1 March 1983] of the meeting, which provided the Contadora process with unprecedented international support barely five days after the Declaration had been issued.

“In that same year, Nicaragua, as part of its consistent endeavour to strengthen the peace initiative of the Contadora Group, introduced a draft resolution [S/15770] in the Security Council on 18 May 1983. That effort resulted in resolution 530 (1983), in which the Security Council:

“ ‘1. *Reaffirms* the right of Nicaragua and of all the other countries of the area to live in peace and security, free from outside interference;

“ ‘2. *Commends* the efforts of the Contadora Group and urges the pursuit of those efforts;

“ ‘3. *Appeals urgently* to the interested States to co-operate fully with the Contadora Group, through a frank and constructive dialogue, so as to resolve their differences;

“ ‘4. *Urges* the Contadora Group to spare no effort to find solutions to the problems of the region and to keep the Security Council informed of the results of these efforts;

“ ‘5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of the development of the situation and of the implementation of the present resolution.’

“Consistent with its desire for peace, its demonstrated support for the Contadora process and its compliance with Security Council resolution 530 (1983), Nicaragua has made every effort to ensure that the Contadora Group

will achieve the objective sought, in all justice, by the Nicaraguan people, the Central American peoples and the international community as a whole. Accordingly, on 15 October 1983, Nicaragua formally submitted to the Contadora Group its proposal for a legal basis for guaranteeing the peace and security of the States of Central America, which consisted of four draft agreements based on the fundamental principles enshrined in international law which must regulate relations between States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in the spirit of the Document of Objectives [S/16041 of 13 October 1983, annex] of the Fourth Joint Meeting of Ministers for External Relations of the Contadora Group and of the Central American countries. Subsequently, at the Joint Meeting of Ministers for External Relations of the Contadora Group and of the Central American countries, held in Washington on 14 November 1983, the Ministers for External Relations of the Contadora Group stated that they were having difficulty in making headway because, despite the Group's repeated requests for suggestions from all the Central American Ministries of External Relations concerning ways of putting into effect what had been agreed in the Document of Objectives through compromises, only Nicaragua had submitted proposals, and it was difficult for the Group to reconcile the positions of five countries when only one of the countries was making proposals and the other four were remaining silent. In the light of those exigencies, the Central American countries decided to set 1 December as the deadline for the submission of specific and detailed proposals. Despite this decision, Nicaragua was again the only country to fulfil its obligations and it submitted proposals which supplemented those made on 15 October, thereby covering the whole of the Document of Objectives. A perusal of all those documents will reveal to the entire world how serious Nicaragua is.

“Because of the lack of performance and co-operation in the Contadora endeavour on the part of other Central American countries, the Contadora Group proposed a new working method which, to quote the words of the Ministers for External Relations of the Contadora Group, after what they called ‘an intense process of consultations and a broad exchange of views with all the Central American Governments’, culminated on 7 September 1984 in the submission of a new version of the Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America. That document, according to the Contadora Group itself, reflects ‘the observations and comments which the five Central American Governments have put forward concerning the draft Act’ [see S/16742, annex I]. Accordingly, at the meeting on 6 and 7 September last year, the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group said that the work of the Commissions and the Technical Group was considered to be concluded, and it stated in the letter of transmittal of the Act that

“ ‘The Central American Governments should now display the political will needed to give legal force to the commitments formulated during this process . . . , and that

“ ‘The signing of the Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America should provide the basis for security and coexistence governed by mutual respect which is essential for guaranteeing the political and economic stability so desired by the peoples of the area’ [ibid.].

\* Circulated also as a document of the General Assembly under the symbol A/39/868 of 19 February 1985.

"In the same letter of transmittal, the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group declared: 'In the light of the persistent threat to peace, we believe that the Governments of the region must expedite the process of assuming the legal commitments contained in the Contadora Act' [*ibid.*].

"After a careful study of the proposal submitted officially by the Contadora Group on 7 September and in response to the Group's urgent appeal to proceed with the signing of the Act at the earliest possible date, Nicaragua, despite the sacrifice which it represented to our Government to accept all the points of that instrument, taking into account the political, economic and military aggression waged by the United States against Nicaragua—which is known the world over as the 'covert war'—on 21 September 1984 communicated to the countries forming the Contadora Group its decision [*see S/16756, annex*] to sign immediately and without any modification the proposed Act of 7 September, agreeing fully with the Contadora Foreign Ministers, who stated in their letter of transmittal that 'negotiating implies yielding some ground in order to secure the ultimate objective which is considered essential' [*see S/16742, annex 1*]. For Nicaragua, this ultimate, essential objective is peace in the Central American region, a peace which our peoples demand as an indispensable condition for undertaking the tasks of our political, social and economic development. For the sake of this peace, Nicaragua chose not to put forward even the amendments it could have suggested in accordance with what had been stated by the Foreign Ministers, in the belief that such a step could be used to hamper the signing of the Act through futile discussions which would in no way affect the substance of the proposed instrument, since, according to the Contadora Foreign Ministers, the substance of their proposal was no longer negotiable.

"The announcement that Nicaragua had decided to sign the Act produced an immediate and abrupt reaction from the Government of the United States, which forced the Governments of Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica to withdraw their initial acceptance and support of the Act. This fact was amply demonstrated with the publication of an official document of the United States National Security Council, dated 30 October 1984, the text of which asserts that 'following intensive United States consultations with El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, these Central American [Governments] submitted a counterdraft to the Contadora States on 20 October 1984.'<sup>13</sup> The text goes on to state that the counterdraft reflects many of the concerns of the United States and that it 'shifts concern within Contadora to a document broadly consistent with United States interests'. This affirmation enables the United States Government, in the same document, to claim victory, declaring that 'we have effectively blocked Contadora Group efforts to impose . . . a revised Contadora Act'. In due course Nicaragua indicated that the interventionist policy of the United States had undermined the Contadora process in that it not only had blocked the possibility of signing the Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America but also constituted a blow from which, in our view, the Contadora negotiation process would find it difficult to recover. In keeping with its policy of blocking the Contadora process, the Government of the United States has

had recourse to the Costa Rican news media, which it has continued to use in order to foment hostility in the region and to denigrate the Contadora process in order, through a campaign which by its virulence could have been orchestrated only by the Central Intelligence Agency, to put pressure on the Government of Costa Rica to make its future participation in the Contadora process conditional upon acceptance by Nicaragua of arbitrary demands, with a view to rectifying a non-existent violation of the right of asylum without using the settlement machinery provided for.

"It is therefore ironic that Costa Rica, a country which has become noted for its most flagrant and systematic violation of the norms and principles of the right of asylum, should seek to justify its failure to continue the Contadora process, adducing arguments which lack the slightest foundation. There is no doubt that the repeated proof of the desire of Nicaragua to arrive at agreements for a peaceful solution within the Contadora framework have induced the Government of Costa Rica to conclude that Nicaragua, having been attacked by the United States, could be the subject of any kind of pressure and blackmail, since it is—as senior officials of the Government of Costa Rica have indicated—the country most interested in signing a peace agreement within the Contadora framework.

"This latest manoeuvre, which has forced suspension of the meeting convened by the Contadora Group for 14 and 15 February, to which Nicaragua had sent a delegation, testifies to the fact that the Government of the United States not only succeeded in effectively blocking the Contadora process but also completely negated the viability of a process which requires that all the countries involved should be able to take their own decisions on the basis of their national interests, without intervention or diktat from third States.

"Such an attitude on the part of the United States Government is all the more serious, coming as it does after that Government's unilateral decision to break off indefinitely the bilateral talks in Manzanillo, and its disavowal of the competence of the International Court of Justice in the request submitted by Nicaragua, withdrawing, in an unprecedented step, half-way through the hearing of the case filed by Nicaragua.

"It is obvious that what the United States Government is attempting to achieve by means of its interventionist policy, which it conceals by blackmailing several Central American Governments involved in the negotiation process, is to confront Nicaragua through these Governments, thus seeking to evade its direct responsibility for the breakdown of a negotiation process which it would consider viable only in the event that the negotiations were to respond fully to the requirements of its policy of violating the international legal order and the Charter of the United Nations.

"These facts make it clear that the only means of averting a breakdown or standstill in the Contadora process is for the United States Government to agree to resume as soon as possible the bilateral dialogue with Nicaragua in Manzanillo, and to comply with the measures of protection ordered by the International Court of Justice, in order to provide the basis for negotiations which would permit normalization of relations among all

our countries. Only by attaining this objective will the Central American countries be able to move forward without any United States interference in or pressure on the Contadora process, and thus lay a foundation for security and coexistence based on mutual respect, a situation that is indispensable for ensuring the peace and the political and economic stability so desired by the peoples of Central America.

"Nicaragua reiterates its support for the Contadora process and consequently reaffirms its desire to continue to participate in that process, for the sake of which it will continue to make all the necessary efforts to achieve the resumption by the United States of the bilateral talks in Manzanillo, a task which is fully supported by Contadora and the entire international community.

"Nicaragua also reiterates its full and unwavering attachment to the norms of international coexistence and peaceful settlement of disputes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and its respect for the International Court of Justice."

I should be grateful if you would have this communication circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Julio ICAZA GALLARD  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/16962

### Report of a mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to inquire into the situation of prisoners of war in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq: note by the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[19 February 1985]

1. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 25 October 1984 [S/16799], the Government of the Republic of Iraq alleged that, in an incident on 10 October 1984 at a prisoner-of-war camp in Gorgan, Islamic Republic of Iran, in the presence of representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Iranian military authorities had indiscriminately opened fire on the prisoners, killing or injuring a considerable number of them, and requested the Secretary-General to send a mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran to investigate the incident.

2. In accordance with established practice, the Secretary-General consulted the Islamic Republic of Iran on Iraq's request. The Islamic Republic of Iran indicated that it would agree to receive the mission, provided that the mission also investigated Iran's concerns regarding Iranian prisoners of war in Iraq. It also informed the Secretary-General that the Islamic Republic of Iran was preparing a report on the incident of 10 October, which would be made available to him. Iraq agreed that the proposed mission should visit both countries.

3. In the light of its role vested under the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War<sup>14</sup> and of its presence at the time of the incident in question, ICRC was informed of the Iraqi request and the Iranian response.

4. The Secretary-General decided, as an extraordinary measure and in the light of his humanitarian responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, to dispatch a mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. The mission was to inquire into the incident of 10 October 1984 in the Gorgan Camp and also would report to him on other concerns that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of Iraq had expressed regarding the situation of prisoners of war and civilian detainees.

5. On 7 November 1984, at the request of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ICRC report on the Gorgan Camp

incident of 10 October 1984 was circulated [S/16820, annex].

6. Preparations were made and itineraries were being finalized with a view to dispatching the mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq during the second half of the month of November 1984 when, on 12 November, the Iranian Government requested a change in the itinerary of the proposed mission whereby it would first visit Iraq before proceeding to the Islamic Republic of Iran. That change was not acceptable to the Government of Iraq. Under the circumstances, the Secretary-General, on 19 November, concluded that, in the light of the differences that had arisen in connection with its itinerary and modalities, the mission would not take place, and so informed the two Governments. Meanwhile, both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq had submitted to the Secretary-General lists of special concerns which they wished the proposed mission to consider in the course of its inquiry.

7. On 4 December 1984, the Government of Iraq informed the Secretary-General that it would have no objection to having the proposed mission visit Iraq first, provided that, when it visited the Islamic Republic of Iran, it would begin its work there with an inquiry into the incident of 10 October at Gorgan Camp. Upon being informed, the Iranian Government, on 12 December, assured the Secretary-General of its full co-operation with the mission.

8. In the light of that development and the continued concern expressed by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Iraq, and mindful of the moral and humanitarian responsibilities vested in his office, the Secretary-General felt duty-bound to seek to determine, as far as feasible, the factual basis for the concerns expressed by both Governments regarding the situation of prisoners of war, including the circumstances of the incident of 10 October. To that end, he requested three qualified spe-

cialists in their respective fields to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iraq and to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mission was constituted as an independent body which would determine the scope of its inquiries, its procedures and method of work. The members of the mission were Professor Wolfram Karl, Professor of International Law, University of Salzburg, Austria; Professor Torkel Opsahl, Professor of Constitutional and International Law, University of Oslo, Norway; and Major-General Rafael Angel Valc Huerta, Military Adviser, Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the United Nations. The mission was assisted by Mr. Benon Sevan, Director in the United Nations Secretariat, and Mr. Francesc Vendrell, Senior Political Affairs Officer. The two Secretariat officials were temporarily assigned to the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs for the duration of the mission.

9. The mission assembled in Geneva on 8 January 1985, where it met representatives dispatched by the Government of Iraq and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who elaborated on the concerns of their respective Governments. It also met representatives of ICRC. The mission visited Iraq from 11 to 17 January, and proceeded to the Islamic Republic of Iran, where it remained from 18 to 25 January. It then proceeded to Vienna, where it prepared a joint report, which it submitted to the Secretary-General on 9 February.

10. The Secretary-General wishes to place on record his deep appreciation to the members of the mission for the efficient, dedicated and tireless manner in which they discharged their assignment despite constraints of time and resources, and often under difficult conditions.

11. In transmitting the annexed report of the mission to the Security Council, the Secretary-General cannot but express his deep dismay and concern that the unanimous findings of the mission indicate that the fundamental purposes that the international community set itself in adopting in 1949 the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War are not being fulfilled.

12. As he has stressed in connection with earlier initiatives and inquiries which he had undertaken, and which were equally motivated by a sense of humanitarian concern, the Secretary-General attaches paramount importance to the strict observance of all the principles and rules of international conduct. The Secretary-General is convinced that any breach of such principles and norms, particularly if it continues to occur, would have a corrosive effect that could undermine the entire fabric of accepted international standards of conduct.

13. For this reason the Secretary-General is convinced, in this situation and in the light of the present report, that respect for the third Geneva Convention must be restored. This can best be achieved if ICRC, which since the start of the hostilities has carried out the functions envisaged for humanitarian organizations in that Convention, is enabled to continue these functions on the basis of mutually agreed arrangements which would prevent future misunderstandings and permit it to discharge its humanitarian duties for the protection of and relief to prisoners of war. Further, it is important that the Iranian Government and the Iraqi Government, one having requested and the other having accepted the mission, pay close heed to the observations and recommendations made in the mission's report.

14. In this context the Secretary-General feels it is incumbent upon him to recall his note verbale of 26 June 1984 addressed to all Member and Observer States parties to the Geneva Conventions [S/16648]. In it, he underscored the vital importance of ensuring the observance of the principles embodied in those Conventions. It is especially relevant that the Conventions envisage that they shall be applied with the co-operation and under the scrutiny of Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the parties to the conflict. For this reason, the Secretary-General urged those States to give serious consideration to serving as Protecting Powers, which are vested with a crucial role in the mechanism for ensuring the observance of the terms of the Conventions. ICRC would continue to discharge its humanitarian mandate under the Geneva Conventions in close co-operation with such Protecting Powers. The Secretary-General remains convinced that, in the light of the observations and conclusions of the members of the mission in their report, it is vital that Protecting Powers assume the responsibilities prescribed for them in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in the context of the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq.

15. This being said, it is self-evident that no effort should be spared to ameliorate or end the continuing suffering of about 60,000 prisoners of war, many incarcerated for years, which is of immediate concern to the international community. The Secretary-General is of the view that, in addition to compliance with the terms of the third Geneva Convention, an effective approach would be to seek an exchange of at least certain defined categories of prisoners of war on the basis of understandings to be promoted with the two Governments concerned. The Secretary-General is fully prepared to investigate actively the feasibility of this proposal, if both Governments indicate their receptivity to it.

16. Such an attempt becomes vital, since it is evident that the report, despite the restraint of its terms, compellingly conveys the tragedy of tens of thousands of men, most of them youthful, losing some of the finest years of their lives in suffering and captivity, a tragic situation magnified by the anguish of their families. These unfortunate men, isolated and uncertain of their fate, who appeal for freedom and a return to their homes, underscore the human dimension of the cost of war. The Secretary-General is more strongly convinced than ever that their plight, and other suffering affecting both combatants and civilians, can be ended effectively only by the termination of the ruinous conflict that continues to inflict a heavy toll on the human assets, and also the material resources, of these two countries. He reiterates, once again, his readiness to help in any endeavour that will bring peace to the people of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq.

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### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

9 February 1985

The Secretary-General  
of the United Nations

Sir,

We have the honour to submit herewith our report on the inquiry which you requested us to undertake concerning certain aspects of the situation of prisoners of war and civilian detainees in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq.

We visited Iraq from 11 to 17 January and the Islamic Republic of Iran from 18 to 25 January 1985 for the purpose of exchanging views with the respective Governments and carrying out on-site observation and interviews, particularly in prisoner-of-war camps, in the respective countries. The report was prepared following our return to Vienna. Although we were appointed in our individual capacities, we agreed to work together as a team and our conclusions were reached unanimously.

We would like to record our sincere thanks to the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the co-operation and assistance they provided to the mission during its stay in each country.

Our thanks are due also to the International Committee of the Red Cross for the relevant information which it made available to the mission.

We also wish to express our deep appreciation for the assistance we received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations, particularly Mr. Benon Sevan, Director, and Mr. Francesc Vendrell, Senior Political Affairs Officer, who accompanied the mission and provided it with necessary support throughout its work.

Lastly, we wish to express our gratitude to you for the confidence you have reposed in us.

(Signed) Wolfram KARL  
Torkel OPSAHL  
Rafael Angel VALE HUERTA

### INTRODUCTION

#### A. Mandate

1. The Secretary-General requested us to inquire into the incident which occurred on 10 October 1984 in the camp for Iraqi prisoners of war located at Gorgan, Iran, and also to report to him on other concerns that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of the Republic of Iraq had expressed regarding the situation of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian detainees. In carrying out this task we were requested to ascertain, as far as feasible, the facts and circumstances of the incident at Gorgan and seek to determine the factual basis for the other concerns expressed by the two Governments.

#### B. Scope and methods of work

2. We assembled in Geneva on 8 January 1985 to discuss the scope of our activities and the methods of work. Although we were appointed by the Secretary-General in our individual capacities, we agreed to work as a team and to submit, on the basis of our independent inquiry, a joint report to the Secretary-General which would be factual, objective and as comprehensive as time and resources permitted.

3. It was further agreed that, in carrying out the tasks entrusted to us, we would bear in mind the exceptional circumstances under which the mission had been decided upon and the necessity to observe strictly the parameters set out in its mandate. In particular, we agreed to bear in mind the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), on which the United Nations has consistently relied to undertake responsibilities relating to POWs, in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.<sup>14</sup> However, we felt that the mandate that we received from the Secretary-General required us to listen fully to the concerns expressed and the representations made by both Governments regarding the treatment of POWs. We decided further that the Geneva Conventions would not, as such, be used as a framework for the conduct of our inquiries, except as standard reference material.

4. In order to carry out our inquiries, we adopted, as required, the following approaches:

(a) Interviews would be held with officials of the two Governments concerned, with a view to obtaining information regarding the policy of each Government towards the POWs under its jurisdiction as well as its responses and comments to each of the concerns expressed by the other Government;

(b) Visits would be paid to POW camps in order to conduct on-site inquiries, including interviews with government and military officials as well as officials in charge of the camps visited, tours of the camps and observation of conditions, and interviews with prisoners of war, with a view to obtaining information regarding specific conditions in the camps.

(c) Documents and reports made available to the mission by the two Governments would be carefully studied and taken into account.

#### C. Itinerary

5. While in Geneva before proceeding to Iraq and Iran, by prior arrangement with the two Governments, we met at the Palais des Nations with the representatives sent by the Iranian and Iraqi Governments, who provided us with additional information as well as supplementary documentation regarding the special concerns that had been expressed by their respective Governments. We also met with the representative of ICRC, who provided us with information that was relevant to our inquiries.

6. Immediately after our meetings in Geneva, and in accordance with the agreements with the two Governments, we visited Iraq for six days from 11 to 17 January and then Iran for seven days from 18 to 25 January 1985, commencing our work in Iran by inquiring into the incident at Gorgan.

7. We then proceeded to Vienna to prepare our report. While in Vienna, we held a further meeting with a representative of ICRC, in order to seek clarification on certain points arising from our inquiries in the countries concerned.

8. The chronology of the mission's activities is reproduced in appendix 7 to the present report.

#### D. Technical aspects of the inquiry

9. We wish to note that, in the course of our visits to both Iraq and Iran, we received full co-operation and assistance in carrying out our inquiries from both the Governments concerned; a full programme of interviews with competent authorities and visits to prisoner-of-war camps were arranged within the context of the time available, and all necessary facilities were placed at our disposal. We wish to stress that we were enabled to conduct interviews with prisoners of war in private without the presence of government witnesses.

10. We feel bound, none the less, to indicate that there were some inherent limitations and constraints to which our inquiries had to be subject. Those limitations kept us from reaching conclusions concerning some matters and led us, in respect of others, to be less categorical in our findings than we might have been otherwise, although, for reasons which also are indicated below, they were not such as to prevent our reaching conclusions on most of the issues raised.

11. It should be noted that the limited time at our disposal evidently did not permit a fuller and more detailed inquiry. Visits to camps had to be brief, and interviews with the prisoners of war, both individually and in groups, were not always conducted under optimum circumstances. Nevertheless, it is our considered judgement that, based on conditions that were repeatedly observed and statements repeatedly heard, we were able to obtain what we believe to be a representative and reliable picture. A more detailed account, in our view, would not be essential to the fulfilment

of the mission's mandate. Moreover, a full and detailed disclosure of the material that we obtained and its sources might endanger a number of unprotected persons. Many POWs conveyed to us their fear of reprisal in that regard, and evidence concerning past incidents clearly justified that fear.

12. Perhaps the one major shortcoming arising from the time limitation, which we considered inadvisable to extend once the mission had commenced, was the absence of opportunity to confront the Government of each country concerned with the explanations, comments and materials collected in the other country.

13. We formed the impression that most of the camps had been prepared by the authorities in advance of our visit. They generally gave the appearance of having recently been put in meticulous order, and apparently freshly brought-in provisions and equipment were in evidence. That impression was confirmed by the testimony of the POWs, who also told us at some camps that certain of their number had been transferred immediately before our visit, a practice which they said was frequent. In some camps, security measures taken by the authorities, while understandable as a necessity, affected the spontaneity of our contact with POWs.

14. The POWs whom we interviewed often were understandably in a highly emotional state, which did not allow us much opportunity for cross-examination about essential details, and occasionally what they said was clearly exaggerated or represented stereotypes rather than their own perceptions or experiences—a common reaction in conflict areas. Some of the information that they conveyed was hearsay rather than a firsthand account. A further difficulty in communication, which also affected our interviews with the authorities, was the lack of precise dates, owing to the time that had elapsed since certain events and the use of different calendars.

15. In interviewing the POWs, we constantly bore in mind that they were men who felt under the total control of the adversary Power under whose authority they were being detained and whose conduct was being examined. The POWs who recounted their experiences often appeared fearful. Yet, repeatedly, they gave us in private, sometimes in great detail, accounts contradicting the description of the standards of treatment given by the detaining authorities and their denial of the existence of serious problems. They also told us about serious incidents that were said to have taken place in the camps in the past. For obvious reasons, such information could not, in the circumstances, always be confronted with the official information. Critical comments by the POWs, however, were given credibility by their repetition and similarity, and to some extent were corroborated by our own observations of the conditions in the camps.

#### E. Organization of the report

16. In the present report, our findings and observations concerning the incident that took place at Gorgan Camp on 10 October 1984 are dealt with separately in chapter I. The accounts of our visits to Iraq and to Iran, exclusive of Gorgan Camp, are contained in chapters II and III. Also addressed in each of these two chapters are the special concerns of the other Government that we conveyed to the host Government, together with the responses and comments of the host Government and our own findings and observations.

17. In order to facilitate their examination, a number of related concerns expressed by each Government have been grouped together for treatment. The lists of specific concerns transmitted by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Iraq are reproduced in appendices 1 and 2, respectively.

18. The final chapter of the present report contains our general observations, conclusions and recommendations regarding the situation of prisoners of war in both countries.

### I. THE INCIDENT AT GORGAN CAMP

#### A. Background

19. Gorgan Camp is part of a military garrison situated within the city of Gorgan, 381 kilometres north-east of Tehran, close to the Caspian Sea. At the time of the incident, the number of POWs interned there was 3,418. The Camp consists of 22 dormitories, each accommodating between 160 and 260 POWs, divided into four sections. Of these, sections 1, 2 and 3, which housed approximately 3,000 prisoners, were intercommunicable and had access to the central yard of the Camp. The rest of the prisoners were housed in section 4 and did not enjoy free access to the yard or to the other sections of the Camp.

20. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, in a letter dated 25 October 1984 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/16799), charged that on 10 October 1984:

"the Iranian authorities were guilty of a fresh crime against Iraqi prisoners held by them, when their military indiscriminately opened fire on the prisoners in Gorgan camp, killing or injuring a considerable number of them. The crime took place notwithstanding the presence of a mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross at the camp".

The Foreign Minister requested the Secretary-General to appoint a mission to investigate the incident.

21. In reply to the Iraqi charge, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 7 November 1984 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/16820), requested that the ICRC report on the incident be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council and stated: "Though too succinct to accommodate some important facts of the incident, the report does clearly show the baselessness of the allegation made by the Iraqi Foreign Minister".

#### B. Sources of information

22. Our findings on the Gorgan incident, are based primarily on the following sources:

(a) The official ICRC report annexed to the letter of 7 November 1984 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran referred to in paragraph 21 (see also appendix 3). The internal ICRC report was not made available to us under long-standing policies of that organization;

(b) The official Iranian report on the incident (see appendix 4);

(c) Other written reports and submissions by the Iranian and Iraqi Governments, including a video tape of an Iranian TV film concerning the death of three Iraqi POWs and consisting largely of the confessions of the seven fellow prisoners accused of killing them, with an English summary of the transcript;

(d) Briefings by ICRC in Geneva prior to our departure. In response to our request to interview some of the ICRC delegates present at Gorgan on the day of the incident, the ICRC replied that it was not able to comply, explaining that "when there is a controversy, the delegate is not responsible in front of courts or commissions; the institution takes full responsibility";

(e) Oral presentations by the representatives of Iran and Iraq, both in preliminary meetings with us in Geneva and in the course of our visits to the two countries;

(f) Statements and answers by Colonel Samani, Commander of the Gorgan Garrison, and First Captain Hosseini, Commander of the Gorgan POW Camp, in meetings with us on 20 January 1985;

(g) Hearings that we held in private on the evening of 20 January 1985 with the seven POWs accused of killing three fellow prisoners on the day of the incident and with two other POWs who, according to the Iranian Government, had given notes to an ICRC delegate;

(h) Our on-site inspection of the Camp and private interviews with POWs interned there.

23. We also took note of certain published material on the incident from Iranian and other sources.

#### C. Undisputed facts concerning the incident

24. At some time between 1115 and 1130 hours, local time, on 10 October 1984, two prisoners started a quarrel, which was quickly joined in by others in the main yard of the Camp, between the mosque and section 1. Violence followed and soon spread to other parts of the Camp, with the exception of section 4, which, as already indicated, was separated from the other three sections. The event happened in the presence of several ICRC delegates who were working in section 1 at the time. The ICRC delegation had arrived in Gorgan on the previous day for its first visit and had conducted its activities in the Camp on 9 October without incident. The Camp Commander was in section 4 in the company of an ICRC delegate and thus not present when the fighting broke out.

25. Attempts to restore order between the two groups of prisoners—who will henceforward be referred to as "loyalists" and "believers"—went unheeded. Prisoners fought each other with stones, iron bars apparently taken from bedsteads, sticks, boards, bottles and other objects.

26. Unable to stop the fighting, the Camp Commander and the guards withdrew from the Camp, taking with them the ICRC delegates, some of whom had to be rescued by means of a ladder, since they were too far from the Camp gate. The ICRC medical doctor stayed behind in the infirmary throughout the incident. Up to the time that they withdrew, neither the Camp authorities nor the guards had been attacked. The ICRC delegates were not attacked at any time.

27. Some time later, reinforcements arrived. The Camp Commander, who by then was accompanied by the Garrison Commander, spoke to the POWs through the loudspeaker, but apparently to no avail, and the riot continued unabated. In the mean time, a large number of POWs rushed

towards the Camp gate with the apparent aim of storming it. Some of the guards threw tear-gas canisters at the prisoners, but the latter counter-attacked *en masse*, preventing the further use of tear gas or of the truncheons with which the guards were equipped. Warning shots were then fired into the air. When those failed to calm the situation, the Garrison Commander gave orders to shoot at the crowd. The Camp Commander stated that the orders were to shoot "below the waist", but he also admitted that the soldiers from the garrison "were not sharpshooters" and that "some might have hit higher". Some of the shots were fired from beyond the gate and the fence by soldiers positioned on a level with the prisoners inside.

28. Precisely how long the shooting lasted was difficult to determine, but there was no firm indication that the shooting went on for longer than necessary to restore calm. The situation was brought under control by about 1230 hours.

29. Nine POWs died as a result of the incident. Of these, three were killed by other POWs, three died immediately from gunshot wounds and three others died subsequently in hospital from the same causes. The number of wounded was 47, according to the official report, though we found some disagreement concerning both the number and causes of injuries.

#### D. *Controversial aspects of the incident*

30. Whereas there is substantial agreement as to the basic facts of the incident, disagreement arises concerning its immediate and underlying causes as well as the interpretation of those causes, particularly in respect of the role of ICRC, against which the Iranian authorities have levelled several charges.

31. One of those charges is that ICRC was acting, wilfully or unwilfully, as an agent of the Iraqi Government. That accusation was not made either in the official Iranian report on the incident or in the conversations that we held with Iranian authorities throughout our stay in Iran. However, public statements by some Iranian leaders as well as comments in the Iranian media have mentioned it. Similar allegations were made by some "believers" with whom we spoke, and we also noticed them in some of the slogans displayed in several other POW camps. The ICRC delegates themselves said that while they were visiting Gorgan on 9 October they had heard from the Camp authorities that a rumour was going the rounds to the effect that ICRC intended to make up a list of names of the members of the two opposing factions in the camps. We were not given, nor did we come across, any document or other information which could lend any support to such an allegation.

32. It has also been alleged that the ICRC visits on occasion cause disruption in the camps. In that connection, we observed that an incident could easily be sparked as a result of the deep antagonism and tension between the two POW factions, combined with the privileged treatment enjoyed by the "believers" and the suspicion with which the latter view the private conversations between their rivals and outsiders. An outbreak, in our view, is all the more apt to happen when one side attempts to prevent the other from talking privately to ICRC delegates and suspects the latter of collecting the names of POWs opposed to the Iraqi Government.

33. The official Iranian report on Gorgan as well as several Iranian officials have suggested that in his opening speech, delivered on 9 October to the assembled POWs, the ICRC representative had blamed past difficulties between ICRC and the Iranian Government for their delay in visiting the Camp.

34. ICRC told us that the speech was of standard content, explaining the purpose of the visit and the method of work, including references to the third Geneva Convention. Although the reason for the delay had been hinted at, the words used were to the effect that, after some difficulties had been resolved, the ICRC had been able to come to Gorgan; but there had been no explicit reference to the fact that those difficulties related to differences with the Iranian Government.

35. The mission considers that, regardless of which version of the speech is accepted as accurate, neither could, by itself, have been the cause of the riot, though, given the prevailing atmosphere, what was said might have been misunderstood or misinterpreted by the Camp authorities or by some of the POWs.

36. In both the official government report [see appendix 4] and statements from several Iranian officials, including the Camp Commander, it has also been claimed that the quarrel between the two prisoners which sparked the whole incident was caused by the action of an ICRC delegate who accepted from one POW a list of "anti-Baathist" POWs to be conveyed to the Iraqi Government. The official report states: "This action created suspicion with a number of POWs. One POW approached the representative demanding to see the note. The ICRC representative flatly refused to comply and subsequently a heated argument erupted", from which fighting developed and spread to the whole Camp.

37. We consider that such action by an ICRC delegate, had it taken place, might have given reasons to the Iranian authorities to suspect that the "ICRC has engaged in espionage on behalf of Iraq". The charge is all the more serious in that, rightly or wrongly, it is widely held by Iranians that the Iraqi authorities, viewing one faction of POWs as traitors, would take measures against them or their families if a list of their names were to come into their hands. However, if this were so, the same serious consequences for their families might also result from the frequent showing on Iranian television of Iraqi POWs at prayer meetings, shouting anti-Iraqi slogans and engaging in similar activities.

38. Whether there is any factual basis for the specific charge levelled against ICRC was therefore very thoroughly investigated by us. It should be noted, first, that no Iranian officer witnessed the supposed episode and, secondly, that a large number of POWs interviewed in the Camp told us that no such incident had taken place. Thirdly, we interviewed the POWs who had earlier admitted to having passed such notes to the ICRC delegate on that day. One of the two POWs was the person named in the official report whose action is claimed by the Government to have sparked the fight. The other was identified in the video film, where he admitted to having given a certain delegate a list of "four names". Their testimony appeared to be flawed and did not help much to clarify matters.

39. We also found certain inconsistencies in the various allegations regarding the supposed list. In response to our questions, it was explained that there were actually supposed to have been two different notes passed, only one of which caused the uproar. There were also different versions as to what had happened to the alleged list: one that it had been tacitly pocketed by the delegate, another that it had been taken back forcibly by a second POW, who snatched it from the delegate's hand and tore it up, and a third that the POW who had given the ICRC delegate the paper had snatched it back and torn it up, "swallowing down half of the paper".

40. ICRC, for its part, has denied that any of its delegates received or would ever have accepted any document whatsoever other than the well-known official forms used for messages. Its instructions to its delegates on that point were, and are, very firm, since any violation of that rule would endanger the organization's work. According to ICRC, the only materials carried by its delegates on that day were their own notes or notebooks for collecting the information required under the Geneva Convention during visits. We were told, however, that in the course of the ensuing turmoil some of the delegates had had their own papers snatched from them. Others had lost their papers in the process of climbing out of the Camp, papers which they never recovered. The delegates had later been searched bodily by the Camp authorities, and their motor vehicle had also been searched. No compromising evidence had been found, and none was presented to us.

41. We also noted that the physical description of the delegate suspected of having received the alleged list conveyed to the mission in Gorgan and the name suggested did not correspond to any of the delegates who, according to ICRC, had actually been interviewing prisoners. ICRC informed us that the delegate in question had been carrying out another function, that of observing material conditions in the Camp. He had not been speaking with the prisoners but taking notes on his observations, somewhat away from the spot where the fighting had erupted. We further noted that the allegation concerning the list episode seems to have been made some time after the event.

42. We note the absence of reliable and consistent evidence to the effect that any ICRC delegate received any note or list, as alleged, and consider it more likely that the quarrel erupted as a result of the suspicions held by one prisoner about the kind of information given by the other to the ICRC delegate, as some POWs told us, or as a result of the attempt by one POW to prevent the other from speaking to the delegate. The versions about a "paper" could have arisen from a rumour spread by some POWs or a misunderstanding, in view of the fact that some of the delegate's papers were lost or forcibly snatched by POWs during the turmoil.

43. The suggestion was also made that one ICRC delegate had actually encouraged the fighting that broke out. According to hearsay, referred to by the Camp Commander, one ICRC delegate, after the quarrel between the two POWs had started, had made a gesture with his hands which was interpreted by the guard who witnessed it as a sign to the POWs to fight each other. We watched the Commander imitate the gesture but its supposed meaning was not clear to us. According to ICRC, one of its delegates near the fence did make a gesture in signal to the guards outside to avoid shooting. At any rate, even if some gestures may signify opposite things among different cultures, none of the POWs with whom we met in our tour of the Camp mentioned any gesture by any ICRC delegate as having had any impact—negative or positive—in the course of the fighting. Moreover, in our view, it is implausible that either of the two groups could have been encouraged by a signal from an ICRC delegate to start fighting.

44. Another controversial point relates to the numbers of prisoners injured in the incident. As mentioned earlier, the official Iranian report states that a total of 47 prisoners were wounded during the incident and that with the exception of one wounded POW, whose leg had to be amputated, "the rest incurred minor injuries" and "after recovering in a short time were returned to the camp." Though it was not explicitly stated, it was clear that the 47 men had suffered injuries severe enough to merit their transfer to hospital. The ICRC medical doctor, who visited the hospital on 11 October, reported having seen 35 wounded.

45. The POWs whom we interviewed in the Camp reported that, apart from those killed, a few hundred had been injured during the incident. We do not consider that this is necessarily an important discrepancy, since there must have been a number of POWs hurt during the disturbance—by fellow prisoners or, perhaps, by shots—whose injuries were judged not severe enough to require hospitalization. The official Iranian report states that more POWs were treated in the hospital for wounds inflicted by other POWs than by gunshot, but we have had no means of verifying that claim.

#### E. Other aspects of the incident

46. We were shown pictures of three dead POWs killed by blows. The victims are identified in the Government's report, which also contains a brief description of their injuries and cause of death. Their bodies were also seen by the ICRC medical doctor on 11 October. From the Iranian TV video tape that we were shown, with some explanations by the government authorities, including an English summary of the transcript, it would seem that the three men had been killed and another seriously injured in dormitory No. 6 in section 1 of the Camp by POWs who presumably belonged to the "loyalist" faction. The Government has described the accused as "Baathists", seven of whom were said to have confessed to the slayings and are to be brought to trial. Those confessions made up most of the video tape film that we viewed.

47. We held hearings in private with each of the seven accused men, during which they described the event, with only minor differences. We also questioned them in some detail about other aspects of the riot, such as the developments already described and their possible causes, and the measures taken by the Camp authorities.

#### F. Measures taken by the authorities following the incident

48. The authorities did not give us any further information about punitive or other measures taken after the riot; but the POWs told us that many of them—the minimum figure given was 600—all belonging to the "loyalist" faction, had afterwards been confined to dormitories for a considerable time or had been deprived of food or water for three days and then given only one meal a day, consisting mostly of bread and/or rice and water, for one month. Many POWs had reportedly become ill as a result.

49. The Camp authorities, however, did confirm that they had segregated the two groups of prisoners involved in the riot, a situation that we ourselves observed. We also noted that the sections had been divided from each other by fences and barbed wire. That was said to have made the Camp "secure" again.

#### G. Conclusions

50. We have reached the following conclusions concerning the incident in Gorgan:

(a) It caused the deaths of at least 9 prisoners, of whom 3 died from beatings and the rest from gunshot wounds, 47 wounded and hospitalized, and a larger number of less severely injured who were not treated in hospital;

(b) The trouble began with a quarrel between two prisoners belonging to the two opposing factions in the Camp, which, among other things, differed in their attitude towards the ICRC visit, with one group opposed to the visit or seeking to prevent the other from communicating freely with the ICRC delegates. The quarrel soon spread to the majority of POWs in the Camp;

(c) The escalating measures taken by the Iranian authorities to suppress the riot were in principle justified and corresponded to normal procedures for riot control;

(d) We find it impossible, however, to form an opinion as to whether in every respect the actual firing was necessary, sufficiently controlled or indiscriminate;

(e) There is no convincing evidence of any improper action of ICRC which, by itself might have provoked the initial quarrel or the ensuing riot;

(f) In the course of the controversy that has developed between the Iranian Government and ICRC in the aftermath of Gorgan, some public

statements by ICRC could have led the Iranian authorities to misunderstand the role of that organization in Iran, though such statements were made after the incident;

(g) Subsequent disciplinary measures against the POWs seem to have been of an unjustifiable character and one-sidedly applied;

(h) Given the experience of the incident, the subsequent separation of groups of prisoners seems to be a legitimate and necessary security measure;

(i) One of the underlying causes of the incident may have been the Iranian Government's policy of favouring the "believers" faction—a minority in most camps—over the "loyalist" faction. The incident might have been prevented had the authorities initially separated the two factions in the Camp and adopted a more balanced attitude towards both;

(j) The incident in Gorgan has not been unique or, indeed, the most violent in POW camps in Iran or Iraq. However, unlike other incidents in both countries, this one attracted considerable international attention because it was publicized shortly after its occurrence by Iranian exiles in France.

## II. VISIT TO IRAQ

### A. Programme of work and itinerary of the mission

51. Upon arrival in Baghdad on 11 January 1985 we held consultations on our programme of work, which we then communicated to the Iraqi authorities, who provided us with all the required facilities and arrangements for its implementation.

52. We were received by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. We also held conversations on the first and the last days of our visit with a team of Iraqi Government officials, which was headed by Mr. Wissam Al-Zahawi, Under-Secretary-General for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and included Mr. Mohamed El-Hadji Hamoud, head of the Legal Department at the Foreign Ministry; Brigadier-General Basim Ahmed Taka, Ministry of Defence; and Brigadier-General Nazar Al-Drubi and Colonel Kadouri Hussein, member and Secretary, respectively, of the Permanent Committee of War Victims. In the course of our visits to the POW camps, we also held meetings with the commanders of the camps.

53. During our stay in Iraq, we visited eight POW camps, namely, the Salahuddin POW Camp, the four POW camps situated in Mosul, and the three camps in the Ramadi area. According to Iraqi authorities, the combined prisoner population in those eight camps—which, we were told, were the only ones in existence in Iraq—was 9,206. In addition, during the final day of our stay in Iraq, we visited two villages in Misan, which is more than 300 kilometres south-east of Baghdad and is where a large number of civilians from the Khuzestan region of Iran are at present located. The list of POW camps with their respective populations, as provided by the Iraqi authorities at the time of our visit, as well as a chronology of activities of the mission in Iraq, are reproduced in appendices 5 and 7 to the present report.

### B. General information and policies of Iraq concerning prisoners of war

54. In the course of their meetings with us, the Iraqi authorities conveyed to us the following observations and comments as well as their general policies regarding prisoners of war:

(a) The Iraqi Government conceded that certain errors had been committed at the beginning of the war in its handling of the POW problem since Iraq was unprepared for the large number of prisoners captured;

(b) Iraqi POWs were the object of abject treatment by the Iranian authorities. Despite this, President Saddam Husseini of Iraq had clearly stated that Iraq had no intention of meeting out similar treatment to the Iranian POWs in Iraq. On the contrary, Iraq was determined to fulfil its international obligations in keeping with its historic values and principles;

(c) Iraq, unlike Iran, abided by the Geneva Conventions and had offered every facility to ICRC to carry out its work in Iraq, even though there had been occasional differences with the Red Cross;

(d) The total number of Iranian POWs held by Iraq was 9,206, housed in eight camps.

(e) Iraq was willing to proceed with an exchange of POWs, provided it was carried out on a proportional basis. Iraq could not accept an exchange of equal numbers of prisoners, as proposed by Iran, since the latter was holding five times as many prisoners as Iraq and the Iranian proposal, if implemented, would leave four fifths of Iraqi POWs in Iranian hands;

(f) Iraq was willing to repatriate wounded and sick Iranian POWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention and as ordered by the President. A mixed medical commission (composed of two ICRC doctors and one

Iraqi doctor) had recently been set up and Iraq had already prepared a list of 100 POWs for repatriation and a second list of 100 was about to be completed. Another 300, in groups of 100 each, would follow. Prior to that, Iraq had already repatriated 424 Iranian POWs;

(g) Iraq was ready to proceed with an exchange of family visits once Iran had produced the full list of Iraqi POWs held in that country. Publishing additional names of POWs through the media, as Iran was doing, was against the Geneva Convention and contrary to Islamic and humanitarian principles. The visits could take place either through a third country or, preferably, through direct border crossings at a sector which would be subject to a mutually agreed temporary cease-fire;

(h) Iraq was willing to accept a Protecting Power if Iran agreed. So far, Iran had only proposed the Syrian Arab Republic and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, countries which had sided with it in the war and were thus unacceptable to Iraq. However, Iraq was extremely concerned to find a way to protect Iraqi POWs in Iran inasmuch as ICRC had been forced to suspend its activities there;

(i) There were no civilian prisoners among Iranian POWs. Some of the Iranians captured on the battlefield wore no uniforms but were armed and thus were POWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The majority within that category were the "child prisoners" belonging to the "Khomeini Guards" who were kept in Ramadi Camp No. 2. Iraq had offered to send that group back to Iran, but the Iranian Government had refused;

(j) There were no civilian medical doctors in the POW camps. The only Iranian medical doctors held in Iraqi camps were military doctors, though some of them, like certain other POWs, were volunteers who had been captured wearing civilian dress. Iraq might be willing to exchange the latter group with Iraqi civilian technicians held in Iran;

(k) There was a large number of Iranian civilians in Iraq, numbering around 75,000, who had not been captured but had sought refuge from persecution. Although they were regarded by Iraq as refugees and not as detainees, they were regularly visited by ICRC and were treated by Iraq according to the fourth Geneva Convention.<sup>10</sup> They were free to leave the camps or villages where they resided for other parts of Iraq or even to go to a third country if they so desired. A total of 130 civilians had already done so;

(l) There were no covert camps in Iraq. POWs, after capture, were taken to transfer centres, or hospitals, from which they were sent to the various camps. The usual period between capture and notification to ICRC was between one and two weeks. No registered POW had disappeared. Occasionally, some POWs were taken from the camps for interrogation but were always brought back to their camps. ICRC had handed to the Iraqi Government a list of 508 supposedly missing persons. The Government had looked into each case and had not been able to find any of them. Most were undoubtedly on the list of 1,432 POWs in Mosul Camp No. 1 which the Government had handed to ICRC in December 1984 after holding back their registration in an effort to put pressure on Iran to allow ICRC to resume its activities;

(m) Iranian POWs, unlike Iraqi POWs in Iran, were not subjected to political or ideological pressure. There had been only one case of an Iranian opposition clergyman who had visited a POW camp at the request of some POWs who had seen him on Iraqi television, but even that kind of visit had been stopped;

(n) Iranian POWs were free to perform their religious rites, since they belonged to the same religion as the Iraqis. However, public prayer, which was not required either by the Geneva Convention or by the Koran, was not allowed for security reasons, though POWs could pray in their own dormitories;

(o) Prisoners were not subjected to torture or maltreatment. ICRC had made some complaints to that effect, but when Iraq had proposed the establishment of a mixed medical commission to investigate the question, ICRC had refused. The physical marks seen by ICRC on some prisoners were the result of wounds and bruises received on the battlefield;

(p) The maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed by camp commanders on POWs for breaches of discipline was three days. A disciplinary committee, composed of 15 members, could sentence a prisoner to a maximum of 15 days in gaol. More serious breaches of discipline were dealt with by the military courts;

(q) POW representatives were freely elected by the prisoners themselves. If prisoners had any complaints, they were free to approach the Camp Commander through their representatives;

(r) Prisoners who were not officers received an allowance of 1.5 dinars per month; officers received 5 dinars.<sup>16</sup>

(s) Hygienic and medical conditions in the camps were excellent, as the President of ICRC had had occasion to remark during one of his visits.

(t) Concerning mail, Iraq allowed more than the two messages a month required by the Geneva Convention. In recent months, though, no messages from Iran had been received. Medical and other packages were welcome, though none had been received;

(u) POW personal possessions were put in a package and kept in the custody of the Camp Commander. If an Iraqi guard stole an item from a prisoner, he would be in breach of discipline and be severely punished.

### C. Examination of the concerns expressed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

55. Our findings and observations regarding the concerns expressed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the explanations of the policies of the Government of Iraq concerning the prisoners of war held in Iraq follow.

#### 1. Allegations regarding the killing of prisoners of war in the camps

*"Investigation of intentional murder and massacre of prisoners of war and civilian detainees, including the investigation and preparation of a report on the incident at Mosul Camp No. 2 on 19 November 1982, during which at least three people were killed and more than 80 injured"*

56. The Iraqi authorities emphatically denied that there had been any intentional murder or massacre of prisoners of war under their custody. They told us that the only incident in a POW camp which had resulted in the death of any POW had taken place on 26 July 1982 in Mosul Camp No. 1, though they added that another incident which had caused no deaths had taken place at Ramadi in January 1984. According to the authorities and to the official report provided us, a riot had broken out in Mosul Camp No. 1 following a quarrel between an Iranian POW and an Iraqi guard. The rioting prisoners had assaulted the guards and had broken doors and windows in the camp. Only after all the steps required under the regulations had been taken did the guards open fire in self-defence. Some POWs had been wounded, and two had died afterwards in the hospital. Had the POWs not tried to obstruct the medical staff from carrying out their duties, those two prisoners might not have died. The official report also contained the text of the testimonies given by several POWs who had witnessed the incident. As for the purported incident in Mosul Camp No. 2, the Iraqi authorities added that not only had such an incident not taken place but that camp was not in operation at the time the incident was supposed to have occurred.

57. In the course of our visit to the camps in Iraq, we received numerous reports from POWs about the occurrence of two separate incidents in Mosul in the course of 1982: one, which had taken place in Mosul Camp No. 1 on 26 July, and another, said to have happened in November, in Mosul Camp No. 2. There were some differences among POWs as to the exact date of both incidents, mainly owing to the lapse of time and the use of non-Gregorian calendars. Despite those differences, it is clear to us that the two incidents took place at separate times and camps in Mosul in 1982. The following brief accounts of the two incidents are based on the reports of numerous POWs and, in the case of Mosul No. 1, also on our hearings of two POWs who, according to the official report, had testified before the Iraqi authorities.

#### (a) Mosul Camp No. 1

58. Several days before the incident, 500 POWs were transferred from Mosul Camp No. 2 to Camp No. 1. Their arrival in what was already a crowded camp increased tension in the camp, which was already ideologically divided between those supporting and those opposing the Iranian Government. The POW representatives requested the camp authorities to allocate two rooms on the second floor of the camp—where the guards had their quarters—as additional dormitories to relieve the overcrowdedness. The authorities, while refusing to allocate rooms on the second floor, agreed to allocate two rooms on the ground floor where all POWs were housed. The rooms were being refurbished when the incident broke out.

59. The camp is in the form of a quadrangle with a large courtyard in the middle. Two sets of dormitories occupy opposite wings of the camp. One, divided into six dormitories (Nos. 8-13), contained the anti-Iranian Government POWs, while the other wing, divided into seven dormitories (Nos. 1-7), was occupied by pro-Iranian Government prisoners. Almost all newcomers were placed in dormitories Nos. 1 and 2, where an atmosphere of restlessness prevailed. There were approximately 125 POWs in dormitory No. 1 and 150 POWs in dormitory Nos. 2-7.

60. On the day of the incident, 26 July 1982, at approximately 2000 hours the doors of the dormitories had been locked except for dormitory No. 1. One of the guards took a POW to the officer on duty present at the camp, apparently because after the roll-call had been concluded he refused to enter his dormitory as did some other POWs belonging to dormitory

No. 1. At that moment, the POWs from that dormitory started shouting "Allah Akbar" (God is great), "Khomeini Rahbar" (Khomeini is the leader). Some POWs from other dormitories joined in the cheers. Noise was increasing; POWs in dormitory No. 2 broke the windows and opened the door with outside help, ran out and started breaking the locks of the doors of dormitories Nos. 3 to 7 of the same wing, while inside, POWs broke windows, ventilators and even the electricity cables. Eventually some 900 POWs were out in the courtyard. The guards withdrew to the main door and shot into the air. The officer in charge of the camp ordered the POWs to return to their dormitories but was not obeyed or heard and he and the guards withdrew from the courtyard. The POWs apparently intended to cross the courtyard towards the opposite wing and also tried to reach by the stairs the second floor where other guards were ready to fire. The guards were apparently ordered to shoot at the ground in front of the rioters but fire spread and went out of control. From POW testimonies it would appear that the Camp Commander attempted to halt the shooting, but without result. Some 8 to 12 guards reportedly fired. Two POWs died, one of them in the centre of the yard, the other one in a dormitory, and several were wounded while climbing the stairs or crossing the yard. It seems that two other prisoners died some time later because of their wounds.

61. The causes of the incident were apparently the tensions caused by crowded dormitories, bad treatment and the practice of confinement in halls as collective punishment. The attitude of the newcomers shortly before the incident may also have been a contributing factor. As told to us by POWs, there had been internal disputes among POWs because a group which was referred to as "the Khomeini people" did not want to hear radio programmes or play any kind of games and attempted to impose their views on the others. (In some cases they obtained from the authorities the removal of the loudspeakers from their dormitories in order not to hear the Farsi-language programmes transmitted by Radio Baghdad.)

62. In our view the officer in charge of the camp at the time of the incident followed the required steps, although he was not obeyed at the critical moment when some of the shooting was aimed not only at the rioters but also at the dormitories that had remained closed. We are unable to confirm that the shooting was carried out in self-defence. From the facts it appears more logical to conclude that the shooting was ordered for the purpose of re-establishing order. Despite all the measures taken, we found that the general conditions of the camp were not good; overcrowdedness was still evident, the treatment of POWs had not improved and there were too many sick and wounded prisoners, who should be repatriated.

#### (b) Mosul Camp No. 2

63. The incident in Mosul Camp No. 2 took place following the collective confinement of all POWs to their dormitories without food or water. Those measures had been taken after the POWs refused to eat their lunch-hour meal in protest over the punishment of their representatives, who were being held and apparently ill-treated in the guards' quarters after they had tried to protest the attempt to separate those POWs belonging to the regular army from the volunteers.

64. After several days of confinement—it appears to have been five or six—the inmates of one dormitory smashed the windows and also managed to break the lock of their dormitory. Prisoners in other dormitories proceeded to do likewise. Once in the courtyard, they staged a sit-down and proceeded to select new representatives—the old ones being still in detention—to talk to the Camp Commander. The latter reportedly refused to speak to the new representatives. Instead, he came down and ordered prisoners to go back to their rooms, which the POWs refused to do, apparently out of fear of being locked up again. Nothing happened on that day, but on the following day a high-ranking officer from outside the camp arrived and again ordered all POWs to return to their rooms. Before the prisoners—who were obviously reluctant to obey—could decide, he gave a signal, and a large number of guards brought from the outside rushed in with iron sticks and other weapons and attacked the prisoners. Two POWs were apparently killed on the spot, and a large number of them injured. Two other POWs reportedly died afterwards in the hospital from their injuries. The guards also entered the dormitories and proceeded to destroy mattresses, blankets and POW belongings. The prisoners said that they had been told that their treatment was in retaliation for the battle of Bostan. On the day of the incident, or the day after, some 30 to 35 POWs were picked up, apparently at random, and taken to the second floor of the camp, where, together with the POW representatives still being held there, they were beaten with clubs by the guards. They were kept there for approximately 20 days, with reduced food rations and subjected to periodic assaults.

65. On the basis of the information received, we were unable to reach a definite conclusion that the measures that were taken as well as the

beatings which resulted in the deaths and injuries of POWs had been justified.

66. We consider it necessary to mention that, on the basis of numerous testimonies received from POWs, other serious incidents appear to have occurred in Anbar and Ramadi Camp No. 1.

*"Investigation of suspicious deaths in which incisions in the area of the stomach and chest as well as broken skulls and the like have been unequivocally cited as causes of death"*

67. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that suspicious deaths have been reported in numerous cases, citing as an example that the representatives of ICRC, during their visit to the Al-Rashid camp in Baghdad, had noticed that 16 Iranian prisoners had died in that camp.

68. It should be noted that the Iranian authorities, while citing ICRC, did not make available to us any ICRC reports on its visit to the Al-Rashid camp.

69. The Iraqi authorities informed us that the so-called "Al-Rashid Camp" is the military hospital in Baghdad, to which seriously injured personnel, including POWs, are taken. We were invited by the authorities to visit the above-mentioned hospital as well as others.

70. We did not, however, consider that such visits would be likely to throw much light on the causes of death of the POWs in question or of any other similar cases, and, for lack of time, we decided not to visit any of the said hospitals. In any event, we ought to point out that the cause of death in hospital of a person from injuries normally has to be found elsewhere. We regret not having been able to investigate the causes of such deaths, which would have necessitated our inspection of other places and documents as well as the hearing of possible witnesses.

71. In brief, we were not in a position to establish the factual basis for the above concern expressed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except as it is covered by our observations in paragraphs 56-66 and 106-108.

#### 2. Allegations of the killing of prisoners of war on or after capture

*"Investigation of various cases of mass execution of prisoners of war in general, and that of the detained personnel of the Revolutionary Guards in particular"*

72. Iran has asserted that Iraq was practising mass execution of Iranian captives and, in particular, of the members of the Revolutionary Guards. Evidence was submitted by the Iranian authorities in the form of copies of purported Iraqi military orders to treat "Khomeini Guards" as "warlike criminals in the battlefield", instead of transferring the injured Guards to hospitals for treatment.

73. The Iraqi authorities replied that such orders did not exist. They would contradict humanitarian law and would thus be against Iraqi principles. The material presented by Iran was said to be forged.

74. We observed that in so far as the Iranian allegation might include incidents which occurred in Iraqi prisoner camps, they have mainly been dealt with in paragraphs 56 to 66 above. It would not be correct to speak of "mass executions" in this respect. As to the alleged execution of newly captured enemy personnel, we heard some statements to that effect in the camps but could not ourselves draw any firm conclusion on the basis of the material available to us.

75. Bearing in mind the intense animosities engendered by this war, it cannot be excluded that a considerable number of Iranian soldiers could have been killed on the battlefield upon surrender.

76. Although we were not in a position to verify the information we received, nothing we heard would, in our opinion, contradict what was stated in a memorandum of ICRC of 7 May 1983:

*"Both in Iran and in Iraq captured soldiers have been summarily executed. These executions were sometimes the act of individuals involving a few soldiers fallen into enemy hands; they have sometimes been systematic action against entire enemy units, on orders to give no quarter."*

*"Wounded enemies have been slain or simply abandoned on the field of battle. In this respect the ICRC must point out that the number of enemy wounded to which it has had access and whom it has registered in hospitals in the territory of both belligerents is disproportionate to the number of registered able-bodied prisoners in the camps or to even the most conservative estimates of the extent of the losses suffered by both parties."*

#### 3. Allegations regarding persons unlisted or "disappeared"

*"Preparations for a follow-up on the fate of nearly 20,000 disappeared persons, many of whom, according to reports of the International*

*Committee of the Red Cross and other services, are in covert detention camps"*

77. The Iranian authorities informed us that, two years ago, a list of 10,000 missing Iranian soldiers had been submitted to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation. By the beginning of 1985, that number had increased to approximately 20,000 persons. A list of their names had been handed to us in Geneva. The Iranian Government said that it had substantial evidence and proof indicating that a large number of those persons were being held in secret captivity. Further specifications and documentation in this regard were provided by the Iranian authorities.

78. We handed to the Iraqi authorities the list of missing persons, together with some photographs—taken from the Iraqi media by the Iranian authorities—of persons claimed to be missing.

79. The Iraqi authorities stated that all Iranians in POW camps were registered by ICRC. Further, there were no covert camps in Iraq, and all camps were open to ICRC. Those on the list provided by the Iranian authorities might have disappeared on the battlefield. The Iraqi authorities stated that they did not have the time for a detailed study of the list, which was handed back to us, or the other documentation that we provided, before our departure from Iraq. As for the photographs, we were told that they could have been taken anywhere and might be forgeries. The Government further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had refused to provide information on Iraqis killed on the battlefield.

80. Some of the names on the list, the Iraqi authorities stated, might be those of some "75,000 civilian refugees which are living in several villages in the areas of Al-Tash, Misan, Samawa, etc.". On the battlefield, they pointed out, many enemy dead had remained in no man's land for long periods of time and could not be recognized. In one case, through ICRC, the Iraqi authorities had requested a cease-fire to remove corpses, but that had been rejected by Iran. Moreover, many other Iraqis killed in battle did not have any tags or documents to permit identification. In some battles, Iran had launched human waves, sometimes with old people or children, to clear the minefields, many of whom had died and whose names were probably included on the list. Whenever dead bodies were recovered, the Iraqi side buried them with such identification as was available. The Iraqi Government was ready to provide the list of those buried, if Iran would reciprocate. The authorities also gave us a video cassette, showing actual battle scenes, to demonstrate the difficulties involved in the identification of those killed.

81. Owing to constraints of time and the extremely difficult and complex task of locating missing persons, we were unable to do anything but emphasize the gravity of the accusation made by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We questioned the Iraqi authorities very closely and carefully to ascertain, as far as possible, the actual whereabouts of those mentioned on the list. It appears to us that, for a variety of reasons, some of the bodies of persons who had died on the battlefield could not be recognized and, as a consequence, had been buried as unidentified or unknown. However, the failure to submit the required reports in other instances may have been part of counter-intelligence measures designed to mislead the enemy. We believe that, since the Iraqi authorities have not reported the names of the dead members of the Iranian armed forces or volunteer combatants whom they have been able to identify, failing thus to fulfill their humanitarian duties, many of these dead must be among the list of 20,000 said to be missing.

82. The reasons given by Iraq are plausible but not satisfactory. We should like to recall, as we do in the case of Iranian failure to submit such reports, that the parties to the conflict are obliged, under the first Geneva Convention,<sup>13</sup> to record and provide to the central prisoner-of-war information agency for transmission to the country of origin all data on each wounded, sick or dead person of the adversary falling into their hands as well as the identity and state of health of captured personnel, with death certificates of those who have died after capture.

*"The investigation into and report on civilian prisoners"*

83. This concern has two aspects: first, civilians, including old men, women and children, said by Iran to have been forcibly removed from their homes and transferred to internment camps in Iraq and to be numbering tens of thousands; and, second, civilians held in POW camps and registered by ICRC, claimed to number more than 1,500. These two matters are dealt with separately below.

*(a) Civilians moved from their homes in Iran to Iraq*

84. These are said by Iran to have been deported by force, most of them being Iranian Arabs and Kurds.

85. ICRC, for its part, pointed out in its memorandum of 7 May 1983 that "tens of thousands of Iranian civilians from the Khuzistan and Kurdistan border regions, residing in areas under Iraqi Army control, had been

deported in grave breach of the fourth Geneva Convention", and that until May 1983 the ICRC delegates had had only restricted access to a few of these people.

86. The Iraqi authorities admitted that considerable numbers of Iranian citizens totalling some 75,000 were currently on Iraqi soil and lived in special villages built for and by them on land granted by the Government of Iraq. They were not considered deportees, detainees or internees but civilian refugees. They were not captured but had come voluntarily to Iraq, in the wake of the war, fleeing from persecution. Most of them were farmers. Though Iraq regarded them as refugees, it had agreed that they should be covered by the fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and they were thus visited by ICRC. We were told that we were welcome to visit the villages, an invitation which we accepted.

87. We decided to travel to the Misan area, where 25,000 civilians of Arab origin from the Khuzistan region of Iran are concentrated in four villages. We went first to the village of Bitarah, 40 kilometres west of Amara in the southern part of the country, with a population of about 2,500 families (some 15,000 persons, of whom 6,000 to 7,000 were under 16 years of age). Another village nearby briefly visited was Kumet (Do-solek), which has about 500 families.

88. In further official briefings in Bitarah, we were told that nobody in Misan had been forced to leave Iran. Many had travelled by their own means of transport, such as cars or carts, on lorries provided by the Iraqi army or by foot. Many had brought with them their own belongings. Both the dangers in the war zone and opposition to the Iranian Government were cited as grounds for their preference to stay in Iraq. We were also informed that the people living in Misan had been issued identity cards by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior similar to those issued to all Iraqis but stating that they were "Arabistans", since, though Arabs, they were not Iraqi nationals. They were under the supervision of the Iraqi Committee of Victims of War, on which representatives from the various government ministries sat. Every village had a school, and the inhabitants had been given land and cattle by the Iraqi Government.

89. We inspected the two villages, including the schools, and we were able to speak in private with what we consider to be a fair cross-section of the inhabitants of Bitarah. Some of those interviewed stressed that they considered themselves to be part of the Arab nation, though not necessarily Iraqis, and even referred to their anti-Iranian activities while in Iran. Others, however, after expressing fear of speaking out, stated that they had been forcibly brought to Iraq and doubted that the presence in the village of many of its inhabitants was voluntary. Several, particularly the older ones, complained about their separation from their families as well as a lack of mail from those relatives left in Iran. Allegations were also made about younger men, aged between 18 and 40, being coerced into enlisting in the Iraqi army under such threats as having their pay cut off. That, however, was denied by the authorities.

90. We noted that the civilians in those villages did not seem to be unanimous in their attitude or their assessment of their conditions and that some of them seemed to wish to be repatriated independently of the war and the political situation in Iran. Currently, they were not allowed to do so. Given the constraints of time, it was impossible for us to assess the proportion of people who shared such views—and therefore should not be regarded as refugees in any sense of the word—and of those who did not wish to return, at least under the existing circumstances.

91. We were informed by the Government that all civilians from Iran had freedom of movement and of employment within Iraq and that there were no restrictions if they wished to move to third countries. About 130 civilians had, in fact, done so. We were provided with a list of 102 names of those who had emigrated from Iraq to a third country. In our view, any repatriation programme or resettlement (which was said by the authorities not to be an issue in practice) would in those circumstances have to be based on detailed investigation and accompanied by assurances that they are voluntary.

92. It was not possible for us, owing to constraints of time, to visit Anbar (Al-Tash), the village for Kurds with an estimated population of 15,000. Samawa, basically for "intellectuals", was another village which could not be visited because of lack of time.

*(b) Iranian civilians held in Iraqi POW camps*

93. This concern is related to other Iranian concerns, such as the general claim of large numbers of Iraqis missing in Iraq and those relating to the captured Iranian Minister of Oil and his entourage, as well as Iranian medical personnel held by Iraq. However, it is also more specifically claimed that in the course of registration of Iranian POWs by ICRC, it had merged that a number of them, said by the Iranian Government to number more than 1,500, were civilians whom ICRC had been unable to

have separated and released. It was claimed that, of 424 captives repatriated by Iraq, 235 were civilians, 171 of them being over 50 years of age.

94. According to the Iraqi authorities, the persons held as POWs had been captured when actively engaged in the hostilities. The authorities pointed out that in the Iranian war effort many persons had participated in the fighting besides the regular army, such as the Revolutionary Guards and other volunteer forces. When, for instance, a medical doctor was captured, arms in hand, he had to be regarded as a POW (see para. 102). The repatriation of a number of persons referred to by Iran showed, on the other hand, Iraq's willingness to examine individual cases, as Iraq was also currently doing with a view to repatriating more POWs unilaterally as soon as the necessary procedures could be completed.

95. As a point of departure, we have taken note of the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq in his meeting with us, admitting generally that mistakes might have been made, especially in the earlier stages of the war.

96. During our visits to the POW camps in Iraq, we met in most of the camps a considerable number of prisoners who claimed to be civilians and gave credible accounts of their background. Many of these prisoners were old and in poor health. Others were farmers, still other young professional civilians captured during the hostilities, especially in the areas of Khorramshahr and Abadan, areas which were for some time occupied by Iraq. Occasionally, we encountered POWs who claimed that they had not been captured during hostilities but had fled from Iran seeking political asylum. The specific complaint was made by some such persons that the authorities arresting them had not listened to them and that they never had had a chance to present their cases.

97. While unable to verify the individual stories and taking into account the well-publicized fact that both old and young Iranian civilians have volunteered to join the war effort, we must, nevertheless, point out that we consider it established beyond reasonable doubt that there are in Iraqi POW camps a number of inmates who should not properly be there. A close examination of the files of POWs by the competent Iraqi authorities would, we believe, confirm our conclusion.

*"Investigation of the fate of Mr. Tongguyan, the Minister of Oil, and his deputies and companions captured by the Iraqi forces"*

98. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has accused Iraq of not permitting the captured Minister of Oil and his deputies, namely, Mr. Yahyavi and Mr. Boushehri, and his other attendants to be visited by ICRC. They have further charged that the Minister and his companions have been mistreated and tortured.

99. We requested the Iraqi authorities to be allowed to meet with the Minister of Oil, Mr. Tongguyan, and his deputies. We were told that they were willing to have us meet the Minister but that he had expressed his wish not to meet anyone, including ICRC, and had threatened to commit suicide if his wishes were not respected. They informed us that the Minister was well and that he had spoken with his family both in Iran and in New York on the telephone. From a military viewpoint, we were told, the Minister was less important than an Iranian pilot. But the Minister refused to see anybody. The Iraqi Government had made an offer to ICRC to meet the Minister on condition that ICRC signed an affidavit taking full responsibility for the Minister's actions thereafter in view of his threat to commit suicide. The Iraqi authorities were willing to allow us to see the Minister, provided we gave the same guarantee that had been requested from ICRC. After due consideration, we felt that we were not in a position to accept such an offer. The authorities informed us that the Minister's companions at the time of his capture could be seen by us when we visited Anbar and Ramadi No. 1 camps.

100. We very much regret that we could not meet either the Minister of Oil or, except for his driver held at Ramadi Camp No. 1, any of his associates who might have been with him at the time of capture. The Iraqi authorities claimed that they had never captured the two deputies and therefore did not know their whereabouts. During our visits to the camps, we heard from a number of POWs that they had seen Mr. Yahyavi and Mr. Boushehri in detention at Abu Ghoraba, a prison about 30 kilometres from Baghdad which the authorities claimed was solely reserved for Iraqi prisoners.

*"Investigation of the fate of the Red Crescent personnel, including medical doctors, assistants and other personnel, captured and detained in contravention of Protocol 1 additional to the Geneva Conventions"*

101. The Iranian authorities have stated that persons falling within the above category have been denied any contact with members of ICRC or with their families.

102. The Iraqi authorities informed us that they had, in fact, repatriated four women belonging to the Iranian Red Crescent staff. All medical doctors and assistants held by Iraq had to be considered military personnel, since they either were part of the regular army or, even if they wore civilian attire, were part of the volunteer forces. Regarding the latter group, Iraq would be willing to exchange them for Iraqi civilian technicians held as prisoners by Iran, on a percentage basis, not in equal numbers.

103. We met a number of medical doctors and personnel in various camps in Iraq, including a group of five doctors in Anbar Camp who had been captured as long ago as October 1980. The five ranged in age from 46 to 61 years and some of them were themselves afflicted with various ailments and infirmities.

104. All of them declared that they were civilian doctors who had been captured in October 1980 on the road from Khorramshahr. Only one of them stated that he had been a member of the Iranian Red Crescent who had been sent to treat the wounded in civil hospitals.

105. We should like to recall that, according to the first Geneva Convention, the staff of national Red Cross societies and that of other voluntary aid societies must be respected and protected in all circumstances. If they fall into the hands of the adverse party, they must be retained only in so far as the state of health and the number of POWs require; in other words, they shall be returned to their country unless their retention is indispensable. In repatriating them, account should be taken of the chronological order of their capture and their state of health. Although these persons are not to be deemed prisoners of war, they are entitled to a status at least as favourable. It seems to us that the five Anbar doctors are a clear case for unconditional repatriation, irrespective of reciprocity.

*"Investigation of the fact that the names of the Iranian prisoners of war are submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross months and sometimes years after their capture"*

106. The Iraqi authorities informed the mission that they had consistently reported all captured Iraqis to ICRC within a period of one to two weeks and, as of December 1984, all Iranian POWs were registered by ICRC. However, as ICRC had been informed, Iraq did hold up for a time the registration of a substantial number of Iranian POWs, not yet seen by ICRC, in order to exert pressure on Iran, which was holding thousands of unregistered Iraqi POWs. After a while, those Iranian POWs, who numbered 1,432, were registered by ICRC in December 1984. They were all housed in Mosul Camp No. 1.

107. Despite the assurances given by the Iraqi authorities, we believe that there have been considerable delays in many instances in submission to ICRC of the names of captured Iranian prisoners, with some POWs never seen by ICRC.

108. We visited Mosul Camp No. 1 and have, indeed, ascertained that 1,432 POWs had been registered by ICRC in December 1984. The rest of the POWs in Mosul Camp No. 1 were already in possession of their ICRC cards. Of the 9,206 Iranian POWs claimed to be held by the Iraqi authorities, 9,195 had been registered by ICRC at the time of the mission's visit.

#### 4. Allegations of the existence of "secret" camps

*"Investigation of the fate of prisoners of war who have been suspiciously transferred from overt to covert camps or vice versa"*

109. The Iranian authorities provided us with information concerning the alleged practice of the Iraqi authorities of transferring POWs from overt to covert camps, or vice versa. They also provided the names of what they consider secret camps, where Iranian POWs are interned.

110. The Iraqi authorities, in reply to the above-mentioned Iranian concern, stated that some Iranian POWs had, in fact, been temporarily transferred from their camps for the purpose of interrogation but they were always returned to their camps. It was also possible that, at times, such transfers could have coincided with visits of ICRC to the camps. However, such transfers were not premeditated to coincide with such visits. The interrogations related to matters of a military nature or to events in POW camps and were always carried out without coercion. On other occasions, interrogation was required after the authorities had discovered the true rank or identity of a prisoner who had hidden either from the authorities.

111. According to the Iraqi authorities, ICRC had visited all the POW camps in Iraq and had registered all the POWs. There were no covert or "secret" POW camps in Iraq, they stated. It happened that military hospitals, like the one in Al-Rashid, which were in military camps, were often used for the treatment of POWs who required special care. On other occasions, military quarters were used as a transit point for newly captured POWs. For example, the Tanookeh Camp referred to by the Iranian authorities was located in the war front, where army units had their quarters.

112. Although we were not in a position to ascertain for ourselves the existence of covert POW camps in Iraq, or if the transfers of POWs were made for short periods solely for the purpose of interrogation, as claimed by the Iraqi authorities, we believe, based on information received from a variety of sources, that many Iranian prisoners of war, including the Minister of Oil and some of his associates, remain concealed from the time of their capture. We estimate the number of concealed POWs to be in the hundreds.

113. During the course of our visits to the POW camps, we met a number of Iranian POWs who claimed to have been held in "covert" camps or such places as a wing in the Ministry of Defence and Abu Ghorab, which, the Iraqi authorities told us, was solely for Iraqi prisoners. Some POWs, in recounting their detention in such "covert" camps, stated that they had seen Iranian prisoners, mainly Revolutionary Guards and pilots, kept in such places. For instance, we received information to the effect that 51 Iranian officers were being held in Abu Ghorab. Most POWs who claimed to have been at one time or another in interrogation centres or in "secret" camps explained that they had been kept in overcrowded cells, often with barely any light, sometimes for long periods of time, and frequently subjected to torture.

114. We were also informed by some POWs that prior to our visits to their camps, some POWs, particularly those in punishment cells, had been removed by the authorities. We were not in a position to verify the above allegations.

### 5. Allegations of torture and severe mistreatment of prisoners of war in camps

#### "Mental and physical torture of the prisoners"

115. In support of the above charges, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran refers, *inter alia*, to reports from ICRC which have mentioned credible instances of beatings with sticks, batons and wire cables.

116. The Iraqi authorities responded that the above charges made by Iran were totally unsubstantiated, as we would realize when we talked with the POWs.

117. During our visits to the POW camps in Iraq, we saw and heard much evidence of physical violence and ill-treatment in the camps, attributed mainly to prison guards but also, on occasions, to those POWs who enjoyed the confidence of the authorities and were said to be "authorized" to use force against fellow prisoners. Shortness of time did not allow us to examine and verify the truth of all such allegations, though their frequency and similarity leads us to the conclusion that brutality by guards in most POW camps is common.

118. The allegations most frequently heard related to blows on the head and other beatings with batons, truncheons or wire cables. In almost all the camps visited we met POWs who had had their hearing impaired, including several who had lost their hearing in one ear and even some who had become totally deaf as a result of blows on their head or ears. We were also told that some POWs had lost their sight or had had it seriously impaired as a result of beatings. We noticed scars, bruises, broken teeth and other bodily marks which appeared to be consistent with the stories told to us by the prisoners. Other frequent forms of punishment mentioned to us included confinement in punishment cells for periods of up to a month, and individual and collective deprivation of food.

119. Some prisoners complained that they had been beaten or otherwise punished for talking to ICRC.

120. POWs who had spent some time in interrogation centres stated that torture was frequently employed there as a punishment, in order to extract information, or simply for purposes of intimidation. They spoke of being suspended upside down from ceilings or ventilators, of having the soles of their feet whipped or beaten, of electric shocks administered to various parts of their bodies, including their genital organs, of burnings with cigarettes and, in some cases, mock executions. We met several POWs who alleged that they had become impotent as a result of torture and heard allegations about cases of castrations and of POWs having bottles or other objects inserted into the rectum. We were also told of instances of sexual assaults, particularly in Anbar and Ramadi Camps Nos. 1 and 2.

121. We did not, of course, have the means of verifying such allegations. Even taking into account the possibility of exaggeration, we were struck by the consistent pattern of many of the allegations.

122. We regret not being able to enter into more specific details of some of the practices reported to us because of the need to protect our sources.

123. We questioned the authorities in some detail about the system of disciplinary punishment. The rules to which the Government referred do not seem to allow practices such as those described. For instance, the

maximum period of solitary confinement that a Camp Commander may impose is 3 days; a maximum of 15 days can only be imposed by decision of a disciplinary committee, a central authority. More severe punishments can only be imposed by a military court.

124. We believe, however, that outside these rules, punishment both of a corporal character and in the form of isolation and confinement in "punishment rooms", and deprivation of food and facilities take place through more informal procedures.

125. We consider that any form of torture or physical ill-treatment of POWs should be absolutely forbidden and that any orders to that effect should be strictly enforced. We also do not think that there is room for any kind of collective punishment. We further believe that the existing rules regarding solitary confinement should be observed in practice.

### 6. Allegations of political and ideological pressure and indoctrination

#### "Political and ideological pressure on prisoners of war by the leading members of terrorist groups infiltrating the camps"

126. The Iranian authorities have charged Iraq with political and ideological intimidation of Iranian prisoners of war. Further, they have claimed that leaders and members of the Iranian opposition groups, such as Sheikh Ali Tehrani and Mueyehidin-E-Khalgh, were allowed to enter the camps, where they systematically tried to brainwash Iranian POWs and incite them to abandon their religious beliefs and commit treason against their country.

127. The Iraqi authorities countered the above charges by referring to their own charges against Iran for carrying out such practices against Iraqi prisoners of war. They stated that they had had only one such case when one member (a clergyman) of an opposition group went to visit a POW camp at the request of some POWs who had seen him on television.

128. In the course of our visits to the camps we heard various allegations of attempts to influence POWs politically and ideologically. In several camps, many POWs complained about being forced to hear from morning to night, through the loudspeakers installed in every dormitory, radio programmes of a political content broadcast in Farsi by radio Baghdad. Other POWs told us of attempts to force them to give interviews critical of the Iranian leaders on radio or television, and of forced shouting of "anti-Khomeini" slogans. Reference was also made to the staging of plays of a political content critical or abusive of the Iranian leadership. We were also told in one or two camps of visits by Iranian opposition leaders—in one case, shortly before our arrival—whom all POWs were forced to listen to. Those allegations notwithstanding, we received the impression that such ideological pressure did not seem to be intense.

129. We have noted the recent establishment of a school at the Ramadi Camp No. 2 (better known as the "children's camp"). The school has been given much publicity by the Iraqi authorities, with organizations such as Terre des Hommes and Défense des Enfants providing equipment and some of the teaching staff. The school, which was formally opened on 6 February 1985, is named "Iranian children prisoners-of-war school".

130. We visited the school, where we were informed by the authorities that the choice for attendance was left to the "children". The average age of the children in the camp, some of whom had been in captivity for more than 2 years, appeared to be about 16 years.

131. We were informed by the non-Iraqi teachers that after initial opposition, an increasing number of the youngsters were attending school. The fact that many prisoners appear to stand aloof from the school tends to give credence to the voluntary character of this educational programme. Though we recognize that instruction at school could easily be abused for purposes of political indoctrination, particularly of young people, we feel that it is too early to pass judgement on this experiment.

#### "Investigation of the Iraqi measures to prevent the prisoners from performing their religious prayers"

132. According to the Iraqi authorities, there were no such restrictions for any religious group in Iraqi POW camps. The only problems arose from the wish of some POWs to hold collective (congregational) prayers; that could not be allowed for security reasons. Participation in such prayers was limited by the authorities to 10 POWs at a time. They added that Islam did not prescribe such forms of collective prayers.

133. During the course of our visits to the camps, we saw a number of POWs praying individually. We also heard a number of them complaining that they were not allowed to have collective prayers. Even when the authorities had allowed groups of 10 to pray together in the dormitories, they were forced to stay at least 1 metre apart from each other, instead of shoulder to shoulder, as called for by their *Shari'ah*.

### 7. Allegations of substandard conditions in camps

*'Unhygienic conditions and lack of necessary facilities in the camps'*

134. The Iranian Government referred to the inadequacy of meals, insufficient water supply, vitamin deficiencies causing mouth infection, and bad hygiene. It was also claimed that the camps were overcrowded, which intensified contamination and hygienic hazards.

135. The Iranian Government also complained about shortages of medical facilities and supplies.

136. The Iraqi authorities did not comment specifically on the above charges but asked us to see for ourselves the conditions in the camps.

137. During visits to camps, material conditions, health services and related subjects were often discussed with representatives of the authorities, medical personnel and the POWs. We noted that the camps visited were all in good order when we arrived and showed signs of recent cleaning and tidying, inside as well as outside the dormitories.

138. Nevertheless, shortcomings of installations and equipment required for good hygiene were evident. There were few showers, and in some camps we were told by the POWs that only cold water was available, and then not at all times. The latrines were in extremely bad shape; frequently their stench was appalling. Further, when dormitories were locked, buckets placed in the dormitories were used as toilets. We also noticed some leaking ceilings and walls, and heard frequent complaints of dampness in the dormitories. In most of the dormitories, prisoners did not have beds, only mattresses and blankets on the floor. Overcrowding in the dormitories of some camps was evident. One dormitory visited, 15 by 5 metres in size, accommodated 57 to 60 POWs.

139. A number of prisoners raised medical problems and complained about inadequate health services and supplies. In one camp, the POWs told us that there was no resident doctor. Many POWs complained about the lack of dental care and adequate medicines, and the absence of certain vitamins in their diet.

140. Most health complaints appeared to be related to inadequate hygiene, as evidenced by the apparent prevalence of scabies, haemorrhoids and rheumatism. We also heard complaints of chronic and some infectious diseases as well as of mental disorders.

141. Though food was said to have improved in most camps before our arrival, there were also complaints about its poor quality and quantity. Cases of deprivation of meals as group punishment have already been noted.

*'Lack of attention to the sick and the wounded, thus ending in permanent disability and amputation'*

142. The above claims were contested by the Iraqi authorities. In our contacts with official medical personnel in the camps the point was often made that besides the health facilities in each camp, efficient treatment was provided in military hospitals when necessary. In fact, some of the alleged transfers of prisoners from camps to covert places and back again were said to be cases of hospitalization. The invitation to the mission to visit a military hospital could not be acted upon, as explained by us in paragraph 70.

143. It was difficult for us to determine the factual basis of this particular Iranian concern, especially as regards those wounded in the battlefield, though some POWs asserted having witnessed several wounded prisoners shot dead. We were told of a POW in Anbar who had died owing to lack of treatment after having suffered a heart attack and of prisoners who had become permanently disabled as a result of inadequate medical treatment.

144. We met some of those prisoners as well as others who claimed that they were not being allowed to have a required operation for third-degree haemorrhoids.

145. As we mentioned in connection with the previous Iranian concern, we witnessed a good deal of suffering among POWs, who complained of lack of medical attention of various kinds, of chronic diseases, of deteriorating hearing and eyesight and other ailments.

146. Despite our inability to form a definitive opinion as to the correctness of all the complaints, we believe that there is considerable room for improvement regarding the treatment of the sick and wounded.

**8. Allegations of denial or withholding of mail and other entitlements of prisoners of war in camps**

*'Investigation of the fact that the messages of families of prisoners are withheld by the Iraqi censorship and sometimes never reach them'*

147. The Iraqi authorities stated that Iranian POWs in Iraq received eight times more correspondence than the Iraqi POWs in the Islamic Republic of Iran, who were much larger in numbers. They had, until recently, been allowed up to six messages per month. However, that had created

serious administrative problems. After discussions with ICRC, it had been agreed to allow two messages per month, as called for by the third Geneva Convention. In recent months, however, no messages from Iraqi POWs had arrived from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

148. From our inquiries, we have come to the conclusion, without passing judgement on the causes, that the one to eight proportion indicated by the Iraqi authorities seems plausible. This does not mean, of course, that irregularities, including the withholding of mail by the Iraqi authorities, do not exist. We have also heard from some POWs that they were allowed only one letter or message per month; photographs were not delivered. A related complaint expressed by POWs in virtually every camp was that they were not being allowed pencil and paper. Nevertheless, delays in handling messages due to censorship procedures seem to be prevalent.

*'Investigation of Iraqi refusal to allow Red Crescent aid packages containing such items as medical spectacles and special medicines to reach the prisoners'*

149. The Iraqi authorities replied that medical and other packages were welcome, though none had been received from Iran. They, in turn, complained that packages sent to Iraqi POWs had not been distributed by the Iranian authorities.

150. Our own inquiries, however, have indicated that camp commanders, in both Iran and Iraq, have not allowed distribution of medical supplies sent to POWs.

*'Investigation of the Iraqi soldiers' seizure of the prisoners' personal possessions'*

151. We feel that seizure of personal possessions of a POW has been happening on both sides, either at the time of capture or shortly thereafter. Given the length of their detention and the seriousness of some of their problems, only a few Iranian POWs in the camps visited made such complaints. It was not possible for us to investigate in detail the concern expressed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

152. We requested the Iraqi authorities to explain and demonstrate their system for securing the personal possessions of POWs after capture and registration. They said that when POWs were in the hands of responsible authorities, Iraqi regulations corresponding to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions applied. To have an illustration of how the rules were observed in practice, we requested in one camp to see the possessions kept on behalf of some of the prisoners. We found out that they were kept in a safe next to the Camp Commander's office. A few samples of such belongings were brought to us and were verified by the POWs concerned during our visit in the camp.

**9. Allegations of the prevention of visits and certain other concerns**

153. In a letter dated 19 November 1984 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General (see appendix I), the following proposals were made for consideration by us to be carried out under the auspices of the Red Cross:

*'(a) Exchange of an equal number of prisoners;*

*'(b) Preparations for the families of the prisoners to visit them.'*

154. Further, we made the following proposals in this regard to the Iraqi authorities:

*'(a) To allow Iraqi families to travel to Iran for the purpose of visitation;*

*'(b) To create a similar possibility for Iranian families to travel to Iraq.'*

155. The Iranian authorities have informed us that despite the negative response of Iraq to the proposals for family visits, the Iranian authorities were allowing family visits to Iraqi POWs in Iran and providing all facilities for such visits.

156. We are aware that ICRC has formulated procedures for family visits which have been submitted to the two Governments. However, there has been no follow-up on the matter on the part of the Governments concerned.

157. The Iraqi authorities informed us that they were ready to allow family visits, once Iran had provided the full list of Iraqi POWs held in Iran. They could not accept the Iranian practice of announcing the names of Iraqi POWs through the media, a practice that they considered to be in violation of the Geneva Conventions. The visits, once the Iraqi demands had been met, could take place through a third country or, preferably, through direct border crossing, which would require a mutually agreed temporary cease-fire.

158. The authorities in both countries expressed their readiness to exchange POWs. The authorities in Iraq, however, stated that the exchange

should be on a proportional basis, as Iran held about five times as many Iraqi POWs as there were Iranian POWs in Iraq. They added, however, that they were prepared to be flexible concerning the proportionality.

### III. VISIT TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

#### A. Programme of work and itinerary of the mission

159. Upon our arrival in Tehran on the morning of 18 January 1985, we decided upon our programme of work after considering a number of proposals submitted to us by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The programme was subsequently communicated to the Iranian authorities, who provided us with all the technical arrangements and linguistic facilities required for its implementation. In deciding our itinerary, we had to balance the desirability of visiting as many POW camps as possible, in addition to Gorgan, against the limitations imposed by the distance of some of the camps from Tehran and by the limited length of our stay.

160. We were received by Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We also held conversations, at the start and at the conclusion of our visit, with a team of Iranian Government officials, which was headed by Mr. D. J. Mahallati, Director-General for International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and included Mr. Said Rajaie-Khorassani, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, Mr. S. Nasserli, head of the Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. Akhondi, Adviser to the Minister of the Interior, and Mr. H. Hosseini, deputy head of the Department of International Organizations.

161. We also held discussions with Colonel Mokri, Commander of the Military Centre in Tehran, with overall responsibility for POW camps throughout the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as with the commanders of every POW camp visited. We also met with the Secretary and other leading members of the Commission for the Protection of Iranian Prisoners of War.

162. During our stay in the Islamic Republic of Iran, we visited eight POW camps: Gorgan Camp; Sari and Semnan, situated between Gorgan and Tehran; and five other camps situated in Tehran and its surrounding area, namely Davoudieh, Mehrabad, Heshmatieh, Takhti and Parandak. A planned visit by helicopter to Arak POW camp, situated some 200 kilometres south-west of Tehran, had to be cancelled owing to weather conditions. The combined POW population held in the camps visited was 30,894. The list of POW camps in Iran together with their population as provided by the Iranian authorities, as well as a description of the eight POW camps visited, appears in appendix 6 to this report. The chronology of our activities in Iran is set out in appendix 7.

#### B. General information and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning prisoners of war

163. In the course of the preliminary meetings, the Iranian authorities conveyed to us the following observations and comments, as well as their general policies on the matter of prisoners of war.

164. Concerning the situation of Iranian POWs in Iraq, the information received by the Iranian Government suggested that their situation was extremely precarious. As the mission would undoubtedly note, that was in clear contrast to the treatment of POWs in Iran, which was a humane one, based on the dictates of the Koran and in accordance with the guidelines laid down by Imam Khomeini himself, who wished all POWs to be treated as guests.

165. It was unfortunate, they stated, that the issue of POWs should have become a practical tool in the hands of Iraq and its supporters. Recently ICRC had also fallen into that trap. A clear example was the problem of Iranian POWs under 18 years of age captured by Iraq. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which also held a large number of POWs falling within that age group, had proposed the release through ICRC of all POWs under 18 held by both sides. ICRC, however, had not assisted in the implementation of that proposal but had used it as part of its propaganda against Iran. Two weeks before the mission's arrival, the Government of Iraq had announced its intention to build two schools for Iranian child prisoners, and two Swiss organizations had volunteered assistance for that undertaking. The Iranian Government had called the attention of the Swiss Government to that matter.

166. The incident in Gorgan was similar to incidents that had occurred also in Mosul and other POW camps in Iraq. ICRC knew about them but, whereas it had chosen to publicize the Gorgan incident, it had remained silent about Mosul.

167. The Islamic Republic of Iran was used to being subjected to outside pressures. Iraq had started the war in an attempt to prevent the

Islamic Republic of Iran from pursuing the policies it had set out to achieve. The Iranian Government was ready to consider any proposals within an international framework but beyond the glare of publicity. It would therefore not accept such a renowned organization as ICRC if it was to be used as an instrument of publicity and pressure. The Islamic Republic of Iran was satisfied with the way the United Nations had handled its two inquiries into civilian areas subjected to military attack and into the use of chemical weapons. The Government trusted that in carrying out its work, the mission would not be influenced by the political propaganda surrounding the POW issue.

168. Concerning areas for negotiation with Iraq, the Iranian Government pointed out that, several years previously, when the Islamic Republic of Iran held far fewer POWs than at present, it had proposed a mutual exchange of prisoners but had received no reply from the Iraqi Government. It was still ready to exchange POWs in equal numbers, or in numbers acceptable to Iraq. There was also the problem of Iranian civilians—for example, medical doctors—held by Iraq as POWs in contravention of the Geneva Conventions. That was another area for negotiation with Iraq, even though the Iranian Government doubted Iraq's willingness to reach an agreement. The Islamic Republic of Iran, moreover, was willing to arrange for an exchange of child prisoners in any numbers to which Iraq might agree. Several years previously, the Iranian Government had put forward a suggestion for the exchange of visits by POW families. Some steps taken by the Government of Iraq had prevented such a proposal from becoming a reality. The proposal was still on the table, and Iran was willing to allow visits by Iraqi families of POWs, irrespective of reciprocity.

169. We were also informed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had been willing for some time to release unilaterally large numbers of invalid Iraqi POWs. To date, one group of 72 such POWs had been repatriated, and another group of 26 would follow. There had been some delays in that regard, owing to the strained relations with the ICRC.

170. The Islamic Republic of Iran was seriously considering the possibility of asking one or more neutral countries, or an international organization, to act as a Protecting Power. Alternatively, the Iranian Government would be willing to use the good offices of a third country or of an international organization, without either taking up the role of Protecting Power, for the purpose of assisting in an exchange of prisoners.

171. In reply to a question, we were told that the Iranian Government felt that those POWs held for the longest period should be released first. There were between some 6,000 and 7,000 Iraqis who had been held in captivity for more than four years.

172. Turning to the policies and administrative practices followed by the Iranian Government towards Iraqi POWs, we were informed that:

(a) The total number of POWs in the Islamic Republic of Iran was more than 46,000 spread over 16 camps. Most POWs had been captured near Khorramshahr;

(b) The camps were located in areas where the climate was best, far from the battlefield. Most of them had previously been Iranian army quarters;

(c) All camps had tap water in abundance and had heating and cooling facilities; some were air-conditioned;

(d) Every camp had the required sanitary facilities: showers, lavatories and water basins. POWs were required to shower at least once a week. Although there were some mechanized laundry facilities, most POWs washed their clothes by hand, for which they were given laundry soap;

(e) All camps had doctors and medical facilities to cope with mild medical cases. Emergency and intensive care was available in military hospitals. There was an average of one doctor and three medical assistants per 1,000 POWs. That compared favourably with the rest of the country, where the ratio was one doctor per 10,000 inhabitants. Use was made in the camps of captured Iraqi medical personnel;

(f) Prisoners wounded on the front were immediately moved to hospitals in Tehran. It was the policy of the Iranian Government, in keeping with Islamic precepts, to seek to repatriate, via a third country, those POWs with chronic or incurable diseases. If there were any hindrances to that effort, they were due to bureaucratic delays, not least on the part of ICRC, which had resulted, for instance, in the death of two POWs before they could be repatriated;

(g) The sleeping facilities in the camps were identical to those provided for Iranian soldiers. Beds, mattresses, pillows, blankets, towels and tooth-brushes were provided for every prisoner;

(h) Fifteen items of clothing were supplied to each POW. Every six months they received a new cap; every four, new underwear; every month, four bars of soap; every six months, new bath and hand towels, a tooth-brush and a pair of slippers; every month, one pair of socks; every year,

a new bedspread and every other year, two new blankets. Prisoners also received a new woollen coat and trousers every year;

(i) The food provided to POWs was the same as that provided to the Iranian army. Since the country was at war, army rations contained 3,500 to 4,000 calories per day. The same applied to POWs. Frequently, camp authorities consulted POWs about their diet. One consequence had been, for instance, that the amount of rice had been reduced and that of meat increased. Twice a week POWs ate chicken. Meat was always provided with their main meals. Butter and preserves, and sometimes eggs, were served with breakfast. Three days a week, the authorities endeavoured to give prisoners fruit or compote;

(j) Every POW, irrespective of rank, received the equivalent of 20 Swiss francs a month. Of this, SwF 10 was paid to them in coupons, which they could use as money in the camp canteen or store, where goods were available at cost value. The other SwF 10 was paid in the form of cigarettes, at the rate of seven per day. POWs were not paid in cash, since that would facilitate the task of those seeking to escape. In addition, every POW was given a daily allowance of 20 rials<sup>19</sup> to purchase sweets. At the beginning of the war, soldiers received SwF 8, NCOs SwF 12 and officers SwF 16. It was decided later that it would be more equitable to increase the pay of everybody to SwF 20. Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran was going beyond what was required under the third Geneva Convention. Sometimes prisoners received their pay for two or three months in one lump sum;

(k) Concerning amenities, all camps had colour television and radio sets. POWs were free to switch on any programmes that they wished. Journals and magazines in Arabic and, sometimes, in English were available;

(l) Physical exercise in the morning was compulsory. Games were not, although football, baseball and table tennis were popular. Each POW camp had its own teams which competed against each other. The winning team then played against an Iranian team. The authorities had recently decided to allow the winning team to play abroad in 1985;

(m) Every facility for religious worship was provided. Some POWs had even been taken to the Holy City of Qum. The needs of Christians and any other religious minorities were also taken care of, particularly at Christmas and some other major Christian religious holidays;

(n) Regarding mail, we were told that POWs were free to correspond with anybody anywhere, including, of course, their families. Pens and pencils as well as paper were provided. Correspondence was handled through ICRC or through a third country. Letters sent to countries other than Iraq received prompt replies. Replies from Iraq were slow, suggesting that the Iraqi Government was holding up mail or that the families did not receive the letters sent to them by POWs. Proof of that was the fact that, in several instances, prisoners received "phony" letters, written, for instance, by the "wife" of a prisoner who was unmarried or containing information about the health of a relative who was long dead. Letters from POWs, after being censored, a process that usually took between one and two weeks, were handed to ICRC, unless they went via a third country;

(o) The Iranian Government was willing to facilitate meetings of POWs with their families. Third countries had been notified that any families of POWs were welcome in the Islamic Republic of Iran. To facilitate matters and to avoid possible reprisals by the Government of Iraq, the Iranian authorities did not stamp the passports of those coming to visit their relatives in the camps. Their entry visa was put on a separate slip of paper. Facilities were provided for POWs to meet their wives in total privacy. In some camps, we were informed that POWs had appeared on television requesting their families to come and visit them;

(p) Virtually all camps had a cultural committee. One of its main tasks was to provide literacy classes for those POWs who did not know how to read and write. It was calculated that 50 per cent of Iraqi POWs were illiterate at the time of their capture. As a result of that effort, between some 6,000 and 8,000 POWs had learned to read and write. A total of 285 literacy classes were held in the camps, employing a total of 581 teachers, most of whom were POWs themselves. In most classes, a commentary of the Koran was provided. Geography and history were also taught. In addition, a total of 260 plays had been performed in the camps by the prisoners themselves and more than 500 POW songs had been taped and distributed. Every prison had a library. All that was in keeping with the guidelines set out by the Imam, who wanted POWs to return one day to their country and become useful elements of their society;

(q) In every camp there was a workshop where POWs could acquire practical skills and carry out useful work, ranging from art and handicrafts to small-scale manufacturing activities. Those who worked received additional money;

(r) All concerns of the POWs were handled by the camp representative and a council of eight, all of them POWs elected by the prisoners. Each dormitory and section had its own elected representatives. Representatives were subject to approval by the camp authorities. In those camps which contained officers as well as soldiers, officers sometimes but not always acted as POW representatives;

(s) No Iraqi civilians, with the exception of families, were allowed inside the camps;

(t) Most breaches of discipline were handled by the camp commanders, who could impose a period of solitary confinement for a period not exceeding 10 days. Serious crimes were brought before a court, although the sentence was suspended until the conclusion of the war. Corporal punishment could be imposed only by a court, in accordance with Islamic law. The camp authorities, let alone other prisoners, were not allowed to administer corporal punishment.

173. Our findings and observations regarding the concerns expressed by the Government of Iraq, as well as the policies of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the prisoners of war held in that country, are contained in the following section.

### C. Examination of the concerns expressed by the Government of the Republic of Iraq

#### 1. Allegations regarding the killing of POWs in the camps

*"Harsh treatment of Iraqi prisoners—their torture, murder, the amputation of the limbs of some of them, and the taking of blood from them"*

174. Complementary to these Iraqi concerns, the Iraqi authorities have claimed that such inhumane treatment has repeatedly led to revolt among Iraqi POWs in the camps at Gorgan, Sari, Parandak, Semnan and Mashad, resulting in large-scale killings and wounding of prisoners by the Iranian guards.

175. The above charges were categorically and *in toto* rejected by the Iranian authorities, who declared them to be nothing but propaganda. The claim that blood was taken from Iraqis was declared to be without foundation. Even if blood was needed for their compatriots, it would not be drawn from the POWs but supplied by the national blood banks. With regard to the incidents claimed by Iraq to have occurred in various camps, they were either denied altogether or attributed to quite different causes.

176. We were not in a position to establish the factual basis of the Iraqi concerns regarding wilful killing, unnecessary amputations in connection with medical treatment or the taking of blood from Iraqi POWs to be used for Iranian soldiers. During the course of our visits to POW camps, however, we heard many complaints of physical and mental ill-treatment of a general nature, including whipping and beating with wire cables, sticks and iron pipes, and kicking, especially of wounded parts of the body. Such treatment was usually inflicted by prison guards, but, on occasion, by fellow POWs opposed to the Iraqi Government. We also heard reports of long-term confinement, sometimes solitary, sometimes in small and overcrowded cells, of being locked into containers with no room for movement, of the pulling of nails etc. Collective punishment measures, such as deprivation or reduction of food for periods up to 30 days, were also reported.

177. Although it was not possible for us to determine the accuracy of individual accounts, their prevalence and similarity, substantiated by numerous POWs, led us to conclude that undoubtedly such practices had been carried out. Maltreatment, or even rumours about it, might well lead to revolt; it is therefore quite likely that it is partly accountable for some of the violent incidents which have repeatedly occurred in some of the camps. Apart from the incident in Gorgan Camp, which has been described in detail in the preceding section of the present report, during our visits to the camps we also heard from several sources of the following incidents:

(a) In the Kaladous section of Parandak Camp, on 5 February 1983, 13 POWs had been killed, and more than 100 seriously wounded; and in Fallahi section, on 23 August 1984, 1 POW had been killed, and dozens seriously wounded;

(b) At Sari Camp, on 5 January 1983, 1 POW had been killed and 7 wounded;

(c) At Semnan Camp, on 2 January 1983, 3 POWs had been killed and 15 seriously wounded;

(d) At Takhti Camp, in early August 1984, 4 POWs had been killed.

178. We also heard of an incident at Ghouchan Camp, on 13 February 1983, during which about 50 POWs had been killed and scores seriously wounded, and another at Mehrabad Camp (no date provided), where no less than 10 POWs died. An incident at Mashad Camp was also mentioned without details.

179. In connection with the above incidents, the POWs at the various camps visited gave us full or partial lists of the names of POWs killed or injured, with their ICRC registration numbers as well as registration cards. Most of the POWs told us that the cause of the incidents involved the ideological differences between "believers" and "loyalists" and the resistance of the latter to having the "believers" with them in the same dormitories or sections. The authorities admitted to the incidents at Parandak, Sari and Takhti. They stated that the incidents stemmed from quarrels between opposing POW factions and attempts to escape. We were not in a position to verify the other incidents, but we do conclude, based on the well-corroborated information provided to us, that the incidents at Semnan on 2 January and at Parandak on 5 February 1983 did, indeed, take place.

*"The rendering of death sentences or sentences of imprisonment against certain Iraqi prisoners without informing the International Committee of the Red Cross of the legal proceedings taken in the investigation and the trial"*

180. In respect of the above concern, the Iraqi authorities provided us with copies of three death sentences and three sentences of imprisonment imposed by the Iranian military courts in 1983 which had not been reported to ICRC.

181. The Iranian authorities maintained that in conformity with the third Geneva Convention of 1949, the host State holds the right to try and punish delinquent POWs in accordance with its military regulations. They stated that the three POWs with sentences of imprisonment had been interviewed in 1984 by ICRC and that we could meet with the three if we wished to do so.

182. During the course of our visits to the various camps we heard a number of complaints about sentences imposed by Islamic courts and the sentencing to death of pilots for having carried out air raids on civilian areas. However, we were not in a position to ascertain the factual basis for such claims.

183. We should like, however, to draw attention to articles 104 and 107 of the third Geneva Convention, according to which the detaining Power has the duty to inform the Protecting Power (or its substitute) at least three weeks before the opening of a trial and any judgement and sentence upon POWs should be immediately reported.

## 2. Allegations of the killing of POWs on or after capture

*"Mass murder of Iraqi prisoners, whether on capture or subsequently"*

184. Iraq has accused Iran of committing mass murder of Iraqi prisoners, on capture or after capture. In order to substantiate that charge, the Iraqi authorities gave us photographs of dead soldiers, with their hands and legs tied, who were said to be Iraqi POWs murdered upon capture in Bostan. They also referred to a magazine article in which it was alleged that the civilian population in Iran was admitted to POW camps and incited to take revenge for the sufferings that they had endured under Iraqi enemy actions. Further, the Iraqi authorities charged that mass executions of Iraqi POWs had taken place on various occasions in different places, the most prominent of which was the shooting of 1,500 POWs in the Al-Khafajiah area on 29 November 1981. They told us that similar instances had occurred after the fighting in Abadan on 27 September 1981 (150 POWs executed) and at Zwarko Camp, east of the Basra sector, where 50 POWs were said to have been executed on 15 March 1984 and buried at Shah Abayyid Cemetery.

185. All the above charges were categorically refuted by the Iranian authorities. The explanation given with respect to the deeds of Al-Khafajiah was that the bodies had been left behind by the Iraqis after a battle which resulted in the liberation of Bostan. The 1,500 abandoned bodies had been gathered and buried in Bostan. As to Zwarko, the Iraqis denied that any such camp existed. They maintained that the allegations concerning the POWs captured during the Abadan battles and the slaughtering of POWs by the civilian population were without foundation. The photographs that had been given us were denounced as fakes.

186. On the basis of the material available to us, we were unable to confirm the charge of mass murder of Iraqi POWs upon or after capture. It should be noted, however, that similar charges of such incidents were made by some Iraqi POWs in the various camps that we visited, particularly in respect of the battles in Abadan, Bostan and Shush. They also gave us some of the names of those claimed to have been killed after capture. Bearing in mind the vicious and emotional nature of the war, we cannot exclude the possibility that large numbers of Iraqi soldiers could have been killed on the battlefields upon surrender.

187. As we observed under a similar concern expressed by Iran, nothing we heard would, in our view, contradict what was stated on this matter in the ICRC memorandum of 7 May 1983 (see para. 76).

188. Concerning the charge that POWs were killed by civilians, we were not in a position to investigate it, but no such incidents were mentioned by the Iraqi POWs visited by us.

## 3. Allegations regarding persons unlisted or "disappeared"

*"The fact that Iran has not provided the Iraqi authorities with the names of Iraqis missing on the battlefield"*

189. The Iranian authorities stated that each country was itself responsible for the gathering of information on their missing persons. That was why the Islamic Republic of Iran had first presented a list of about 10,000 and, lately, of about 20,000 missing persons.

190. The Iranian authorities further informed us that forwarding the names of all Iraqi missing persons was impossible because:

(a) Iraqi soldiers did not possess metal identity tags, a matter that had been referred to Iraq through ICRC;

(b) There were many instances of escape, where Iraqi soldiers had taken refuge in other countries;

(c) Those Iraqi corpses without metal identity tags or any other identifications had been buried in accordance with Islamic norms;

(d) In some instances, because of circumstances, including heavy bombardment, bodies had remained unattended and, owing to the lapse of time, had become unrecognizable.

191. We should like to draw the attention of the parties to the conflict to the fact that they are obliged to record and provide to the Protecting Power and to the central prisoner-of-war information agency all data on each wounded, sick or dead person of the adversary falling into their hands as well as the identity and state of health of captured personnel, with death certificates of those who have died after capture.

192. From our analysis of the documentation and the testimonies heard, it appears to us that for a variety of reasons, some of the bodies of persons who had died on the battlefield could not be recognized and, as a consequence, had been buried as unidentified or unknown. However, the failure to submit the required reports in other instances may have been counter-intelligence measures designed to mislead the enemy.

193. The reasons given by Iran are plausible but not satisfactory. We believe that because many of the Iraqi POWs have not been reported by Iran to ICRC or any other agency, have not been visited, registered or provided with identity cards and have not been reported to the Iraqi Government, they may constitute a considerable proportion of the persons considered to be missing.

*"The fact that Iran has not handed over to the mission of the ICRC in Iran the names of a large number of Iraqi prisoners (close to 15,000) and, in particular, those of high-ranking officers"*

194. In connection with the above concern, the Iraqi authorities provided us with a partial listing of Iraqi POW officers (1,569) not visited by ICRC who are unaccounted for. They also gave us a list of 79 Iraqi officers reported by Iran as having been captured and a list of 64 names of POWs based on information broadcast by Abadan radio.

195. The Iranian authorities stated that they tried to submit the lists of captured POWs to ICRC as soon as possible, depending, *inter alia*, on where the capture took place, the distance, and the time the captives have been held in detention camps.

196. Further, they informed us that except for some 200 recently captured POWs, all Iraqi POWs had been registered by ICRC. They were all accessible and available to ICRC, which could see them. They were all allowed to write to their families about their well-being on the first available occasion and had also been able to convey messages to their families through the Iranian mass media (television, radio and newspapers). The Iranian authorities maintained that time did not permit them to investigate the lists provided by the Iraqi authorities before our departure, though they had noticed a number of inconsistencies. They also claimed that ICRC had often delayed its visits to the camps and the processing of identity cards after registration.

197. Further, the Iranian authorities stated that very often high-ranking Iraqi officers had concealed their rank and identity. They also pointed out that many of those claimed by Iraq to be among the missing might have died in action. They assured us that they would investigate the list that we gave them and report to us thereon promptly.

198. We have noted a number of inconsistencies with regard to the above information. For example, according to the Iranian authorities, the total number of Iraqi POWs is 46,262, but 45,287 have been registered by ICRC. Moreover, based on our own inquiries, we believe that there are serious delays in providing the required information on POWs to ICRC, which has not been allowed to visit the camps on a regular basis. In fact,

ICRC has not been able to visit all the camps, partly because of the existing difficulties between the organization and the Iranian authorities.

199. It should be pointed out that the suspension of ICRC activities after the incident at Gorgan in October 1984 was not the first. Delay in the registration, or the non-registration, of POWs after capture was verified in the course of our visits to the camps. Some POWs had not been registered since their capture at the beginning of 1982, and others had received their registration cards only recently, despite having been captured a long time ago. Some POWs told us that they had not been registered by ICRC during its visit to their camp because, just prior to the arrival of ICRC, they were either "hidden" or transferred to another camp and then returned to their camp immediately after the departure of ICRC. That charge was repeated often in the various camps. In one instance, we were told that more than 140 officers had been transferred prior to our arrival. It was also alleged that some POWs, particularly officers, were often transferred and that no one could ascertain their status thereafter.

200. We have also noted that not many officers were included in the figures provided by the Iranian authorities on the various camps, at least on those that we visited. Very few of them were of the rank of Colonel or Lt. Colonel, and only 8 were pilots. We were not provided with an actual breakdown by rank.

201. Though the official Iranian figure for Iraqi POWs stands at 46,252, there have been reports estimating their number to be between 50,000 and 53,000. We were not in a position to establish an accurate figure or to verify the Iraqi Government's claim that there are close to 15,000 POWs whose names have not been reported to ICRC (see observations in paras. 203-211).

*"The presence of a number of Iraqi prisoners in Evin Prison under Iranian names"*

202. As will be seen in paragraph 207, the Iranian authorities informed us that the Evin Prison was reserved for Iranian prisoners and that there were no Iraqi POWs interned in that prison. We were not in a position to ascertain whether there were, in fact, any Iraqi POWs interned in Evin Prison.

#### 4. Allegations of the existence of "secret" camps

*"The fact that there are unpublicized prison camps which the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Iran is unable to visit, although the Iraqi Government knows of the existence of some of them"*

203. In connection with the above concern, the Iraqi authorities in Baghdad provided us with lists:

(a) A list of nine POW camps and two hospitals in Iran visited by ICRC in 1984;

(b) A list of seven POW camps not visited by ICRC but whose existence, they told us, had been confirmed by the Iranian authorities;

(c) A list of 15 undisclosed POW camps in Iran.

204. We submitted the three lists to the Iranian authorities, whose comments are reflected below.

205. In turn, the Iranian authorities gave us their list of POW camps in Iran. They informed us that the names of the camps visited by ICRC on the Iraqi list were erroneous and that those on their list were correct. They also pointed out that the reports of the Red Cross regarding those camps had been published. They explained that the reason why ICRC had not visited the other seven camps was that it had decided to suspend its activities. The list of POW camps, with the number of Iraqi POWs in each, as provided by the Iranian authorities, is reproduced in appendix 6.

206. With regard to the Iraqi claim concerning the "secret" camps, the Iranian authorities emphatically denied the existence of such camps and replied in writing as follows:

"(a) Definitely, there exists no camp in the name of 'Walli-al-Assar' in Iran;

"(b) The camp 'Torbat Jam' has been previously mentioned in the Iraqi list as an official camp of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But now it is listed as an unofficial camp;

"(c) The city of Dezful has one air base, where only the air base personnel and their families live, and no POW camp exists in that city;

"(d) There is no camp in Qazween whatsoever;

"(e) Mashad has only one camp which has been previously mentioned in the list of official camps;

"(f) In Mashad there is definitely no region or camp with the name of 'Qali';

"(g) In Mashad there is no camp called 'Zwarko';

"(h) The prison of Evin is especially for internal (Iranian) prisoners; there are no POWs in that camp;

"(i) Farahabad is the previous name of Takhti, which has been mentioned as an official camp;

"(j) Sang Bast is not a camp but is a place where addicts are kept;

"(k)-(l) In general, all camps named Tariq-al-Quds start at 1 and end at 16; in the Islamic Republic of Iran no camp bears the name of Tariq-al-Quds 20 or 21;

"(m) Mehrabad is mentioned in the official list of camps and has been constantly visited;

"(n) In Berjand there is no POW camp;

"(o) Shameranat is located in North of Tehran and has no POW camp."

207. The Iranian authorities further informed us that of the 40 POW officers alleged by Iraq to be held in Evin Prison, only seven had been located in various POW camps and that there were no POWs in Evin Prison. The seven were in camps visited by ICRC. They indicated that a major difficulty in identifying the persons claimed to be imprisoned was the fact that the full names of the said prisoners of war were not provided by the Iraqi authorities. Very often, too, the POWs did not provide full information on their actual rank or names. The Iranian authorities asked us to extend our stay in Iran for one day, in order to investigate the Iraqi claim regarding "secret" camps. Given the magnitude and the practical difficulties that such an investigation might entail, we felt unable to accept their offer.

208. We believe that some of the confusion regarding established and confirmed POW camps might be the result of linguistic differences. Moreover, some of the places mentioned by the Iraqi authorities could have been used as centres for the collection and/or transit of newly captured POWs to various camps. The Iranian authorities have confirmed that some camps had been evacuated, such as the Anzali Camp in 1984 when the POWs were transferred to the Kalrizak Camp. The Gezel Hessar Camp had also been evacuated. We heard from a number of POWs at various camps of the existence of camps such as Al-Ahwaz, Qasr-Firouzi and Bandar-Anzali. Sang Bast was mentioned on several occasions as an underground camp with more than 2,000 POWs, the majority unregistered by ICRC. However, we were not in a position to confirm or deny the existence of such camps.

209. Numerous testimonies have been analysed and coincide in reflecting the existence of small detention camps and punishment areas near the existing official camps and of certain normal cells that exist in the military installations surrounding some of the camps which are possibly used for POWs. For example, the authorities admitted that some punished Iraqi Christian POWs from Parandak Camp were kept in the military police headquarters (Deshwan) in Tehran although we had sufficient information confirming the existence of individual disciplinary cells in several POW camps.

210. We were informed by many POWs that special places used as cells or punishment areas were changed or redecorated before our arrival.

211. There is a substantial number of hospitals where ill and wounded POWs are convalescing or under treatment, none of which did we visit for lack of time; some of them had been previously visited by ICRC but not recently.

#### 5. Allegations of torture and maltreatment of prisoners of war

*"Harsh treatment of Iraqi prisoners—their torture, murder, the amputation of limbs of some of them, and the taking of blood from them"*

212. The findings and observations of the mission regarding this concern are contained in paragraphs 174 to 179.

*"Pillorying of Iraqi prisoners in the streets of Iranian cities, while bound with chains"*

213. The Iranian authorities stated that the Iraqi claims were "totally false and without foundation". Referring to the fact that Iraqi prisoners appear regularly in Friday prayer sessions on television, the Iranian Government has stated that this was on their own request to be allowed to join religious ceremonies and visit sacred places.

214. Although we did hear reports on the pillorying of Iraqi prisoners in the streets of Iranian cities, we were not in a position to establish the factual basis either of the Iraqi claims or of the Iranian response.

#### 6. Allegations of political and ideological pressure and indoctrination

*"The placing of civilian supporters of the Iranian régime together with Iraqi prisoners for political, ideological and propagandistic purposes which are internationally prohibited"*

*"The fact that political elements, under cover of religion, visit the prison camps in order to undertake political activities hostile to Iraq and with the intention of influencing the morale of Iraqi prisoners and enrolling them, by coercive means, in political movements subservient to the Islamic Republic of Iran"*

215. Iraq made the accusation that the Iranian authorities regularly practised brainwashing and political indoctrination on Iraqi POWs. According to these allegations, civilians, in particular members of Iraqi opposition groups, who have fled to the Islamic Republic of Iran, are admitted to POW camps. They would be allowed to make propaganda for their own political aims and try to win over Iraqi POWs and incite hatred against the Iraqi Government. This would normally occur under cover of religious practices. Pressure would also be exerted on POWs to read books of certain political, religious or ideological bent. Those converted would be trained to return to Iraq and organize a rebellion there. They would also be induced to fight in the Iranian army against their own country. Evidence was submitted in the form of a military report on a ceremony where a great number of "Iraqi POWs promised allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini", agreed to join the Islamic Dawa party and engaged themselves to free Iraq from its present Government. Individual oaths were said to have been taken in the presence of Hojatolislam Mohammad Baqir Al-Hakim, from Nejev.

216. The Government of Iraq has also accused the Iranian authorities of forcing the Iraqi Christian POWs to perform the Islamic rituals (prayers and fasting) and not allowing them to practise their religion.

217. The Iranian authorities rejected the above-mentioned accusations as totally baseless and false. The performance of religious duties could certainly not be called "brainwashing". Religious services and preachings served the religious and psychological needs of POWs. They were allowed in response to the prisoners' own wishes. Apart from Hojatolislam Al-Hakim, who was recognized as a religious leader by most of the Moslems of Iraq, no Iraqi opposition leader had ever been admitted to the camps, it was said. As to the alleged coercion to read books with certain contents, it was said that the camp libraries corresponded to Iranian public libraries. In any case, people could not be forced to read. The Islamic Republic of Iran also denied training POWs with the aim of instigating a rebellion in Iraq, but it felt unable to suppress the Iraqi people's own opposition to the Baathist régime. In no case would Iraqi POWs be allowed to fight against Iraq, even if they wished to do so. A number of reasons were given as proof that the military report produced by Iraq as evidence was a forgery. Further, the Iranian authorities stated that Islam did not allow the enforcement and imposition of beliefs. The Christian POWs were allowed to observe their own rites and twice a year the camp authorities invited Christian clergy to administer religious rites.

218. When visiting the camps, the mission found unequivocal signs of political indoctrination being applied to Iraqi POWs. In quite a number of cases, our first contact with POWs was overshadowed by their shouting slogans condemning the Iraqi Government and praising the Islamic revolution. That could go on for almost an hour as was the case in Takhti Camp. Banners with slogans were hoisted and posters showing the portraits of leaders of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Iraqi opposition leaders and unflattering drawings of the President of Iraq were present in most camps visited. We were repeatedly told by the POWs that they were forced to attend lectures and preachings with an anti-Iraq bias. Everything was done, we were told, to change the POWs' political, ideological and religious allegiance, including physical and mental ill-treatment. In almost every camp visited, there was a group of Iraqi POWs who were against the Government of Iraq, co-operating closely with the Iranian political and military authorities. They were said to enjoy special privileges, and we were in fact able to notice considerable differences between the various sections of a given camp in terms of clothing, accommodation and free movement. Such divisions coincided conspicuously with the opinions heard from the inmates. It seems that considerable latitude is given to the faction known as "believers" in order to influence their fellow prisoners' convictions. They, rather than the military authorities, we were told, ran some of the sections of camps. We were repeatedly told that POWs were more afraid of those professing opposition to the Iraqi Government than of their Iranian guards.

219. Throughout our visits to the camps we were cautioned by POWs that the Cultural Committee referred to by the Government—the POWs call it "Farhangi"—was in fact run by "Al-Hakim followers". The Committee had wide authority to interrogate, beat, torture, deprive a POW of his right to send and receive messages, or order transfer of POWs to unknown camps. We were not, however, in a position to verify such allegations.

220. Prisoners often complained of restrictions on music or on singing or of being denied access to a radio. It was generally asserted that the only Arabic journals and magazines POWs received were those published in

Iran by the Dawa party and other Iraqi opposition groups living in that country. Libraries were said to be stocked almost entirely with books on Islam or on Islamic-oriented subjects, as we were, on occasion, able to verify ourselves.

221. We were also informed by the POWs that classes, where available, were reserved for "believers". Certainly we were able to note that few, if any, classes appeared to exist in those camps or sections exclusively inhabited by those who continued their support for the Government of Iraq.

222. Whenever we inquired from POWs about the contents of plays and songs performed in the camps, we were informed by both factions of POWs alike that they mainly had a political content, with the President and the Government of Iraq being frequently the target of abuse or satire.

223. It certainly cannot be denied that Iraqi POWs in the Islamic Republic of Iran live under strong psychological pressure. This is all the more so since religious and political issues are closely interwoven in that country and, as many "believers" repeatedly stated, they identified themselves with the Iranian war aim of overthrowing the Iraqi Government, which was decried as criminal and anti-Islam. Religious instruction, which is administered by the Iranian clergy, thus almost inevitably takes a political turn which is bound to create conflicts of conscience for the Iraqi prisoners. We noted the presence of a clergyman in Gorgan who was alleged by POWs to be an Iraqi deportee. A great effort would be needed indeed in order to safeguard the human dignity of those POWs who have their families in Iraq and wish to return to their country once the war is over.

224. During our visit to the various camps, we observed the psychological isolation as well as the trauma of Christian Iraqi POWs in the midst of "believers". This was noted in particular during our visit to the Takhti Camp, where over 1,000 "believers" kept shouting and singing anti-Iraqi slogans. There were only a score of Christians seated in one corner in silence, afraid and refusing to talk. In many other camps, we were informed of several attempts to convert non-Islamic minorities. Further, we were informed that the religious ceremonies on Christmas 1984 had been disrupted by "believers" who hurled insults at Christian POWs, and serious fighting had taken place. Although we could not confirm some of these allegations made by POWs in camps visited, in view of the overall atmosphere in the camps, such incidents could be possible, not as a result of official Government policy but rather as a result of the missionary zeal of some "believers". We feel none the less that, in view of the exceptional psychological situation prevailing in POW camps, minority groups require special attention and assistance.

#### *7. Allegations of substandard conditions in camps*

##### *"Bad health and medical services and inadequate equipment and food"*

225. The Iranian authorities informed us that all possible health services were provided in the POW camps and that on the war front the same prompt attention was accorded to all wounded, whether Iraqi or Iranian.

226. They further stated that the food provided for the Iraqi POWs was the same as that provided for the army personnel of the Islamic Republic of Iran and that the ICRC reports proved the falsehood of Iraqi allegations. The same policy was applied with regard to clothing for POWs.

227. The authorities provided many details about the policy and regulations applicable to POWs, as well as the personnel and resources available in each camp, one principle being that their material conditions should be the same as those of the Iranian soldiers. We heard many other details about regular replacement of clothing, types and quantities of food and provisions in the canteens where goods were available for POWs to buy from their earnings.

228. We paid considerable attention to the material conditions in the camps visited. Apart from health, medical services, equipment and food, we examined in particular clothing, bedding, hygienic facilities, buildings, exposure to weather and climate, possibilities for movement and exercise, etc. This was not an attempt to do the work of ICRC. In the circumstances, such an inquiry was essential.

229. We could not verify the statement made by the authorities regarding the policy of maintaining the same standards for POWs as for Iranian soldiers, as we did not examine the conditions of the soldiers in any comparable way. We noted, for instance, that when hospitalization was requested, medical services were supposed to be given in the nearest military hospital, but for lack of time, we could not visit the hospitals. Therefore, our assessment is based on what we saw and heard in the POW camps.

230. We visited dispensaries, clinics and sick wards and interviewed medical personnel, including Iraqi doctors and medical assistants who were themselves POWs, sometimes working together with Iranian health per-

sonnel. We also visited a considerable number of patients receiving care in those places.

231. We noted the complaint in some camps that facilities were inadequate to cope with the health problems of POWs. In particular it appeared that the medication was insufficient, and that the doctors were provided only with limited and inadequate means, even medications whose shelf-life had expired.

232. The more serious aspect seemed to be that, despite these services, the general health standard was low in certain camps and dormitories. A number of prisoners suffered from very visible ailments, disabilities and injuries which, according to them and their fellow POWs, either were not treated at all or were treated very inadequately. The late amputation of infected limbs and the pulling of teeth instead of treatment at an earlier stage were cited as examples.

233. In several instances such complaints were confirmed by the responsible medical personnel, who declared that they were unable to cope with the task.

234. Certain chronic diseases were observed in several camps. We were told by POWs in many camps of widespread urinary and malignant diseases, tuberculosis, scabies, haemorrhoids, skin diseases, cancer, etc. We saw many disabled prisoners, victims, we were told by POWs, of the war, of incidents in the camps or of torture. Cases of mental disorders and apathy were numerous.

235. In our view, this situation, perhaps inevitable after long years of captivity, proves that the care provided is inherently insufficient. We were informed by many POWs that they had not had a physical check-up since captivity over four years previously.

236. We were shown the equipment available to POWs for their daily life in dormitories and elsewhere inside the camps. Apart from their beds and clothes the individuals did not have many personal effects of their own; some had their small personal belongings in self-made cardboard containers near their beds. Some workshops, libraries and other common places seemed satisfactorily equipped. In most of the places we visited, we were informed in private conversations that new equipment had been handed out recently, at times just before our visit.

237. Many POWs spoke about their own earlier lack of minimal personal effects, or of poor equipment (e.g., we were told by POWs in one camp that from 1982 through 1983 they had been provided with two suits, two pairs of shorts, two vests and two pairs of slippers; they had to buy pyjamas, socks and caps, as well as cups). We noted very often the rather poor state of their clothing, which was often patched. All dormitories visited were in good order, at least for the occasion, and practically everywhere blankets and sheets were new and clean. Where heating was necessary, heaters seemed to be available.

238. We heard frequently complaints about insufficient monthly allowances—equivalent of SwF 10 in coupons per month and seven cigarettes per day irrespective of whether one was a smoker or not. Complaints were also heard about delayed payments of allowances, at times extending more than six months.

239. Moreover, on random inspection in various places underneath the new bedding, mattresses were still very poor and worn out. And in some camps many prisoners wore poor clothes, in particular in Semnan, and in certain sections and dormitories of other camps.

240. Hygienic facilities such as toilets, washrooms and showers were provided and apparently an attempt was made to keep them clean. Their standard and numbers, however, were in most places insufficient in view of the large numbers of POWs. POWs in some camps complained also that they had to take cold baths irrespective of weather conditions and that they were taken to public baths four times a year. Also, the water supply was insufficient. One part of Semnan, the lower camp, had 20 lavatories and 18 showers for 2,881 persons, which may have accounted for some of the health problems in those places.

241. Overcrowding in dormitories was widespread. Even taking into account the reduced standards one must expect compared to civilian life, facilities seem totally inadequate when several hundred prisoners must share a room perhaps constructed for 100 or when three persons have to share two beds among them.

242. In quarters used for "punishment", or "disciplinary units", the overcrowding was in some places appalling. We saw 33 persons living in a room of 12 square metres. Other POWs told us of having been kept, as punishment, for many weeks with more than 100 persons in a room for 10 to 12, sleeping in turns while the others were standing up.

243. The lack of privacy was obvious, and we had the impression that the more POWs were made to stay together in one room, the more easily tension could arise among them.

244. We noted no obvious cases of malnourishment. We saw the kitchens and distribution of meals and inspected the food served during our visit. We heard, however, some comments about special food being served on that occasion, and that normally food was inadequate, insufficient and of poor quality. Consistent and credible descriptions were heard on certain occasions of withholding of food, reduced portions, cutting of diet to one meal a day, etc., sometimes even denial of water, as collective punishment.

245. The camps inspected were mostly located in former army barracks, and most of the POWs were lodged in one-, two- or sometimes three-storeyed buildings (Davoudieh, Mehrabad, Heshmateh, Parandak); one camp was located in a sports stadium (Takhiti) and one in the open plain in tents (Semnan). Whereas some of the camps had adequate space adjacent to the buildings for movement and exercise, this was not the case everywhere. Some sections in some camps were separated from the other sections and were described by their inmates as well as by other POWs in the camps as "prisons". They were not, however, places for the detention of offenders (disciplinary or criminal), but in fact the whole population of these sections was separated from other prisoners. This was mainly the case of prisoners who were actively loyal to the Government of their country. These prisoners, on the other hand, seemed to some extent to prefer to be kept apart from other groups, in particular from those who are considered to be "believers". POWs often complained of restrictions on music or on singing or of being denied access to a radio. In no camp were we informed by POWs that physical exercise was compulsory. On the contrary, complaints were frequently expressed about its inadequacy. In some camps, POWs were allowed to go outside their dormitories only for two hours a day and were restricted to the relatively narrow area of the section.

246. We noted that there had been no provision for separate camps for POWs who are officers. In all the cases we witnessed, non-commissioned officers and soldiers were mixed in the same camp with officers, although they were usually grouped in separate sectors or dormitories. In all cases dormitories were crowded. The representatives of the camps or sectors were not usually the officers unless they belonged to the group opposing the Iraqi Government.

247. A large number of officers, even in cases when they were considered to be anti-Iraqi Government, informed us that they were not respected as officers and also received bad treatment, in some cases insults, beatings and punishment in cells. The great majority claimed to have been kept under constant pressure by the Iranian authorities under intimidating circumstances, very often being transferred from one camp to another. They also complained that they were ordered to salute non-commissioned officers and that their allowances were the same as those of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

#### 8. Allegations of withholding of mail and other entitlements of POWs

*"Intentional stoppage or delay, on the part of the Iranian authorities, of letters from Iraqi prisoners for long periods of time"*

248. The Iraqi authorities claim that the Iranian authorities have withheld letters to or from Iraqi POWs for more than a year with the full knowledge of ICRC, especially letters of officers and other POWs who have refused to co-operate with camp authorities. They withheld family photographs sent to POWs. Further, some letters which were supposedly sent by Iraqi POWs were in fact written by the Iranian authorities with anti-Iraqi invectives in order to sow distrust between the families and the Iraqi authorities.

249. The Iranian authorities informed us that, in spite of all difficulties, the Islamic Republic of Iran had exerted maximum effort to expedite letters and messages as much as possible. Letters containing obscene, political or security material were not allowed, subject to the judgement of the appropriate authorities. POWs' correspondence was carried in accordance with the following stages: distribution of special ICRC message forms in POW camps, collection of written messages, which were then forwarded by the military authorities to the ICRC mission in Tehran, and thence to ICRC headquarters in Geneva. ICRC then forwarded the letters to the authorities in Iraq. After clearance by Iraqi censorship, letters were then transmitted to the families of POWs in Iraq. Incoming letters to the Islamic Republic of Iran had to go through a similar process which took on average from three to eight months.

250. We recognize the difficulties, in particular the administrative and logistical difficulties, in handling messages to and from POWs whose numbers are estimated as close to 50,000; we also recognize the inherent delays arising from the collection, clearance and distribution and/or forwarding of such messages.

251. Contrary to what we were informed by several camp commanders about a larger number of messages addressed to the prisoners being received, we were told by POWs that they received very few. In fact, one of the most frequently heard complaints was the infrequency, when not the total absence, of mail. Most POWs claimed to receive one, or at most two, letters per year. There were also allegations that mail was received more frequently by the "believers" or, in some camps, that mail had reached them only after a long delay, shortly before our arrival.

252. Some complaints were also heard that POWs had been denied the opportunity to write messages, or that messages written by them or addressed to them were either destroyed or not delivered by the authorities. We were not in a position to establish the factual basis of such complaints, although the possibility cannot be discarded that the delaying of messages might be used as a means of exerting pressure on POWs.

#### 9. Allegations of prevention of visits and certain other concerns

*"The fact that the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross has not been permitted to visit Iraqi prisoners or has been permitted to visit them only at infrequent intervals, in contravention of the Geneva Conventions"*

253. The Iranian authorities stated that the claim made by Iraq was contrary to the truth. The Iraqi authorities should clarify where and when the Iranian Government had officially denied ICRC admission to the camps. In spite of the expansion of POW camps, the increasing number of POWs and other administrative difficulties, the reports of ICRC and the flow and exchange of correspondence from POWs were clear evidence of ICRC activities. However, the lack of experience of some members of the ICRC mission and their disregard for the psychological conditions and cultural background of the POWs had created problems to the extent that ICRC had suspended some of the planned visits; at that stage, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran had insisted on the activities of ICRC being continued.

254. In any event, the Islamic Republic of Iran had always welcomed representatives of international organizations who had wished to meet with POWs. So was the case with the United Nations mission currently visiting Iran; all facilities were accorded to the mission to visit POWs freely without the presence of Iranian officials. That had been the usual procedure of the Islamic Republic of Iran and would be accorded to all, unless impartiality and neutrality were not observed.

255. Reference is made to our observations in paragraphs 198 to 201.

256. We have noted that relations between ICRC and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have not always been smooth. At times difficulties have arisen not so much because of practical problems, but rather for reasons arising through misconceptions of each other's activities or intentions. It is not so much what actions have in fact been taken but what each has perceived the other as doing. The atmosphere prevailing in the camps we visited demonstrated on two occasions how misconceptions or misunderstandings, among other factors, could give rise to tensions and at times riots and fighting between the two determined opposing factions among the POWs. The distinct ideological divisions between the two groups, one of which enjoys the support of the Iranian authorities, could have given rise to tensions during the visit: of ICRC members who at times had been harassed by POWs who profess to be against the Iraqi Government.

257. As mentioned above, the relations of ICRC with the Iranian authorities have much to be desired. On several occasions the activities of ICRC have been suspended in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with one such suspension lasting for more than eight months; since the Gorgan incident in October 1984, ICRC has stopped visits to the camps and the only functions performed are those of handling messages, to which reference is made in paragraphs 248 to 252.

258. Another factor in the difficulties faced regarding regular visits by ICRC personnel, we believe, is the large number of POWs and camps, the distances between the camps and the relatively small number of ICRC personnel allowed to be stationed in Iran. We have been informed that ICRC had a maximum of 20 delegates in the country at any one time.

259. In several of the camps we visited, a considerable number of POWs did not have ICRC identification cards, which meant that, no matter what reasons were invoked, a large number of POWs have not been seen or had any contact with ICRC. This is an important point since the Iranian authorities only reported numbers and left it to ICRC to register them. Most of those POWs unregistered expressed their concern and fear, stating that they felt in danger because they had not been given a card, in some cases even when they had been more than three years in prison.

260. In some reported cases, especially with a group of officers, POWs have been transferred several times from one camp to another, whether by coincidence or not, just before an ICRC visit.

261. On the other hand we have witnessed that some POWs belonging to the "believers" faction demonstrated hostility towards ICRC and destroyed their ICRC registration cards in the presence of members of the mission. In one particular camp, Takhi, we received numerous messages sealed in blood, expressing opposition to ICRC and its activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

262. It should be noted that during the years 1982 to 1984 the average frequency of visits by ICRC teams to camps open to it was once in 18 months.

263. In Davoudieh Camp in Tehran, we met a group of over 190 non-Iraqi detainees who claimed to be either soldiers who had volunteered in the Iraqi Popular Army or civilians. Considerable portions of the non-Iraqis were Egyptian, Lebanese, Somali and Sudanese nationals. Smaller numbers came from Algeria, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. In total, 17 countries—mainly Arab—were said to be represented. Over 25 per cent of the detainees claimed to have been working for the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) on the Isle of Majnoon when they were captured by Iranian troops on 23 February 1984. Another, smaller group of non-Iraqis told us they were fishermen. They had joined the Union of Fishermen in Kuwait and were working for a private Kuwaiti employer before being captured on 22 August 1983. Among the detainees were also some journalists.

264. From the non-Iraqis who had volunteered in the Iraqi Popular Army, we heard that, when doing so, they had been acting not with mercenary intent but for political motives and in a spirit of Arab solidarity. At least some of them had their domicile in Iraq before entering the Iraqi military service.

265. None of those detained had been either seen or registered by ICRC; only we were accorded free access. The detainees were housed on the third floor in two dormitories with a corridor in between.

266. We are aware of the fact that the legal status of the group described may give rise to certain difficulties. There is no doubt, however, that civilians of non-belligerent nationality should be returned to their country of origin.

267. Volunteers in the Iraqi Popular Army, however, according to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, are to be treated as combatants. They are, therefore, entitled to the status of prisoners of war and should be registered as such. In any case, they cannot be regarded as mercenaries for the following reasons. First, and primarily, the notion of "mercenaries" is only of recent origin and cannot be invoked by States which have not ratified Protocol I<sup>1</sup> additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 of 8 June 1977 (which Iran has not). Secondly, it is quite obvious that the material conditions of a mercenary would not be fulfilled by the persons in question. The... soldiers do not seem to have acted from a desire for private gain, nor, they assured us, had they, in a... been promised material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to other Iraqi combatants; or they were residents of Iraq or territories formerly controlled by it; or they were in any case members of the Iraqi army (see art. 47, paras. 2 (c), (d) and (e) of additional Protocol I), any such reason being itself sufficient to exclude the status of mercenary.

*"The fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not complied with the decision of the Mixed Medical Commission concerning the handing over of disabled Iraqi prisoners, and the fact that the Commission has not been allowed to continue its work"*

268. The Iranian authorities informed us that on several occasions they had repatriated many handicapped prisoners of war. They already had a list of 26 ready for repatriation, bringing the total to be repatriated to 192. Those to be repatriated were informed only about a week before the actual repatriation for security reasons and also to spare them the mental suffering of their repatriation, for some reason, had to be postponed. Moreover, the authorities stated, they had heard reports that some of those repatriated previously had been subjected to persecution by the Iraqi authorities. The delay in the repatriation of the 26 was due to the suspension of the activities of ICRC. The Iranian authorities were consulting with a third party in order to handle the repatriation exercise.

269. During our visits to the various camps, we noticed many handicapped POWs, as well as those suffering from chronic or incurable diseases

270. We believe that no effort should be spared to repatriate such POWs expeditiously on humanitarian grounds, as called for under the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

#### IV. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

271. The sight of so many thousands of men in POW camps, mostly in the prime of their life, wasting their best years away in confinement, deprived of virtually all the amenities of life, uncertain of their fate, could not but stir deep emotions in every one of us. It should not be forgotten that, apart from those who have died or have been wounded in the battlefield, prisoners of war and their families are the immediate victims of the prolonged and ruinous war between the two countries. The most vivid images that we have carried back from the POW camps are fear, loneliness, uncertainty, isolation, bitterness and despair.

272. The mandate that we received from the Secretary-General was to report on the situation of POWs and the concerns of the Governments. However, from the camps in both countries we have brought back a message from the POWs themselves which we feel duty-bound to convey. Countless POWs expressed their message in impressive and moving ways, from eloquent and convincing pleas to silent sadness, from emotional outbursts to tears. The questions most frequently asked were: "When will the war finally end?"; "How much longer will we have to endure this suffering?"; "What will happen to us when the mission leaves?"; "Why does society tolerate such cruelty toward us?"; "Often it was just one word: 'Repatriation!'".

273. While we were given assurances by authorities in both Iraq and Iran that they endeavoured to adhere to accepted international norms for the treatment of prisoners of war, it was evident that the policies and standards that they professed to uphold were not always being observed. We found that harsh treatment and violence in the camps were far from uncommon. POWs provided a large volume of information about their physical ill-treatment, by such means as whipping, beating with truncheons or cables, simultaneous blows on both ears, electric shocks, assaults on sexual organs and kicks—often inflicted in parts of the body where POWs had suffered wounds. Physical violence appeared to be particularly common in POW camps in Iraq. We also received reports of collective punishment measures, such as lengthy confinement and deprivation of food and water. While we could not reach categorical conclusions about the truth of individual allegations, we heard many similar complaints from prisoners in different camps and were shown marks, wounds, injuries, etc., which were compatible with the allegations.

274. POWs repeatedly spoke, sometimes in great detail, about grave incidents that were said to have taken place in the camps in the past, despite denials of local camp authorities and representatives of central authorities accompanying the mission. Our efforts to have further clarifications on such points succeeded, on several occasions, in having them officially admitted and in obtaining records with sufficient detail to confirm the substance of the POW assertions. Sometimes the official denials were vague and conditioned (e.g., the Commander saying that nothing of the sort happened during his term of office in the camp), but in other cases they were so categorical, despite repeated inquiries, that we must regrettably conclude that they were made in spite of the two Governments' own information. Regarding these incidents, POWs sometimes admitted that they were related to their own protests, which, however, they claimed were justified by their harsh treatment and condition. In this connection we wish to reiterate what we already stated in the chapter relating to Gorgan, namely that the incident in that camp was by no means an isolated one, nor indeed the most serious to have occurred in POW camps in either country. The chief exceptional feature about the Gorgan incident was the world publicity attached to it.

275. We were told by POWs everywhere we went that many of the facilities and the general condition in the camps had noticeably improved shortly before our arrival. In many camps mattresses and blankets had been provided and new items of clothing had been distributed, while the quality and quantity of food had improved. In some others restriction on the supply of water had been lifted, or hot water had become available for the first time. To some extent the reported recent improvements were evident from our own observation. We nevertheless noted serious inadequacies in the hygienic conditions of several camps as well as in the daily diet of the prisoners.

276. One aspect which appeared to cause special distress to many POWs, and on which numerous POWs laid special emphasis, particularly in Iran, was the sense that their deeply-felt ideological and national identity was not being respected and, indeed, was under assault. We also heard allegations of religious pressure on non-Muslim POWs and of conversions to Islam by some Christian POWs. While we were not able to ascertain

whether these conversions had taken place under duress, we could not but notice the atmosphere of missionary zeal that permeated some camps.

277. Both Governments have, in varying degrees, attempted to promote, if not to exploit, the ideological differences existing among the prisoners. The problem was often exacerbated by prisoners' "representatives" who had not been properly elected. We noted that these divisions ran particularly deep among Iraqi POWs in Iran and were at the root of the fear and tension which had, in turn, sparked many disturbances and outbreaks of violence, as the Gorgan incident demonstrated.

278. Another aspect which caused our serious concern was the enforced physical and intellectual idleness of many POWs in most of the camps we visited in both countries. Not enough provision was made to keep the prisoners occupied in some kind of useful activity and the availability of reading material seemed woefully inadequate. Recreational amenities in many of the camps were either insufficient or, at times, totally lacking, and prisoners frequently complained of restrictions on games, music, singing or on access to a radio. This situation, coupled with the long years of incarceration, cannot but result in the progressive mental degeneration of the prisoners as the number of those whom we noted suffering from mental disorders testifies.

279. The problem on other occasions was the enforced nature of some of the "recreations" provided. POWs told of their being forced to listen, from morning to night, to radio programmes containing political propaganda beamed through the loudspeakers installed in their dormitories. Equally, POWs reported being encouraged to take part in "plays" of a political nature with the leaders of their countries being often the target of abuse or ridicule.

280. One of the major and most frequent complaints we heard and one which contributed significantly to the feelings of isolation among POWs was the infrequency, when not the total absence, of mail, particularly in Iran. We would like to express our deep concern at this grave situation, which could easily be corrected.

281. The feeling of isolation was further deepened when there was an absence of regular visits to the camps by an impartial humanitarian body. We wish to draw attention in this connection to the role played by the ICRC, through its resources and long experience, in promoting respect for the observance of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including, in particular, the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. That both Governments have, in connection with the subject of the present inquiry, extensively resorted to reports of ICRC to support their arguments constitutes, in our view, a testimony to the irreplaceable role of the Committee.

282. We must regrettably report that we were not in a position to make definite findings as regards the issues of missing persons and of alleged mass killings of POWs and other enemy personnel. We did not find evidence of wilful killings in POW camps. Insofar, however, as such allegations may have referred to what might have happened on the battlefield, it escapes the scope of the present inquiry, which had no way of verifying the degree to which such regrettable practices may have occurred, as opposed to battle deaths, or of tracing those victimized.

283. These are very serious issues and, above all, nobody should be insensitive to the concerns of the bereaved families who are kept in anxiety and worry for the tens of thousands of missing or those alleged to have been summarily killed. No effort should be spared to examine these concerns, if need be by appropriately constituted international inquiries in co-operation with the two Governments. However, when we were confronted with these concerns, there was very little we could do except receive the comments of the other side.

284. We did, however, note that neither party to the conflict had fulfilled the obligation under the first Geneva Convention of providing the other party, through the intermediary of the central POW information agency, a Protecting Power or its substitute, information on each wounded, sick or dead person of the adverse party who falls into their hands as well as the identity and state of health of captured personnel, with death certificates of those who have died after capture. This has no doubt increased the number of those who are officially listed in their country as missing. While taking note of the explanations given by the two Governments as to why identification of enemy dead in the front often is difficult, we believe that a serious effort should be made to provide the required information promptly and accurately so as to alleviate the anxiety and distress of the families of the missing.

285. Having noted that numerous POWs have spent three or more years in detention, we feel compelled to pose the question: is not prolonged captivity in itself inhuman treatment? Indeed, many POWs told us that this, more than any specific ill-treatment, was the greatest source of their

torment. The very fact of prolonged and indefinite captivity is so inhuman and futile that the only effective and human solution to the problems of most of the POWs visited would be their early release.

286. Although the Geneva Convention does not require release before the cessation of hostilities, the belligerents' right to keep POWs for the whole duration of the conflict loses its justification when the conflict is inordinately prolonged, particularly in modern warfare, which does not depend on manpower to the same extent as in the past. In this respect the Convention seems out of step with modern humanitarian principles. It should be recalled that POWs are neither to be regarded as criminals nor as hostages; they are to be treated honourably without degrading them in rank or personality. Many POWs repeatedly asked whether there should not be a time limit for their suffering irrespective of the continuation of the war.

287. We would also point out that the prolonged captivity of POWs embitters relations and creates tensions and conflicts, both inside the camps and at the international level, while frequently becoming an instrument of propaganda between the warring parties. This in turn requires the detaining Powers to divert material resources in order to maintain and secure POWs that could be better spent for other purposes.

288. For these reasons, but above all for humanitarian considerations, we consider it both unjustified and counter-productive to continue the lengthy detention of the POWs as presently done by both parties. It would be in the interest of each to release, unilaterally as they have on occasion done, or through mutual agreement, as many prisoners of war as possible, giving priority to certain categories of them, including those seriously ill or disabled, and civilians mistakenly made POWs, who have been held on both sides in contravention of the international obligations of the parties, as well as minors and aged prisoners.

289. Unilateral or mutually agreed release of POWs should proceed in an orderly and controlled manner with the participation of competent agencies. Supervision would be necessary to ensure that those released would not return to the theatre of war, any repatriation is voluntary and those apprehensive for whatever reason about repatriation and preferring to be resettled either in the country now holding them as prisoners or in a third country are granted such opportunities as may be available. We have noted that certain steps have been taken by the parties in this regard, but we consider them so far quite inadequate and tainted by propaganda purposes.

290. Indeed, in the course of the present inquiry, we have formed the unfortunate impression on both sides that certain matters were not always reported objectively but subject to distortions for propaganda purposes. Some of the Governments' concerns seemed also to have been advanced more for propaganda purposes than out of any realistic expectation that they could be assessed by the present mission. This might be understandable given the bitterness of the conflict between them. There is no need to elaborate on the finding, however, that such attempts by the detaining Power to use the prisoners of war as tools or weapons against the enemy after they have fallen into its hands constitute an abuse.

291. We further noted and welcomed the fact that both Governments have expressed their readiness to provide in principle for the release of those disabled or sick, as well as to consider exchanges of other categories of prisoners of war and to arrange family visits. While we are aware that many difficulties must be resolved before agreement could be possible and that arduous and eventually unsuccessful efforts have been made in the past in this area, we express an earnest hope that the two Governments would pursue these proposals in the spirit of humanitarian concern for the suffering of the thousands of prisoners of war.

292. Similarly, we were encouraged by the assurances of the authorities in both Iraq and Iran of their intent to respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as well as by their repeatedly stated readiness to amend any shortcomings found by the mission. We welcome this attitude and express our hope and expectations that our findings and recommendations will assist in the endeavour to improve the treatment of POWs in both countries.

293. We cannot but stress, however, that the overriding yearning of the prisoners of war themselves was that this prolonged and tragic war should be brought to the earliest possible end.

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294. In the light of these considerations and of the specific observations submitted in other parts of this report, we have reached the following unanimous conclusions.

(a) In neither country are the POWs treated as badly as alleged by the Government of the other country; nor, on the other hand, are they treated

in either as well as claimed by the Government of the detaining Power. The existing situation on both sides is cause for serious concern.

(b) Prolonged and indefinite captivity is itself the greatest source of hardship for prisoners of war.

(c) Most of the problems confronted by the prisoners of war are identical or similar in both countries: difficult living conditions, frequently harsh treatment—such as excessive use of force by some camp guards, particularly in Iraq—incidents marked by violence, isolation from the outside world and uncertainty about the length of their captivity. Gorgan was not a unique or the most serious incident to have occurred. In Iran, ideological and religious pressure exerted on prisoners and the consequent existence of antagonistic groups in POW camps adds to the tension and atmosphere of fear.

(d) Camps in both countries also share the common malaise of a prolonged period of captivity as well as of physical and intellectual idleness, resulting in a considerable incidence of mental disorders.

(e) We were not in a position to form definite conclusions about allegations regarding missing persons or mass killings of prisoners of war.

295. We wish to submit the following unanimous recommendations:

(a) Treatment of prisoners of war in both countries should be fundamentally improved and their rights under the third Geneva Convention strictly respected and safeguarded.

(b) Corporal punishment and any form of physical ill-treatment, as well as the practice of collective punishment, should be prohibited, and any infraction of this rule should be strictly dealt with by the authorities. Measures should be taken, particularly in Iraq, to prevent excessive use of force by camp guards.

(c) Living conditions in the camps in both countries should be generally improved, including in particular dietary and hygienic standards, and opportunities should be provided to prisoners of war to engage unfettered in constructive physical and intellectual activities to the maximum extent feasible. Medical services should be improved, and psychiatric help should be made available as required.

(d) Immediate measures should be adopted to give full effect to the rights of POWs to send and receive correspondence and to receive parcels with the frequency and in the manner prescribed in the third Geneva Convention.

(e) The provisions of the Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of officers according to their rank should be fully respected and enforced, particularly in Iran.

(f) The freedom of thought, religion and conscience of every prisoner of war should be strictly respected. No ideological, religious or other pressure should be brought to bear on the prisoners.

(g) In order to improve the general atmosphere in the camps and reduce the risk of conflicts, measures should be taken, particularly in Iran, to refrain from exerting ideological or religious pressure on POWs and to separate physically the two opposing groups of prisoners as well as to afford them equal treatment. Greater efforts should be made to meet the religious needs of minorities free of coercion or discrimination.

(h) In the interest of all POWs and of the two Governments concerned, conditions should be created to enable the International Committee of the Red Cross effectively to carry out all its functions under the Geneva Conventions for the protection and relief of POWs and other victims of war in both countries. The Committee should be enabled, as a matter of priority, to look into the matter of missing persons.

(i) Immediate measures should be taken by each of the two Governments to collect and record information on each wounded, sick or dead person of the adverse party who falls into its hand and to provide such information to an appropriate agency for transmittal to the other Government. In order to facilitate identification and reduce the number of missing persons, both Governments should consider taking measures to ensure that all members of their forces use double name tags or name plates and to issue orders to the Commanders of their armies to instruct their soldiers to report to their superiors the identity of those dead or wounded soldiers they come across in the battlefield.

(j) Both Governments should take immediate steps to exchange lists, through ICRC or another intermediary, containing the total number of POWs captured with, in particular, detailed up-to-date data concerning sick and wounded personnel.

(k) It is to be hoped that the two Governments would give serious consideration to releasing, unilaterally or on a reciprocal basis, as many of the prisoners of war under their jurisdiction as possible. Some could be released unconditionally, others conditionally, subject to international guarantees and control that they would not return to the theatre of war. Prisoners who are seriously or chronically ill, wounded or disabled, as

well as civilians mistakenly made POWs, should be immediately repatriated. Minors and aged prisoners should be treated as a matter of priority.

(i) Both Governments should desist from making use of prisoners of war—including those repatriated—and their suffering for purposes of political propaganda.

#### APPENDIX 1

List of points of special concern of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran contained in a letter dated 19 November 1984 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General in elaboration of points of concern contained in the letter of 8 November from the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Investigation of intentional murder and massacre of prisoners of war and civilian detainees, including the investigation and preparation of a report on the incident at Camp 2 of Mosul on 19 November 1982, during which at least three people were killed and more than 80 injured.

2. Investigation of various cases of mass execution of POWs in general, and that of the detained personnel of the Revolutionary Guards in particular.

*Note:* Documents found in captured Iraqi military headquarters contain an official order to Iraqi military personnel to this effect.

3. Investigation of suspicious deaths in which incisions in the area of the stomach and chest, as well as broken skulls and the like, have been unequivocally cited as causes of death.

4. Preparations for a follow-up on the fate of nearly 20,000 disappeared persons, many of whom, according to reports of the Red Cross and other sources, are in covert detention camps.

*Note:* A list of these persons will be included in our report.

5. The investigation into and report on civilian prisoners.

*Note:*

(a) Tens of thousands of Iranian civilians were captured during the invasion by Iraq. The inhabitants of the occupied cities, including old men and women as well as children, were forcibly removed from their homes and transferred to Iraq. The fate of many of them is not known.

(b) In the list of prisoners who were visited by the ICRC there are more than 1,500 names of civilian prisoners, some of whom are over the age of 55 years. Among the 424 prisoners who were freed there were 235 civilians, 171 of whom were over 50 years old and most of whom spent about three years in captivity.

6. Investigation of the fate of Mr. Tondguyan, the Minister of Oil, and his deputies and companions captured by the Iraqi forces.

*Note:* Contrary to what the Iraqi media show for public consumption, reports of their subjection to torture have been received.

7. Investigation of the fate of the Red Crescent personnel, including medical doctors, assistants and other personnel, captured and detained in contravention of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

*Note:* These persons have been denied any contact with members of the ICRC or with their families.

8. Investigation of the fate of prisoners of war who have been suspiciously transferred from overt to covert camps or vice versa.

*Note:*

(a) The report of the ICRC has repeatedly asserted that a number of prisoners of war who had been previously visited have since been transferred from overt to covert camps or vice versa.

(b) Some of the covert camps have been identified and their names and locations will be provided in due course.

9. Political and ideological pressure on POWs by the leading members of the terrorist groups infiltrating the camps.

10. Mental and physical torture of the prisoners.

*Note:* Reports of the ICRC have mentioned some instances of beatings with sticks, batons and wire cables. Consequently, many of the prisoners of war now suffer from mental illness.

11. Unhygienic conditions and lack of necessary facilities at the camps.

12. Lack of attention to the sick and the wounded, thus ending in permanent disability and amputation.

13. Investigation of the fact that the names of the Iranian prisoners of war are submitted to the Red Cross months and sometimes years after their capture.

14. Investigation of the Iraqi measures to prevent the prisoners from performing their religious prayers.

15. Investigation of the fact that the messages of families of prisoners are withheld by the Iraqi censorship and sometimes never reach them.

16. Investigation of Iraqi refusal, in contravention of the third Geneva Convention, to allow Red Crescent aid packages containing such items as medical spectacles and special medicines to reach the prisoners.

17. Investigation of the Iraqi soldiers' seizure of the prisoners' personal possessions.

I also request your good offices to have the following proposals considered by the mission and carried out under the auspices of the Red Cross:

1. Exchange of an equal number of prisoners.

2. Preparation of the families of the prisoners to visit them.

*Note:* At present the names of the Iraqi prisoners are being publicized gradually by the Arabic broadcasting radio of the Islamic Republic of Iran so as to enable their families to visit them if they wish. The first list of the names of 1,000 prisoners is being completed and this compilation will continue.

The mission can make the following proposals in this regard to the Iraqi authorities:

(a) To allow the Iraqi families to travel to Iran for the purpose of visitation;

(b) To create a similar possibility for Iranian families to travel to Iraq.

#### APPENDIX 2

List of points of special concern of the Government of the Republic of Iraq transmitted by a letter dated 12 November 1984 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

1. The fact that Iraq has not provided the Iraqi authorities with the names of Iraqi soldiers missing on the battle fronts.

2. The fact that Iraq has not handed over to the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Iran the names of a large number of Iraqi prisoners (close to 15,000) and, in particular, those of high-ranking officers.

3. The fact that there are unpublicized prison camps which the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Iran is unable to visit although we know of the existence of some of them.

4. The intentional stoppage or delay, on the part of the Iranian authorities, of letters from Iraqi prisoners for long periods of time.

5. The fact that the mission of the ICRC has not been permitted to visit Iraqi prisoners or to visit them only at infrequent intervals, in contravention of the Geneva Conventions.

6. Harsh treatment of Iraqi prisoners—their torture, murder, the amputation of the limbs of some of them, and the taking of blood from them.

7. The pillorying of Iraqi prisoners in the streets of Iranian cities while bound with chains.

8. The mass murder of Iraqi prisoners, whether on capture or subsequently.

9. Bad health and medical services and inadequate equipment and food.

10. The presence of a number of Iraqi prisoners in Evin Prison under Iranian names.

11. The placing of civilian supporters of the Iranian régime together with Iraqi prisoners for political, ideological and propagandistic purposes which are internationally prohibited.

12. The fact that political elements, under cover of religion, visit the prison camps in order to undertake political activities hostile to Iraq and with the intention of influencing the morale of Iraqi prisoners and enrolling them, by coercive means, in political movements subservient to Iran.

13. The fact that Iraq has not complied with the decision of the Mixed Medical Commission concerning the handing over of disabled Iraqi prisoners, and the fact that that Commission has not been allowed to continue its work.

14. The rendering of death sentences or sentences of imprisonment against certain Iraqi prisoners without informing the ICRC of the legal proceedings taken in the investigation and the trial.

#### APPENDIX 3

Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross  
on the incident at Gorgan Camp, 10 October 1984

[Text identical with that in the annex to document S/16020 of 7 November 1984.]

APPENDIX 4

Report on the Gorgan Camp incident, 10 October 1984, prepared by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Nine representatives of the ICRC visited the Gorgan Camp for Iraqi prisoners of war and distributed more than 3,000 questionnaires among them from 1030 to 1700 hours on 9 October 1984.

2. A representative of ICRC in a speech delivered to the POWs stated, among other things, that owing to certain problems with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ICRC had not been in a position to visit the camp earlier. Now, ICRC had come to see whether the provisions of the third Geneva Convention had been implemented or not.

3. On this day, according to the usual procedure, the ICRC delegation was first briefed on the general conditions of the camp and, during a visit to the hospital and public places, distributed the questionnaires among 3,000 POWs and also registered 14 new POWs.

4. On the second day, the visit continued with registration of 374 Iraqi POWs and, while medical teams examined some of them, other ICRC delegation members undertook to inspect different parts of the camp, conducting the visit to POWs with no witnesses.

5. At 1130 hours, a note was delivered to one of the ICRC representatives by a POW, Khazir Abbas Khazir, who later stated during the investigation that the note included a list of names to be presented to the Iraqi authorities.

6. This action made a number of POWs suspicious. One POW approached the ICRC representative demanding to check the note. The ICRC representative flatly refused to comply and subsequently a heated argument erupted.

7. As the argument continued, a tense atmosphere developed and within a short time spread to other parts of the camp. This led to scuffles and fights among the POWs, who used any object they found, including bedsteads, empty metal cans and pieces of glass as weapons.

8. The camp authorities asked the POWs to stop the violence immediately and to restore calm. They later attempted to disperse the POWs by firing tear gas canisters and by using truncheons.

9. Three POWs were killed by a number of other POWs in one of the dormitories and one was seriously injured. Injuries from the objects mentioned and blows received on the head, face and stomach have been recognized as causes of death for the three POWs.

10. Taking advantage of the prevailing atmosphere, some POWs attacked the guards and rushed towards the gates, attempting to escape from the camp. The disturbance, still not being contained, forced the guards to fire warning shots in the air. The POWs, however, did not pay any attention to this warning, compelling the guards to shoot below the waist, using slow-moving bullets.

11. The disturbance ended around 1230 hours and calm was restored. A total of six people were killed (three by gunshot wounds and three by POWs). Also 47 were injured during the disturbance. The number of those injured by gunshot was smaller than that of those injured by the POWs. Three other injured persons died after being transferred to the hospital and while undergoing medical treatment. Except for one case of leg amputation, the rest incurred minor injuries and, after recovering in a short time, were returned to the camp.

12. The names of the POWs who lost their lives in the incident are:
1. Hossein Marhij Jabbar . . . . . Killed by POWs
  2. Abdol-Karim Mahmoud Hadi . . . . . Killed by POWs
  3. Jabbar Mazheh Salman . . . . . Killed by POWs
  4. Rahman Jaber Rahman . . . . . Killed by gunshot
  5. Bejer Shawi Shand . . . . . Killed by gunshot
  6. Hasoun Fazaa Hasireh . . . . . Killed by gunshot
  7. Hamd Khalis Sami . . . . . Killed by gunshot
  8. Majid Ghader Ebrahim . . . . . Killed by gunshot
  9. Amer Mohsen Alvan . . . . . Killed by gunshot

CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. This is the first time that any disturbance has broken out in the Gorgan Camp since it began its operation as a POW camp in 1981.
2. The measures taken by the camp authorities were recognized as proper and timely, considering the extent of the disturbance, on one hand, and the low number of casualties, on the other.
3. Considering the existence of personal, tribal, ideological and political differences among the Iraqi POWs and the fact that a number of

them are members of the Baath Party of Iraq, while others are among their opposition, the ICRC representatives should have adopted a more tactful attitude towards the POWs.

4. Seven POWs who have confessed to the slaying of the other three POWs would be brought to trial once the investigation of their case is completed.

5. This report is the result of a thorough investigation of the incident, including interviews with the Commander in charge and other personnel of the camp, the guards and a large number of POWs, all recorded and documented.

APPENDIX 5

List provided by the Government of Iraq of the prisoner-of-war camps in Iraq and their population at the time of the mission's visit

Name of camp	Number of POWs
1. Anbar . . . . .	1 330
2. Mosul No. 1 . . . . .	1 439
3. Mosul No. 2 . . . . .	1 572
4. Mosul No. 3 . . . . .	1 724
5. Mosul No. 4 . . . . .	663
6. Ramadi No. 1 . . . . .	1 332
7. Ramadi No. 2 . . . . .	874
8. Sallahuddin . . . . .	272
TOTAL	9 206

DESCRIPTION OF THE CAMPS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE VISITED BY THE MISSION

1. *Sallahuddin*. The camp is situated between Baghdad and Mosul, some 150 kilometres to the north of the capital. It is part of a military garrison and houses a total of 275 prisoners of war in two blocks of buildings facing each other, one for officers, who constitute more than half of the inmates, and the other for soldiers and NCOs, who are mostly assigned to work as orderlies.

2. *Mosul (Camps Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4)*. There are four POW camps on the outskirts of Mosul, the second largest town in Iraq, 400 kilometres north of Baghdad. The four buildings where the camps are located were former barracks of the Iraqi army, which still maintains a garrison in the vicinity. The four camps are two-storey quadrilateral buildings, with a yard in the middle, about half of which has been converted into vegetable gardens tended by the prisoners. The ground floor houses the prisoners, while the second floor is reserved for the officers and guards. With the exception of Mosul Camp No. 4, which was the latest one converted into a POW camp, the other three gave an impression of being overcrowded. At the time of the mission's visit Mosul Camp No. 1 had a total of 1,439 POWs; Mosul Camp No. 2, 1,572; Mosul Camp No. 3, 1,724; and Mosul Camp No. 4, 663.

3. *Ramadi (Anbar Camp, and Ramadi Camps Nos. 1 and 2)*. There are three camps on the outskirts of Ramadi, a town some 110 kilometres west of Baghdad. One, somewhat farther away from the other two, is called Anbar and has a total POW population of 1,330. The other two camps are located close to each other. Ramadi Camp No. 1 holds 1,332 POWs, while Ramadi Camp No. 2—the so-called "children's camp"—houses 874 POWs, all below the age of 18.

APPENDIX 6

List provided by the Iranian Government of prisoner-of-war camps in the Islamic Republic of Iran and their population at the time of the mission's visit

Name of camp	Number of POWs
1. Arak . . . . .	2 392
2. Bojnoord . . . . .	2 359
3. Davoudieh . . . . .	2 384
4. Ghouchan . . . . .	2 404
5. Gorgan . . . . .	3 402
6. Heshmatieh . . . . .	7 253
7. Kahrizak . . . . .	3 264
8. Manjeel . . . . .	1 685
9. Mashad . . . . .	961
10. Mehrabad . . . . .	2 371

Name of camp	Number of POWs
11. Parandak .....	8 276
12. Qasr .....	886
13. Sari .....	1 953
14. Semnan .....	4 294
15. Takhti .....	1 073
16. Torbate-Jam .....	1 305
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b><u>46 262</u></b>

DESCRIPTION OF THE CAMPS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE VISITED BY THE MISSION

1. *Gorgan.* Gorgan Camp is part of a military garrison situated within the city of Gorgan, 381 kilometres north-east of Tehran, close to the Caspian Sea. According to the camp's authorities, the number of POWs at the time of the mission's visit was 3,402. The Camp consists of 22 dormitories, each accommodating between 160 and 260 prisoners of war, divided into four sections. Since the 10 October incident in 1984, POWs cannot move freely about the Camp and are restricted to their respective sections.

2. *Sari.* Sari Camp is located in the heart of the city of the same name, 131 kilometres west of Gorgan and 250 kilometres north-east of Tehran. According to figures provided by the authorities, there were 1,953 POWs in the camp on the day of the mission's visit. According to the camp authorities, most of the prisoners in the camp had been captured in 1982. The camp consists of single-storey buildings divided into five sections, with a total of 14 dormitories, each with an average number of 130 POWs. As is the case with the other camps visited, with the exception of Takhti and Mehrabad, prisoners are not free to move outside their section. The last visit by the ICRC took place in 1983.

3. *Semnan.* Semnan Camp lies in the proximity of the town of the same name, 201 kilometres south of Sari and 228 kilometres west of Tehran. A former military training camp, it consists of a series of tents grouped into two self-contained "camps", the Upper Camp and the Lower Camp. The total POW population of Semnan at the time of the mission's visit was 4,294, of whom about 106 were officers. There are about 10 prisoners per tent. Most of the prisoners had been in other camps before being sent to Semnan. The only visit of the ICRC to Semnan took place in 1981 for purposes of registration. Given the nature of the camp, prisoners sleep on mattresses instead of bunks or beds as is the rule in the other Iranian POW camps visited.

4. *Davoudieh.* Davoudieh Camp is situated in the north of Tehran in three-storey former university buildings. The number of POWs totalled 2,384 on the day of the mission's visit. According to the camp authorities, the figure included 273 officers and 445 non-commissioned officers as well as 194 non-Iraqis who are regarded as "mercenaries" by the Iranian Government and to whom ICRC has had no access. The non-Iraqi prisoners—mostly nationals from other Arab countries—live in separate dormitories. The Camp consists of seven divisions, with a combined number of 20 rooms and 3 large halls. According to the authorities, there were some 50 prisoners under 18 years of age in the camp. The only visit by ICRC to the camp took place in June 1984.

5. *Mehrabad.* This camp is situated within the Mehrabad air force base in the centre of Tehran. It houses a total of 2,371 POWs and is divided into seven sections, with four dormitories. The dormitories, housed in two-storey buildings, are spacious, with individual beds instead of bunks. POWs are free to move within the different sections. The last ICRC visit took place in June 1984.

6. *Heshmatieh.* The camp lies in the south of Tehran. After Parandak, it is the second largest POW camp in Iran, with a total prisoner population of 7,253 at the time of the visit by the mission. There are reported to be 82 officers and 2,018 NCOs among the prisoners. The camp consists of single-storey barracks containing 30 dormitories and is divided into 5 sections. With an average of more than 230 POWs per dormitory, the impression was one of rather crowded conditions. The camp was last visited by ICRC in May/June 1984.

7. *Takhti.* Takhti is located in a stadium in Tehran. It currently holds 1,073 POWs. The last ICRC visit took place in July 1984. According to the camp authorities, more than 1,000 POWs had been transferred since then to Parandak, partly because the camp was destined to be closed in the near future, partly also because of the need to separate the two "ideological" groups following an incident in the summer of 1984 which had led to the death of one POW. In the coming months the remaining POWs, all of them currently housed in a single enormous hall, are expected to be transferred to Parandak.

8. *Parandak.* This camp, situated some 80 kilometres south-west of Tehran, is the largest POW camp in Iran. At the time of the mission's visit, the official number of POWs was 8,276, housed in 22 dormitories deployed in 6 self-contained "camps". The camp, consisting of single-storey buildings, had been newly built and was still being expanded to accommodate an enlarged POW population. A visit to the dormitories left an impression of overcrowdedness. There were 315 POW officers in the camp who, as in other camps visited, shared the same quarters with the NCOs and the soldiers. The last ICRC visit had taken place in the summer of 1984 before the transfer of half of the Takhti inmates.

APPENDIX 7

Chronology of activities of the mission

Tuesday, 8 January 1985

—Mission assembles in Geneva

Wednesday, 9 and Thursday, 10 January

—Meetings at the Palais des Nations:

- (a) Meeting with delegation from the Republic of Iraq
- (b) Meeting with delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran
- (c) Meeting with the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross

Friday, 11 January

—Departure from Geneva

—Arrival in Baghdad

Saturday, 12 January

—Meetings with Iraqi Government officials

—Meeting with Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq

Sunday, 13 January

—Visit to Sallahuddin Camp

—Visit to Mosul Camp No. 3

Monday, 14 January

—Visit to Mosul Camp No. 2

—Visit to Mosul Camp No. 1

—Visit to Mosul Camp No. 4

Tuesday, 15 January

—Visit to Anbar Camp

—Visit to Ramadi Camp No. 1

—Visit to Ramadi Camp No. 2

Wednesday, 16 January

—Visit to civilian villages in Misan area

—Meeting with Iraqi Government officials

Thursday, 17 January

—Departure from Baghdad

Friday, 18 January

—Arrival in Tehran

Saturday, 19 January

—Meeting with Iranian Government officials

—Meeting with Commander of the Military Centre in charge of prisoner-of-war camps

—Arrival in Gorgan

Sunday, 20 January

—Visit to Gorgan Camp

Monday, 21 January

—Visit to Sari Camp

—Visit to Semnan Camp

Tuesday, 22 January

—Visit to Davoudieh Camp

—Visit to Mehrabad Camp

—Meeting with members of the Commission for the Protection of Iranian Prisoners of War

Wednesday, 23 January

—Visit to Heshmatieh Camp

—Visit to Takhti Camp

—Meeting with Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Thursday, 24 January

—Visit to Parandak Camp

—Meeting with Iranian Government officials

Friday, 25 January

—Departure from Tehran

—Arrival in Vienna to prepare report

#### DOCUMENT S/16963\*

#### Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[19 February 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to invite your attention to the fact that it has been more than three weeks since the Islamic Republic of Iran, in conformity with the exalted principles of Islam regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, officially announced its readiness to unilaterally and immediately free 31 Iraqi hand-capped POWs with a third country acting as intermediary.

The Iraqi régime, however, has not so far announced its willingness to accept its own POWs.

In view of the extremely important and humanitarian issue concerned, you are kindly requested to take every measure necessary and available to the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ensure the placement of the freed Iraqi POWs in Iraq among their families.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/869-S/16963.

#### DOCUMENT S/16964\*

#### Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[19 February 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 9.30 a.m. on 19 February 1985 and the following was brought to his attention by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

“The Pakistani authorities have recently once again claimed that two Afghan aircraft allegedly entered the airspace of Para Chenar and dropped two bombs, 3 kilometres south-east of Kharlachi on 11 February 1985.

“The pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan consider these Pakistani charges as totally

groundless and void of reality and, while categorically rejecting them, once again demand that the responsible authorities of Pakistan refrain from levelling such baseless accusations and hostile propaganda against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which result in further heightening of tension in the region”.

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/134-S/16964.

**DOCUMENT S/16965\***

**Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of Thailand  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[19 February 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 15 February 1985 [S/16960], I have the honour to bring to your attention the latest acts of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand committed by the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, as follows:

1. On 6 February 1985, at 1730 hours, about four rounds of 70-mm rocket containing toxic chemical agents fired by the Vietnamese forces landed in Thai territory, approximately two kilometres north of Ban San Ro Changan, Ta Phraya district, Prachinburi province.

2. On 16 February, between 0540 and 1550 hours, the Vietnamese forces fired artillery shells into Thai territory at Ban Kruat, Buriram province, about 13 kilometres from the Thai-Kampuchean border. As a result, five Thai villagers were killed and seven others were seriously wounded.

3. During 16 and 17 February, the Vietnamese troops made several incursions into Thai territory and attacked a Thai military position at Hill 472, about 1 kilometre from the Thai-Kampuchean border in the area of Ban Kruat District, killing three Thai soldiers and wounding 16 others.

The Royal Thai Government wishes to draw your attention to these heinous crimes, especially the use of toxic chemical weapons against the innocent Thai people as well as the Kampuchean displaced persons along the Thai-Kampuchean border, deliberately committed by the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea in blatant violation of fundamental human rights, international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

The Royal Thai Government deeply regrets that Hanoi has continued to disregard the repeated calls for immediate cessation of its hostile acts against Thailand. The Royal Thai Government is outraged by the Vietnamese terrorist actions and demands once again that Hanoi immediately stop committing these murderous acts against the Thai people, the consequences for which the Vietnamese Government must bear the full responsibility.

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Birabongse KASEMSRI  
Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/136-S/16965.

**DOCUMENT S/16966**

**Note verbale dated 14 February 1985 from the Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Russian]  
[19 February 1985]

The Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in reply to his note dated 21 December 1984, has the honour to state the following.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, steadfastly guided by its position of principle concerning the criminal policy of *apartheid* pursued by the South African racist régime, maintains no relations with South Africa in the political, economic, military or any other fields.

Accordingly, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic welcomed Security Council resolution 558 (1984), which supplements the Council's earlier decisions concerning the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, and has strictly implemented its provisions, as in the case of previous relevant decisions of Council.

In view of the fact that the racist régime in South Africa continues to disregard United Nations decisions on the struggle against *apartheid*, pursues a policy of aggression, destabilization and State terrorism against neighbouring independent States and is building up its military capacity and striving to acquire nuclear weapons, thereby posing a direct threat to international peace and security, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic supports the growing demands that the Security Council urgently adopt all the necessary measures against the racist régime, including comprehensive and mandatory sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations requests that this note be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/16967\***

**Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[20 February 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour, with reference to the statement made on 8 February 1985 by the spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Iraqi régime<sup>19</sup> to draw your attention and that of the international community to the following brief remarks:

1. The Iraqi régime in the above-mentioned statement claims "it did not, and it will not, resort to shelling civilian centres". The report of the United Nations investigation team stationed in Tehran [S/16897], however, confirms that the foregoing Iraqi claim is a mere lie and proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the criminal régime of Iraq has, in fact, savagely shelled the purely civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran and thus has miserably failed to uphold its own undertaking of 12 June 1984 [S/16609].

2. Referring to that undertaking, the Iraqi régime further claims in the said statement that "the Iranian régime continued to violate it". The report of the United Nations investigation team stationed in Baghdad [S/16750 of 19 September 1984], however, clearly indicates otherwise, and proves that the Iranian Muslim combatants have not shelled any civilian centres in Iraq and have thus fully abided by their undertaking of 12 June 1984.

3. The President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hojratolislam Khamenei, on 8 February, on account of the preceding facts, warned the Iraqi régime of a strong reciprocal measure should they continue with their criminal acts of aggression and shelling of innocent civilians.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/870-S/16967.

The knavish and wicked quiddity of the ruling gang of the Iraqi criminal régime has long been exposed for the Iranian people. Statements of the sort made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Baathist régime on 8 February 1985, which are not worth the paper they are printed on and in which lies, misrepresentations and fabrications are, as is clearly shown above, so embarrassingly distinct, have not only disclosed the Iraqi criminal régime's true nature at the international level, but have also been construed as an insult to the intelligence of the world community in general and the United Nations system in particular.

The said statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Iraqi régime, which was a miserable and deceitful attempt to cover up their crimes and save face, has in fact added another page to the dark record of the Baathist Iraqi régime.

Allow me to add that if the Iraqi régime continues to shell the Iranian civilian centres, the combatants of the Islamic Republic of Iran are left with no option but to retaliate strongly.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/16968\***

**Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of China  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Chinese/English]  
[20 February 1985]

On instructions from the Chinese Government, I wish to state the following with regard to the letter dated 7 February 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General [S/16944].

1. The Chinese Government has rejected the contents of the note of protest dated 31 January 1985 by the Afghan authorities to the Government of the People's Republic of China [ibid.].

2. The Afghan question is entirely the result of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by foreign troops. The support by the international community to the struggle

of the Afghan people against foreign aggression is justified and beyond reproach.

3. The allegations contained in the note of the Afghan authorities to the effect that China has intervened in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, waged an undeclared war against it, dispatched advisors and instructors to training camps inside Pakistan and transferred some of the camps to China's territory are sheer fabrications concocted out of ulterior motives and the attempt to confuse truth and falsehood, mislead the public and divert world opinion from its condemnation of the foreign invasion of Afghanistan, so as to extricate the Afghan authorities from the predicament of isolation.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/138-S/16968.

4. The fact that the foreign troops have refused to withdraw from Afghanistan has impeded the implementation of the resolutions on the Afghan issue adopted by the past six sessions of the General Assembly [resolutions ES-6/2, 35/37, 36/34, 37/37, 38/29 and 39/13] and hindered a just solution of the question to this day. The Afghan authorities have now gone so far as to try to shift the responsibilities on to China and the other justice-upholding countries. Their acts of inflating the arrogance of the aggressors will be futile and they will only help expose further the nature of the Afghan authorities as a puppet régime.

5. The Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete implementation of the resolutions on the Afghan issue adopted at the past sessions of the General Assembly, an early restoration of the independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and the determination by the

Afghan people of their own destiny, free from outside interference. The Chinese Government is in favour of a political solution to the Afghan question and maintains that the key to a political settlement is the total withdrawal of foreign troops from that country. This position of the Chinese Government is in conformity with the interests of the Afghan people and conducive to the restoration of peace and stability in south-west Asia.

I have the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LING QING  
Permanent Representative of  
the People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16969\*

#### Letter dated 20 February 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[20 February 1985]

Further to my letter of 15 January 1985 [S/16898], I have the honour to send you herewith additional information on the current situation in Kampuchea, consisting of excerpts from the Directives of the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to all military units in all fronts in Kampuchea on 31 January.

I should be most grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith  
Permanent Representative of  
Democratic Kampuchea  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

#### The situation in Kampuchea in January 1985

#### A. PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION OF THE VIETNAMESE ENEMY AND THEIR PLAN DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE SEVENTH DRY SEASON

##### 1. The present military situation of the Vietnamese

In the military field, the Vietnamese are facing more difficulties than during the sixth dry season.

(a) The Vietnamese troops are facing more difficulties because our national army has carried out its guerrilla activities deeper and deeper inside Kampuchea, especially in battle zone I (the Tonlé Sap region), thus tying down tens of thousands of Vietnamese troops;

(b) In this battle zone I, through its ever active and powerful military operations, our army has been able to penetrate deeper and deeper inside Kampuchea, wiping out the Vietnamese from Skoun to Prek Kdam, at Bat Doeng, Tuol Leap, Bek Chan and Kambaul. These activities have largely crippled the transportation of the enemy supplies to the western zone of Kampuchea.

Our army has daily been carrying out activities to cut the railways. It has constantly cut the Phnom Penh-Battambang railway and the enemy supply line through the Tonlé Sap. In addition, highways No. 5 and No. 6 have been cut in many places. All these actions have rendered the

transportation of Vietnamese supplies to western Kampuchea more difficult than during the sixth dry season.

Since the beginning of the current dry season, the seventh, the Vietnamese have been practically without transport and the fresh troops they have sent to western Kampuchea have had to go on foot, in dribbles.

Thus, battle zone I, which constitutes the strategic "throat" of the enemy, has been so tightly squeezed by our national army that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to breathe.

The enemy have mobilized tens of thousands of their troops to prevent our army from carrying out their activities in this zone, but it has been of no avail. They appear to be in a position to ward off our attacks or to defend their strategic "throat" supply lines to western Kampuchea.

If the Vietnamese keep mobilizing their troops to defend their strategic "throat" and fail, they will certainly be strangled to death.

For this reason, their Politbureau in Hanoi has sounded the alarm, as follows:

(a) If the Vietnamese enemy persist in mobilizing their forces to oppose the Kampuchean army in battle zone I, they will be defeated;

(b) If they send forces from eastern and central Kampuchea and dare to send an important number of troops from battle zone I to oppose and attack our national army in western Kampuchea, they will face two eventualities:

- (i) They might oppose some resistance to our army and thus gain time which they could use for their diplomatic campaign of lies;
- (ii) Alternatively, they might continue to risk being strangled in Kampuchea, especially in battle zone I, and in battle zone II (western Kampuchea), because they would be at bay.

The Vietnamese enemy cannot extricate themselves from the guerrilla warfare and combat tactics of our army throughout the country and especially in battle zone I and in western Kampuchea. Actually, as the Vietnamese have withdrawn some of their forces from battle zone I in order to relieve their troops elsewhere or to oppose us in western Kampuchea, their forces have become very thinly spread in battle zone I. Our army has seized this opportunity to decimate their fighting forces, to destroy their administrative apparatus at the level of the communes and districts, as well as their economic bases and supply lines, and to penetrate deeper inside Kampuchea towards the capital, Phnom Penh.

The redeployment of the enemy troops to oppose or attack us so as to improve their position on the western front gives us the opportunity to wipe out more of their fighting forces because we are in a better position in terms of troop strength and of military and food supplies. As our enemies

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/139-S/16969.

have to bring their troops and their military and food supplies from a considerable distance, they cannot face a long campaign.

## 2. Measures taken by the Vietnamese enemy during the seventh dry season

The enemy are well aware that if they only keep trying to mobilize their forces to oppose us at their strategic "throat" and fail, they will be defeated. Consequently, they have to regroup their forces to oppose and fight us in western Kampuchea. This has been the decision taken by the Politbureau in Hanoi, which has ordered its army high command in Kampuchea to do this at all costs for, to use their own words, "it is a matter of life and death".

In pursuit of the above-mentioned objectives, the Vietnamese have taken a number of important measures, as follows:

(a) They have mobilized the maximum of their forces to oppose and fight our army in western Kampuchea;

(b) They have done their utmost to transport the additional military equipment provided by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, especially heavy artillery and tanks, to western Kampuchea;

(c) They have intensified their Fascist policy of forcible enlistment of Kampuchean in their army as strategic support forces;

(d) They have intensified their barbarous policy of commandeering the population of the communes, districts and provinces and sending them to clear forests and build roads in western Kampuchea.

In line with the above-mentioned assignment of their forces, the Vietnamese enemy have set themselves the following combat objectives in western Kampuchea:

(a) To send intelligence and commando units across the border to fight 1 to 10 kilometres inside Thai territory;

(b) To destroy our military depots and our military equipment, such as heavy artillery, and trucks, and our roads, bridges, transmitter-receiver sets, etc.;

(c) To cut our supply lines to battle zone I;

(d) To attack our command posts from the regimental level upward.

In order to achieve these four objectives, the enemy have set up and used their special forces called "A5 special units", which they consider as their forward intelligence and commando units. However, the Vietnamese themselves have admitted that these "A5 special units" are short of men and lacking in fighting spirit, while the lower ranks of their officers are weak and have a rather limited knowledge of the combat terrain.

The enemy forces also comprise the infantry divisions stationed in Kampuchea, some infantry divisions from the Lao People's Democratic Republic, especially the 305th division, an important number of reinforcements specializing in heavy artillery, tanks, commando and intelligence activities and other fields, from North Viet Nam. They have also increased the number of their aircraft and use them more than during the sixth dry season.

## B. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND OUR LINE OF ACTION

1. The Vietnamese enemy have been committing acts of aggression against Kampuchea and have occupied it with a view to annexing it, as they had already done in Kampuchea Krom. However, the people of Kampuchea and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea have never been more united in their struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors than they have been over the last six years, when they have been striving to tie the enemy down and increase their difficulties. As a result, the Vietnamese enemy are now at the end of their tether in the political, military, diplomatic and economic fields, in Kampuchea and in Viet Nam as well.

In the military field, the Vietnamese aggressors are completely bogged down. They are also facing increasing difficulties because they cannot stop our national army, which has been penetrating and fighting them deeper and deeper inside Kampuchea. They know that if our forces approach nearer to the capital, Phnom Penh, they will represent a mortal danger to them.

That is why the Hanoi Politbureau has decided to mobilize its military forces and equipment to attack us at all costs in western Kampuchea. In such a situation, we can see that the Vietnamese are not attacking, they are on the defensive. They try to oppose us in order to lighten their burden and gain time for propaganda and crafty diplomatic manoeuvres. However, these measures cannot save them from being bogged down in the actual fighting in Kampuchea.

Although the Vietnamese have mobilized their troops and military equipment from eastern and central Kampuchea and sent them to fight us in western Kampuchea, our national army keeps on fighting them in eastern

Kampuchea and even more strongly in battle zone I. And on the western front, too, our army will be able to fight the enemy, aiming especially at destroying as much as possible of their fighting forces and their military equipment.

2. According to excerpts from the directives of the high command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to all military units on all fronts in Kampuchea on 31 January 1985, our line of action will be as follows:

(a) Creative application of the principle of "defending ourselves by taking the offensive" or "taking the offensive to defend ourselves".

(b) Continuing to launch heavier attacks deeper in battle zone I according to the "five-target combat tactics" by taking advantage of the redeployment of the Vietnamese troops from this zone in western Kampuchea and doing our utmost to harass and destroy all Vietnamese forces stationed there. Especially, launching attacks against their main and secondary supply lines, the communes and the small and medium-sized population centres in order to destroy as far as possible their political administrative apparatus and economic bases in battle zone I; liberating the population and mobilizing them to fight more actively against the enemy, so as to expand further our guerrilla bases and liberated zones.

By so doing, we shall be tightening our stranglehold on the strategic "throat" of the enemy till they suffocate, and the Vietnamese forces in western Kampuchea will be suffocating also. In a word, the Vietnamese forces in western Kampuchea are dependent on their strategic "throat" in battle zone I.

(c) We have managed to defend successfully our command committees at all levels, our depots and military equipment and our supply lines. We must keep on going and even improve our defence. If we are to carry out this task properly, we must completely defeat the Vietnamese plan for the seventh dry season.

(d) In the battlefield of western Kampuchea it is a fight between two regular armies. On this front, we must fight and destroy as much as possible the Vietnamese fighting forces during the seventh dry season by making creative use of all forms of our guerrilla tactics and taking the initiative all the time.

We must apply the following principles and tactics of combat:

—Making use of our forces in the fighting in such a way that our forces and those of the enemy are intertwined;

—Ordering our forces to watch the enemy night and day, to attack them at once or call our artillery when they meet them, to attack and mine the enemy's supply lines, to attack their intelligence units, to storm their forces, to launch attacks from the rear and to use our artillery to destroy the enemy's tanks and artillery.

In brief, we must resort to intertwined combat tactics so as to wear down the enemy forces. Everywhere we meet the enemy we must attack them, particularly from the rear, and slash them to pieces. It is of the utmost importance that every unit should fight furiously against the enemy and never let them get away. The tactic of attacking and then retreating must never be used.

The Vietnamese enemy have many weaknesses in western Kampuchea: for instance, they depend entirely on the strategic "throat" in battle zone I. If this strategic "throat" is squeezed, the Vietnamese forces in western Kampuchea will also be suffocated on all sides. Thus, after a period of fighting, the enemy's troop strength, military equipment and food supplies will be running short so that they cannot fulfil their plan. Besides, in December 1984, we destroyed an important regimental stronghold of the A5 special unit stationed at Aur Popoul, where we also eliminated a large number of soldiers, destroyed a great quantity of military equipment and killed a lieutenant-colonel, deputy commanding officer of the A5 special unit. Moreover, since last November we have eliminated more fighting men, including troops belonging to the A5 special unit, than we did during the whole of the sixth dry season.

The Vietnamese enemy consider the following to be their strong points:

(a) Their commando units;

(b) Their intelligence units;

(c) Their heavy artillery and tanks;

(d) Their crafty schemes to attack us on the flanks and in the rear;

(e) The stubbornness with which the Vietnamese troops have resisted in some places.

In order to offset these strengths, we keep on attacking the enemy so that they are always having difficulties. We must keep on fighting the enemy according to the following directives:

(a) To keep constant track of the enemy, night and day;

- (b) Not to fail to attack their intelligence units;
- (c) To cut their supply lines at any cost;
- (d) To use our artillery to destroy their artillery and tanks;
- (e) To wage a relentless fight against the enemy.

The situation as a whole is developing favourably for us and unfavourably for the enemy. Four months have already elapsed since the beginning of the seventh dry season, which will be over in only three months more. We have already fought the enemy for more than half of the current dry season and we have won victory after victory:

We must keep on fighting the enemy so that we win more victories before the end of the seventh dry season, always bearing in mind the following guidelines:

- (a) To continue to launch attacks against the Vietnamese enemy more actively and deeply in battle zone I according to the "five-target combat tactic";
- (b) To defend our command committees, depots and supply lines;
- (c) To fight the Vietnamese enemy in western Kampuchea in order to eliminate the largest possible number of their fighting men.

## DOCUMENT S/16970\*

### Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of China to the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese/English]  
[20 February 1985]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the full text of the statements of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on 6 and 18 February 1985 on the situation in Kampuchea and the relations between China and Viet Nam.

I shall be most grateful if you can arrange for the circulation of this letter and its enclosures as documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LING Qing  
Permanent Representative of  
the People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX I

Statement of 6 February 1985 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in response to questions on the Kampuchean situation and Sino-Vietnamese relations

**Question:** The Foreign Ministers of the three countries of Indo-China met recently and issued a communiqué. Would China like to make any comment on that?

**Answer:** We don't see any sincerity on the part of the Vietnamese authorities in their professed intention to settle the Kampuchean question. The so-called conference of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries of Indo-China and the communiqué are nothing but propaganda tricks in co-ordination with Viet Nam's dry-season offensive. People only sneer at them.

**Question:** Lately the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea called its fifth cabinet meeting. Do you have any comment on the meeting?

**Answer:** Yes. The fact that Prince Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, presided over the fifth cabinet meeting of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea a short time ago, when the Vietnamese aggressor troops were launching massive attacks against the Kampuchean patriotic armed forces, shows that the Coalition Government is expanding its political influence both at home and abroad, its military strength is growing and its unity has been further consolidated. The communiqué of the cabinet meeting exposed the political and military conspiracies of the Vietnamese authorities, strongly condemned the crimes committed by the Vietnamese aggressor troops against the Kampuchean people and expressed the determination to carry the war against Vietnamese aggression through to the end, i.e., until all the Vietnamese aggressor troops are pulled out of Kampuchea. The Chinese Government and people warmly congratulate the Coalition Government on the result of the meeting and highly praise it. We are convinced that the patriotic armed forces and people of Kampuchea, inspired by the spirit of the cabinet meeting of the

Coalition Government and under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, will put up even stronger resistance against the Vietnamese aggressor troops, frustrate the enemy's frenzied attacks and win victory in the struggle of the seventh dry season.

**Question:** The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said some time ago that the Chinese frontier troops had been compelled to fight back in self-defence against the Vietnamese troops. Could you tell us something about the present situation along the Sino-Vietnamese border?

**Answer:** The Chinese frontier troops have fought back in self-defence to protect the sacred territory of their motherland only when they were forced to do so after provocations from the Vietnamese troops along the Chinese border and intrusions into Chinese territory. Tension still prevails along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The tension there will be relaxed only when the Vietnamese troops stop their armed provocations and intrusions.

**Question:** The Vietnamese Chargé d'affaires in Beijing attacked China when he was interviewed by a correspondent of the Associated Press. Any comment from the Chinese side on this?

**Answer:** What he has said is a mere repetition of the hackneyed anti-China propaganda of the Vietnamese authorities. We deeply regret that he should have made such a statement in Beijing.

**Question:** In its statement of February 2, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry charged that the statement that the Chinese frontier troops "stand ready to repulse the invading enemy", made by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in answering a question on January 30, had "created extreme tension". Do you have any comment on the statement of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry?

**Answer:** The tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border has been solely the making of the Vietnamese authorities. Our consistent stand towards Vietnamese military provocations and intrusions has been: "We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack".

**Question:** According to the foreign press, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian has recently said that China will not stand idly by if Viet Nam intrudes into Thailand. Would you like to confirm this statement?

**Answer:** To support all the countries and peoples of the world in their struggles against foreign aggression has been the consistent position of the Chinese Government and people. Should Viet Nam dare to invade Thailand, China will give firm support to the Thai Government and people in their struggle against foreign aggression.

#### ANNEX II

Statement of 18 February 1985 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the situation in Kampuchea

Recently, the Vietnamese aggressors, trying by one reckless action to extricate themselves from their predicament both at home and abroad, have massed tens of thousands of troops along the Kampuchean-Thai border and dispatched planes, tanks and artillery in a frenzied offensive against the patriotic forces of Kampuchea, and made numerous intrusions into

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/140-S/16970.

Thailand. Powerful and truculent in appearance, they attempted to wipe out the patriotic forces at one stroke, yet have only got no more than a few deserted camps and mountain strongholds by mobilizing so many troops.

Victory or defeat in a war depends on the growth and decline of the effective strength of the two sides rather than the gain or loss of a camp or a place. With a view to conserving their strength, the patriotic forces of Kampuchea have moved away from their original positions on their own initiative to carry out guerrilla warfare wherever they can and to wipe out the effective strength of the aggressors. Facts over the years have proved that the Kampuchean people, resolved to fight stubbornly for their country's independence and national survival, are unconquerable.

The communiqué issued by the recent cabinet meeting of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk demonstrates the determination of Kampuchea's three patriotic forces to strengthen their unity and carry on the struggle against the Vietnamese aggression until all the Vietnamese troops are pulled out of their country.

The Foreign Ministers of the six member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) called a special meeting and issued a joint statement, unanimously reiterating their firm stand of supporting the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and strongly calling on the international community to intensify their political support and military aid to the Kampuchean people.

Together with the ASEAN countries and the international community, the Chinese Government and people will continue firmly to support and assist the Kampuchean people in carrying their just struggle against the Vietnamese invasion through to the end.

The Vietnamese authorities can never realize their vicious aim of perpetual occupation and annexation of Kampuchea either by military attacks or by political tricks. The prolonged war has brought grave disasters not only to the Kampuchean people but also to the Vietnamese people. The only way out for the Vietnamese authorities is to withdraw all their aggressor troops from Kampuchea by earnestly observing the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

## DOCUMENT S/16971

### Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[20 February 1985]

On instructions from my Government and with reference to your statement of 12 February 1985, made public by an official spokesman on that day, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Iraq remains committed to the letter and spirit of the agreement of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610] concerning the cessation of all deliberate attacks on purely civilian targets.

I should be grateful if you would be so kind as to have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/16972

### Letter dated 20 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[20 February 1985]

With reference to the letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran [S/16910] and dated 25 January 1985, and on instructions from my Government, I should like to state the following:

1. The statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran regarding the concern of his Government at the situation of shipping in the Arabian Gulf is surprising since everyone knows that Iran, through its aggression against Iraq, has prevented by military might the exercise by Iraq of its legitimate right to free navigation in the Arabian Gulf. In view of the persistence of the Iranian Government in continuing its aggression and in refusing to comply with the provisions of the Charter by settling its dispute with Iraq by peaceful means, Iraq has had no alternative but to pursue its policy of defending itself on the basis of those provisions of international law which authorize a State which is a party to an armed conflict to impose a blockade on the ports of the adversary State, within a precisely defined zone made known to all, in order to induce that State to accept peace.

2. The term "neutral mercantile ships" used by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is inconsistent with reality, since the activity of the said ships is tantamount, from the point of view of the outcome, to supplying the Iranian military machine and enabling Iran to continue its aggression in violation of the provisions of international law. Accordingly, the said ships forfeit their neutral character since they violate a right unequivocally conferred by international law, and the owners and sailors of those ships and the Iranian régime are all responsible for the consequences entailed by that violation.

3. If the Iranian Government was in fact desirous of ensuring the freedom of navigation and security in the Arabian Gulf, as stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would be more fitting for it to comply with Security Council resolution 540 (1983), which called for a halt to hostilities in the region of the Gulf, including all ports and waterways, thereby enabling all the littoral States to exercise their legitimate right to free navigation in order to serve the interests of the international community.

4. Clearly, the essential point is that the Iranian Government has the responsibility under the provisions of the Charter and of international law of settling the dispute by peaceful means and of renouncing the policy of continued war and aggression, because that alone is capable of bringing about the security, well-being and stability of the Arabian Gulf region and the welfare of its peoples.

I should be grateful if you would be so kind as to have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16973\*

##### Letter dated 20 February 1985 from the representative of Costa Rica to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[20 February 1985]

With regard to the letter dated 15 February 1985 addressed to you by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the permanent mission of Nicaragua [S/16961], I have the honour to bring to your attention the joint communiqué signed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica on 14 February. This communiqué was issued at the meeting of the three Ministers held in San José, Costa Rica, on the same date. Both the joint communiqué and the letter of 21 January<sup>20</sup> addressed to you concerning the situation in Central America constitute a categorical reply to the unfounded and tendentious statements of the Government of Nicaragua.

In this connection, it seems even more ironical that the Government of Nicaragua, whose Junta of National Reconstruction was in fact constituted in San José and many of whose members benefited from the right of political asylum offered to them by our Government, should forget these

circumstances and assail with coarse epithets the country which offered them political asylum, a hospitable welcome and friendship. We hope that this at least will not be denounced as a "flagrant and systematic violation of the norms and principles of the right of asylum".

I should be grateful if you would be so kind as to have this letter and the attached joint communiqué circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jorge A. MONTERO  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

Joint communiqué issued on 14 February 1985 by the Foreign Ministers of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica

[Same text as that of the annex to document S/16959.]

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/871-S/16973.

#### DOCUMENT S/16974\*

##### Letter dated 21 February 1985 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[21 February 1985]

Further to my letters concerning Israel's acts of aggression and practices in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, and on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

1. The Israeli Forces have been engaging for many days now in the areas under their occupation, more specifically Nabatieh, Tyre, Rashaya and western Bekaa, in a series of raids, arrests, killings and repression. These operations and consequent practices have resulted in a great number of casualties. Besides the wounded, some of them seriously, six people are known to have been killed while many other corpses still lay in the streets as they could not be identified owing to the siege laid by the forces of occupation in these areas.

2. Israeli officials have repeatedly indicated the willingness of Israel to continue to mount repressive operations and to intensify them in compliance with their stated "iron

fist" policy. Such a policy is a prelude to an escalation of their acts of repression and abusive acts.

3. In addition to the list of Israeli practices in the annex, the latest information coming from the area indicates that an Israeli force, strong with a great number of soldiers in armoured personnel carriers and other military vehicles and bulldozers, has made its way to the villages of Deir Kanoun and Tair Dibbah, the former situated at 8 kilometres north-east of Tyre.

The Government of Lebanon, while strongly protesting against these Israeli acts of aggression and abusive practices, reserves its right to request a special meeting of the Security Council should it deem that necessary.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Rachid FAKHOURY  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a document of the General Assembly under the symbol A/40/148 of 22 February 1985.

## ANNEX

### Report on the abusive practices of Israel in southern Lebanon: 12 to 20 February 1985

1. On 12 February: the village of Kamid Al-Loz is surrounded and a house in it belonging to a Mr. Mohieddine Hussein Ghaddar, is demolished.
2. 15 February: the Israeli forces continue, for the fourth consecutive day, to surround Kamid Al-Loz and to prevent its inhabitants from entering or leaving the village, even the sick and the elderly; a food shortage is being felt by the population.
3. 17 February: the villages of Deir Mimas and Kfar Kila are besieged and 15 and 22 persons respectively from each are being detained.
4. 18 February: the Israeli forces enter the village of Bazuriyah, shooting at random and conducting searches of houses and places of worship, ransacking their furniture and detaining nine persons. They shot Ghazi Awada (10 years old) and Mohammad Jaafar Kassir (18 years old), seriously wounding them at the triangle of Deir Qanun El-Nahr.
5. During the night of 18-19 February: the village of Tibnin is raided, its houses stormed and one inhabitant, Mr. Mohammed Mahmoud Haidar (20 years old) shot and killed.
6. 18 February 1985: the village of Tair Dibbah is besieged and house searches are conducted.
7. 19 February:
  - The Israelis shot at 2 persons, killing them instantly: Mr. Salim Mohammad Elabed (58 years old), on the road between the villages of Burj Rahhal and Kasmiyah, and Mr. Louay Riad Fakih, in the triangle of Abbasiyah-Deir Qanoun-Burj Rahhal.
  - Sixty armoured vehicles and bulldozers enter the village of Bazuriyah.
  - At the intersection leading to the region of Nabeh El-Tasseh, the Israeli forces surrounded the area, when the corpse of an unidentified man

was found, and prevented the Lebanese internal security forces from investigating on the scene.

—The village of Qar'un was besieged for two days, the students prevented from returning to the village and six people were detained.

—The village of Burj Rahhal was surrounded, its school destroyed and the teachers detained.

#### 8. 20 February:

—A corpse was found on the road to Abbasiyah village and was brought to Tyre hospital by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

—At the pass to Numeiriyeh, two women, Najwa Hussein Mahmoud (20 years old) and Khadijeh Mohammad Taleb (54 years old), were shot at and seriously wounded.

—The village of Bazuriyah is besieged and all roads leading to it are cut, as well as the roads between Tyre, Tair Dibbah and Ma'arakeh.

—Three bullet-ridden corpses from Israeli fire were found on the road between the villages of Bazuriyah and Tair Dibbah.

#### 9. 21 February:

—The Israeli forces entered the village of Bazuriyah, blew up four houses and detained four persons.

—In the village of Arab Salim, after four days of continuing siege, it is reported that nobody is allowed to enter or leave the village; a great number of casualties, dead and wounded, still lie in the streets; four people are known to have been killed, one of them identified as Mr. Hassan Ahmad Hassan (29 years old); six houses were razed by the Israeli bulldozers; more bulldozers were brought in, and 20 persons were deported; the inhabitants were gathered in a pool of mud, in the rain; ICRC delegates were prevented from entering the village; all the houses and cars were looted or stolen; 20 military vehicles and a bulldozer entered the village of Deir Qanoun El-Nahr.

## DOCUMENT S/16974/ADD.1\*

### Letter dated 25 February 1985 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

*[Original: Arabic]  
[25 February 1985]*

Further to my letter of 21 February 1985 [S/16974], and on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you two lists containing information on the continuing abusive Israeli operations and practices in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district in the period between 21 and 25 February.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Rachid FAKHOURY  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations*

## ANNEX I

### Report on abusive Israeli operations and practices: 21 to 23 February 1985

—The Israeli forces in the village of Qar'oon, which is still under siege, proceeded to enter the mosque and the church in the village and removed from them loudspeakers and certain other articles.

—Storming of Tair Dibbah and Dayr Qanun El-Nahr by large numbers of infantry and motorized units, and assembly of the inhabitants in the public squares for interrogation.

—Israeli forces comb the wadis and plantations situated on the Bidas-Abbasiyah-Burj Rahhal-Dayr Qanun El-Nahr-Yanuh road using automatic weapons, thereby paralysing traffic on that road.

—On 20 February, a detachment from the Israel Defence Forces took up positions in the Bunni quarter of the village of Rum, Jezzín district,

and established a wireless relay post close to the relay post belonging to the Lebanese Army and the security forces.

—Siege of Arab Salim for the fourth consecutive day; expulsion of 26 of its inhabitants, murder of 2 villagers, destruction of 8 houses and continuing detention of citizens in garages.

—At Zarariyah, demolition of 3 houses, detention of 5 young men and random firing at citizens.

—A force made up of 600 armoured vehicles, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers and accompanied by bulldozers and 5 helicopters, besieged the villages of Deir Qanun El-Nahr, Burj Rahhal, Bidas, Abbasiyah, Tora, Tair Dibbah and Ma'arakeh. The operation resulted in a number of dead and wounded, dozens were detained and houses were demolished. The final outcome is not yet known since the siege of the area continues.

—Jib Jannin remains under siege and the Israeli forces have prevented the inhabitants from entering or leaving. They have also prevented movement within the town and have detained Mustafa Muhammad Ajram, Muhammad Ahmad Sharaniq, Ibrahim Said Sharaniq and Khalid Muhammad Al-Safir, teachers at the Kfar Dunin school and the intermediate school at Jib Jannin, and have removed them to an undisclosed location.

—Continuation of the siege of Arab Salim and prevention of the International Committee of the Red Cross from entering the village to evacuate the dead and wounded. The occupation forces continue to hold hundreds of citizens in the open air, which has led to the death from exposure of the village *mukhtar*. Bodies remain in the open air because of the continued encirclement. The Israelis have also expelled close to 75 persons from the village.

—Raid on the village of Haruf, and random shooting.

—Detention of 29 persons at Tair Dibbah, and destruction of 3 houses and theft of their contents.

—At Yanuh, detention of 3 persons.

—At Bint Jubayl, expulsion of 20 families.

—Detention of citizens from Kfar Rumman and Zawtar.

\* Also circulated as a document of the General Assembly under the symbol A/40/148/Add.1 of 25 February 1985.

- At Dayr Qanun El-Nahr, destruction of houses, murder and detention.
- At Qanun, detention of citizens.
- Shooting at citizens at the Numayriyah gatehouse, resulting in the death of the person in charge.

## ANNEX II

### Report on abusive Israeli operations and practices: 23 to 25 February 1985

The Israeli occupation forces continued their campaigns against the inhabitants of the villages of the south, the western Bekaa and Rashaya and there appear hereunder the most salient of the particulars available on the operations which have taken place over the past 24 hours:

- Blocking of the Zahrani-Nabatiyah road at the Numayriyah crossing point; besieging of villages; in Nabatiyah firing on various quarters of the town leading to a number of dead and wounded. Husayn Ali Al-Susi is known to be among the dead. A number of houses were also set on fire.
- Raid on the village of Zawtar, and detention of citizens, who were removed to an undisclosed location. The village remains under siege.
- The village of Arab Salim remains under siege for the sixth consecutive day. Entry to and departure from the village have been prohibited and food and medical supplies have been withheld from it.
- Raid on the village of Bazuriyah by a mechanized military unit, and the destruction of houses. Information on the situation in the village is not available.
- Encirclement of, intrusion into and firing on the villages of Tora, Burj Rahhal and Bidyas.
- Qabrikha, siege for the fourth consecutive day; continuation of pressure on families to leave their homes; continued acts of aggression against them, resulting in six persons being seriously wounded; the abduction of citizens and their removal to the Khayam barracks.
- Qaroon suffers from a supply crisis because of the continuing siege of the village. Here, an extensive campaign of arrests among citizens and firing on the village school leading to the wounding of two teachers and a student.
- Suhmor, raid on the village, intrusion into dozens of houses and detention of a number of citizens.
- Kamid Al-Lawz remains under siege; detention of seven persons.
- Jib Jannin, 25 citizens remain in detention.
- Zillaya, encirclement of the village, then its seizure.
- Khirbat Ruha, encirclement of the village, followed by a surprise attack and the detention of a number of citizens, among whom is known to be Ghazi Hajir, and their removal to an undisclosed location.

- Deir Minas, prohibition of movement, assembly of the inhabitants in the public square, their subjection to interrogation, and detention of 10 citizens.

—Reinforced barricades on the Ansar-Duwayr road in the Nabatiyah area; detention of some travellers and theft of their vehicles.

—Sir El-Gharbiyah, a massacre to which seven persons fell victim. More than 1,000 troops entered the town, broke into the houses and assembled the inhabitants in the government school, where they proceeded to make them all kneel down and interrogated them. They arrested 35 citizens and removed them to an undisclosed location. The corpses of seven detainees were subsequently found, their bodies riddled with bullets.

—The encirclement of Tora was lifted after the occupation forces had killed Sami Muhammad Haydar (31 years old), detained four persons, plundered a number of houses and destroyed their contents, wrecked a number of vehicles, demolished the wall of the government school and damaged extensive areas of crops.

—Withdrawal from Burj Rahhal after the detention of five persons and their removal to an undisclosed location and the destruction of seven homes and a number of vehicles.

—In Bidyas, 16 citizens detained.

—The occupying Israeli forces killed inhabitants of the village of Qusaybeh in the Nabatiyah district in an oven, threw smoke grenades at them and then closed the steel door upon them. The Israelis then mounted to the roof of the oven and opened fire in order to terrorize them and prevent them from fleeing. When they thought the inhabitants had expired from suffocation, they left the place. A small opening in the oven nevertheless enabled the people to breathe, and they were accordingly saved and taken to the nearest doctor, from whom they received treatment.

—In Arab Salim, the occupation forces, in front of 400 detainees, proceeded to strike one of the citizens on the head with a large stick until the blood ran out of his ears and he collapsed. The fate of this person, Husayn Na'im Haydar, is not yet known. The International Committee of the Red Cross was not permitted to investigate the incident.

—The Shaqra drinking water station in the Bint Jubayl district is in need of urgent maintenance work if the people are not to die of thirst. The maintenance teams are unable to do their work because of the opposition of the occupation forces, in spite of the attempt of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to intervene in this humanitarian matter.

—Flour from the Siblin plant can no longer reach the areas of Tyre and Nabatiyah because of the arbitrary measures taken by Israel and the closing of the crossing points. The citizens are suffering from a severe supply crisis. Contacts with the International Committee of the Red Cross on this subject have had no result.

## DOCUMENT S/16976\*

### Letter dated 21 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[2 February 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to set forth below the comments of the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the contents of the report of the United Nations team in Tehran concerning the inspection carried out by it on 7 and 8 January 1985 [S/16897]. They should provide a response to the hallucinations of the Iranian régime appearing in the letter dated 19 February addressed to you by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran [S/16967].

It was stated in the report prepared by the United Nations team in Tehran that there was no evidence in the villages of Bardieh and Dehlavieh or in their immediate vicinity of any industrial or military installations and that those villages were purely civilian centres.

In this connection, the Government of the Republic of Iraq wishes to state the following:

1. The Iranian authorities have been using these two villages, in addition to the village of Alavaneh and other villages such as Suuraybila, Saddamiyah, Sa'idiyeh, Bisitin and Hoveyze, as assembly areas for their regular military units and Khomeini's guard troops for the purpose of putting them into the front lines, which are approximately 5 to 20 kilometres away, in order to implement their hostile intentions of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq has already explained to the Secretary-General in his letter dated 27 June 1984 [S/16649] that the Iranian side uses purely civilian centres as centres for concentrating its forces, making them a point of departure for its attacks on Iraq. This clearly violates the agreement arrived at through the Secretary-

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/872-S/16976.

General concerning avoidance of the bombardment of civilian centres and also violates article 28 of the Geneva Convention, of 12 August 1949,<sup>10</sup> relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, which prohibits the use of the presence of protected persons to render certain points of areas immune from military operations and turn such towns into military centres.

2. At the time, the competent Iraqi authorities were certain of the presence of Iranian military units in the areas where the inspection took place, for example, two armed brigades from the 16th division, three guard brigades from the Quds division, a brigade from the 25th Karbala division and a number of heavy artillery units, as well as support and supply units and stores of *matériel* of the kind used especially to serve the war effort.

3. The presence of the forces referred to in the preceding paragraph around and in the vicinity of those villages places our defence positions within their range, which threatens the peace and security of Iraq. What is stated in the team's report concerning the village of Alavaneh is consistent with this, which confirms that Iraqi activity in those areas has not been aimed at purely civilian villages and centres but has been directed at military units only.

4. The three to four days which elapsed between the date of the alleged bombardment and the date of the United Nations team's inspection is a sufficient period for the withdrawal of any units from the area in question and the removal of all military signs.

5. The team reported that it saw some buildings of about five or six stories 1 kilometre east of the village of Alavaneh but was not able to determine their use. The team should have made an effort to learn the nature of these buildings and their relation to military operations.

6. These villages are situated at a major road junction, which is used for military purposes for aggression against Iraq. This makes the region a target for continuing Iraqi bombardment, which is aimed at the roads and not at the villages themselves.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/16977\*

#### Letter dated 22 February 1985 from the representative of Costa Rica to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[22 February 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the communiqué issued in San José on 21 February 1985 by the Government of Costa Rica.

I should be grateful if you would be so kind as to have the text annexed to this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jorge A. MONTERO  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

#### Communiqué issued on 21 February 1985 by the Government of Costa Rica

1. The dispute between the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua arises from an incident which occurred during the night of 24 December 1984 in the offices of the Embassy of Costa Rica in Managua. The Nicaraguan citizen José Manuel Urbina Lara had been in asylum in those diplomatic premises for four months. The Government of Costa Rica, having examined his record and using the powers conferred on it by the inter-American conventions, had granted him the status of political asylee. That night, the asylee Urbina Lara was removed from the protection of the Costa Rican State against his will, as is apparent from his own statements and the subsequent conduct of the Government of Nicaragua.

A bullet-mark on the wall of the Embassy and blood-stains in areas belonging to the Mission justify Costa Rica's concern about the inviolability of the diplomatic premises. The abduction of the asylee José Manuel Urbina Lara by the Nicaraguan authorities, evidently on the grounds of the Diplomatic Mission, justifies the concern of Costa Rica about the right of asylum.

2. In view of the aforementioned violations of the conventions and norms of international law, the Government of Costa Rica sought the

relevant explanations and the restitution of the rights of the asylee Urbina Lara through bilateral contacts. Initially, the Government of Nicaragua insisted that what was involved was a voluntary renunciation of the right of asylum, but following the Costa Rican request that that renunciation be confirmed under diplomatic protection, the Government of Nicaragua changed its version and subsequently tried the asylee Urbina Lara and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.

3. With a view to achieving a satisfactory settlement of this dispute, the Government of Costa Rica brought the case before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS). The latter accepted the offer of the Contadora Group countries to undertake mediation with a view to settling the dispute. The offer of the Contadora Group and its acceptance by the Permanent Council of OAS clearly indicate recognition of the link between the Contadora peace efforts and the bilateral dispute concerning the inviolability of diplomatic missions and observance of the conventions on the right of asylum.

4. At a meeting held at Panama City on 1 February 1985, attended by the Deputy Ministers for External Relations of the countries of the Contadora Group, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Nicaragua undertook to expel the asylee Urbina Lara to Mexico. That cleared the way for the meeting of plenipotentiaries scheduled for 14 February, and both parties agreed to discuss their bilateral differences and the implementation of the conventions on the right of asylum in the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan Mixed Commission.

5. The failure to observe the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic missions, to respect the inter-American conventions on the right of asylum and to comply with the undertaking given in Panama on 1 February give rise to profound concern regarding the will of the Government of Nicaragua to fulfil its international legal undertakings. For this reason, the Government of Costa Rica considers it impossible to continue negotiating a comprehensive legal instrument within the Contadora framework so long as the Government of Nicaragua fails to observe the norms of international law and the legal undertakings it has given.

6. Costa Rica has clearly demonstrated good faith in its relations with Nicaragua. It has repeatedly expressed its willingness to accept verification by the Contadora Group or an international agency of the activities allegedly being carried out by Nicaraguan exiles; this is merely one example of that good will.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/873-S/16977.

Another clear indication of Costa Rica's desire to maintain correct relations is the amount of the debt owed by Nicaragua to Costa Rica, which amounts to more than 20 per cent of Costa Rica's annual exports and is larger than the obligations which Costa Rica is renegotiating with the oil-supplying countries.

7. The Government of Costa Rica reaffirms its confidence in the peace efforts of the Contadora Group and in the mediation being carried out in the case of the asylee Urbina Lara. Similarly, it reiterates its willingness to negotiate bilateral or multilateral agreements with any country which fulfils its international legal obligations.

The Government of Costa Rica will unwaveringly defend the rules that govern the civilized conduct of nations. It is grateful for the solidarity of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in defending an institution that for a century has been recognized by the peoples of the continent as a cornerstone of Latin American international law.

The Government of Costa Rica reiterates its intention to return to the negotiations sponsored by the Contadora Group as soon as the institution of the right of asylum is re-established in the person of José Manuel Urbina Lara.

## DOCUMENT S/16978

### Letter dated 24 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[24 February 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the statement made by the official spokesman at the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 February 1985 on the occasion of the publication of the report submitted by the mission dispatched by you to Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran to inquire into the situation of prisoners of war in the two countries [S/16962].

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

##### Statement made by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 24 February 1985

An official spokesman at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Iraq would request the Security Council to convene a meeting during the first week of March 1985 to discuss the report of the United Nations mission to investigate the facts about the conditions of prisoners in both Iran and Iraq [S/16962]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had summoned the representatives of the States members of the Council accredited to Iraq and had asked them for the consent of their Governments to the convening of a meeting of the Council for this purpose. The mission was, of course, set up on the basis of a request submitted by Iraq to the Secretary-General on 25 October 1984 for an investigation of the crime committed by the Iranian régime in Gorgan Camp on 10 October 1984. The Iranian régime tried to obstruct the mission's discharge of its functions by insisting that it should visit Iraq also. When Iraq agreed to that, the Iranian régime proceeded to insist that the mission should visit Iraq first. Iraq's initiative and its approval of the programme for the mission's visit not only enabled the United Nations to send the mission but also confirmed Iraq's sincerity and objectivity in the matter.

The report of the United Nations mission, however, overlooked a basic fact, namely, that the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the international organization responsible for following up the affairs of prisoners of war, had been working uninterruptedly in Iraq, while the Iranian régime had long been preventing ICRC from carrying out its work in Iran, as was made clear by Mr. Alexander Hay, President of ICRC, in his statement on 23 November 1984 [S/16842, annex].

This fundamental difference between the positions of Iraq and Iran is not referred to in the report of the United Nations mission, nor does the report focus on its importance with regard to the level of the sincerity of the two parties on the question of prisoners of war and with regard to the

guarantees brought into effect for Iranian prisoners in Iraq and the absence of such guarantees in the case of Iraqi prisoners in Iran.

It should be recalled also that the work of ICRC has covered all detention centres for prisoners of war in Iraq but has not covered all detention centres for prisoners of war in Iran, even during the few periods in which ICRC has been able to exercise some of its functions in Iran, which underscores the fact that a large number of Iraqi prisoners of war have been deprived of the care of ICRC throughout the term of their imprisonment.

Such was the case also with regard to the United Nations mission, inasmuch as the mission visited all places of detention for prisoners in Iraq and was allowed, from the practical viewpoint, to make in-depth visits and contacts, while in Iran it visited only samples of detention places for prisoners. That was in accordance with the decision of the United Nations Secretariat that the duration of the visits to the two countries should be equal. From the outset, Iraq expressed a reservation to this procedure, because it was not permissible to deal with the question on a basis of formal equality. The mission should have visited all detention places for prisoners in Iran and should have made in-depth contacts in order to discover more facts, as it did in Iraq. If that had been done, the mission would have discovered many facts already confirmed by ICRC in its statements and other facts not ordinarily discovered by ICRC in the course of its work. The fact should not be overlooked that ICRC has been closely monitoring the situation in the two countries for a number of years.

With regard to the allegations concerning the so-called civilian prisoners, Iraq would like to state that there is a large number of Iranian civilians, numbering around 75,000, living freely in Iraq in the villages assigned to them and that Iraq considers those civilians refugees. It had nevertheless agreed that they should be covered by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War<sup>10</sup> and they are therefore visited by ICRC.

Iraq renews the assurances that it has previously given to the United Nations mission, namely, that it is fully prepared to return all of these civilians to Iran or to enable them to travel to another country should they so desire, and to do so in co-operation with ICRC.

Iraq is convinced that the recommendations made by the United Nations mission with a view to alleviating the suffering of the prisoners of war and improving their conditions must be implemented. Iraq is prepared to implement them faithfully and meticulously, in particular those relating to the exchange of prisoners. In order to set up a practical mechanism for that purpose, Iraq is of the view that a meeting of the Security Council must be held and a resolution adopted in the Council obliging both parties to implement the recommendations of the mission and drawing up a clearly defined programme to relieve the suffering of the prisoners in the shortest possible time. Iraq can only agree fully with the statement made by the Secretary-General in his note introducing the report of the mission, when he pointed out that the plight of the prisoners could be ended effectively only by the termination of the war. Iraq also welcomes the readiness expressed by the Secretary-General to help in any endeavour that will bring peace to the Iranian and Iraqi peoples.

Iraq reserves the right to make detailed observations on certain aspects of the report after completing its study thereof.

**Letter dated 24 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Arabic]  
[24 February 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement made by an Iraqi military spokesman on 14 February 1985 concerning the Iranian allegations regarding an attack on the Bushehr reactor installations. This statement confirms the lying nature of the charges by the Iranian leaders that Iraq carried out an attack on the above-mentioned installations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Text of the statement**

An authorized Iraqi military spokesman denied that Iraqi aircraft had carried out an attack on the Bushehr reactor installations as alleged by the Iranian news agency. The spokesman said, in a statement to the Iraqi News Agency yesterday, that on Tuesday, 12 February 1985, the Iraqi air force attacked only two maritime targets near Kharg Island and the troop concentrations on the Iraqi border.

**DOCUMENT S/16980**

**Letter dated 24 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[24 February 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you to convene a meeting of the Security Council during the first week of March 1985 to discuss the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to inquire into the situation of prisoners of war in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq [S/16962].

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/16981\***

**Letter dated 22 February 1985 from the representative of Malaysia  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[25 February 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the joint statement issued by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Association of South-East Asian Nations at their meeting in Bangkok on 11 February 1985, with regard to the recent Vietnamese attacks against Khmer refugee encampments along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

I have further the honour to request that this note and the attached text be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) ZAIN Azraai  
Permanent Representative of Malaysia  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Joint statement issued in Bangkok by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs  
of the Association of South-East Asian Nations on 11 February 1985**

The Foreign Ministers of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) deplore the continuing military offensive launched by Viet Nam along the Thai-Kampuchean border which has resulted in renewed hardship and suffering for tens of thousands of displaced Kampuchean as well as affected Thai villagers. They note with concern the particular severity and scope of this offensive and condemn the numerous incursions that have been made by the Vietnamese military forces into Thailand along the Thai-Kampuchean border in blatant violation of Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity. They call for the immediate cessation of such illegal and hostile actions, which have exacerbated tensions in the region. They reaffirm the solidarity of the ASEAN countries with Thailand in the face of such external provocations and in the exercise of its legitimate right of self-defence and call upon the international community to respond urgently to the pressing humanitarian needs along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/147-S/16981.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers note with deep regret the latest demonstration of Viet Nam's continued pursuit of a military solution in Kampuchea. Such actions contradict the professions of Viet Nam in favour of a negotiated solution. Viet Nam continues to try to legitimize its military occupation of Kampuchea. This is the main reason for the lack of progress in the efforts by some countries and parties who are trying to find a political settlement. ASEAN's efforts to-date have not borne fruit for the same reason.

The Foreign Ministers reiterate their call to Viet Nam to seek a political settlement on the basis of the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces, national reconciliation among all Kampuchean, and the exercise of self-determination by the Kampuchean people. National unity can be achieved only through the participation of all Kampuchean in the act of self-determination to be held under international supervision. They further reiterate their call for a direct dialogue between Viet Nam and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea to arrive at a political settlement.

The Foreign Ministers take note of the many appeals for restraint made to Viet Nam and the condemnations of its military actions in Kampuchea issued by a number of countries, including an appeal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They express their regret that Viet Nam continues to ignore these appeals and the established rules of orderly and peaceful conduct of relations between States. They appeal to the international community to continue to urge restraint upon Viet Nam and to persuade it that its security could not be achieved through military means but through negotiations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Foreign Ministers note the current trends in Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet-United States relations and Sino-United States relations. Viet Nam's

actions seen in this light work against current efforts to reduce international tensions and they underscore Viet Nam's international isolation. They also undermine ASEAN's initiative to engage in meaningful dialogue through its interlocutor, Indonesia. With these movements in big power relations and ASEAN's sincere desire for peace and stability in South-East Asia, the Foreign Ministers express their conviction that the best means for smaller countries to maintain their sovereignty is to remain independent and strong through national socio-economic development and greater regional peace and stability. The Foreign Ministers urge Viet Nam to work in this direction by providing a conducive atmosphere so that a meaningful dialogue for a peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean problem could be started.

The Foreign Ministers express their deep appreciation for the interest and effort of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as shown during his recent visit to South-East Asia to find a just and lasting solution to the Kampuchean problem. They express the hope that he will continue to use his good offices to bring about a political settlement in Kampuchea.

The Foreign Ministers note that despite having to withstand yet another massive military onslaught, the Khmer resistance forces remain intact and display high morale. The Foreign Ministers commend the resilience and determination of the Khmer freedom fighters and reaffirm the strong support of the ASEAN countries for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The Foreign Ministers call upon the international community to increase support and assistance to the Kampuchean people in their political and military struggle to liberate their homeland from foreign occupation.

## DOCUMENT S/16982\*

### Letter dated 24 February 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

*[Original: Arabic]  
[25 February 1985]*

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement made by an official spokesman at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq on 16 February 1985 in response to the Iranian régime's allegation that Iraq has not announced its willingness to accept Iraqi prisoners.

I request you to have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations*

#### ANNEX

#### Statement made by an official spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 16 February 1985

In accordance with his habit of distorting the facts and in a new attempt to lie to the Iranian peoples and to the peoples of the world, a high official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Iranian régime has stated that Iraq refused to accept a group of Iraqi prisoners whom the Iranian régime had decided to release.

Desiring to make the facts clear and refute the lies and fabrications of the Tehran rulers, we wish to state that, on 7 February 1985, Iraq received a note from the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Baghdad containing the Iranian régime's proposal to hand over 30 handicapped Iraqi prisoners through the intermediary of the Turkish Government and without the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) playing any

role in supervising the operation, on the alleged grounds that the Iranian régime had severed its relations with the ICRC mission, which was consequently no longer active in Iran.

Immediately upon receipt of the Turkish note, the Iraqi authorities proceeded to study the request it contained and gave their consent, at the appropriate time, to the Turkish authorities for them to receive the Iraqi prisoners and play a supervisory and intermediary role.

Out of their respect for the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Iraqi authorities requested that the ICRC mission should receive these prisoners from the Turkish authorities and accompany them to Iraq.

The Iraqi authorities also submitted to the ICRC mission and to the Turkish authorities in return a list containing the names of 20 Iranian prisoners to be handed over to Iran in return for the Iraqi prisoners.

The Iranian régime's charge that Iraq hesitated to accept the most recent batch of Iraqi prisoners and agreed to accept them only after its authorities had sent notice to the ICRC representative is also a lying and disgraceful allegation. Iraq gave its consent to the ICRC mission immediately, and no one has heard of the alleged notice mentioned by the Iranian official; the speed of the Iraqi reply giving its consent left no time for giving such notice.

Everyone knows that Iraq has released Iranian prisoners a number of times without any return out of respect for the Geneva Conventions and the decisions of the Mixed Medical Commission, in accordance with its method of procedure, its principles and the principles of the glorious Islamic Sharia, at a time when the Iranian authorities were turning their backs on all international conventions, customs and pacts and were according Iraqi prisoners harsh and ugly treatment, which went so far as shooting at them within view of the ICRC mission in Gorgan Camp.

The Iranian régime's charges are a wretched and futile attempt to enhance its ugly image with regard to its treatment of Iraqi prisoners, a treatment which is contrary to all religious, legal and human values and which has been clearly exposed by ICRC in its official statements on many occasions.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/874-S/16982.

**DOCUMENT S/16983**

**Letter dated 25 February 1985 from the representative of Lebanon  
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original: English]  
[25 February 1985]*

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continuing acts of aggression and abusive practices of the Israeli occupying forces in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district.

*(Signed) M. Rachid FAKHOURY  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations*

**DOCUMENT S/16985\***

**Letter dated 19 February 1985 from the representative of Pakistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[27 February 1985]*

Further to my letter dated 7 February 1985 [S/16951], I have the honour to report to you a serious violation of Pakistan's airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side that occurred on 11 February. On that date, two Afghan aircraft intruded into Pakistan's airspace in the Kharlachi area of Khurram Agency. The aircraft dropped two bombs 3 kilometres south-east of Kharlachi, causing injury to three refugee women.

I also take this opportunity to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected as totally false the allegations made by the Kabul authorities that the Armed Forces of Pakistan had fired across the border towards Barikot in Kunarha Province on 6 February and towards Chamkani and Bangash in Paktia Province on 5, 7 and 8 February 1985. On 14 February, Pakistan's denial was conveyed to the Afghan Chargé d'affaires in Islamabad, who was told that the Armed Forces of Pakistan were under strict orders not to commit violations anywhere along Pakistan's borders and that, by fabricating baseless charges, the Kabul authorities were merely trying to shift the blame to Pakistan for events within Afghanistan.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

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\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/151-S/16985.

**DOCUMENT S/16986**

**Note verbale dated 26 February 1985 from the Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: Russian]  
[27 February 1985]*

The Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in connection with his note of 7 November 1984, has the honour to state the following.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, firmly and consistently advocating the complete and final elimination of the remnants of colonialism and racism, vigorously condemns the inhuman policy and practice of *apartheid* being pursued by the colonialist and racist régime of South Africa

against the overwhelming majority of the country's African population, and it has no political, economic, military or other relations with that régime.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic supports all United Nations resolutions relating to the struggle against the racist South African régime's policy of *apartheid*, which is a crime against mankind, irreconcilable with the norms and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments of the law of treaties and which threatens international peace and security.

Guided by this position of principle, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic welcomed Security Council resolution 556 (1984) and actively supported the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session in which the Assembly condemned and rejected the political manoeuvring of the racist Pretoria régime in connection with the so-called "new constitution", which the General Assembly declared null and void.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic condemns the policy and actions of the United States and other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are aimed at maintaining and increasing their co-operation with the racist South African régime in all fields and which interfere with international efforts to eliminate *apartheid*.

Since the Pretoria régime is not only continuing but in fact intensifying its policy of *apartheid* in South Africa, has not ceased its acts of aggression, destabilization and State terrorism against independent African States, is constantly increasing its military potential and is trying to acquire nuclear weapons, all of which creates a direct threat to international peace and security, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic fully supports the demand of the African States that the Security Council should institute comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic believes that the United Nations must take tangible and effective steps to ensure the prompt implementation of its decisions concerning the policy and practice of *apartheid* in South Africa and must endeavour in every way to bring about the final elimination of that shameful phenomenon.

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic has provided and is providing the national liberation movements in southern Africa with support of every kind in their just and legitimate struggle.

The Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations requests that this note should be circulated as a Security Council document.

#### DOCUMENT S/16987\*\*

Letter dated 27 February 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)*  
[27 February 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to recall your humanitarian appeal of 29 June 1984 to the Governments of Iraq and of the Islamic Republic of Iran to declare to you that each undertakes a solemn commitment not to use chemical weapons of any kind for any reason [S/16663].

In response to this appeal, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hojarolislam Sayed Ali Khamenei, in his letter of 2 July [S/16664] declared *inter alia*:

"... The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to remain strongly against any resort to these inhuman weapons and unconditionally condemns their use.

"...

"The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its respect for the Islamic and humanitarian principles and in order to reaffirm its good faith, welcomes your appeal and declares that it is fully committed to continue with its policy not to use chemical weapons."

Bearing in mind that the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran is the first well-documented case of such a drastic crime in the history of mankind since the adoption of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>8</sup> the details of which are contained in the report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate the use of such weapons [S/16433] and with reference to our letters of 3 August [S/16690] and 22 October 1984 and 5 February 1985 [S/16941] in which our attempts to have you announce the Iraqi response to your appeal have so far remained futile, allow me, in all fairness, to ask you to provide this Mission, as well as the whole international community, with any kind of reaction you have received from the Iraqi régime to the foregoing appeal.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Fereydoon Damaranji KAMALI  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

<sup>8</sup> Incorporating document S/16987/Corr.1 of 28 February 1985.

\*\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/154-S/16987 and Corr.1.

**Letter dated 27 February 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[28 February 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 10.30 a.m. on 25 February 1985 and the following was brought to his attention by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"The pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan informed that the Pakistani aggressive forces, in spite of the repeated warnings and protestations of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, still continue their savage and irresponsible attacks on the Barikot area of Kunarha Province. For instance, as a result of shellings by heavy weapons such as recoilless guns, mortars and heavy machine-guns by these forces on 18 February 1985 on Barikot, one child was injured and enormous damage was inflicted on the dwellings of the residents of the area.

"According to another report, the authorities of Pakistan have recently expanded the scope of their savage aggressions and, in addition to repeated shellings, the arming and dispatching of bandits for murder and destruction, the forces of Pakistan stationed in the vicinity of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan cross the frontier from time to time and conduct savage raids. For instance, at 8 a.m. on 23 February 1985, one

of these contingents, which comprised approximately 400 persons, crossed the frontier and brought the Barikot garrison under the fire of heavy weapons; unfortunately as a result of this irresponsible and savage attack, five members of the garrison were martyred and four others were severely injured.

"The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan severely condemns and deplores these aggressive and irresponsible actions by the forces of Pakistan that take place on the instructions of the military authorities of that country against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and strongly protests to the Government of Pakistan over these actions. It is once again demanded from those responsible in Pakistan to put an end without any delay to such savage acts of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Otherwise, the responsibility for the grave and heavy consequences of such actions shall rest with the military authorities of Pakistan."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF*  
*Permanent Representative of Afghanistan*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/155-S/16988.

## DOCUMENT S/16990\*

**Letter dated 26 February 1985 from the representative of Lebanon  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: Arabic)*  
*[28 February 1985]*

Further to my letters of 21 and 25 February 1985 [S/16974 and Add.1], and on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you a supplementary list containing information on the continuing abusive Israeli operations and practices in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district as of 25 and 26 February 1985.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Rachid FAKHOURY*  
*Permanent Representative of Lebanon*  
*to the United Nations*

## ANNEX

**Report on abusive Israeli operations and practices  
in southern Lebanon: 25 and 26 February 1985**

After encircling them, the occupation forces stormed the villages of Haruf and Jibshit and opened fire on the houses and in the streets; as a result, seven citizens were seriously wounded. They also opened fire on

the government school in the village and on a private school, after surrounding them with large numbers of motorized troops. The forces in question withdrew from the village after detaining 15 citizens from Haruf and 4 from Jibshit and blowing up a number of houses.

The occupation forces broke into the hospital at Jabal Amil and opened fire inside, terrifying the patients and causing them to rush in panic to the shelter. The Israelis attempted to break into the operating theatre, where a surgical procedure was being performed on a wounded person, but the doctors resisted them. They broke into the doctors' room and opened fire there.

Storming of the village of Bazuriyeh and destruction of two houses, the first by means of a bulldozer and the second with explosives; they then opened fire in the village in a random manner.

Continued encirclement of Kamid Al-Lawz, Qar'oon, Jib Jannin, Lala and B'ul; detention of seven secondary school pupils in Kamid Al-Lawz, prohibition of movement there and shooting at everything that moved in the village

Erection of reinforced barricades at the Abbasyah-Tora intersection, on the road from El-Ma'shu to Burj Esh-Shamah at the entrance to Jawia and at the entrance to Shihabiyyeh

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/156-S/16990.

DOCUMENT S/16991

Letter dated 28 February 1985 from the representative of Egypt  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[28 February 1985]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Group of African States at the United Nations for the month of February, I have the honour to request you to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation in South Africa resulting from the murder of defenceless Africans demonstrating against forced removals, the arrests and "high treason" charges against the United Democratic Front officials and the continued intensification of the *apartheid* State's violent repression in that country.

(Signed) Mohamed Ibrahim SHAKER  
Deputy Permanent Representative of Egypt  
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/16992

Letter dated 26 February 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[1 March 1985]

With reference to the Iraqi statement annexed to document S/16978, I have the honour to bring the following points to your attention:

1. As the statement indicates, the Baathist régime of Iraq has made yet another attempt to take opportunistic advantage of the Security Council in order to divert its attention from the shameful crimes which that régime has been perpetrating, in contravention of all humanitarian principles and international conventions, against the prisoners of war (POWs) in its custody. The report of the Secretary-General's mission [S/16962], added to many others indicating the moral bankruptcy and criminal nature of the Baathist régime of Iraq, is indeed another internationally recognized record of defeat. Despite the fact that the achievement record of the Security Council regarding the Iraqi war of aggression does not seem to be a highly honourable one, we sincerely hope that the Council will not allow the Iraqi authorities to take advantage of it once more. The politicization of the situation of the POWs and the exploitation of that situation for political purposes would not be beneficial to the predicament of our POWs in Iraq.

Since diverting attention from the issue will only lead to an unnecessary prolongation of their ordeal and sufferings, the international body must, in the interest of the POWs, sedulously avoid any action which may divert attention from the essentially humanitarian issue of the POWs to something else.

To orchestrate a meeting of the Security Council while trying to impose pomposity on it by encouraging certain participations is a malicious Iraqi scheme for confusing the issue and prolonging the suffering of our POWs in Iraq, which must be countered by the Council itself.

The Council is not particularly renowned for its concern for humanitarian matters; its primary responsibility, constitutionally speaking, is the maintenance of international peace and security. Its previous contributions regarding the Iraqi war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of

Iraq proved to be less constructive and may be counter-productive. The Islamic Republic of Iran has, therefore, counted on the good offices and particularly on the honest and unquestionable impartiality of the Secretary-General, confidence in whom has been the major reason for us to take part in the processes which have so far taken place.

With regard to the foregoing, we hope that the Council will not permit itself to be further manipulated by the Iraqi Baathists. It would be better if the Secretary-General, who has enjoyed the vote of confidence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of Iraq, were left to carry out his successful initiatives without intervention and politicization.

2. In the above-mentioned letter, Iraq has ostentatiously claimed that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been operating in that country continuously and without interruption.

We should hear the comment of ICRC on this Iraqi claim. However, since a brief summary of the results of this intimate and uninterrupted co-operation is now reported to the international body in paragraphs 99, 111, 112, 117, 118, 120, 122, 138, 143 and 144 of the report [*ibid.*], and the international body in turn may congratulate both ICRC for its conscientious and continuous humanitarian efforts in Iraq, and Iraq for its uninterrupted and intimate co-operation with ICRC, concurrently with which the crimes in the paragraphs just mentioned have taken place.

3. Although the presence of ICRC in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been intermittent, the humanitarian attitude of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Iraqi POWs who call themselves the guests of the Islamic Republic of Iran has remained unchanged and constant.

Let us not forget that humanitarian values and services are not political or axiological inventions of ICRC nor are they its national or international monopoly to be safeguarded under the sole guardianship of ICRC. What is of the utmost importance is that the situation of the "guests" of the Is-

Islamic Republic of Iran differs from that of Iranian POWs, civilian POWs, and the thousands of civilians who were forcibly displaced by Iraq during its occupation of our cities.

4. In the said letter, Iraq has pointed out that the United Nations mission visited only samples of detention places for prisoners in Iran. We have already declared, both in Tehran to the mission and in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, our wish that the mission should resume its task so as to be able to visit more camps and locations, simply because we too believe that owing to shortage of time, it has not been able to complete its mandate in Iran or in Iraq.

Pursuant to our letter of 25 February 1985 to the Secretary-General we reiterate our request that the mission undertake another visit so as to complete its investigations of the concerns of both parties.

5. As to the 75,000 Iranian civilians whom Iraq claims to be walking about in freedom within Iraq, it is not necessary to add to the self-explanatory comments of the mission contained in paragraphs 85, 89 and 90.

6. Iraq has announced its readiness to implement the recommendations of the United Nations mission, although experience shows that one cannot rely on the commitment of the present rulers of Iraq. It is questionable that the Iraqi authorities, who have so far committed themselves to the violations of all moral and humanitarian principles, would all of a sudden decide to undertake an abrupt change in what they have been violating with peace of mind, and be ready for the implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations mission.

We are of the opinion that the following objectives should be pursued in the investigation of the situation of the POWs:

- (a) Extension of the mandate of the United Nations mission;
- (b) An in-depth investigation and formulation of a practical framework for disclosing the fate of the missing persons;
- (c) Undertaking preparatory measures to effect the repatriation of willing civilian POWs and civilians forcibly removed from Iran and now detained in Iraq;

(d) Establishment of practical guarantees from Iraq to terminate the subjection of the Iranian POWs to the torture, physical and psychological ill-treatment;

(e) Investigation into the situation of Mr. Tondguyan, Minister of Oil of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and his companions;

(f) Examination of the treatment of the injured POWs by Iraq, particularly in the war fronts;

(g) The immediate release of all the injured and disabled POWs for purely humanitarian reasons;

(h) Measures to improve the hygiene and general welfare conditions of the camps;

(i) Securing a guarantee for the freedom of religious practice by the POWs;

(j) Uncovering the clandestine camps in Iraq;

(k) Putting forward practical proposals for the repatriation of the different groups of POWs.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has already expressed its appreciation of the work of the United Nations mission. However, we wish to bring to your attention and that of the international community our concern that the mission, compelled by circumstances to produce an even-handed account, has failed to incorporate in its report certain very important and positive aspects of the situation of the POW camps in the Islamic Republic of Iran. These circumstances might have influenced the mission to insert some "editorial alterations", which do not present all the facts that could otherwise have been presented.

A detailed response of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the report as a whole will subsequently be transmitted to you.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAI-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/16993\*

### Letter dated 28 February 1985 from the representative of Nicaragua to the Secretary-General

(Original: Spanish)  
[1 March 1985]

#### ANNEX

#### Statement made by the President of the Republic of Nicaragua on 27 February 1985

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement made by Commander of the Revolution Daniel Ortega Saavedra, President of the Republic of Nicaragua, on 27 February 1985.

I should be grateful if you would have this statement circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier CHAMORRO MORA  
Permanent Representative of Nicaragua  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/375-S/16993

It is also well known that President Reagan's Government unilaterally broke off the discussions with Nicaragua which were being conducted at Manzanillo, Mexico. It has blocked the development of the Contadora process by its decision not to accept the Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America [SI16775 of 9 October 1984] proposed by the Contadora Group in September 1984 and has, moreover, refused to recognize the competence of the International Court of Justice in Latin American affairs.

This combination of recent circumstances, which has aggravated the climate of tension in the region, and the campaign of slanders and distortions of every kind with regard to the Government of Nicaragua and its policies have compelled me to make today the following statement addressed to the Governments, Parliaments, international organizations and peoples of the world.

1. Nicaragua is not part of any bloc and has no military alliance with anyone. We are a non-aligned country struggling against backwardness, endeavouring to rebuild our country and, in that effort, promoting relations of friendship, solidarity, mutual respect and co-operation with all Governments and peoples of the world that desire, on a basis of common interests and mutual respect, to establish and develop relations with our country.

2. It is a principle of our international policy and a profound conviction of the Government of Nicaragua that revolutions such as the one which concluded the long process of the Nicaraguan people's struggle against the Somozaist dictatorship and for national sovereignty cannot and should not be exported. Each nation, each people, in accordance with its needs, history and circumstances, chooses its own destiny and makes its own history, which no one else can do for it.

3. In that connection, the Governments of Central America should not make the mistake of supposing that our country represents a threat to them. Nicaragua is not and will never be an aggressor country and firmly advocates a course whereby, on the basis of the common interests of the Central American peoples, we can seek a joint solution of the economic and political crisis in order to achieve stability and coexistence between our countries.

4. Nicaragua has never concealed its conviction that the changes which the Central American peoples need, in accordance with the particular circumstances of each country, should be made in a peaceful manner, nor its constant interest in having changes take place in that manner, thereby protecting those peoples from the grievous consequences that violence can bring. In that connection, our Government continues to seek a negotiated political solution to the conflict in El Salvador.

5. It is a principle and an objective of our international policy that in Central America and in the other countries of the hemisphere, there must be maintained a political pluralism which will be translated into unrestricted respect for the modalities of political and economic self-determination of each of the States. Only respect for diversity is consistent with respect for the freedom of peoples.

6. The Government of Nicaragua maintains and defends the Sandinist design for a mixed economy, genuine non-alignment and political democracy, preserving the best values of representative democracy.

It is a principle of our policy to guarantee and strengthen the mixed economy, the existence of a private sector and a sector of State ownership, which, combined with different forms of co-operative association, constitutes the balanced economic structure that serves as the foundation for the reality and the possibilities of real political pluralism that the Sandinist design defends.

7. Nicaragua believes that it has the right to establish and develop friendly relations with the people of the United States, as with all the peoples of the world; it is continuing its efforts to that end and will not give up its initiatives vis-à-vis the present and future Governments of that country until relations between the United States and Nicaragua are normalized.

8. Nicaragua has as one of its fundamental purposes the preferential development of its relations with Latin America, to which our country and our nation are irrevocably bound by history. With that end in view, Nicaragua's acceptance of the Contadora Act expressed and expresses our full identification with the Latin American principles formulated through the Contadora group of countries in the aforementioned Act, which are compatible and agree completely with the principles of the Nicaraguan State.

9. Nicaragua, as a genuinely non-aligned nation, is developing relations of friendship and co-operation with the countries of Europe and the African and Asian continents and with the socialist countries. Nicaragua attaches particular interest and importance to its relations with Western Europe, and it is a primary objective of our international policy to promote

and stimulate greater co-operation and participation by Europe in Central America in the interests of peace and the social and economic progress of our peoples and in order to promote true diversity in the international relations of our countries.

10. The Government of Nicaragua reaffirms that its relations of friendship and growing co-operation with the socialist countries, in particular with the Soviet Union and Cuba, are an expression of Nicaragua's genuine non-alignment. Respectful friendship with all States is consistent with our independence, sovereignty and self-determination.

11. In the face of the pretexts and unscrupulous allegations of every kind advanced by the Government of the United States with regard to its security, Nicaragua declares once again that it is not and will never become a military base for any foreign country or Power.

12. Nicaragua, as a third-world country and a non-aligned country, fully identifies and will always maintain political and moral solidarity with the just struggles of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America that are struggling against backwardness and for their sovereignty, freedom and national independence.

13. The Government of Nicaragua shares the most profound conviction of the statesmen, political leaders and peoples of the world that in the face of the serious deterioration of the international situation, in the present nuclear age, nothing has higher priority or is more fundamental than the defence of peace and international détente.

Nicaragua, which has never ceased making proposals, at the bilateral level, in negotiation processes and in international forums, that could lead to a peaceful solution of the problems of the tormented Central American region, has decided to take immediate unilateral initiatives and decisions which, in accordance with its decision to accept without any change the Act for Peace and Co-operation proposed by the Contadora Group, will make an immediate contribution to the revitalization and strengthening of that peace-making negotiating process.

The Government of Nicaragua is confident that our initiatives will arouse in the Central American Governments a political willingness to accept the Contadora proposals; at the same time, they should help to bring the United States Government back to the Manzanillo discussions and prompt it to stop asking Congress for funds, so as to end the policy of hostility against Nicaragua, which violates the principles and norms of international coexistence.

Motivated by the gravity of the regional situation, which requires the Governments involved to take a responsible, mature and flexible attitude favourable to détente, we have agreed:

1. As a first step towards the achievement of the objective—proposed by Contadora and supported by Nicaragua—of bringing about the complete withdrawal of military and foreign advisers from the Central American area, my Government will dispense with the co-operation of 100 military instructors of Cuban nationality, and the first 50 of those instructors will return to Cuba during May 1985.

2. In the same Contadora context, we have decided to declare an indefinite moratorium on the acquisition of new weapons systems and of those fighter aircraft required to complete our country's present anti-aircraft system.

At the same time, wishing to eliminate excuses and arguments based on considerations which are secondary and are irrelevant to the development of the normal Contadora process, arguments which have been used in an attempt to block that initiative, Nicaragua will inform the Contadora Group of its decision to take immediate practical steps aimed at overcoming the alleged obstacle cited as a pretext for making it impossible to hold the meeting scheduled for 14 February 1985.

We also wish to announce that, in a desire to help give the Congress, public opinion and Government of the United States a better understanding of the false arguments advanced with respect to the supposed militarization of Nicaragua, I have decided to invite leaders of the Congress of the United States to send a delegation of the Congress to visit our country if they consider that desirable and to assess on the scene the defensive nature of our country's armed forces and weapons of defence.

The Government of Nicaragua is firmly convinced that progress will be made on the road to peace in spite of the intransigent positions adopted and that the Governments and peoples of the world will make their voices heard on behalf of respect for the principles of international law and for the Nicaraguan people's right to live in peace.

Nicaragua intends to advance these proposals on behalf of regional peace, which will surely win the support of the international community, before the Heads of State and Government who will meet in Uruguay at the inauguration of Mr. Julio María Sanguinetti as President.

**Letter dated 1 March 1985 from the representative of Pakistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[1 March 1985]*

Further to my letter dated 19 February 1985 [S/16985], I have the honour to report to you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected the protest made by the Kabul authorities on 25 February 1985 [see S/16988], in which it was alleged that on 18 February there had been firing from the Pakistan side towards Barikot in Kunarha Province and that on 23 February 400 persons had crossed the border and attacked Barikot. The rejection of the Kabul protest was conveyed to the Afghan Chargé d'affaires in Islamabad on 26 February and he was told that the frequent repetition of baseless charges by the Kabul authorities only reflected an attempt by them to shift the blame onto Pakistan for developments within Afghanistan.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ*  
*Permanent Representative of Pakistan*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Incorporating document S/16995/Corr.1 of 4 March 1985.

\*\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/157-S/16995 and Corr.1.

**DOCUMENT S/16996**

**Letter dated 4 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: Arabic)*  
*[4 March 1985]*

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 24 February 1985 [S/16978], I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the detailed observations of the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the report of the United Nations mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to inquire into the situation of prisoners of war in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq [S/16962].

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI*  
*Permanent Representative of Iraq*  
*to the United Nations*

**ANNEX**

**Observations of the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to inquire into the situation of prisoners of war in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Iraq**

The Government of the Republic of Iraq has carefully studied the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Iraq and Iran to investigate the situation of prisoners in the two countries [S/16962]. My Government would like, on this occasion, to express its appreciation for the efforts of the mission to achieve a noble humanitarian objective. It also expresses its appreciation to the representatives of the Secretariat who accompanied the mission.

Before entering into the details of the report, my Government would like once again to assert that it is unable to ignore the motives of a diplomatic nature which influenced the final drafting of the report. Whenever an issue is treated for which Iran is condemned on the basis of abundant testimony and evidence, a diplomatic assiduity for redressing the balance by stressing secondary negative factors relating to Iraq comes into play.

For the purpose of clarifying certain points made in the report, my Government has found it appropriate to make the following observations:

1. Iraq can only agree fully with the statement made by the Secretary-General in his note introducing the report of the mission to the effect that the plight of the prisoners can be ended effectively only by the termination of the war. Iraq also welcomes the readiness expressed by the Secretary-General to help in any endeavour that will bring peace to the people of Iraq and Iran. In this connection, it is worth pointing out that Iraq has, since the outbreak of the armed conflict between the two countries on 4 September 1980, put forward or agreed to initiatives, proposals and resolutions for a solution to the conflict by peaceful means, whether within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries or the United Nations. The Iranian régime, however, pursuing its expansionist ambitions in Iraq in particular and in the Arab homeland in general, has rejected all such efforts. Its most recent negative attitude in this field is that adopted by it towards the resolution 12/15-P on the Iraq-Iran conflict adopted by consensus, on 22 December 1985, at the Fifteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Sana'a,<sup>21</sup> which called upon the two parties to co-operate fully and sincerely with the Islamic Good Offices Committee in order to achieve an immediate halt to the war and a solution to the conflict between the two countries on a just and honourable basis, and to respect the international conventions concerning the treatment of prisoners. After the Iranian delegation had accepted the resolution and after it had been adopted by the Conference by consensus, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran announced, at a news conference held on the following day, that his Government rejected the appeal contained in the resolution and claimed that the Iranian delegation had expressed reservations with respect to it, particularly that part relating to mediation.

2. As you know, the mission was originally dispatched at the request of Iraq, as indicated in the letter dated 25 October 1984 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General [S/16799]. This request underlines Iraq's sincerity and its good intentions with respect to the question of the treatment of prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It was, moreover, Iraq that made the task of the mission possible after the Secretary-General had decided to cancel it as a result of Iran's refusal to receive the mission first. Iraq immediately agreed to being visited first. This attitude of Iraq's only confirms its objectivity and sincerity on the issue.

3. The report ignores one basic fact, and that is that the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the body entrusted with monitoring matters concerning prisoners, has operated in Iraq without interruption. At the same time, the report makes no reference to another essential fact, namely that ICRC operations in Iran have been halted on numerous occasions, the most recent of which was the freezing of ICRC activity after the crime committed at the Gorgan Camp on 10 October 1984. No reference is made in the report of the mission to this essential difference between the attitudes of Iraq and Iran, and no stress is placed on its importance for determining the sincerity of each of the two parties on the issue.

4. ICRC operations have extended to all prisoner-of-war camps in Iraq, whereas they have not extended to all prisoner-of-war camps in Iran, underlining the fact that a large number of Iraqi prisoners of war have been deprived of the Committee's care.

5. The United Nations mission also visited all the prisoner-of-war camps in Iraq and was enabled, from the practical point of view, to conduct visits and establish contacts of a detailed character, while in Iran it confined itself to visiting a sampling of prisoner-of-war camps. This came about on the basis of the Secretary-General's assessment that the time allocated to visits to the two countries should be the same. The mission visited only eight of the 16 prison camps that exist in Iran according to the claim of the Iranian authorities. From the beginning we had expressed reservations with respect to this procedure, for it was not proper that the question should be treated on a basis of purely formal equality and the mission ought to have visited all of the prisoner-of-war camps in Iran, as it did in Iraq, and to have made detailed contacts in order to establish more facts, as it also did in Iraq. If that had been done, the mission would have discovered many of the facts which had been previously confirmed by ICRC in its reports and which the mission failed to reveal. The fact should not be ignored that ICRC has been closely monitoring the situation in the two countries for a number of years.

6. It is stated in paragraph 50 (c) of the report that the escalating measures taken by the Iranian authorities to suppress the riot in the Gorgan Camp were in principle justified and corresponded to normal procedures for riot control. This paragraph is surprising when we see that the mission itself states in the following paragraph 50 (d) that it finds it impossible to form an opinion as to whether in every respect the actual firing was necessary, sufficiently controlled or indiscriminate. The contradiction between the two paragraphs is extremely clear since, if the Commission was unable to decide on the issue of the appropriateness of opening fire, how could it allow itself to justify the legality of the actual firing as it did in paragraph 50 (c) mentioned above?

That is one aspect of the matter. In another respect, it is stated in paragraph 50 (f) of the report that one of the underlying causes of the incident may have been the Iranian Government's policy of favouring the "believers" faction—a minority in most camps—over the "loyalist" faction, and that the incident might have been prevented had the authorities initially separated the two factions in the camp and adopted a more balanced attitude towards both. In paragraph 218 of the report, it is stated that, when visiting the camps, the mission found unequivocal signs of political indoctrination being applied to Iraqi POWs, that in almost every camp visited, there was a group of Iraqi POWs who were against the Government of Iraq, co-operating closely with the Iranian political and military authorities, and that the mission had noticed considerable differences between the various sections of a given camp in terms of clothing, accommodation and free movement. The report also states in paragraph 219 that throughout its visits to the camps the mission was cautioned by POWs that the Cultural Committee (which was in fact run by followers of the lackey Al-Hakim) enjoyed wide authority to interrogate, beat, torture, deprive a POW of his right to send and receive messages, or order transfer of POWs to unknown camps. The mission ascertained, as stated in paragraph 223, that it cannot be denied that Iraqi POWs in the Islamic Republic of Iran live under strong psychological pressure. If such are the practices and measures applied by the Iranian authorities to Iraqi prisoners in their custody—and they are practices and measures which are in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949—then how can the Iranian régime be absolved from responsibility for killing Iraqi prisoners in the Gorgan Camp and in other camps? The riot that took place in the Gorgan Camp—which was exploited by the camp authorities in order to murder Iraqi prisoners, supposing for the moment that their murder was not premeditated—came about as the result of the premeditated and persistent practices and measures of that régime. These are practices and measures to which the mission refers on more than one occasion, as we have just now stated above. This makes us fully convinced that it is the Iranian Government that bears prime responsibility, in one form or another, for what occurred at Gorgan.

7. The Iraqi authorities had told the mission, at the time of its visit to Iraq, that the only incident in a POW camp which had resulted in the death of a POW had taken place on 26 July 1982 in Mosul Camp No. 1, and that in the context of the guards opening fire in self-defence. The mission nevertheless gives the impression, in paragraph 60 of the report, that the number of dead had been four. It formulates this opinion using expressions such as "it would appear" and "it seems", terms which should not properly be used by a mission whose basic task it is to ascertain the facts and not to make doubtful inferences which have no basis in truth.

8. It is stated in paragraph 66 of the report that other serious incidents "appear" to have occurred in Anbar and Ramadi I Camp without the mission mentioning the nature of such serious incidents, the dates of their occurrence and other important information which it is presumed should be mentioned in the report in order to make it possible to reply to such allegations. The mission should, before making general and cryptic accusations, have presented in its report all the information relevant to the serious incidents that it alleges occurred, and then, on the basis of such information, it should have stated its opinion with respect to such incidents. This model was not followed by the mission, and the Government of the Republic of Iraq can only express its astonishment and its sorrow at that fact.

9. It is stated in paragraph 74 of the report that the mission heard in the camps some statements to the effect that newly captured enemy personnel had been executed but that it had not itself been able to draw any firm conclusion on the basis of the material available to it. Nevertheless, in spite of the view thus expressed and in spite of its assertion, in paragraph 76, that it was not in a position to verify the information it received, it was of the view that it cannot be excluded that a considerable number of Iranian soldiers could have been killed on the battlefield upon surrender. This is a surprising conclusion for the mission to have reached, given its lack of evidence to support such a conclusion, as the mission itself acknowledged.

With regard to the reference to the two paragraphs from the memorandum of ICRC of 7 May 1983 concerning summary executions of captured soldiers in Iran and Iraq and to the effect that large numbers of wounded had been slain or abandoned on the battlefield, in which ICRC bases itself on an analysis of the significance of the fact that the number of wounded visited by ICRC in the hospitals was disproportionate to the number of prisoners or to the extent of the losses suffered in battle, we have previously explained to ICRC itself that it has neglected to take into account in issuing its judgement the enormous human waves that the Iranian régime hurls onto battlefields on which modern weapons are used, bringing such large numbers of men to assured destruction. Such a grave accusation should not be levelled against a country on the basis of inferences drawn from pure imagination and rumours which are not founded on material facts. I-4 reaffirms its outright rejection of this charge.

10. It is stated in paragraph 89 of the report that some of the civilian inhabitants who had come from Iran to Iraq as refugees stated that they had been forcibly brought to Iraq. This is a claim which has no basis in truth. It is well known that these civilian inhabitants left their towns and villages, either through fear of the tyranny of the Iranian authorities or in flight from the conflagrations of battle, and took refuge in Iraq. Iraq informed the ICRC mission in Baghdad, by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum of 14 February 1983, that it was fully prepared to facilitate its task of returning them to their towns and villages. What is more, these Iranian citizens, whom Iraq considers refugees, are unconditionally free to leave Iraq for any third State agreeing to accept them. Several hundred such refugees have, in fact, applied to leave Iraq for another State (other than Iran). Some of them have submitted applications for asylum in other States and have, in fact, left Iraq for other States after those States have agreed to accept them. This is a point which is referred to in the report in paragraph 91.

Iraq renews the assurances that it has previously given to ICRC and to the United Nations mission to the effect that it is fully prepared to return all of these Iranian civilians to Iran or to enable them to travel to any other country they may desire under the supervision of ICRC or any other neutral body.

11. In paragraph 89 of the report, it is stated that allegations were made about younger men among the Iranian civilians being coerced into enlisting in the Iraqi Popular Army under such threats as having their pay cut off. We should like to state here that the formations of the Iraqi Popular Army are voluntary formations, that they do not compel any person to enrol under their banners and that the Iraqi authorities do not exert any pressure in order to induce any person to enlist in these formations. If there are among the Iranian refugees those who have joined the Popular Army, then they have done so by their own free will alone, particularly

since a large number of such refugees are Arabs and "consider themselves to be part of the Arab nation", as stated by the mission itself in the same paragraph.

12. With regard to the allegation that there are a number of Iranian civilians in prisoner-of-war camps, the mission refers, in paragraph 97 of the report, to the fact that both old and young Iranian civilians have volunteered to join the war effort, which means that they will necessarily be considered as prisoners of war in the event that they fall into the hands of the Iraqi forces, in accordance with the third Geneva Convention.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, and in spite of its observation to that effect, the mission comes up with the statement that there are in Iraqi POW camps a number of inmates who should not properly be there, without informing us of what basis it relies on in expressing this opinion.

Iraq emphasizes, once again, that all of those who have been placed in prisoner-of-war camps bore arms at the battlefronts and are those to whom the definition of prisoners of war applies in accordance with international law. If Iraq had needed to place a number of civilians together with the prisoners of war, it would not have made such efforts to open camps for the thousands of refugees forced by the Iranian authorities to abandon their homes and take refuge in Iraq.

13. The report, in the heading inserted before paragraphs 101 to 105, refers to "Investigation of the fate of the Red Crescent personnel, including medical doctors, assistants and other personnel, captured and detained in contravention of the First Protocol of the Geneva Convention". We should like to call attention to the final provisions of that Protocol concerning its ratification and entry into force. One of the conditions that must be met for a State to be bound by the provisions of the Protocol is its ratification. This is a measure that has not yet been taken by either party to the conflict. Accordingly, it is inappropriate on the part of the mission to refer to the Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions in order to determine the extent to which Iraq is complying with its provisions. Iraq has complete freedom with regard to ratification or non-ratification. Moreover, the persons in question, as previously mentioned, had borne arms alongside the armed forces, not as members of a medical mission but as combatants within the enemy armed forces.

14. It is stated in paragraph 112 of the report that the mission believes that many Iranian prisoners of war remain concealed from the time of their capture. It estimates the number of concealed POWs to be in the hundreds. This is a belief which has no basis in truth. Allegations of the existence of covert camps (such as a wing in the Ministry of Defence and Abu Ghorraib) are not based on authentic information, and their only basis is in rumours spread by the enemy for the purpose of damaging Iraq's reputation. The Iraqi authorities had requested the mission at the appropriate time to visit those places in order to ascertain to what extent this allegation was true. The mission, however, pleaded shortness of time as an excuse.

15. With regard to the "Mental and physical torture of the prisoners", referred to in paragraphs 115 to 125, the mission refers to the use of violence and ill-treatment in the camps in spite of the fact that it asserts, in paragraph 121, that it did not have the means of verifying such allegations, a consideration which should, presumably, have induced it not to publish the opinion which it expressed.

Since the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran conflict, Iraq has assiduously respected the Geneva Conventions of 1949, not only because of legal considerations arising out of the obligations imposed upon it under the terms of these Conventions, but also for religious and ethical considerations and considerations of principle. In fact, Iraq has not been content with simply applying and respecting the Geneva Conventions, but has gone beyond them with a view to doing better. This humane policy has found expression, first, in the establishment of a special school for Iranian child prisoners at the Ramadi Camp, in spite of the fact that the third Geneva Convention contains no provision obliging it to do so, and it is also reflected in the decision adopted by the Revolutionary Command Council last year, in which it proclaimed:

The release of a number of Iranian prisoners without any quid pro quo from the Iranian side, giving them the choice of returning to their country or seeking asylum in any country which consents to receive them; a declaration to all members of the Iranian armed forces of its readiness to release combatants who seek asylum in our ranks, now, or in battle, or thereafter, and to facilitate their return to their country or asylum in any State that will accept them.

If the attitude of Iraq towards Iranian prisoners of war is thus, how can it be accused of ill-treating them?

Iraq can only express its surprise and sorrow at the statements of the mission in its report. It here affirms its outright rejection of the charges levelled at it, which lack evidence and factual support.

16. It is stated in paragraph 131 of the report, concerning the school for Iranian child prisoners at Ramadi, that attendance at the school was optional. The mission makes no reference to anything done by the Iraqi authorities to influence the children politically. It nevertheless declares, in the same paragraph, that "instruction at school could easily be abused for purposes of political indoctrination". It forgets that its task is to determine the extent to which the two parties to the conflict comply with the Geneva Conventions, and not to state suppositions and possibilities not based on anything in reality.

17. In paragraph 147 of the report, the mission confirms the statement of the Iraqi authorities to the effect that Iranian POWs in Iraq received eight times more correspondence than the Iraqi POWs in Iran, who were much larger in numbers. The mission once again asserts that the statements of the Iraqi authorities appear to be true. In spite of that fact, it refers in paragraph 280 to the infrequency, when not the total absence, of mail, referring in that connection to both countries and particularly to Iran. The incompatibility of the two paragraphs, as far as they concern Iraq, is obvious and requires no comment.

18. With regard to paragraph 149 of the report, concerning Red Crescent packages sent to prisoners, the mission states that camp commanders in Iraq have not allowed distribution of medical supplies sent to POWs. Such a remark is surprising when we know that the Iraqi authorities have not received from Iran any packages destined for its prisoners. In the report, the mission does not clarify who dispatched those packages or when or how they did so.

19. We find the same contradiction when the mission broaches the subject of the "Investigation of the Iraqi soldiers' seizure of the prisoners' personal possessions". In paragraph 152 of the report, the mission ascertains that the possessions of Iranian prisoners of war were kept in a safe next to the Camp Commander's office. In spite of having ascertained that, the members of the mission mention, in paragraph 151, that they feel that seizure of personal possessions of a POW has been happening on both sides. This expression is not compatible with the reality of the mission having found these possessions. Is it, moreover, proper for the mission to use ambivalent words such as "we feel" which do not, by any means, convey certitude and do no more than convey that these are impressions which are subject to various factors and various influences?

20. With regard to the health situation and the services provided to prisoners, the Iraqi authorities have already explained to the mission the following:

(a) There are in each camp an Iraqi general practitioner and a dentist assisted by a number of aides, in addition to Iranian prisoners who are doctors. There is a pharmacy containing the medical supplies necessary to treat illness within the camp.

(b) Patients who cannot be treated within the camps are transferred to nearby hospitals. The Mosul military hospital is designated to receive prisoners located in the Mosul camps, and the Tammuz military hospital those in the Ramadi camps.

(c) Cases requiring complex operations are sent to the Al-Rashid military hospital.

(d) The Iraqi Red Crescent Society from time to time supplies the prisoners with spectacles and sets of teeth after lists containing the names and particulars of the examinations of such prisoners as require those items are sent by the doctor of the Red Cross mission and the camp doctors.

The mission, unfortunately, does not include this information in its report and contents itself with mentioning only the allegations of the prisoners.

21. The Iraqi authorities have previously explained to the mission that the Iranian prisoner receives the same quantity and quality of food as does the Iraqi soldier. The mission, however, makes no reference to that and contents itself merely with saying in paragraph 141 that "food was said to have improved in most camps before our arrival". It would have been more fitting for the mission to have ascertained this point by all possible means, as from the beginning of the conflict, and to have referred to the information provided to it by the Iraqi authorities and to what the mission itself had seen in the camps.

22. It is cause for surprise and astonishment that the mission should rely on the reports of ICRC for certain charges made against Iraq, while omitting mention of such reports on many occasions in the case of charges made against the Iranian régime. This is particularly so since those reports speak of a fundamental violation of international humanitarian law and since the President of ICRC has described the choice given the Iraqi prisoner as that of betrayal or death.

23. It is cause for surprise that the mission ascribes the delay in providing the names of prisoners to the ICRC mission to the tense relations between that mission and the Iranian authorities (para. 198) and to the

great number of Iraqi prisoners. It does not put its finger on the true reason for a delay arising out of the intentional policy followed by the authorities of the Iranian régime to conceal Iraqi prisoners and treat them in a discriminatory manner, in contravention of international humanitarian law. The tension between those authorities and the ICRC mission is no more than the natural consequence of that policy. The clearest proof of that is the endeavour of the Iranian authorities not to submit the names of most of the Iraqi officers, particularly the airmen among them.

I should like, in conclusion, to reiterate the readiness of the Republic of Iraq to implement the recommendations made by the mission at the end

#### DOCUMENT S/16997\*

### Letter dated 4 March 1985 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

(Original: Arabic/French)  
[4 March 1985]

Further to my letters of 21, 25 and 26 February 1985 [S/16974 and Add.1 and S/16990] relating to Israel's abusive operations and practices in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, and on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

At 7.30 a.m. on Saturday, 2 March 1985, Israeli forces took it upon themselves to surround and storm the village of M'arakah (located south of the Litani River in the vicinity of the town of Tyre). More than 800 Israeli soldiers and over 50 armoured vehicles (tanks, personnel carriers and two bulldozers) took part in the operation, after which 350 citizens were locked up at the village school after being interrogated; 17 of them were later taken away to an unknown destination. In addition, one vehicle and four houses were totally destroyed.

Before leaving the village of M'arakah, the Israeli forces also planted mines and explosives at the village mosque (Husseynyah) and blew it up when villagers were gathered there at midday on Monday, 4 March 1985. It is estimated that as many as 200 people were inside the mosque when it was blown up. According to preliminary reports on this massacre which have reached us, at least 15 were killed, another 45 wounded, dozens are still trapped amid the rubble, and rescue operations are continuing.

of its report faithfully and meticulously. In order for it to be possible to implement those recommendations, the Security Council must establish effective and practical means for putting them into effect, finding a comprehensive and radical solution to the problem of the prisoners and putting an end to their suffering. We are in complete agreement with the statement in the report of the mission to the effect that to continue the lengthy detention of the prisoners constitutes inhumane treatment and is counter-productive. It represents, in our view, a violation of international humanitarian law.

The Israeli forces prevented ambulances and other emergency vehicles from entering the village; they surrounded the hospital in the village of Jebel Aamel, the village closest to M'arakah, and fired shots in the air to terrorize the people and prevent the wounded from being taken to the hospital.

This massacre, which was perpetrated by the Israeli occupation forces at a sacred place of worship, constitutes a violation of the most elementary rules of morality and a breach of the principles and norms of law and international agreements.

The Lebanese Government, which has consistently warned the international community about Israel's constant and perpetual abusive practices in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district, condemns this new massacre, this criminal act perpetrated at M'arakah by the Israeli forces. It is not yet possible to determine fully the sad toll in terms of the number of victims. The Lebanese Government reiterates its call and appeal for the condemnation of Israel's abusive operations and practices, and for an immediate end to those operations and practices in the occupied Lebanese territories.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Rachid FAKHOURY  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/158-S/16997.

#### DOCUMENT S/16998

### Letter dated 4 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[4 March 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the report prepared by the War Information Headquarters of the Supreme Defence Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the conditions of the Iranian prisoners of war in the Iraqi prisoner-of-war camps.

It would be highly appreciated if this report were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

Report dated 4 March 1985 prepared by the War Information Headquarters of the Supreme Defence Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the conditions of Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) in Iraqi POW camps

#### INTRODUCTION

The Iraqi régime commenced its military aggression against the western, south-western and north-western borders of Iran along a 1,300 kilometre front. It occupied over 14,000 square kilometres in the five Iranian provinces of Khuzestan, Ham, Kurdestan, Bakhtaran, and West Azarbaijan, as well as hundreds of villages and districts, with 12 well-equipped Iraqi divisions and with the aerial bombing of residential areas in provincial centres and large cities, including Ahwaz, Bakhtaran, Orumiyyeh, Tabriz, Hamadan, Bushehr, Sanandaj, etc. Thus it began its imposed war against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

This open aggression not only made approximately 2 million Iranians residing in non-military areas homeless, but also encouraged the Iraqi régime to kidnap thousands of Iranian citizens living in the border regions, to take them into its own territory and treat them in the worst possible manner.

The following report outlines only part of the status of Iranian POWs in Iraq. It has been compiled on the basis of reports of international organizations and institutes, especially the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Therefore, statements of the released POWs and other sources have been used to a lesser degree in this article. It can be said that the report reflects an understatement of the reality. Thus the Iranian POWs are living under far more difficult circumstances.

#### GENERAL CONDITIONS OF POWS AND MISSING PERSONS IN IRAQ

In their massive aggression against the Islamic Republic, Iraqi forces occupied large areas of Iranian territory on 22 September 1980. At the beginning of its military assault, the enemy occupied cities and residential quarters and, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, embarked on harassing civilians there; Iraqi soldiers brutally raped hundreds of women and girls and, contrary to the fourth Geneva Convention,<sup>10</sup> kidnapped thousands of residents of those areas, including aged people, women, and children. Even after the passing of over four years since the outbreak of the Iraqi-imposed war, there is no reliable information available on the fate of these people, who have been stationed in secret camps which are hidden from the representatives of international societies. Only after the lapse of months, and sometimes years, when a number of these people are transferred to open Iraqi camps, is there the possibility for the representatives of ICRC to register their names.

In a report on 7 May 1983, in this connection, ICRC wrote, "The International Committee of the Red Cross has registered the names of over a thousand civilian Iranian prisoners of war who are being stationed in Iraqi camps which include aged people, women and those arrested by the Iraqi Army in the occupied areas and forcefully taken to Iraq. These people have been in custody since the outbreak of the war."<sup>11</sup>

This attitude taken by the Iraqi régime has enabled the representatives of ICRC to register only 1,500 names of civilian people. Therefore there is no information on the fate of thousands of other Iranians and, so far, international pressure has failed to force Iraq to separate civilians from POWs and/or release them; only a few of them have been freed due to illness and old age. It was this same illegal policy which encouraged the Baghdad régime to take Mohammad Javad Tondguyan (the Oil Minister) and his companions prisoner in Abadan on 31 October 1980, contrary to international regulations, and hide them in its secret prisons after savagely torturing them. Although the Iraqi régime has shown these people to the public and to the world through its mass media, ICRC has so far not been able to visit them. The Iraqi régime has not even allowed these people to contact their families, yet another measure against humanitarian principles.

The health condition of one of the released members of the delegation, Ahmad Bakhshpour, whose chest and four teeth had been broken as a result of being tortured by the Iraqis, reveals only a part of the attitude of the executors of the Baghdad régime towards members of this delegation and other civilian people. The heroic resistance of the inhabitants of occupied areas on the one hand, and offensives and limited attacks launched by the Islamic combatants in the early months of the war, as well as the implementation of the first offensive plan 105 days after the outbreak of the war on 4 January 1981 on the other hand, paved the way for the Iraqi régime to infringe upon the third Geneva Convention<sup>12</sup> and, instead of capturing Iranian forces, it either killed them in the battlefronts or dispatched them to secret camps.<sup>13</sup>

Confidential and secret documents seized from enemy forces in various operations fully reveal how the Baghdad régime issued orders for the execution or the transfer to secret camps of Iranian military personnel, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard or *Basij* (volunteer corps) POWs. The following letters by the third Iraqi army, issued simultaneously with Iran's first offensive on 4 January 1981, clearly reveal the issue:

"From: Ibn Al-Walid Armoured Brigade (Reinforced)

"To: Subordinate units

"No.: AS/448/17

"Date: 14 January 1981

"The confidential and urgent letter No. 550 of the third army, dated 4 January 1981, which has been conveyed to this unit by the confidential and urgent letter No. 81 of the 9th armoured division, dated 9 January 1981, reads as follows:

"It has been recently noticed that some units are still transferring Khomeini's injured revolutionary guards to hospitals. Therefore, hereby it is stressed that Khomeini's revolutionary guards should be treated as war criminals in the battlefields.

"Please take necessary measures accordingly.

"(Signed) Khatab Omar NAJIM

"Staff Lieutenant-Colonel"

"From: Command of the Ibn Al-Walid Armoured Brigade (Reinforced). In a top secret letter, the first army has stressed the hiding of Iranian POWs and has issued the following circular to its subordinate units:

"Totally confidential and personal

"Infantry Brigade 102 (Reinforced)

"Information

"No.: S SH/105

"Date: 25 May 1981

"To: Battalions 5 and 3 of Brigade 92

First machine gun unit of Battalion 120 of the Field Artillery  
Al-Zaf Commando Companies

"Subject: Iranian POWs

"The totally confidential and personal letter No. 426 of the first army, dated 3 January 1981, which has been conveyed to this unit through letter No. 125 of the Arbil Command, dated 19 January 1981, is as follows:

"1. Please order the transfer of the Iranian POWs from the front lines to the POW camp, after two weeks to be interrogated by security units and to be visited by the Red Cross delegation.

"2. The POWs who, according to the special delegations, should be hidden from the Red Cross delegation, are excluded from the order stressed in paragraph 1. This circular is conveyed to you for your information and its implementation.

"(Signed) Ali Mohammad AL-OWAYD

"Commander of the Infantry Brigade

"102 (Reinforced)"

Such an attitude on the part of the Baghdad régime encouraged Iraqi forces either to martyr wounded Iranian POWs or to leave them on battlefronts to die instead of taking them to hospitals. Therefore, the number of wounded Iranians transferred to behind the fronts would automatically decrease to the extent that Mr. Haflinger, General Representative of ICRC in the Middle East and North Africa, who visited Iran in March 1982 after the start of the Fath-Ul-Mubin operations, told the representatives of the Iranian army, "we have repeatedly announced our protest in this respect and have told them that this is a strange war for there are a great number of injured among the POWs of one of the belligerent parties (Iraqi POWs) while there are no wounded among the POWs of the other party (Iranian POWs), if any". Meanwhile, the Iraqis do not take proper care of the Iranian combatants who are being transferred to hospitals or behind the fronts and their wounds therefore become infected and, owing to maltreatment, they become disabled, paralysed or die as a result. In a report on its inspection tour of the Anbar POW camp from 2 to 4 January 1984, ICRC said "The ICRC medical delegate visited all patients in the sick ward; most of them suffered from inadequately treated traumatic lesions, specially compound fractures of upper and lower limbs, some complicated by osteomyelitis."

Iraq has not only treated injured Iranians in this manner, but it also has violated the first Geneva Convention,<sup>17</sup> having captured a number of Iranian doctors, nurses, personnel of the Red Crescent Society and even female relief workers. It has hidden most of them from the representatives of ICRC.<sup>18</sup> The Baghdad régime will not even allow them to contact their families, and recommendations of the ICRC in this respect have so far failed to hinder these measures.

#### NON-VISITED POWS (MISSING)

So far the ICRC has visited 8,324 Iranian POWs and has registered their names, while the rest have not been visited and, therefore, are regarded as missing in action who are estimated to number about 20,000. The Baghdad régime has hidden these people, mostly Revolutionary Guards, army commanders, pilots, medical staff, experts and civilians, in special secret camps and will not show them or give their names to the representatives of the Red Cross. The families of a great number of these people missing in action have now been informed that they are prisoners through receiving their letters, secret notes,<sup>19</sup> hearing their voice on the radio or

watching their picture on television, or through Iraqi or foreign publications, and in some rare cases, through ICRC officially notifying the Islamic Republic of Iran that these people have been taken prisoner. For instance, the names of 13 Iranians missing in action who had been captured three years ago have been seen in the list presented by the Red Cross. Furthermore, passengers on Iranian planes hijacked to Iraq on 8 September 1984 met a few of these people while visiting one of the Iraqi camps and informed their families of their health condition.

The continuation of such illegal acts by the Iraqi régime prompted ICRC to write the following note<sup>1</sup> on 7 May 1983 to all the Governments signatories of the third Geneva Convention:<sup>14</sup>

"The International Red Cross, with certitude, announces that a great number of Iranian POWs have, since the outbreak of the war, been deliberately hidden by Iraqi officials. The International Committee has prepared a list of the names of hundreds of these POWs. These POWs are being imprisoned in hidden places where the International Committee has not been able to go. Although a number of them have been transferred to camps, and their names have been registered by the Committee, still the question of missing POWs has remained unanswered."

According to the information collected, the missing people have mostly been imprisoned in Baghdad gaols or nearby prisons such as Nasseriyyeh Al-Rashid camp, Abu-Ghoreb camp, and some place in the defence ministry. Numerous reports of the Red Cross representatives confirm the existence of such places of detention.

For example, in its report on inspection tours to Mosul camp No. 2 on 20 and 21 July 1982, the Committee wrote, "On 7 July 1982, 74 Iranian civilians were transferred from an unknown place to Baghdad and finally to Mosul camp No. 2." In another report on the Committee's tours of inspection to Anbar camp from 3 to 5 November 1983, it said, "four prisoners of war have been transferred to Baghdad, to a place which has not been inspected by ICRC".

Therefore, at present, there are about 20,000 Iranian POWs in various prisons in Iraq and, no doubt, the reason for their being hidden from representatives of ICRC and the reason why the Red Cross representatives have so far not visited them according to the time schedules, is that their condition is much worse than the other POWs whose names have been registered. Moreover, some of the Iranian POWs, after having their names registered by ICRC, have disappeared, and the Iraqi Government, in answer to persistent questions from the Committee, declared the case "closed" and claimed that the said POWs had been released without the mediation of the Red Cross (a measure contrary to the third Geneva Convention).

For instance, following a request by the families of Iranian POWs inquiring about the health condition of their children, officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran asked ICRC to report on the condition of Bijan Hafezi, Parviz Bozorgnia, Mohammad Reza Ya'qubi, Amir Nasser Mostafavi, Gholamreza Sanaisadeh, Fatolah Shairaini Yazdi, Nasser Asgari, Zabi-hollah Bahaeeddini, Reza Naderi and Bahram Morad Jamshid Mehracini.

The Red Cross representative body in Tehran, in a reply dated 13 April 1982 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while confirming that on 10 November 1980 the Committee had registered the said people at Mosul camp, further announced, "Representatives of ICRC could, under no circumstances, visit these people and this issue is openly in contradiction with article 126, paragraph 1, of the third Geneva Convention".

Since then, the representative body of ICRC in Baghdad has not spared any effort to obtain information from Iraqi officials about these people. The families of these POWs were asked to continue writing messages to them and these messages were handed over to the Baghdad officials. The said officials once claimed they had released these POWs.

The representative body of ICRC in Tehran remained in contact with the families of the POWs and gained one positive result on No. 9, a person who was actually released on 7 December 1980 in the Marivan region.

Finally, the officials noted that from their point of view the case was closed, adding that any further measures taken by ICRC in this connection would be useless.

#### POWS VISITED

The Iraqi régime, after separating certain POWs from the rest, dispatched a number of them to non-secret camps where the POWs would be attacked and mentally and physically tortured by the officials of the camp or by military men and in some cases younger Iranian soldiers were raped by lustful Iraqi forces. The Red Cross doctors have also confirmed signs on the bodies of the POWs indicating that they have been beaten. The Red Cross delegation which visited Mosul camp No. 1 from 11 to 13 November 1983 wrote in its report in this connection "around 130 prisoners had been

severely beaten that month. The POWs had been punished in groups of 10 in front of the administration. The camp commander and another officer had watched between 20 to 25 guards inflicting the 'punishment'. The POWs had to pass between two rows of guards who beat them with cables, sticks, belts, etc.; even four old POWs and a blind man had been beaten".

Iranian POWs who, for any reason, are transferred to other camps, are not only deprived of basic facilities, especially in cold weather, but are beaten upon their arrival in the new camp.

A Red Cross delegation which visited Mosul camp No. 2 from 9 to 11 November 1983 described the situation of the Iranian POWs as follows: "The 180 prisoners newly arrived from Ramadi were said to have been beaten with cable and sticks and kicked by about 40 guards. The camp commander himself is said to have participated. The 180 prisoners had then allegedly been locked up for about 20 hours in three small isolation cells. They did not receive food or water and could not use the blocked toilets; wounded POWs among them did not receive any medical care". In addition to the officials, guards of the camps, under unfounded pretexts, would constantly beat a large number of POWs. Some of them would occasionally be martyred due to the severity of their wounds."

Moreover, in most of the POW camps, there are special rooms which the Iraqi guards refer to as "punishment rooms". This has been mentioned in many reports of the Red Cross. One of the excuses for which Iranian POWs are being punished is possession of a pen, for which Iraqi guards even imprison them for a few days. Also, those Iranian POWs who refuse to hold interviews with the Baghdad radio are punished and beaten. In many cases it has been noticed that an Iranian POW who had been completely healthy at the time of his capture has become crippled owing to the inhumane treatment received from the Iraqi guards. The mysterious martyrdom of these people, which becomes clear when signs of torture are clearly seen in the pictures of their bodies, further reaffirms, more than ever, the subjection to torture of Iranian POWs in Iraqi camps. In addition, death certificates sent from Iraq are generally incomplete and include contradictory information. For instance, in one death certificate, the date of the death was mentioned to be 1 July 1982 while the date for the issuance of the certificate is mentioned as 20 June 1982, i.e., prior to death.

The Iraqi régime has sometimes committed illegal acts as a condition for accepting the visit of the Red Cross representatives. For example, once in Mosul camp No. 2, the separation of the *Basij* (volunteer corps) forces from privates by the representatives of the POWs was set as a condition. Thirteen of their representatives were summoned for negotiations and after being beaten were sent to an unknown place. (There is a strong possibility that some or all of them have been martyred.) The rest of the POWs were imprisoned in their rest houses for five days and six nights and were deprived of food as well as being prohibited to go to the bathroom or toilet.

When, under such circumstance, the POWs smashed the windows and rushed towards the camp yard and kitchen to get some food, some 200 to 400 soldiers who were dispatched from somewhere else to the camp attacked the POWs with clubs and cables and beat them, as a result of which 80 POWs were injured and three others martyred. The death certificate issued for the three was opposed by ICRC.<sup>15</sup>

Officials and guards of the Iraqi camps even exceeded their limits and in some cases beat Iranian POWs with cables in the presence of the representatives of ICRC. When the camp commander faced the protest of the Red Cross representatives he said: "Hereafter we will tell them not to punish them in your presence."

The Iraqi régime, through imposing mercenaries over Iranian POWs and by forcing them to take part in compulsory ceremonies, has paved the way for the outbreak of clashes in the camps. According to the POWs, the Iraqi régime has sent fugitive Iranian terrorists to the camps to deliver speeches and has forced the POWs to attend the gathering; otherwise they would be beaten. Only in one case, after a speech delivered by Ali Tehrani (a fugitive Iranian who was recently granted asylum in Iraq) and as a result of the attack of Iraqi soldiers on the Iranian POWs who refused to listen to Tehrani's speech, three POWs became blind and at least 50 others were wounded.

#### CONDITIONS IN IRAQI CAMPS FOR IRANIAN POWS

Iranian POWs are being assigned to camps where they are deprived of basic nutrition, medical, welfare, sport and religious facilities, and where various regulations stressed in the third Geneva Convention are repeatedly ignored by the Iraqi régime. Reports of the ICRC describe the condition of Iraqi camps as follows:

##### 1. General living conditions

The POW camps are mostly located in areas not suitable for living, either in the summer or in the winter, and the temperature goes as high

as 45 to 50 degrees centigrade in the summer, although there are no air-conditioning facilities, while it drops to zero or five degrees below zero in the winter. Reports of the Red Cross delegation indicate that in the winter there is not a sufficient number of heaters in the rest houses and enough fuel is not put at their disposal or in some cases no fuel is given to them.<sup>1</sup> One of these reports shows that under these circumstances not even enough clothing is put at the disposal of the POWs and the commander of the camp refrains from changing the old clothes of the prisoners. Therefore, most POWs are forced to make underwear for themselves from their bed sheets and only old people are allowed to make hats for themselves to use in the winter time.<sup>2</sup> In summer time, lack of air conditioners or their malfunction makes the environment hard to tolerate by the POWs. There is also not enough room in rest houses and POWs mostly suffer in this connection. According to the Red Cross report from the Anbar camp on 29 and 30 January 1982, there were only 9 square metres for every six prisoners, each having an area of a maximum 1.5 square metres. When the Red Cross delegates visited Ramadi camp from 3 to 5 November 1982, they noticed that 1,239 prisoners were stationed there while the camp has a capacity of 720 people, and in Mosul camp No. 1, with a capacity of 1,200 people, some 1,586 prisoners are being stationed. Furthermore, in many cases the POWs were not given a mattress and had to sleep on the floor. Under these circumstances, the windows of the rest houses are often closed and there is not enough light there, or enough bathrooms and toilets.<sup>3</sup>

The sewage system does not work properly in these places and not only is there not sufficient hot water in the camps,<sup>4</sup> but in some of them, there is not enough water for drinking or washing, which itself creates a polluted environment, favourable to the proliferation of insects transmitting diseases. Representatives of the Red Cross, after visiting Mosul camp No. 2 from 9 to 11 November 1983, reported on the sanitation of the camp as follows: "There was no natural light; four neon tubes and four light bulbs provided artificial lighting; some were broken. In the isolation cells, the ICRC delegates found a very critical situation. The two toilets were blocked up and dry excrement and bloody clothing was scattered on the floor. A trace of blood was found on a wall. Dirt and bad smell were omnipresent. There was no ventilation and lighting at all, and only one neon tube at the entrance access to the three smaller cells."

Also, the Red Cross delegates, in a report on the inspection tour of Mosul camp No. 1 from 28 to 30 May 1983, wrote as follows:

"There were nine washrooms in the camp. (Most of them were out of order. Major repair was needed.) The prisoners could no longer take showers as distribution of kerosene had been stopped for the summer.

"The delegates reminded the authorities that the problem regarding the sanitary infrastructure of the camp had been discussed since September 1981, but the situation had not improved and was even deteriorating."

In some of the camps, the situation is even worse and Iranian POWs are often forced to use buckets, instead of toilets, placed in the rest houses, which are emptied once a day. POWs suffering from diarrhoea are given plastic sacks. Representatives of the Red Cross, in this connection, have repeatedly reported: "When the doors were closed, the POWs were forced to use plastic buckets placed in the corners of the rooms".<sup>5</sup> Under normal circumstances, when the Iranian POWs do not undergo group punishment or are not punished individually, they are forced to live under such unsuitable conditions, and in some cases some only have the opportunity to use fresh air for half an hour a day.

## 2. Food conditions

The food conditions in the POW camps are very bad and are constantly becoming worse.<sup>6</sup> According to the reports of the Red Cross delegates, the materials used are not according to regulation and do not contain enough of the vitamins needed by the POWs.

POWs are given food twice a day (in the morning and in the afternoon) in dishes for 10 to 15 persons, and sometimes they are only given one meal, while some of the POWs are forced to eat with their hands.<sup>7</sup>

Contrary to the third Geneva Convention, food given to the POWs is totally different, both from the qualitative and quantitative points of view, from the food given to Iraqi soldiers. The food is usually inedible and the bread is not well cooked, to the extent that POWs have to leave the bread in the sun to cook it. POWs are constantly complaining of the taste of soap in their food, which is a cause of their suffering from diarrhoea.

The guards and officials of the camps are sometimes covetous of the food ration of POWs and plunder parts of it.<sup>8</sup> The case is even worse for POWs who, for various reasons, are in isolation cells. These prisoners receive only bread and water.<sup>9</sup>

POWs are even deprived of fresh water and are often faced with the water being cut off. Although POWs have taken measures in this respect,

they are still having water problems and when they are imprisoned in their rest houses, they have no access to water for 24 hours.

In their inspection tour of Mosul camp No. 1 from 11 to 13 November 1983, the ICRC representatives reported: "The POWs had built a cement tank having a capacity of about 23 cubic metres. They said that they had water in the morning for three or four hours, scarcely any in the afternoons, and for one or two hours when they were locked inside the rooms."

The case is even worse as far as giving fruit to POWs is concerned. Some reports indicate that POWs have not tasted fruit for months. Once in its report on an inspection tour of Mosul camp No. 4, from 12 to 14 January 1984, the ICRC delegation wrote: "There was a serious problem in the supply of fruit, which was given only three times per month".

## 3. Sanitary conditions

The deplorable situation prevailing in the POW camps, the lack of sufficient means to provide a healthy environment and render the necessary medical treatment have created a polluted atmosphere in the camps to the extent that most of the POWs are afflicted with lice. Moreover, sick and wounded POWs do not have access to doctors or medicine. Sometimes doctors will not visit them even every other two months. Lack of proper nutrition and needed vitamins has also intensified the issue to the extent that infectious and contagious diseases are widespread in the camps. Many of the POWs suffer from dizziness, diarrhoea, mouth disease, infectious pimples, mouth and teeth infection, and inflammation and skin diseases of the testicles, and cases of typhus have been seen.<sup>10</sup>

The Iraqi régime not only refuses to put required medical facilities at the disposal of Iranian POWs, but also will not allow medical equipment and medicine such as glasses, medical belts and special medicine to be sent to them through the Red Crescent aid packages.

The Iraqi régime, contrary to the third Geneva Convention, hesitates in handing over the wounded POWs, patients suffering from chronic illnesses, the disabled and aged people. This hesitation has resulted in the martyrdom of a number of Iranian POWs. It was in this connection that the ICRC representatives, after their inspection of Mosul camp No. 1 from 28 to 30 June 1981, requested the Baghdad régime to return these people to Iran: "The ICRC delegates considered that the women and families kept in Mosul camp, as well as a number of seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, should be repatriated to Iran as soon as possible."

## 4. Work conditions

The Iraqi régime, contrary to the third Geneva Convention, not only does not provide POWs with welfare and financial possibilities to meet their basic needs, but, on various pretexts, uses POWs for forced labour without pay, and for intolerable activities.

The ICRC delegates, after inspecting the Ramadi camp from 24 to 26 November and on 1 and 17 December 1980, reported: "However, the POWs said that groups of 40 to 50 POWs were taken outside the camp to make mud bricks and to construct small buildings near the camp; those POWs received no extra pay for their work."

## 5. Training and communication conditions

In most POW camps, there are insufficient educational and cultural facilities and the Iraqi régime not only does not put enough volumes of the Koran, prayer books and various other books at the disposal of the POWs, but will not give them pen and paper either.<sup>11</sup>

To further aggravate the POWs and impose pressure on their families, the Baghdad régime creates many obstacles for the POWs to prevent them from sending their letters and messages, or only mail them after a long delay. For example, among messages received through ICRC in October 1984, there were more than 150 messages from 1983 and five messages from 1982. Reporting on this, ICRC wrote on its inspection tour of Anbar camp, from 3 to 5 November 1982, "About 1,000 messages gathered in Anbar in September and 7,000 in October had still not passed Iraqi censorship at the time of the visit".

Meanwhile, most families of the Iranian POWs have complained that items enclosed in the letters including pictures, handicrafts, gifts, etc. or letters sent by the POWs themselves, have been stolen by the Iraqi guards.

## 6. Religious ceremonies

Iranian POWs are not free to observe their religious rites and are constantly put under pressure and beaten for holding religious ceremonies. To say prayers loudly or to read the Koran in a loud voice, which is Islamically recommended, is considered as an offence and receives severe punishment.

Various ICRC reports indicate that the Iranian POWs have been punished for performing religious ceremonies during the religious mourning periods.<sup>12</sup> The Iraqi régime also plays loud music and thus puts pressure on the Iranian POWs in this connection. In addition, the Iraqi régime forces

Iranian POWs to watch a number of cheap films which all propagate corruption and prostitution.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the Iranian women prisoners who were kidnapped by the Iraqis during the early days of the war and a number of whom were raped and then transferred to Iraq, as well as nurses and relief workers of the fronts who were arrested contrary to the first Geneva Convention, are in a deplorable condition and their situation is daily growing worse."

At present, a great number of female POWs, like male prisoners, are being detained in secret camps.

The Iraqi régime, in addition to imposing physical and mental pressure on the POWs, which has caused a number of them to develop mental disorders, has also sexually abused women POWs. Being aware of the sensitiveness of the male POWs and threatening them that the women POWs will be raped, they have gained certain privileges from the male prisoners, subsequently putting women POWs under multifaceted pressures.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND IRANIAN POWS

With regard to the realities hereby presented and the circumstances whereby the conditions of Iranian POWs in Iraq are worsening every day, ICRC, despite its main responsibilities, has unfortunately failed to take effective measures for the improvement of the conditions of the Iranian POWs. In total, the infringements and failure of ICRC in investigating the affairs of Iranian POWs can be divided into the following categories:

1. Although the observance of impartiality is one of the principal responsibilities of ICRC, the organization has not remained impartial in its contacts with POWs of the imposed war, and without giving the least information on the condition of Iranian POWs in Iraq to the mass media, it has taken an open stance *vis-à-vis* the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. ICRC has not taken any effective international measure to improve the conditions of the Iranian POWs and has only contented itself with giving warnings to the Iraqi officials. This organization, despite having information about the conditions of the Iranian POWs in Iraq, has never informed world public opinion of the violations and inhumane treatment of the Iranian prisoners of war.

3. In view of the fact that ICRC is unable to clarify the situation of the 20,000 Iranians missing in action and has not taken any effective measures in this respect, Iran determined to clarify the situation of Iranian POWs by placing it on the agenda of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, but when it tried to do so ICRC prevented any discussion of the matter by claiming that investigation into the situation of POWs was the duty of the Red Cross Committee and should not be discussed by the Human Rights Committee. Thus, the fate of 20,000 Iranians missing in action still remains unknown.

#### NOTES

\* Forty prisoners, among the 74 newcomers, were elderly. Their ages varied between 50 and 86 years. Reports of ICRC from Mosul camp No. 2 (20-21 July 1982) read: "A large number of the POWs in Mosul camp No. 1 were civilians; furthermore, about 100 were between 55 and 82 years old."

\* The report of ICRC for 18 to 20 July 1982, the original text of which is in French, reads as follows: "Le CICR a enregistré dans les camps de prisonniers de guerre plus d'un millier de civils, dont des vieillards et des femmes, arrêtés dans les territoires occupés par les forces armées irakiennes, déportés en République d'Iraq et arbitrairement privés de leur liberté depuis le début du conflit."

\* In a report of 7 May 1983, ICRC pointed to the massacre of POWs in the war fronts by the Iraqi régime.

\* One of the Iranian POWs, Zagross Mirani, after his escape from a prison in Iraq and his return to Iran said, "After 18 or 19 months of captivity in Mosul camps, the Iraqis brought four female nurses there who were welcomed by other Iranian prisoners shouting "God is Great" as well as other slogans. The four nurses said that they had up until then been kept in dungeons. A month later, the Baathist Iraqis took the nurses somewhere else."

\* Only on one occasion, five of these people wrote a note on a piece of paper and sent it to their families.

\* The original report, in French, is as follows: "Le CICR a pu établir avec certitude que de nombreux prisonniers de guerre iraniens lui ont été délibérément cachés dès le début du conflit. Le CICR a établi des listes comprenant plusieurs centaines de noms de prisonniers iraniens. Ces prisonniers sont incarcérés dans les lieux de détention auxquels le CICR n'a jamais eu accès. Bien que quelques dizaines d'entre eux aient été intégrés dans les camps et enregistrés par le CICR, le problème des prisonniers cachés n'a pas trouvé de réponse acceptable."

\* In many reports prepared at the time of the visit of the Red Cross representatives to the POW camps, many cases of beating of POWs or their death due to the beating have been mentioned.

\* Parts of the Red Cross delegation's report No. 1685, dated 21 and 22 January 1983, on the incident which took place in Mosul camp No. 2 on 26 November 1982, read as follows:

"26 November 1982

"The POWs tried to establish contact with the camp authorities without success on three occasions during the morning.

"At noon, a collective prayer took place and the POWs recited some verses of the Koran which concerned the treatment of POWs.

"At 1 p.m. three high-ranking officers, one Brigadier General, one Colonel and one Major of the Iraqi armed forces, entered the camp, accompanied by other officers. They went towards the end of the court (as far as the sick ward) and ordered the POWs to return to their rooms.

"The POWs remained seated on the ground.

"The officers left and then 200 to 400 soldiers entered the camp. They were armed with sticks and cables.

"The soldiers attacked and the POWs dispersed; a large number of the POWs were beaten and many were seriously wounded.

"Two cameras took films of the event, one from the right wing on the first floor and the other in the left wing, in the yard.

"According to the POWs, two or three POWs died:

"1. ID 5194, Yarmohammadi, Hojatoollah, son of Mohammad Reza, injuries in the head, between room 6 and the old sick ward (left wing).

"2. Non-registered Hassanzadeh, Hassan (20-25 years old), wounded in the head and face (left wing, near kitchen).

"3. . . . Mohsen (13-16 years old), fractured skull, brain exposed (right wing, between room 10 and toilets).

"The soldiers followed the POWs to their rooms, including the sick ward, where they continued beating them and destroyed the equipment.

"The soldiers broke into the canteen and destroyed it.

"The troubles ended at 3:30 p.m.

"About 80 wounded POWs were transported to the Mosul military hospital in ambulances and trucks which were ready. On the way, they were maltreated and the majority of them were brought back without having received medical treatment.

"In the evening, the *Basij* and the soldiers were separated."

\* Report of the Red Cross delegation on its visit to Mosul camp No. 1 from 11 to 13 November 1982 and 11 to 13 November 1983 about the clothing of the prisoners.

\* "Many prisoners were still using the covers of their mattresses to make underwear . . . The delegates asked the camp commander to let the POWs wear the hats they had manufactured themselves during the winter season. He agreed for the aged prisoners, but said it would be forbidden for all other POWs."

\* Red Cross report on the visit to Mosul camp No. 1 from 18 to 20 July 1982. "The sewage system of the camp was in very bad condition and had been so since January 1982. The ICRC delegates, in view of the risk to POWs' health, urged the authorities to undertake the appropriate work as soon as possible. The camp commander said the estimated cost of the work exceeded the amount allocated for the repairs."

\* Hot water was not yet available in the camp, and the prisoners complained of having only cold showers in spite of the winter season. (Report of ICRC on the visit to Mosul camp No. 3 on 19 and 20 January 1983.)

\* ICRC report on the visit to Anbar camp from 3 to 5 November 1983 and to Mosul camp No. 4 from 12 to 14 January 1983.

\* "In comparison with the official food list before January 1983, the ICRC delegates had noticed a drastic decrease in the supply of meat, dried beans, sugar and tea." (ICRC report on the visit to Mosul camp No. 1 from 11 to 13 January 1983.)

\* "Some but not all the prisoners had one plate, one spoon and one plastic cup . . . the official list showed a significant decrease in rice, bread, vegetables and fruits."

\* "The delegates stated that food quantities received by POWs were below the official daily ration. They asked the camp commander to enforce strict respect for Iraqi army regulations concerning POW food rations. During the visit, the delegates had heard allegations that guards profited from food deliveries for POWs. The camp commander promised a thorough check of the matter and severe punishment if such abuses were established as a fact." (ICRC report on the visit to Anbar camp from 3 to 5 November 1982.)

\* ". . . And (they) were given only water and two loaves of bread per day." (ICRC report on the Ramadi camp from 26 to 28 September 1981.)

"Most of the prisoners transferred from Mosul camp No. 2 had evidence of body lice . . . Moreover, the delegate noted widespread mouth infection (probably *candida albicans*) and testicular neurodermitis on these prisoners." (Report of the ICRC delegates on the visit to the Ramadi camp from 3 to 5 November 1983.)

\* Reports of the ICRC delegation on the visit to Mosul camp No. 1, Anbar, Al-Rashid military hospital in Baghdad and Ramadi camps from 23 to 25 May 1983.

"Almost all POWs had been beaten at night when observing religious practices during the four days before Ashura. About 100 guards and soldiers

entered the rooms and beat the prisoners. The camp commander was allegedly present . . . Such treatment was a very serious violation of article 34 of the third Geneva Convention." (ICRC report on an inspection tour of the Mosul 2 camp from 9 to 11 November 1983.)

"The ICRC report on its inspection of Anbar camp on 29 and 30 January 1983, says: "It should be noted that in the case of POWs, the situation has worsened instead of improved . . . The four women POWs who lived in the washroom building of section 2 encountered several difficulties . . . Their quarters (9 square metres) had no natural light and were extremely humid . . . The living situation of the four women POWs had been discussed previously but their condition had worsened."

## DOCUMENT S/16999

### Letter dated 5 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[5 March 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that at 7.30 a.m. local time today, 5 March 1985, the Iranian armed forces took it upon themselves to shell the city of Basra with concentrated artillery fire.

This criminal act constitutes a flagrant violation of the agreement concluded under your auspices between Iraq and Iran on 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610], by virtue of which the two parties undertook to refrain from the deliberate shelling of population centres, and is a grave and deliberate escalation of the situation at a time when the Security Council and yourself are making sincere efforts to find an appropriate and effective solution to the suffering of the prisoners of war.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/17000

### Lebanon: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[11 March 1985]

#### *The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 512 (1982) and 520 (1982), as well as all its resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

*Having heard* the statement of the representative of Lebanon [2568th meeting], and noting with great concern the deterioration of the situation in the areas occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district as a result of the Israeli practices,

*Recalling* the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and stressing the humanitarian principles of the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949<sup>10</sup> and the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,<sup>22</sup>

1. *Condemns* the Israeli practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district which are in violation of the rules and principles of international law, in particular the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention;

2. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, and

in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 508 (1982), and 509 (1982), which demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;

3. *Reiterates* its call for strict respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. *Affirms* that the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention apply to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and that the occupying Power is duty bound to respect and uphold the provisions of the said Convention and of other norms of international law;

5. *Demands* that the Government of Israel, the occupying Power, desist forthwith from its practices against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention and other norms of international law;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a fact-finding mission to report to the Council on these Israeli practices and measures in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review, to consult with the Government of Lebanon and to report to the Council on the implementation of and compliance with the present resolution as soon as possible.

#### DOCUMENT S/17002

#### Letter dated 5 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[5 March 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a letter from Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 5 MARCH 1985 FROM THE MINISTER FOR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO  
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

As you were informed by my letter of 9 February 1985 [S/16949], various reports of your mission concerning the Iraqi attacks on non-military and purely civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran have left no doubt whatsoever as to Iraq's definite determination to continue such criminal attacks and to violate the agreement of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610].

I would like to draw your attention to the above-mentioned letter in which emphasis was laid on the point that the Islamic Republic of Iran pronounced the ultimatum and gave the last chance to international organizations to come up with the possible international solution in order to stop the continuous Iraqi attacks, and if such a solution were found, the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite suffering great human losses due to its strict adherence to the agreement of 12 June, would not resort to reciprocal measures.

You are no doubt aware that this ultimatum of the Islamic Republic of Iran bore no practical fruit. The Iraqi régime did not take the matter seriously with impunity, but there is no point in lamenting this fact.

Unfortunately, during this period, international organizations did not take any practical measures to preserve the 12 June agreement. This fact has rendered the Iraqi régime more determined in its acts of aggression.

Regrettably, yesterday the indiscriminate attacks by Iraq against civilian areas took on new dimensions when at 1335 hours on 4 March two Iraqi jet fighters attacked Ahwaz. This attack left 11 civilians martyred and 25 injured. Similarly, at 1800 hours on the same day, there occurred an aerial attack on Bushehr which resulted in damage to the nuclear reactor installation in that city. This recent attack, which is being discussed in disarmament talks under the title of radioactive weapons, has added a new dimension to the already existing aspects of the Iraqi violations of international regulations.

We regret to declare that under circumstances whereby Iraq has left all international appeals to refrain from attacks on non-military and civilian areas unanswered, in spite of our numerous sincere attempts to preserve the authority of the 12 June agreement, as of this moment we will assume a retaliatory stance *vis-à-vis* all such Iraqi attacks as the only means of stopping them. Even in this measure, however, all humanitarian concerns will be taken into account and prior to retaliation, the inhabitants of the Iraqi cities will be informed so as to enable them to avoid danger by evacuating the cities.

Needless to assert that the responsibility for all the consequences will lie with the Iraqi régime.

(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Islamic Republic of Iran

#### DOCUMENT S/17003\*

#### Letter dated 6 March 1985 from the representative of Democratic Yemen to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[6 March 1985]

I have the honour, in my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States in the United Nations for the month of March, to request the circulation of the enclosed letter dated 5 March 1985 from Mr. Riyad Mansour, the Deputy Permanent Observer for the Palestine Liberation Organi-

zation to the United Nations, as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hussein S. AL-ALFI  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission  
of Democratic Yemen  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/162-S/17003.

ANNEX

**Letter dated 5 March 1985 from the observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Secretary-General**

I am requested by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to bring the following to your urgent attention.

On the evening of 1 March 1985, several units from the Israeli occupation army and border guard stormed both the old and new campuses of Bir Zeit University. This latest Fascist attack against Bir Zeit University was to stop the opening of a Palestinian cultural exhibit sponsored by the Bir Zeit Student Council and Staff Union. During the attack several Palestinian students were badly injured.

The Israeli occupation army then declared Bir Zeit University a military zone, suspended classes at the University and proceeded to arrest scores of Palestinian students and faculty members.

Concomitantly, other units from the Israeli occupation army and border guard stormed the homes of Palestinian students, arrested scores of them and carried out on-the-spot interrogations.

On Sunday, 3 March, massive Israeli reinforcements were sent to the University in an attempt to crush a protest by thousands of Palestinian students against the latest Fascist Israeli attack on Bir Zeit University, and to demand the immediate release of all Palestinian students and faculty members arrested during the attack.

On Saturday, 2 March, Al-Najah University, also in the Israeli occupied Palestinian West Bank, was stormed and surrounded by units from the Israeli army.

These premeditated Fascist attacks on prominent Palestinian universities in the Israeli occupied Palestinian West Bank are further examples of the "iron fist policy" the Zionist régime in Tel Aviv is unleashing against our people under Israeli military occupation.

As of today, Bir Zeit University remains both closed and under siege by the Israeli army.

The United Nations and its organs are called upon to assume their responsibility to put an effective and immediate end to such Fascist and inhuman acts committed by a Member State of the Organization.

**DOCUMENT S/17005**

**Letter dated 6 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original: Arabic]  
[6 March 1985]*

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a letter addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the appeal made by you yesterday, 5 March 1985 [S/17004].

I request you to have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations*

**LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1985 FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

I have been acquainted with the appeal issued by you yesterday, 5 March 1985, relating to the question of attacks on purely civilian locations in the ongoing conflict between Iraq and Iran.

I should like to assure you that Iraq has, in all sincerity, adhered to the agreement reached under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in June 1984 to prevent attacks on purely civilian targets in the two countries [see S/16609 and S/16610].

The day before yesterday, 4 March, the official Iranian authorities gave vent, without any justification, to a blatant threat to shell the city of Basra. They then went on to carry out that threat yesterday, by shelling the city of Basra in a

concentrated manner, causing a large number of casualties among the civilian population, to say nothing of the damage to civilian property.

The pretext used by Iran for committing this crime and violating the June 1984 agreement is baseless. Iran has justified this premeditated crime on the grounds that Iraq had bombarded certain areas inside Iran. I should like to inform you that those Iranian targets bombarded by Iraqi aircraft were targets not covered by the June agreement. That is confirmed by the fact that the Iranian authorities did not request the United Nations mission assigned to investigate such cases to visit those targets in order to determine the truth of the Iranian allegations.

Iraq strongly condemns this deliberate violation of the June agreement by Iran. It is to be noted that the violation occurs at a time when the Security Council is considering one of the sensitive and important problems of the war which Iran persists in continuing and escalating, namely that of the prisoners of war.

We hope that the Security Council will take effective measures to put an end to the repeated crimes committed by Iran, to its deliberate violation of the June agreement and to its determination to escalate the state of war.

*(Signed) Tariq AZIZ  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Iraq*

**Note verbale dated 5 March 1985 from the Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Russian]  
[6 March 1985]

The Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in reply to his note of 7 November 1984, has the honour to inform him of the following:

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, faithful to its position of principle on the complete and definitive eradication of colonialism and racism, resolutely condemns the shameful and inhuman system of *apartheid* imposed by the racist régime of South Africa on the overwhelming majority of the population of that country.

Scrupulously respecting the resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations aimed at isolating and boycotting the South African régime, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has no relations with it. Moreover, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic denounces the policy followed by the United States of America, a number of other countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Israel in maintaining and developing co-operation with the Pretoria régime in various fields, thus undermining international efforts to combat *apartheid*.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic believes that the policy of *apartheid* constitutes a crime against humanity, a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a breach of international peace and security. No one should be fooled by

the attempts of the South African racists to "change the face" of *apartheid*, by their political manoeuvring round the so-called "new constitution", which has been declared null and void by the General Assembly. The criminal policy and practice of *apartheid* must be stamped out.

Accordingly, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has supported Security Council resolution 556 (1984) as well as the other relevant United Nations resolutions, and advocates strict observance by all Member States.

Since the Pretoria régime is continuing its policy of *apartheid*, is unrelenting in its acts of aggression, destabilization and State terrorism against independent African countries, is intensifying its arms build-up and is striving to acquire nuclear weapons, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic supports the call for the Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic again proclaims its solidarity with the national liberation movements in southern Africa, which are waging a legitimate struggle against *apartheid* and for freedom and independence.

The Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations would be grateful if this note could be circulated as a Security Council document.

## DOCUMENT S/17007

**Letter dated 6 March 1985 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[6 March 1985]

My Government utterly rejects the false assertions contained in the letter of 4 March 1985 addressed to you by the representative of Lebanon [S/16997].

1. Israel had no involvement whatsoever in the explosion near the mosque in M'arakah. There were not even any units of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the village at the time of the incident. It appears that this explosion took place when terrorists mishandled the triggering device and caused it to detonate. Similar explosions have occurred elsewhere in Lebanon, both recently and over many years.

2. In no way did IDF units prevent ambulances and other emergency vehicles from entering the hospital referred to in document S/16997. In fact, the contrary is true. The IDF cleared a path to the hospital and assured access to it by dispersing a violent demonstration in front of the hospital. The IDF also apprehended some of the demonstrators who fled inside without disrupting the normal routine of the patients or doctors. The hospital itself was not damaged in any way.

Contrary to the allegations in the recent Lebanese letters, Israel has acted responsibly and forthrightly to prevent further terrorism in southern Lebanon. The IDF uncovered large caches of weapons and explosives intended for use

against, among others, IDF forces. Here is a partial list of what was found in recent days: 13 hand-held LAW missiles; 5 Strella surface-to-air missiles; 15 land mines and side-charges; 86 machine guns; 85 demolition block explosives; 150 kilograms of high explosives (TNT); 199 hand grenades; dozens of Kalachnikov rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition.

This is an arsenal large enough to equip a sizeable military unit. It would have been used to attack not only Israel and Israel's forces; many Lebanese civilians in the south would undoubtedly have been killed as well.

The Government of Lebanon seems to have chosen to attack Israel for defending its own forces as they leave Lebanon. It has further fallen into the habit of blaming Israel for every outbreak of internal violence, violence which has nothing to do with Israel but which reflects the inability of the Lebanese Government itself to enforce law and order.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Benjamin NETANYAHU  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

**Letter dated 6 March 1985 from the representative of India  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[6 March 1985]

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of a communiqué adopted on 6 March 1985 by the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries regarding the situation in the areas occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and to request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vinay VERMA  
*Acting Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations*

## ANNEX

**Communiqué adopted by the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on 6 March 1985 on the situation in the areas occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district**

1. The Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held an urgent session in New York on 6 March 1985 to consider the situation in the areas occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district. The Bureau heard a statement by the representative of Lebanon, Mr. Rachid Fakhoury, concerning the latest Israeli operations and abusive practices against the civilian population in the Lebanese territories occupied by Israel. The Bureau expressed its grave concern at the deteriorating situation, which threatens peace and security in the area as a result of these Israeli practices.

2. The Bureau recalled the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and stressed the humanitarian principles of the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949<sup>10</sup> and the obligations arising

from the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907<sup>22</sup>. The Bureau condemned the Israeli practices and measures against the civilian population in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district which are in violation of the rules and principles of international law, in particular the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention.

3. The Bureau recalled the Political Declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi in March 1983 [see S/15675]. It reaffirmed the final communiqué adopted by the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly held in New York in October 1984 [see S/16773]. The Bureau called on the Security Council urgently to implement its resolutions on Lebanon, particularly resolutions 425 (1978), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), to ensure Israel's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the Lebanese territories to the internationally recognized borders. The Bureau reiterated its support for Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity.

4. The Bureau expressed its support for the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority over all of its territory and for its determination to restore peace and order in the areas to be evacuated by Israel and to ensure the safety and security of the civilian populations in those areas, including the Palestinian refugees in the camps.

5. The Bureau affirmed that the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention applied to the territories occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the Rashaya district and that the occupying Power is duty bound to respect and uphold the provisions of the said Convention and of other norms of international law. It demanded that Israel, the occupying Power, desist forthwith from its illegal and abusive practices against the civilian population in these areas in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention and other norms of international law and immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions in the areas under its occupation.

## DOCUMENT S/17009\*

**Letter dated 6 March 1985 from the representative of India  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[7 March 1985]

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of a communiqué adopted today by the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries regarding the situation in South Africa and to request that this be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vinay VERMA  
*Acting Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations*

## ANNEX

**Communiqué adopted by the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on 6 March 1985 on the situation in South Africa**

1. At an urgent meeting held at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 6 March 1985, the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries considered the grave situation in South Africa resulting, *inter alia*, from the large-scale uprooting and relocation of the indigenous African people, the killing of African demonstrators at Crossroads and other places and the arrest of and preferment of "high treason" charges against certain leaders of the United Democratic Front.

2. The Bureau strongly condemned the Pretoria régime for the wanton murder, in cold blood, of innocent and defenceless men, women and children who were protesting their forced removal from Crossroads and other places for resettlement. It demanded that Pretoria put an immediate and unconditional end to its policy of uprooting indigenous African people from their homes and banishing them to artificially created bantustans.

3. The Bureau also strongly condemned the racist South African régime for the arbitrary arrests of members of the United Democratic Front and

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/164-S/17009.

other mass organizations opposed to the *apartheid* régime. It voiced particular indignation at the preferment of "high treason" charges against Mrs. Albertina Sisulu, Mr. Archie Gumede, Mr. George Sewpreshud, Mr. M. F. Haidoo, Rev. Frank Chikana, Prof. Ismael Mohammed, Mr. Mewa Ramgobin, Mr. Cassim Saloojee, Mr. Paul David, Mr. Essop Jasset, Mr. Curtis Nkondo, Mr. Aubrey Mokoena, Mr. Thomazile Qweta, Mr. Sisa Njikelana, Mr. Sam Kikine and Mr. Isaac Ngcobo, officials of the United Democratic Front, and other leading opponents of *apartheid* for their participation in the non-violent campaign for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa and demanded that such charges be withdrawn and that the arrested persons be immediately and unconditionally released. The Bureau also reiterated its earlier calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all South African political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela.

4. The Bureau noted that the recent killings and arrests, on a massive scale, are of a piece with the Pretoria régime's systematic attempts to further entrench the obnoxious *apartheid* system and that they offer proof, if proof were indeed needed, that the so-called reforms mooted by the racist régime are nothing but an orchestrated campaign of deception. It expressed the conviction that the continued intensification of the *apartheid* State's violent repression against the oppressed and dispossessed people of South Africa further vindicates the legitimacy of their struggle by all means at their disposal, including armed struggle.

5. The Bureau welcomed and commended the massive united resistance of the oppressed people of South Africa against the *apartheid* régime and reaffirmed the legitimacy of their struggle for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

6. The Bureau expressed its admiration for the rejection by Nelson Mandela of the offer of conditional release made by the racist régime, which was aimed at dividing the struggle against *apartheid* and further entrenching racist minority rule.

7. Recalling Security Council resolutions 473 (1980), 554 (1984) and 556 (1984) as well as other relevant resolutions, the Bureau urged the Council to take the necessary measures to implement those resolutions and to deal effectively with the current grave situation in South Africa, through the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

8. The Bureau noted with appreciation the growing international public campaign against *apartheid* and in favour of disinvestment and other measures to isolate the racist South African régime, which is in conformity with United Nations resolutions and decisions and declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement. It expressed full encouragement and support for that campaign and appealed to the United Nations and the entire international community to do likewise.

## DOCUMENT S/17010\*

### Letter dated 7 March 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
(7 March 1985)

Further to my letter of 15 January 1985 [S/16898], I have the honour to send you herewith additional information on the current situation in Kampuchea, consisting of excerpts from the Directives of the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to all military units in all fronts in Kampuchea on 28 February 1985, together with the attached map.

I should be most grateful if you would have this text and the attached map circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith  
Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

**The situation in Kampuchea at the end of February 1985—Excerpts from the Directives of the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to all military units in all fronts in Kampuchea on 28 February 1985**

1. It should be recalled that the battlefield in Kampuchea as a whole has been divided into three main battle zones: battle zone I covers all the provinces bordering the Tonlé Sap; battle zone II is made up of the western border region; and the remaining part of the country constitutes battle zone III.

In these three battle zones, the units of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea have been co-operating in their fighting against the Vietnamese aggressors with a view to tying down the enemy troops throughout the country, eliminating their fighting forces, dismantling or wiping out the Vietnamese administrative apparatus, winning over or disintegrating the puppet army, and launching attacks against small or large supply lines of the enemy. These are the activities carried out in accordance with our "five-target combat" tactic.

2. The current military situation on these three battle zones can be summed up as follows:

(a) In battle zone III, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea has waged guerrilla warfare and put the "five-target combat" tactic into

practice better than during the sixth dry season, especially in their attacks against the Vietnamese administrative apparatus at the commune level and in their attacks to cut railroads or against small or large Vietnamese strongholds, as well as small or medium Vietnamese mopping-up operations. This guerrilla combat and the "five-target combat" tactic must be developed further.

(b) In battle zone I, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea has fought the enemy more actively in accordance with the "five-target combat" tactic, and has penetrated deeper toward the capital, Phnom Penh. During the current dry season, our army has carried out well the "five-target combat" tactic in the areas both north and south of the Tonlé Sap lake. For instance, their daily attacks to cut the Phnom Penh-Battambang railroad track, to destroy the Vietnamese administrative apparatus at the commune level, and especially their attacks to wipe out the Vietnamese forces:

—In the districts of Kompong Svay, Santuk and Baray (Kompong Thom province);

—In the districts of Prey Chhor, Choeung Prey (Kompong Cham province);

—At Kompong Bang, Kompong Leng, Kompong Thkav, Peam Chhkok, Kompong Prasat, Kompong Taches, Prey Kry, Samrong Sen, Chranouk, Chhnok Tru, Borobor, Phat Sanday and the region of Peam Lovek (Kompong Chhnang province);

—In the region of Prek Kdam, Koh Chen, Kompong Os, Peam Setha and Prek Pnœu, a population centre 12 kilometres from the capital, Phnom Penh (Kandal province);

—And also in other districts or provincial towns, such as Siem Reap, Staung, Kompong Kdei, Tang Krasang, Kompong Thmar, Battambang, Chup, Preah Net Preah, Sisophon, Kompong Kul, Phnom Sampeou, Bannan, Chhoeu Teal, Vat Kor, etc.

In the provinces of Kompong Cham, Kratie, Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (north-eastern and eastern regions, zones bordering on Viet Nam) our guerrilla units have fought with more efficiency than before as has been shown by their attacks against the provincial capital of Ratanakiri and the district town of Damber in Kompong Cham province.

In the province of Kampot and around the seaport of Kompong Som, the National Army has attacked the district town of Kompong Trach, and cut the Phnom Penh-Kompong Som railroad track in dozens and hundreds of places every month.

All these attacks have created increasing difficulties for the Vietnamese enemy in the political, military and economic fields as their administrative apparatus has been dismantled in many areas.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/166-S/17010.



- (iii) Our supply lines have been basically preserved;
- (iv) We have been able to preserve our military forces in battle zone III and battle zone I as well as in battle zone II, and to launch continuous attacks against the Vietnamese enemy.

Contrary to their expectation, the Vietnamese enemy who have mobilized large-scale forces and sent them to battle zone II are now bogged down in this battle zone by the attacks of the National Army aimed at wearing down and wiping out their forces. In each front, they have suffered thousands of killed or wounded among their crack troops such as the A5 Special Forces or those surreptitiously sent from North Viet Nam.

As a result, the Vietnamese have sent a large number of soldiers and a huge quantity of war materials to western Kampuchea, but they have suffered considerable losses:

—Between 6,000 and 8,000 Vietnamese troops were killed from December 1984 to late February 1985;

—Politically, they claim that they have won to some extent, but actually they have suffered setbacks. World public opinion has increasingly and more categorically condemned them, and is more cognizant of their true nature of aggressive and expansionist war mongers who allow the Soviet

Union to install military bases in Vietnam for aggression and expansion, thus threatening South-East Asia and the Pacific.

If the Vietnamese troops keep fighting against our forces in battle zone II, time will not be on their side and their situation will be deteriorating. On the one hand, they are the daily target of the National Army's attacks of attrition. On the other hand, they are facing increasing difficulties in transporting supplies for their forces in battle zone II, especially during the rainy season.

In such military conditions, we see that the situation is favourable for us and unfavourable for the Vietnamese.

A short two months from now, the monsoon will start in western Kampuchea with especially heavy rain in mountainous and forest regions. The Vietnamese enemy will have to cope with growing difficulties and we will have more possibilities of fighting against the Vietnamese aggressors, using our guerrilla warfare and the "five-target combat" tactic.

This is the development of the military situation at present, at the end of the seventh dry season and at the beginning of the forthcoming seventh rainy season.

## DOCUMENT S/17012\*

### Letter dated 7 March 1985 from the representative of Democratic Yemen to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
(7 March 1985)

I have the honour, in my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States in the United Nations for the month of March, to request the circulation of the enclosed letter from Mr. Zehdi Labib Terzi, the Permanent Observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations, dated 6 March 1985, as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security of Council.

(Signed) Hussein S. AL-ALFI  
*Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Yemen to the United Nations*

#### ANNEX

#### Letter dated 6 March 1985 from the observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Secretary-General

I am requested by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to bring the following to your urgent attention.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/167-S/17012.

On the evening of 5 March 1985, Israeli occupation troops surrounded the Palestinian town of Sa'eer in the Al-Khalil (Hebron) area. Using batons and rifle butts, they carried out Fascist and barbaric acts against the Palestinian civilian population, severely injuring about 30 persons. Israeli occupation troops broke into several Palestinian homes causing destruction and havoc.

A curfew has been imposed and the area declared an Israeli military zone. As a consequence of the curfew, those Palestinian civilians severely injured in the Israeli attack could not be transferred to hospitals.

Israeli occupation troops used a bulldozer to raze two Palestinian houses in Sa'eer. A number of Palestinians have been arrested and taken away for interrogation.

It has been learned that the request for a delegation from the Red Cross to visit the area was not met as a result of a denial by the Israeli military authorities.

In drawing your attention to this seriously volatile situation, we again press the United Nations to assume its full responsibility *vis à vis* resolutions calling for adequate protection to guarantee the safety and security and the human and legal rights of Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation, and in this context we would recall General Assembly resolution 39/99 I, which urged the Secretary-General "... to undertake effective measures to guarantee the safety and security and the legal and human rights of the Palestinian refugees in all the territories under Israeli occupation".

## DOCUMENT S/17013

### Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago: draft resolution

(Original: English)  
(8 March 1985)

The Security Council,  
Recalling its resolutions 473 (1980), 554 (1984) and 556 (1984), which, *inter alia*, demanded the cessation of the uprootings, relocation and denationalization of the indigenous African people,

Noting with deep concern the aggravation of the situation in South Africa resulting from repeated killings of defenceless opponents of *apartheid* in various townships all over

South Africa and, most recently, the killing of African demonstrators against forced removals at Crossroads,

Gravely concerned by the arbitrary arrests of members of the United Democratic Front and other mass organizations opposed to the *apartheid* régime,

Deeply concerned by the preferment of "high treason" charges against Mrs. Albertina Sisulu, Mr. Archie Gumede, Mr. George Sewpershad, Mr. M. J. Naidoo, the Reverend

Frank Chikana, Professor Ismael Mohammed, Mr. Mewa Ramgobin, Mr. Cassim Saloojes, Mr. Paul David, Mr. Esop Jasset, Mr. Curtis Nkondo, Mr. Aubrey Mokoena, Mr. Thomazile Qweta, Mr. Sisa Njikelana, Mr. Sam Kikine and Mr. Isaac Ngcobo, officials of the United Democratic Front, and other opponents of *apartheid* for their participation in the non-violent campaign for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa,

*Aware* that racist South Africa's orchestrated campaign of deception through so-called reforms, paralleled by intensified repression and charges of "high treason" against leading opponents of *apartheid*, is nothing but an effort further to entrench racist minority rule,

*Concerned* that the continued intensification of the *apartheid* State's violent repression against the oppressed and dispossessed people of South Africa further undermines the possibilities of a peaceful solution of the South African conflict,

*Concerned* over racist South Africa's policy of the uprooting, denationalization and dispossession of three and a half million indigenous African people to date, thus swelling the ranks of the other millions already doomed to permanent unemployment and starvation,

*Noting with indignation* that South Africa's policy of bantustanization is also aimed at the creation of internal bases for the fomenting of fratricidal conflict,

1. *Strongly condemns* the Pretoria régime for the wanton killing of defenceless African people protesting against their forced removal from Crossroads and other places;

2. *Strongly condemns* the arbitrary arrests by the Pretoria régime of members of the United Democratic Front and other mass organizations opposed to South Africa's policy of *apartheid*;

3. *Calls on* the Pretoria régime to release unconditionally and immediately all political prisoners and detainees, including Nelson Mandela and all other black leaders with whom it must deal in any meaningful discussion of the future of the country;

4. *Also calls upon* the Pretoria régime to withdraw the charges of "high treason" instituted against the United Democratic Front officials, and demands their immediate and unconditional release;

5. *Commends* the massive united resistance of the oppressed people of South Africa against the *apartheid* régime, and reaffirms the legitimacy of their struggle for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## DOCUMENT S/17014\*

### Report of the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[11 March 1985]

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of resolution 39/49 D on the question of the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East, which was adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on 11 December 1984. The operative part of that resolution reads as follows:

*"The General Assembly*

*"..."*

*"1. Takes note* of the reports of the Secretary-General [S/16409 and Add.1 of 13 March and 13 September 1984];

*"2. Reaffirms* its endorsement of the call for convening the International Peace Conference on the Middle East in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 38/58 C;

*"3. Expresses its regret* at the negative response of the two Governments and calls upon them to reconsider their position towards the Conference;

*"4. Urges* all Governments to make additional constructive efforts and to strengthen their political will in order to convene the Conference without delay and for the achievement of its peaceful objectives;

*"5. Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to continue his efforts with a view to convening the Conference and to report thereon to the General Assembly not later than 15 March 1985;

*"6. Decides* to consider at its fortieth session the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the present resolution."

2. In pursuance of that request, on 8 January 1985 the Secretary-General addressed the following letter to the President of the Security Council:

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/168-S/17014.

"I have the honour to refer to resolution 39/49 D, which was adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on 11 December 1984, on the question of the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East. The text of the resolution is attached.

"As you know, this question was first raised by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, when it adopted resolution 38/58 C of 13 December 1983. The activities which I undertook in pursuance of that resolution, including my consultations with the Security Council, are described in my reports of 13 March and 13 September 1984 to the General Assembly and the Security Council [S/16409 and Add.1].

"It is also relevant to mention that in my report of 26 October 1984 on the situation in the Middle East [S/16792, paras. 40-49], I reviewed my efforts relating to the proposed conference and the difficulties encountered and commented on a possible approach to a Middle East peace conference that could be organized in the context of the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

"After considering my reports of 13 March and 13 September 1984, the General Assembly adopted resolution 39/49 D, in which it 'requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to continue his efforts with a view to convening the conference and to report thereon to the General Assembly not later than 15 March 1985'.

"Bearing in mind the efforts made last year and the difficulties experienced, I feel that as a first step I should seek the views of the Security Council on the action to be taken for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/49 D. In the light of my reporting responsibility under that resolution, I hope that the views of the Security Council can be conveyed to me not later than 1 March 1985.

"I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council."

3. On 26 February, the President of the Security Council sent the following reply:

#### DOCUMENT S/17015\*

#### Letter dated 8 March 1985 from the representative of Thailand to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[8 March 1985]

Upon the instructions of my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 19 February 1985 [S/16965], I have the honour to bring to your attention the latest acts of aggression against Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity committed by the Vietnamese occupying forces in Kampuchea, as follows:

1. On 28 February 1985, at 0300 hours, the Vietnamese forces fired artillery shells at the Thai military observation posts on Hill 347 south-east of Ban Kruat District, Buriram Province, about 11 kilometres inside Thailand from the Thai-Kampuchean border. As a result, three Thai soldiers were killed and several others were seriously wounded.

"I have the honour to refer to your letter of 8 January 1985, on the question of the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East, in which you had indicated that you felt it necessary to start by requesting the views of the Security Council regarding the action to be taken for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/49 D of 11 December 1984.

"You had also recalled the activities you had undertaken in 1984, of which you gave an account in your reports of 13 March, 13 September and 26 October 1984 to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and noted the difficulties experienced.

"Acting on your request that the matter be drawn to the attention of the Security Council, the President of the Council for the month of January consulted the members of the Council in order to obtain and communicate their views to you by 1 March 1985 as requested. Having received the approval of the members of the Security Council during consultations held on 15 January, he had bilateral talks with each member of the Council during the following days. As President of the Council for the month of February, I have carried forward the process and completed my consultations with all members of the Security Council.

"It is clear from these consultations that almost all members are in favour of the principle of holding such a conference. Many of these members feel that it should be convened as early as possible; some others consider that the conditions that would make it possible to convene such a conference have not been met as yet.

"In this context, members of the Council invite the Secretary-General to continue consultations on the subject in any manner he deems appropriate in the light of General Assembly resolution 39/49 D."

4. The Secretary-General has taken note of the views conveyed to him by the President of the Security Council. He intends to pursue consultations on the subject and will inform the General Assembly and the Security Council of any new developments.

2. On 1 March, at 0700 hours, 14 rounds of artillery shells fired by the Vietnamese forces landed inside Thai territory north-east of Ban Nong Samet, Ta Phraya District, Prachinburi Province, 3.5 kilometres from the Thai-Kampuchean border.

3. On 4 March, at 1015 hours, the Thai troops clashed with the Vietnamese troops inside Thai territory south-west of Aranyaprathet District, Prachinburi Province, about 200 metres from the Thai-Kampuchean border. As a result, one Thai soldier was seriously wounded.

4. On 5 March 1985, at 0500 hours, two Vietnamese battalions (some 800 to 1,000 soldiers) moved into Thai territory in Surin Province two or three kilometres from the

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/169-S/17015.

Thai-Kampuchean border, and launched attacks against the Thai positions on Hills 361, 400 and 424. At the early stage, numerically superior Vietnamese forces were able to occupy parts of Hill 361 and cause 7 Thai soldiers to be killed (2 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers), 34 soldiers wounded and 3 soldiers missing. On 6 March, at 1300 hours, the Thai forces drove the Vietnamese troops away from Hill 361 and inflicted heavy casualties upon the aggressors.

The Royal Thai Government wishes to draw your attention to the recurrence of premeditated, unprovoked and most outrageous acts of Vietnamese violation of Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The latest incursion of the Vietnamese forces into Thailand, brutally and indiscriminately killing innocent Thai civilians and soldiers, is yet another blatant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, and of the fundamental human rights of innocent civilians.

The Royal Thai Government condemns these acts of aggression and indiscriminate killings perpetrated by Viet Nam and demands that the latter cease forthwith its acts of hostility against Thailand.

The Royal Thai Government reaffirms its right to safeguard Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the lives and property of the Thai people, by every means. The Royal Thai Government will not tolerate Viet Nam's acts of aggression, the consequences for which the Vietnamese Government must bear full responsibility.

I have the honor to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Birabhongse KASEMSRI  
Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations*

#### DOCUMENT S/17016

#### Letter dated 6 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

*(Original: Arabic)  
[10 March 1985]*

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a letter addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the letter sent by you to the President of the Republic of Iraq.

I request you to have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations*

#### LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1985 FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have been acquainted with the letter addressed by you today to the President of the Republic of Iraq. I should like to make it clear to you that the targets bombarded by Iraqi aircraft on 4 March 1985 are not among those targets covered by the agreement concluded under your auspices on 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610]. If that had been the case, the Iranian authorities would have requested the United Nations mission appointed to investigate such cases to visit the area and determine the nature of those targets.

However, the deliberate Iranian bombardment of the city of Basra which took place yesterday, 5 March, is a flagrant and intentional violation of that agreement. Basra is a city and a purely civilian population centre. You cannot, I believe, ignore such facts when considering the position.

Iraq has, in all sincerity, adhered to the agreement of 12 June 1984. We are hopeful that effective measures will be taken by you to induce Iran to comply with its undertakings under the said agreement.

I should like to inform you that we have, as of yesterday, requested your mission stationed in Iraq to visit the city of Basra and to investigate the crime of the Iranian bombardment. Up to the time of the drafting of the present communication, the mission has made no move in the direction of Basra. According to the contacts we have made with the United Nations Secretariat, it is the Iranian authorities which are hindering the task of the said mission.

I request you to take effective and urgent measures so that the said mission may perform its duty in accordance with the agreement of 12 June 1984.

*(Signed) Tariq AZIZ  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Iraq*

#### DOCUMENT S/17017

#### Letter dated 8 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)  
[10 March 1985]*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a message from Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on behalf

of Hojatolislam Khamenei, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in reply to the Secretary-General's appeal of 6 March 1985 regarding the status of the commitments un-

dertaken by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq on 12 June 1984. It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAEI-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

**LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

The Zionist Iraqi régime, since the inception of its imposed war and in order to achieve its expansionist objectives, has consistently resorted to the worst anti-human crimes, including repeated violations of all four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Iraqi régime, in flagrant violation of the fourth Geneva Convention,<sup>10</sup> has attacked non-military civilian areas, massacred women, men, the aged and children, both before and after the agreement of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610]. In this connection, more than 100 cases of deliberate Iraqi attacks on civilian areas, in violation of the agreement, have been brought to your attention as well as to the attention of the United Nations mission stationed in Iran.

The deliberate Iraqi attacks on civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Bardieh, Dehlevieh, Alavaneh) have been confirmed by the United Nations and documented in S/16987. However, in order to conceal its explicit violation of the 12 June agreement, the Iraqi régime accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of having allegedly attacked non-military quarters of Iraq on four different occasions. The Islamic Republic of Iran did not hesitate to grant security clearance for the United Nations mission to investigate the Iraqi allegations in all four instances. The Iraqi régime withdrew their request for the investigation of the alleged Iranian attacks by the United Nations mission, stationed in Baghdad in two instances, and on two other occasions, after the investigation of the Iraqi allegations, the United Nations mission rejected them, as is shown by document S/16750 of 19 September 1984 and document S/16920 of 30 January 1985.

Owing to the confirmations of Iraqi attacks against civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the rejection of Iraqi false accusations as regards the alleged attacks on Iraqi non-military quarters by the United Nations mission, stationed in Tehran and Baghdad, the criminal régime of

Baghdad, in order to hide its international disgrace, has, in the last few days, and on various pretexts, intensified its aggravated attacks against civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For instance, on 4 March the residential cities of Ahwaz and Bushehr were subjected to heavy aerial and missile attacks which have left heavy human losses and material damage. Notwithstanding the occurrence and recurrence of this sort of criminal attack, the Islamic Republic of Iran, expecting the international organizations to take some effective measures to stop the savage Iraqi attacks on civilian areas, and in order to preserve the spirit of the 12 June agreement, continued to refrain from retaliation.

In view of the lack of any action from the international organizations, the Islamic Republic of Iran, after the lapse of a 24-hour warning period, was forced to take some restrained action, on a limited basis, to forewarn the criminal régime, solely in order to put an end to the continuous Iraqi attacks, massacring civilians.

The warmongering régime of Iraq, in spite of your appeal to respect the 12 June agreement, while threatening to attack 30 cities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has targeted the cities of Dezful, Abadan, Sar-e-Pol-e Zahab, and Masjed Solayman from air and by missiles.

These savage attacks have caused heavy civilian losses and tremendous material damage. The Iraqi criminal régime is determined to continue with its atrocities against the cities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In view of the foregoing, your attention is drawn to the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran, since the beginning of the imposed war, has refrained from attacking civilian and non-military quarters, and after the agreement of 12 June, it has always respected it.

In response to your recent humanitarian appeal regarding compliance with the 12 June agreement, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the said agreement is a totality which is mutually inclusive, and therefore, Iraqi partial compliance with the agreement, when and if that suits its interests, can never secure the Secretary-General's objectives. Having said this, the Islamic Republic of Iran is willing to continue to respect the said agreement provided that some effective measures can be secured in order to guarantee that the Iraqi régime will not violate it again.

(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Islamic Republic of Iran

**DOCUMENT S/17018**

**Message dated 9 March 1985 from the Secretary-General to the Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq**

[Original: English]  
[10 March 1985]

I am dismayed that my appeal of 6 March 1985 has not brought a halt to the current wave of attacks by both sides, each claiming to be acting in retaliation. Whatever the provocation, I am convinced that such attacks must stop so that innocent civilians are spared further bloodshed. This was the purpose of the message that I asked Mr. Diego Cordovez urgently to convey through the Permanent Representatives of your countries to the United Nations last evening.

Inasmuch as both Governments have consistently affirmed their commitment to the undertakings of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610], I call upon both Governments—

in order to ensure that such undertakings remain fully in force—to cease all attacks on purely civilian population centres by 2359 hours GMT on Monday, 11 March 1985.

## DOCUMENT S/17019

### Letter dated 10 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[10 March 1985]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a letter addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, in reply to your letter dated 9 March 1985 [S/17018] to the President of the Republic of Iraq concerning the bombardment of purely civilian targets.

I request you to have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

#### LETTER DATED 10 MARCH 1985 FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

We have received your letter dated 9 March 1985 addressed to the President of the Republic and, in accordance with his directives, I should like to set forth the view of my Government with respect to its contents.

When, on 9 June 1984, you called upon Iran and Iraq to halt deliberate attacks on purely civilian areas [S/16611], Iraq immediately agreed to your appeal in the letter addressed to you by the President of the Republic on 10 June [S/16610].

In the letter of the President of the Republic, just as in the two letters addressed to you by myself on 21 and 28 June 1984 [S/16638 and S/16649], we stressed that a halt to attacks on towns and villages involved the need to ascertain that Iranian border towns and villages were not used as centres for the massing of Iranian forces. Unfortunately, however, this practical and sensible request was ignored. When you appointed the mission to investigate incidents in violation of the agreement, we requested the United Nations Secretariat to place observers in all sectors of operations so that observation might be effective and immediate. The Iranian side, however, at first refused to host the mission inside Iran and then agreed to its being stationed in Tehran only, thereby prompting you to retain the mission in Baghdad only.

It was clear to us that the insistence of the rulers of Iran on keeping the mission away from the sectors of belligerent operations had the aim of preventing United Nations observation of the use of Iranian border towns and villages as concentration centres and of allowing them to violate the agreement whenever they wished to do so for political or military motives in accordance with their whims and objectives and with the antagonisms and conflicts going on among them.

In fact, our reconnaissance had ascertained that the Iranian towns I mentioned in my letter to you of 28 June were

used as centres for massing forces. We annexed to that letter a list containing the names of the Iranian units being massed in the towns of Abadan, Mohammarah, Khrosrowabad, Ahwaz, Hoveyzeh, Bisitin and Andimeshk. Since that time, a number of military attacks have been launched against the Iraqi borders, namely on 20 October 1984 and on 1 February and 2 and 3 March 1985. Over the past months there have also been numerous violations of the agreement caused by the inadequacy of the supervision procedures and the arbitrary Iranian interpretations of the agreement.

Moreover, the Iranian authorities have not, in recent times, ceased from giving vent to sudden and repeated threats to bombard our cities using as pretexts incidents taking place during military operations to which the terms of the agreement do not apply. In this connection, I single out for special mention the threats made by the President of the Iranian Republic on 8 February 1985.

This month, while the Security Council was discussing a very sensitive and important issue relating to the war, namely, the suffering of tens of thousands of prisoners, in an attempt on the part of the United Nations to find a solution to their plight, the Iranian régime issued, for no good reason, a warning to the effect that it would shell the city of Basra. It then gave effect to its warning by deliberately shelling the city of Basra on 5 March, causing the death and wounding of a number of civilian inhabitants and the destruction of their homes and personal property. As I explained to you in my letter of 6 March [S/17016], the pretexts used by the Iranian régime for committing this crime are baseless. The Iraqi bombardment that took place on 4 March was aimed at a factory on the outskirts of the city of Ahwaz, a target which is not covered by the agreement of 12 June 1984. The Iranian régime, instead of having recourse to the procedures agreed upon with you with respect to the investigation of such incidents by requesting the United Nations mission to visit the site of the bombardment, issued its above-mentioned warning and deliberately shelled the city of Basra. In accordance with those procedures, and before reacting to that deliberate crime, we requested the United Nations mission stationed in Baghdad to go to the city of Basra to investigate the bombardment. The Iranian régime, however, once again violated the rules of those procedures and did not agree to accord your mission safe conduct so that it might carry out its task.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Iranian régime has deliberately violated the agreement of 12 June 1984 and the procedures relating thereto.

It was clear to concerned observers that the deliberate bombardment of Basra on 5 March 1985 had the objective of distracting attention from the deliberations of the Security Council with respect to the situation of prisoners of war, and even of sabotaging the Council's efforts to find a hu-

mane and effective solution to their suffering. Accordingly, instead of making a positive contribution to the solution of this human tragedy, the Iranian régime proceeded to commit new crimes against Iraqi civilians and to cause increased bloodshed.

I should like to stress to you that it was Iraq that was the author of the idea of concluding a special agreement to prevent attacks on towns and villages. The President of the Republic of Iraq made a declaration to that effect in June of 1983. The idea was also embodied in Security Council resolution 540 (1983), which was accepted by Iraq and rejected by Iran. Iraq has, in all sincerity, adhered to the agreement of 12 June 1984. It has co-operated with you and with the Security Council in order to find an overall solution to the conflict and, in like manner, in order to find solutions to the pressing humanitarian problems arising out of the conflict, whereas the Iranian régime has manifested not the slightest degree of co-operation and has continued to direct accusations against the Council and the United Nations and to handle sensitive humanitarian issues on the basis of opportunistic political motives and in accordance with the cheap settling of accounts that it deems appropriate.

Accordingly, in spite of our assured desire to comply with your appeal and spare civilians the afflictions of war, and in spite of our fervent solicitude that the situation should not escalate, we cannot leave matters ambivalent and fluid so that violations might recur. We return once more to the starting point. This is particularly so since the Iranian régime

insists on continuing the war, escalating hostilities at the time it wishes and in the places it wishes. Confirmed information available to us indicates that it is, at the present time, massing in the border areas large-scale forces with the aim of launching new acts of aggression against Iraqi territory.

We believe that the practical solution to this question, and to all the questions of a humanitarian character arising out of the conflict, would come about through the establishment of direct contacts by yourself with authorized representatives of the two parties to draw up clear and agreed principles, rules and guarantees for an agreement to prevent the deliberate bombardment of purely civilian population centres and for establishing a modality for tackling other matters. Thus, we would be fully able to ensure the safety of the population of our country so as not to leave them exposed to the whims of the rulers of Tehran, who threaten their lives and security whenever they wish, and we would also ensure proper handling of other humanitarian issues. I should like to express my readiness to travel immediately to New York to hold direct contacts with you for that purpose. We would also welcome your visiting Iraq should you wish to do so.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Iraq

#### DOCUMENT S/17020

#### Letter dated 10 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[10 March 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a message from Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on behalf of Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in response to your message of 9 March 1985 [S/17018].

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIÉ-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

#### LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I received your message of 9 March 1985. As you are aware, the Islamic Republic of Iran, both before and after the conclusion of the 12 June 1984 agreement [S/16609 and S/16610], made every effort and exercised the highest degree of self-restraint in order to avoid any attack against civilian populations. However, the Iraqi régime by increasing its deliberate attacks on the purely civilian areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran, some of which have already been reported to the United Nations by the United Nations team

stationed in Tehran, left us with no other choice but resort to a limited retaliatory action.

Your appeal of 9 March has come at a time when the Iraqi régime has further continued its missile attacks, aerial bombardments, and artillery fire against several of our cities, and thus has inflicted great many losses of life and property upon our purely civilian population. As we have repeatedly announced, my Government is always willing to respect the commitment it made regarding maintenance of the comprehensive validity of the 12 June 1984 agreement you proposed; and in order to demonstrate our good faith once again, we are prepared to welcome your proposal and terminate all our retaliatory military operations against all purely civilian targets in Iraq as of 2359 hours GMT on Monday 11 March 1985, provided that the Iraqi régime, too, withholds its attacks against our civilians. Moreover we propose the necessity of serious and effective measures against any violation of this renewed agreement, in order to ensure its mutual and comprehensive respect.

Needless to mention that my Government reserves for itself the right to retaliate, should the Iraqi authorities continue their violations of the agreement.

(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran

DOCUMENT S/17021

Letter dated 11 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[11 March 1985]

I refer to my letter dated 9 March 1985 and, on instructions from my Government, have the honour to request you to circulate as a document of the Security Council the text of this letter and of the annexed letter, addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the question of the prisoners of war.

(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 9 MARCH 1985 FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME  
MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ  
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have received with thanks your letter dated 7 March 1985 and am highly appreciative of your interest in the question of the prisoners of war, consideration of which we had requested in the Security Council. On the strength of Iraq's unshakeable position, to which it gave expression during the meeting of the Security Council held on 4 March 1985 [2569th meeting] and which calls for a definitive and comprehensive solution to the suffering of the prisoners of war, and far from any thought of engaging in political manoeuvres or pursuing political goals, I should like to set forth the position of my Government with respect to the suggestions contained in your above-mentioned letter.

1. The Iraqi Government considers that the exchange of prisoners should be full, comprehensive and without any exceptions.

2. The Iraqi Government considers that the exchange can take place in either of the following two ways:

(a) That the exchange of prisoners might take place on a proportional basis, in accordance with the number present in each of the two countries, and over a maximum period of six months within which the comprehensive exchange would be accomplished;

(b) That the exchange might take place in stages, also over a maximum period of six months, and in the following manner:

- (i) The first stage, during which the exchange of sick, disabled, elderly and child prisoners would take place;
- (ii) The second stage, during which the exchange of those prisoners who have spent two or more years in captivity would take place;
- (iii) The third stage, during which the exchange of the remaining prisoners would take place.

3. Iraq would welcome the Secretary-General's playing an active role in this process through close co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

With regard to the idea of Protecting Powers, Iraq, in conformity with the Geneva Conventions, does not oppose such an idea. It considers, however, that it should be studied later on and when it becomes necessary from the practical point of view.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Iraq

DOCUMENT S/17022\* \*\*

Letter dated 12 March 1985 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[12 March 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, the text of a communiqué dated 1 March 1985 of the Co-ordination Committee for Defence of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the text of the communiqué circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) SISOWATH Sirirath  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission  
of Democratic Kampuchea  
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Communiqué dated 1 March 1985 of the Co-ordination Committee for  
Defence of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

In accordance with the wish expressed by the Council of Ministers at its meeting of 3 February 1985 to see a reinforcement of the co-ordination of the three participating parties of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in the military field, a meeting of the Co-ordination Committee for Defence of the Coalition Government was convened by Mr. Son Sann, Prime Minister of the Coalition Government. The meeting took place on 1 March under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and was attended by the Ministers of the Co-ordination Committee of the party of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, The Khmer People's National Liberation Front, and the party of Democratic Kampuchea, assisted by other military personalities of the three parties.

The meeting of the Co-ordination Committee for Defence made an assessment of the politico-military situation in the field following the latest series of offensives against the Coalition Government by the Vietnamese occupation forces. The meeting proceeded to an exchange of views on

\* Incorporating document S/17022/Corr.1 of 14 March 1985.

\*\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/171-S/17022 and Corr.1.

how to utilize to the maximum the current resources available to the Coalition Government, especially in the areas of logistics and the sharing of intelligence and other information on the military situation of the enemy.

The three parties are convinced that the current Vietnamese dry season offensive has not been a military triumph for Viet Nam. It indicates that six years after their invasion of Kampuchea, they are still faced with enormous and growing problems in this country. The current military situation in Kampuchea is in favour of the resistance forces, who continue to grow in strength and present a serious challenge to the enemy. The attempt by the Vietnamese occupation forces to seal off the border has not only met with failure but will leave more room for the resistance forces to increase their activities in the interior.

The Co-ordination Committee for Defence agreed to meet more frequently—at least once every month and as often as necessary—in order to multiply the common efforts of the three participating parties of the

Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with a view to further strengthening the co-ordination and co-operation between their armed forces for a speedy liberation of the Khmer motherland.

The Co-ordination Committee also discussed the need to complement its military co-ordination activities with a strengthening of the co-ordination activities in the political field, notably through the establishment of an appropriate mechanism of co-ordination.

The three parties were unanimous in their decision to carry out an armed struggle to liberate Kampuchea from the Vietnamese aggressors until the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese occupation forces and until the implementation of the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea<sup>23</sup> and all relevant General Assembly resolutions.

The meeting of the Co-ordination Committee for Defence of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was held in an atmosphere of fraternal understanding.

## DOCUMENT S/17023\*

Letter dated 11 March 1985 from the representative of China  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese/English]  
[12 March 1985]

Upon instructions from the Chinese Government, I have the honour to state the following with regard to the Vietnamese authorities' latest military provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border and the Thai-Kampuchean border and their military offensives against the Kampuchean patriotic forces and people:

Recently, while launching a frenzied offensive against the Thai-Kampuchean border, the Vietnamese authorities have intensified their military provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The Vietnamese troops have frantically bombarded border villages and towns inside China, wilfully shot and kidnapped peaceable Chinese border inhabitants, and dispatched secret agents and other armed personnel to sneak into China's territories and to conduct sabotage against production and economic installations. Furthermore, they have launched repeated military attacks against China, infringing upon China's territorial sovereignty and gravely menacing the security of China's southern frontier. Under these circumstances, the Chinese frontier troops were forced to engage in restricted and necessary counter-attacks against the invading Vietnamese troops, in exercise of their sacred right of self-defence.

In total defiance of the strong condemnation of the international community, the Vietnamese authorities have gone so far as to employ large numbers of troops to carry out blatant military offensives against the patriotic forces and people of Kampuchea and make repeated incursions into the territory of Thailand, thereby violating the sovereignty and threatening the security of Thailand. In his letter to you dated 8 March [S/17015], the Permanent Represent-

tative of Thailand lodged a protest against the intrusion of nearly 1,000 Vietnamese soldiers into Thai territory and pointed out that these acts were premeditated and most outrageous forms of violation of the territory of Thailand by the Vietnamese authorities. The Chinese Government strongly condemns these acts of aggression perpetrated by the Vietnamese authorities and resolutely supports the peoples of Kampuchea and Thailand in their just struggle against Vietnamese aggression.

The Vietnamese authorities' unbridled offensives against Kampuchea, their savage incursions into Thailand and their military provocations against the Chinese border have not only subjected the people of the three countries to the agony of aggression, but have also constituted a grave threat to the peace and tranquillity of South-East Asia and Asia as a whole. A situation like this cannot but arouse the serious concern of the international community.

The Chinese Government solemnly demands that Viet Nam implement the resolutions on the question of Kampuchea adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, immediately cease its acts of infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand, completely withdraw its troops from Kampuchea and stop all its military provocations and incursions against the Chinese border.

I should be most obliged if this letter could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LING Qing  
Permanent Representative of  
the People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/172-S/17023.

**DOCUMENT S/17024**

**Letter dated 12 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: Arabic]  
[12 March 1985]*

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you a letter addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the launching by the forces of the Iranian régime of an attack against Iraqi territory today, 12 March 1985.

I request you to have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations*

**LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER  
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ TO THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL**

In my letter to you of 10 March 1985 [S/17019], I informed you that our reconnaissance had ascertained that the Iranian towns close to the Iraqi border were being used as centres for massing Iranian forces. I also pointed out in my letter that incontrovertible information available to us indicated that the Iranian régime was massing large-scale

forces in the border areas with the aim of launching new aggression against Iraqi territory.

I should now like to inform you that today, 12 March, the forces of the Iranian régime began to launch an attack against Iraqi territory across the Hur-Al-Hoveizeh marsh. This confirms our expectations that the Iranian régime's violation of the agreement of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610] by shelling the city of Basra on 5 March was a preliminary step towards new aggression against Iraqi territory. The surface attack in which the forces of the Iranian régime are presently engaged only confirms the intentions which that régime has long made public by its insistence on continuing its aggression against Iraq and on occupying Iraqi territory.

Accordingly, we reaffirm the statements made in our letter to you of 10 March concerning the need for direct contacts to be established by you with both parties with a view to solving all the problems confronting us on a clear and agreed basis.

*(Signed) Tariq AZIZ  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Iraq*

**DOCUMENT S/17025**

**Letter dated 12 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[12 March 1985]*

I have the honour to bring to your attention that, as previously announced and reported to you, the military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in compliance with your appeal of 9 March 1985 [S/17018], were instructed to stop all military operations against Iraqi civilian targets as of 2359 hours GMT on Monday 11 March 1985. However, the Iraqi forces, not surprisingly, acted in contravention of your appeal and continued with their attacks against our civilians.

Since noon today, Iraqi forces have bombarded Marivan and Piranshahr while Ghassemabad, Bostan and Hamadan were subjected to aerial attacks. Sixteen people were killed and injured in Bostan and some damage was reported in Ghassemabad. Statistics on casualties and damage in Marivan and Piranshahr have not yet been received. Under these circumstances, the Islamic Republic of Iran has no choice but to retaliate in kind.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

**Letter dated 12 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)  
[12 March 1985]*

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to write to you about the miry record of madness and insanity in which the murderous Iraqi régime has so despicably drowned itself since 5 March and until 11 March 1985.

As you are aware, the forces of the Iraqi régime, in spite of the warning of the Islamic Republic of Iran, attacked Ahwaz on 4 March. In retaliation for Iraqi continuous violations of the 12 June agreement [see S/16609 and S/16610], the Islamic Republic of Iran took restrained action, on a limited basis, against Basra only after a 24-hour warning whereby the inhabitants had the chance to evacuate the target area. Even in retaliatory measures by the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the humanitarian concerns have been fully taken into account and, as a result, only three people were injured in Basra, according to testimony of the Iraqi régime itself.

The Iraqi régime, on the contrary, has continued its violation of the 12 June agreement and has tremendously intensified its indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on the

population centres of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 5 March 1985.

The atrocities of this hopeless régime since then are unequivocally the landmark of flagrant violations not only of international law, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or the conduct of war but also its own undertaking on 12 June 1984, and it has certainly taken a path that no responsible and principled régime should follow, for it is the climax of sanguinariness against innocent civilians.

Seven hundred and seventy-three people were martyred and 2,747 injured between 5 March and 11 March 1985 by the Iraqi criminal régime and the search for more bodies still continues.

Enclosed please find a tentative list of Iraqi attacks on purely civilian population centres.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

**ANNEX**

**List of the attacks perpetrated by the Iraqi forces against purely civilian  
population centres in Iran between 5 and 11 March 1985**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Cities</i>	<i>Nature of attack</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
9 March 1985	Gilan-e-Gharb		4 martyrs
8 March	Bakhtaran		80 martyrs—650 injured
9 March	Khorramabad	4 ground to ground missiles	120 martyrs—500 injured
7, 9 March	Dezful	12 missiles	19 martyrs—175 injured
9 March	Dehloran	Aerial attack	Not reported
9 March	Oroumiyeh	Air space violation	
7, 8, 9, 10 March	Abadan	8 aerial attacks	30 martyrs—150 injured
7, 8, 9, 10 March	Bandar-e-Khomeini	Aerial attack	Not reported
7, 8, 9, 10 March	Boroujerd	Aerial attack	Not reported
7, 8, 9, 10 March	Sanandaj	Aerial attack	111 martyrs—111 injured
8 March	Masjid-e-Sollman	Missile attack	Not reported
10 March	Andimeshk	Missile attack	Not reported
10 March	Marivan	Aerial attack	80 martyrs
10 March	Baneh	Aerial attack	40 martyrs—60 injured
10 March 1985	Kharg & Bushehr	Air space violation	
10 March 1985	Ramhormoz	Missile attack	13 martyrs—100 injured 50 houses destroyed and 300 houses damaged
10 March 1985	Nehavand	3 missiles dropped by aeroplanes	18 martyrs—120 injured, 12 in critical condition
10 March 1985	Salehabadan	Aerial attack	40 martyrs—130 injured
10 March 1985	Isfahan	Aerial attack	2 martyrs—19 injured
9 March	Piranshahr	Aerial attack	60 martyrs, more than 300 injured
10 March	Tabriz	Aerial attack	34 martyrs—209 injured
8, 9, March	Susanerd	Aerial attack (cluster bombs)	48 martyrs—200 injured
9 March	Paveh	Aerial attack	40 martyrs
7, 8, 9 March	Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab	Aerial attack	34 martyrs—23 injured

**DOCUMENT S/17027\***

**Letter dated 12 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[13 March 1985]*

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention that, following the intensification of Iraqi criminal attacks on civilian population centres of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the retaliatory attack of the Muslim combatants on Kirkuk, we have received detailed and reliable information that the wretched Iraqi régime is about to resume its chemical attacks against the Islamic Republic of Iran on a large scale.

Owing to the seriousness of this threat, the Islamic Republic of Iran deems it necessary to warn the international body beforehand that, unless it acts according to its responsibilities and takes necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of further Iraqi gross violations of international and humanitarian norms, the international body will be held responsible for the consequences in conjunction with the Iraqi régime.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

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\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/174-S/17027.

**DOCUMENT S/17028\***

**Letter dated 13 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[13 March 1985]*

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a letter from Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding the sad news of a new deployment of chemical agents on the war front against the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

**LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

I have the honour to bring to your attention that, exactly as it had been repeatedly predicted and warned by the Islamic Republic of Iran, today, the criminal Baathist régime

of Iraq once again resorted to the use of chemical weapons on the war front.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expects and urgently requests you to take necessary steps immediately to stop this anti-human action, which is in gross violation of international regulations, in general, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925<sup>8</sup> in particular.

It is also necessary to reassert the opinion of my Government that had the United Nations agreed to the request of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the stationing of a permanent expert mission in Tehran for the purpose of investigating the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi régime, the latter would have refrained from further use of these weapons. I wish to express my sincere regrets with regard to this instance of negligence on the part of the United Nations.

*(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran*

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\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/176-S/17028.

**DOCUMENT S/17029**

**Letter dated 14 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[14 March 1985]*

I am instructed to bring to your attention that after the massive Iraqi bombing of our innocent civilians in several cities, including Tehran and Isfahan, on Wednesday 13 March 1985 (details of casualties will be reported to you subsequently), our forces were regrettably obliged to take retaliatory measures in order to stop the criminal Iraqi attacks against civilians. Therefore, having given prior warning to the people of Baghdad of our decision to strike against certain economic and industrial centres of Baghdad, we launched one land-to-land missile, fired at 2.30 a.m. Baghdad time, which hit the Central Bank of Kafidin. The particular time and target were chosen for the strike in order to reduce the rate of casualties to the minimum possible, because this strike was intended only to convince the Iraqi authorities that they must stop their illegal, inhuman attacks against our civilians.

We hate to attack our civilian brothers and sisters in Baghdad, but I am afraid that we may be forced to do so

in spite of our desire. We believe the fact that the criminal rulers of Iraq are not prepared to accept your appeal does not relieve the United Nations of its responsibilities, which it has forgotten for a long time and has therefore been only a callous, irresponsible spectator to the scene of all sorts of Iraqi crimes. We therefore appeal to you to reiterate your appeal for the cessation of all military operations against purely civilian areas unconditionally and immediately, or else we shall be driven to more effective retaliatory strikes in order to terminate the Iraqi atrocities.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Saïd RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

**DOCUMENT S/17030\***

**Letter dated 13 March 1985 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[14 March 1985]*

Further to my letter dated 1 March 1985 [S/16995], I have the honour to report to you two serious violations of Pakistan's airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side that occurred on 7 and 12 March 1985. The details of the incidents are as follows:

On 7 March, four Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace in the Domandi post area, 45 kilometres north-east of Chaman. The aircraft fired eight rockets about 5 kilometres south-east of the Domandi post.

On 12 March, four Afghan jet aircraft and two helicopters violated Pakistan's airspace in the Arandu area of Chitral. The aircraft intruded about 8 kilometres into Pakistan's airspace and dropped 10 bombs inside Pakistan's territory approximately 1 to 2 kilometres south of Arandu.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/178-S/17030.

**DOCUMENT S/17031**

**Letter dated 14 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[14 March 1985]*

Pursuant to my letter of 13 March 1985 [S/17028], I have the honour urgently to bring to your attention the sad news that so far the criminal and indeed anti-human Baathist régime of Iraq has, on two intermittent occasions, deployed and used chemical agents against the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the southern war front of Hur-Al-Hoveipeh. On one occasion, the force and direction of the wind contributed to fewer injuries by diverting the toxic fumes. Overall, however, according to the most recently reported statistics, the number injured as a result of exposure to chemical agents has reached 180. Any further news will be subsequently submitted to you.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/17032

Letter dated 18 February 1985 from the Secretary-General to Governments of all States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies, containing a further appeal for voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

[Original: English/French/Spanish]  
[15 March 1985]

I have the honour of writing to you concerning the financial situation of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). As I mentioned in my report of 12 December 1984 to the Security Council [S/16858 and Add.1], I am profoundly concerned about the worsening financial situation confronting UNFICYP. This concern is very much shared by the troop-contributing countries, as is reflected in their joint letter to the President of the Security Council [S/16662 of 6 July 1984] and in their note to me.

As you will recall, when establishing UNFICYP [see resolution 186 (1964)], the Council authorized the Secretary-General to accept voluntary contributions towards meeting the cost of the Force. Despite my predecessors' and my own repeated appeals, voluntary contributions have, over the years, fallen far short of the expenditures for which the United Nations is responsible, even though the United Nations share is but a fraction of the total cost of maintaining UNFICYP.

The deficit in the UNFICYP account has grown at an alarming rate and, as of 12 February 1985, amounts to some \$122 million. This worsening situation has placed an increasingly disproportionate burden on the troop-contributing countries, whose claims on the United Nations have only been met through June 1978. I am enclosing in annex a more detailed presentation of the current financial situation related to UNFICYP.

The important peace-keeping role of UNFICYP has been emphasized by the Security Council time and again. The Force has made, and continues to make, an indispensable contribution to international peace and security and to maintaining calm in Cyprus, a condition which, I need not stress, is crucial to my ongoing efforts to promote a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem in the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council.

Given the vital role played by UNFICYP and the very precarious financial situation in which it finds itself, I should be most grateful if you could convey to your Government my urgent appeal for a financial contribution to UNFICYP. It is my hope that your Government will find it possible to give favourable consideration to my renewed appeal and that it will make a generous contribution to the financing of this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations.

(Signed) Javier PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR  
Secretary-General

ANNEX

Financial position of the United Nations  
Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

Since 1964, 72 countries have made payments or pledges of voluntary contributions to support the United Nations operation in Cyprus. Contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account since the beginning of the operation, as well as the pledges and payments received so far for the periods from 16 December 1983 to 15 December 1984, are listed in the attached table.

In order to provide contingents for UNFICYP, the troop-contributing Governments divert from national duty troops and other resources at an ongoing cost to them estimated by them at present at \$36.2 million for each six-month period. This figure includes (a) the troops' regular pay and allowances and normal *matériel* expenses for which, under existing arrangements, the United Nations is not required by the troop contributors to reimburse them; these therefore constitute costs of maintaining the Force which are being financed directly by the troop-contributing Governments; and (b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that they incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under existing arrangements, the troop contributors would be entitled to claim reimbursement from the United Nations, but which they have agreed to finance at their own expense as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

Including the above two elements of costs, the actual cost of financing the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the six-month period ending 15 June 1985 would total approximately \$50.1 million, estimated as follows:

	<i>Millions of US dollars</i>
1. (a) Regular troops' pay and allowances and normal <i>matériel</i> costs;	
(b) Certain extra and extraordinary costs of the troop-contributing Governments that are financed directly by them . . . . .	36.2
2. Direct costs to the United Nations which the Organization is required to meet (including the extra and extraordinary costs of Governments providing contingents for which they seek to be reimbursed), financed through voluntary contributions . . . . .	13.9
TOTAL COSTS	<u>50.1</u>

Voluntary contributions from Governments are required to finance the second of these cost elements, as indicated in the cost estimates included in my report of 12 December 1984 [S/16858, chap. VI].

The voluntary contributions received from Governments have not been sufficient to cover these costs. Moreover, the resulting deficit has been growing, since voluntary contributions have been running at an average of \$8.7 million per six-month period, while expenses have been averaging \$14 million per six-month period. The accumulated deficit from the inception of the operation through 12 February 1985 now stands at \$121.9 million, as compared to \$117.6 million about eight months ago. Contributions amounting to approximately \$12,000 have been received so far towards that portion of the costs of maintaining the operation during the six-month period ending 15 June 1985 (that is, \$13.9 million) which is to be financed by voluntary contributions.

**PLEDGES AND PAYMENTS TO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE PERIOD 27 MARCH 1964 TO 15 DECEMBER 1984  
AS AT 12 FEBRUARY 1985  
(United States dollar equivalent)**

Country	Forty-fifth period (16 December 1983 to 15 June 1984)	Forty-sixth period (16 June 1984 to 15 December 1984)	Total pledges	Payments received
Australia	50 008	50 008	2 819 889	2 819 889 <sup>a</sup>
Austria	125 000	125 000	4 190 000	4 190 000 <sup>a, b</sup>
Bahamas	1 000	1 000	9 000	9 000
Barbados	-	-	1 500	1 500
Belgium	91 154	91 154	4 375 454	4 375 454
Botswana	-	-	500	500
Cameroon	-	-	21 699	21 699 <sup>c</sup>
Canada	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	-	-	4 031 359	4 031 359
Democratic Kampuchea	-	-	600	600 <sup>d</sup>
Denmark	114 227	-	4 894 188	4 894 188 <sup>a, b</sup>
Finland	-	-	1 050 000	1 050 000 <sup>b</sup>
Germany, Federal Republic of	431 570	431 570	23 335 865	23 335 865
Ghana	-	-	76 897	76 897
Greece	400 000	400 000	20 520 312	20 520 312
Guyana	-	-	11 812	11 812
Iceland	5 000	5 000	96 657	96 657
India	5 000	5 000	90 000	90 000
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	-	-	144 500	94 500
Iraq	-	-	50 000	50 000
Ireland	-	-	50 000	50 000
Israel	-	-	26 500	26 500
Italy	-	-	7 781 645	7 747 128
Ivory Coast	-	-	60 000	60 000
Jamaica	-	-	33 033	33 033
Japan	-	-	4 440 000	4 440 000
Kuwait	-	-	140 000	140 000
Laos People's Democratic Republic	-	-	1 500	1 500 <sup>a</sup>
Lebanon	-	1 000	4 194	4 194 <sup>a</sup>
Liberia	-	-	13 321	11 821
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	-	-	50 000	50 000
Luxembourg	-	-	124 837	124 837
Malawi	-	-	6 363	6 363
Malaysia	-	-	7 500	7 500
Malta	-	-	1 820	1 820
Mauritania	-	-	4 370	4 370
Morocco	-	-	20 000	20 000
Nepal	-	800	1 600	1 600
Netherlands	-	-	2 518 425	2 518 425
New Zealand	-	-	71 137	71 137
Niger	-	-	2 041	2 041
Nigeria	-	4 492	15 292	15 292
Norway	305 000	305 000	8 918 265	8 918 265
Oman	-	-	8 000	8 000
Pakistan	3 000	-	53 791	53 791
Panama	250	250	1 000	1 000
Philippines	-	-	12 430	12 430
Portugal	-	-	12 000	12 000
Qatar	-	-	21 000	21 000
Republic of Korea	-	-	16 000	16 000
Senegal	-	-	4 000	-
Sierra Leone	-	-	46 425	46 425
Singapore	-	-	9 000	9 000
Somalia	-	-	1 000	1 000
Sri Lanka	2 000	-	2 000	2 000
Sweden	-	-	7 120 000	7 120 000 <sup>a, b</sup>
Switzerland	144 804	144 804	6 512 293	6 512 293
Thailand	-	1 000	4 500	4 500
Togo	-	-	2 806	1 020
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	2 400	2 400
Turkey	-	-	1 839 253	1 839 253
United Arab Emirates	-	-	30 000	30 000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1 212 687	1 092 175	69 701 727	69 701 727 <sup>a, b</sup>
United Republic of Tanzania	-	-	7 000	7 000
United States of America	4 500 000	-	159 721 177	159 721 177
Uruguay	-	-	5 000	5 000
Venezuela	-	-	28 000	28 000

Country	Forty-six period	Forty-six period	Total pledges	Payments received
	(16 December 1983 to 15 June 1984)	(16 June 1984 to 15 December 1984)		
Viet Nam	-	-	4 000	4 000 <sup>b</sup>
Yugoslavia	-	-	40 000	40 000
Zaire	-	-	30 000	30 000
Zambia	3 171	3 172	44 343	44 343
Zimbabwe	1 154	1 154	6 912	6 657 <sup>c</sup>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7 395 025</b>	<b>2 662 579</b>	<b>335 298 132</b>	<b>335 206 074</b>

<sup>a</sup> Indicative figures over a six-month period of the costs absorbed by Governments providing contingents are as follows: Australia, \$500,000; Austria, \$1.9 million; Canada, \$10.7 million; Denmark, \$650,000; Sweden, \$3.5 million; United Kingdom, \$19 million.

<sup>b</sup> Payment has been made or will be made by means of an offset against the Government's claims for reimbursement of its costs.

<sup>c</sup> The following additional pledges or payments have been received for the period 16 Decemt. 1984 to 15 December 1985: Cameroon, \$6,383; Lebanon, \$1,000; Zimbabwe, \$16,552.

<sup>d</sup> Maximum amount pledged. The ultimate contribution will be dependent on the contributions of other Governments.

<sup>e</sup> Contributions received in 1964.

<sup>f</sup> Contributions received in 1967.

<sup>g</sup> Maximum amount pledged.

<sup>h</sup> Contributions received from 1964 through 1966.

## DOCUMENT S/17035\*

Letter dated 15 March 1985 from the representative of Jordan  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[15 March 1985]

I am sending you the most recent information communicated by Mr. Shawkat Mahmud, Minister for Occupied Territory Affairs, on Israel's settlement activity in the occupied Arab territories during the months of October, November and December 1984. This activity includes the confiscation of Arab lands for the establishment of new settlements, and it violates the principles of international law relating to military occupation, in particular, the Hague Conventions of 1907<sup>22</sup> and the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.<sup>10</sup>

I need not stress the danger of the continuation of such a policy for peace and security and for the prospects for peace in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdullah SALAH  
Permanent Representative of Jordan  
to the United Nations

### ANNEX

#### Israeli settlement activity during the last quarter of 1984

During October, November and December 1984, the Israeli occupation authorities established two settlements, as follows:

1. *Karnei Shor*, established on 28 October near Halhoul. It is inhabited by students from Jewish religious institutes who belong to the Co-operative Villages Movement of the so-called Habor' il Mizrahi or Oriental Jews.

2. *Rocham*, established on 12 November north of the Jordan Valley and belonging to Nahal.

The land confiscated by the Israeli occupation authorities during this period may be broken down as follows:

- One thousand dunums of the land of the Al-Malih region in Ghor Al-Jirlik, 27 October.
- Fifteen hundred dunums of the land of the village of Deir Qiddis, Ramallah district, 12 November.
- Sixteen hundred dunums of the land of the eastern Bariyah, in the village of Kafr Aqab, Jerusalem district, 21 November.
- Thirty dunums of the waqf land of the village of Abu Jubnah located between Wadi Al-Jawz and Sheikh Jarrah in Jerusalem, 26 November.
- Fifteen hundred dunums of the land of the village of Esh-Shuyukh, Hebron district, 30 November.
- Thirteen hundred and eighty dunums of the land of the village of Rantis, Ramallah district, 12 December.
- Seven hundred dunums of the land of the village of Beit Fajjar, Bethlehem district, 17 December.

Settlement news reported during this period includes the following:

- The Jerusalem newspaper *Al-Fair* of 28 December stated that the Jewish Settlements Council of the Gush Emunim movement had announced that, in 1985, it would establish seven new settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- The newspaper *Al-Quds* of 26 November stated that the Israeli Farmers' Federation had established three new agricultural settlements, two of them in the Galilee hills and the third in the Jerusalem hills north of Latrun. It may be noted that this Federation is a non-partisan organization and supervises the affairs of 50 settlements.
- The Jerusalem newspaper *Al-Sha'b* of 30 November stated that, on 13 November, a settlement, called Amital, was established in the Gaza Strip.
- The newspaper *Al-Quds* of 3 October stated that, on 1 October, settlement No. 32, called Qila' Allon, was established in the Golan Heights.
- The Israeli newspaper *Al-Hamishmar* of 23 December stated that almost half of the dwellings in the new Jewish settlements established in the West Bank were totally empty of Jewish inhabitants.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/179-S/17035.

**Letter dated 16 March 1985 from the representative of Iraq  
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original: Arabic]  
[17 March 1985]*

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the letter which Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, addressed to you on 16 March 1985 setting forth the position of the Republic of Iraq with regard to the statement of the President of the Security Council issued on 15 March concerning the conflict between Iran and Iraq [S/17036].

I request you to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Riyadh M. S. AL-QAYSI  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations*

**LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1985 FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME  
MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

After considering the statement which you issued on 15 March 1985 on behalf of the members of the Security Council, I have the honour to inform you that Iraq welcomes the substance of that statement, in which the members of the Council emphasized the urgent necessity for a cessation of hostilities commencing with the implementation of ceasing attacks against purely civilian population centres with a view to finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and international law and acceptable to both parties.

This position of Iraq is based on the previous positions it has adopted since the outbreak of the conflict and it comes now as a reaffirmation of the said positions. From the outset Iraq has accepted all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council as well as all the international initiatives and appeals for the cessation of hostilities and for a peaceful settlement to the conflict between the two countries. I now wish to reaffirm once more firmly and sincerely Iraq's wish to spare civilians from the scourges of war, as I informed the Secretary-General of in my letter dated 10 March [S/17019], in which I also pointed out Iraq's adherence to the agreement of 12 June 1984 [see S/16609 and S/16610] and how the Iranian régime exploited that agreement to mass its forces in Iranian border towns and villages with a view to continuing its aggressive attacks against Iraq.

I also wish to state that the Iraqi bombardment of 4 March was against a factory near the town of Ahwaz—a target not covered by the agreement of 12 June. The Iranian régime used it as a pretext for the deliberate bombing of the town of Basra on 5 March in violation of that agreement as a prelude to launching a new and large-scale act of aggression against the territory of Iraq. In fact, some days after the Iranian régime had deliberately violated the agreement of 12 June, it launched a very large-scale act of aggression against Iraqi territory on 12 March 1985, which is still continuing.

We believe that the time has come for the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to take the necessary measures to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the conflict between Iraq and Iran. We consider that such action should be taken within the following framework:

1. The arrangement of a cease-fire, the immediate cessation of all military operations and the withdrawal of forces to the internationally recognized frontiers; and the sending of a United Nations observer group to confirm and verify the cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops as well as to monitor observance of these measures by the two parties;

2. The carrying out by the Secretary-General or the Security Council of direct contacts with the two parties to put into effect the arrangements for a cease-fire, troop withdrawal and the selection of international observers, as well as the effective arrangements for ensuring the abstention from attacking purely civilian population centres;

3. The carrying out of negotiations between the two parties, under the auspices of the Secretary-General or the Security Council, with a view to reaching a comprehensive and just settlement of the conflict on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, as was stated in your statement, in a manner ensuring respect for the sovereignty and the international frontiers of each of the two parties and non-interference in their internal affairs;

4. Finding a speedy solution to the tragedy of the prisoners of war by means of a comprehensive exchange of all prisoners, to be commenced immediately;

5. Iraq, desirous of co-operating with the Council and the United Nations, does not object to commencing with steps of a preliminary nature with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace, which would include proceeding, under the auspices of the Secretary-General or the Security Council, to consider with the other party the arrangements for abstaining from attacking purely civilian population centres and for a comprehensive exchange of prisoners of war, if the other party commits itself to the same steps and, in an interconnected manner, makes a commitment to work seriously and without interruption in order to settle the conflict in accordance with the bases provided for in the previous paragraphs;

6. Iraq warns that any deliberate violation or procrastination which may hinder the achievement of a comprehensive peace would be regarded as a violation of all the undertakings or arrangements reached at any particular stage. Iraq will then have the right to act in the manner it deems appropriate in order to defend its sovereignty and security, as well as its legitimate rights and interests.

*(Signed) Tariq AZIZ  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Iraq*

**Letter dated 14 March 1985 from the representative of Thailand  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[18 March 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 8 March 1985 [S/17015], I have the honour to bring to your attention once again the recent acts of aggression deliberately committed by the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea against Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as follows:

1. On 4 March, approximately 100 Vietnamese troops made a deliberate incursion into Thai territory at Kantharalak district, Sisaket province, about 10 kilometres from the Thai-Kampuchean border and captured 62 Thai villagers working in the fields. Eleven Thai villagers who tried to escape were killed by the Vietnamese soldiers. The Thai troops who were dispatched to the scene to rescue the rest of the unfortunate villagers clashed with the Vietnamese troops, resulting in five Thai soldiers being killed.

2. Threatened by heavy and continuous cross-border artillery fire and incursions into the Thai territory by the Vietnamese forces between 5 and 10 March, more than 7,500 Thai villagers of Kabchoeng, Buachet and Sangkha districts, Surin province, had to be evacuated from their homes to a safe area. The said incidents caused the deaths of two Thai villagers and of a large number of livestock, as well as extensive damage to 40 villagers' houses and a school building.

3. On 11 March 1985, elements of the Vietnamese forces which had launched the attack on the base of Prince Sihanouk, President of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, in Kampuchea, resumed premeditated incursions into Thai territory in Sangkha district. The Viet-

name force clashed with the Thai troops, resulting in 11 Thai soldiers being killed, 68 wounded and 3 missing.

These latest incidents constitute additional serious violations of Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity perpetrated by the Vietnamese forces occupying Kampuchea. Such blatant acts of outright hostility contradict Viet Nam's repeatedly declared intention to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand. The Vietnamese military actions along the Thai-Kampuchean border, having caused casualties and renewed hardship to both innocent Thai and Kampuchean people, have heightened tensions along the border. They clearly demonstrate Viet Nam's single-minded determination to seek a military solution to the Kampuchean problem. The Vietnamese forces have shamelessly and flagrantly violated the sacred principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

The Royal Thai Government strongly condemns these Vietnamese acts of aggression and demands that Viet Nam immediately cease its hostile actions against Thailand. The Royal Thai Government once again reaffirms its legitimate right to take all necessary measures to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand and to protect the lives and property of the Thai people.

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Birabhongse KASEMSRI  
Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/180-S/17038.

## DOCUMENT S/17039

**Letter dated 18 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[18 March 1985]

I have the honour to forward to you the letter of Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Said RAJAJIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

**LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC  
OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

With due regard to critical events in recent weeks and the humanitarian positions adopted by you, I deem it necessary to touch upon certain points.

More than one year has elapsed since the Iraqi régime started large-scale deployment of chemical weapons. During this period, we did our utmost to warn the international community of the dangerous consequences of such adventurism. We said that if an important protocol such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>1</sup> formulated through endless efforts of the international community to save humanity from the dangers of chemical weapons, can be trampled underfoot

so easily, the philosophy of the very existence of all international treaties and laws would be questioned.

Your formal appeal [S/17018], after the publication of the report by the United Nations team of experts [S/16750 of 19 September 1984], to refrain strictly from using chemical weapons was totally ignored by Iraq.

Recently, the Iraqi régime has resorted to chemical weapons twice. As you are aware, the redeployment of chemical weapons had been predicted before and we had requested the dispatch of a mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran to prevent the recurrence of this tragedy. You agree that the presence of a United Nations inspection team in Tehran, in spite of Iraq's disrespect for globally recognized humanitarian norms, could have been effective in this respect. What the constraints are that caused you to refrain from taking such a measure is, therefore, puzzling. Could the same authority that enabled you to commission a team of experts in the past not be utilized again?

We hope that the predicted redeployment of chemical weapons by Iraq with its grave consequences results in your taking serious measures at the earliest possible time. Once again, the Islamic Republic of Iran will do its utmost in self-restraint. However, one-sided tolerance is not possible for ever and, in case this dastardly act is continued, there will be no option but to resort to final solutions.

On the issue of attacks on civilian population centres, it is unfortunate to say that Iraq is still failing to abide by international and humanitarian principles in spite of the ef-

forts you have made. Giving no response to your appeal after the attack on Ahwaz reflects Iraq's serious intention to continue its attacks on civilian targets while the Islamic Republic of Iran, even after Iraq's bombardment of the civilian-inhabited areas of Dehlahieh, Alavaneh and Bardiéh, as reflected in the United Nations inspection team records, preserved its self-restraint and refrained from taking retaliatory measures.

You are aware that the Islamic Republic of Iran, in spite of being able to put all four corners of Iraq under its fire, has always responded positively to your appeals. But the question remains for us as to why all these efforts at co-operation have been fruitless so far. Does the United Nations believe that the only way to stop the Iraqi attacks on residential areas and its deployment of chemical weapons is retaliation? If so, then what is the role of that Organization in grave international issues?

The United Nations will celebrate its fortieth anniversary soon and has called upon all nations to send their suggestions and proposals for the completion of the Charter of the United Nations. The best recommendation that I can make is to seek practical guarantees for the existing limited rights rather than talking about new ones.

(Signed) Seyed Ali KHAMENEI  
President of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran

## DOCUMENT S/17040

Note verbale dated 15 March 1985 from the representative of India  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[19 March 1985]

The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note of 21 December 1984, has the honour to state the following:

The Government of India has consistently supported the oppressed majority in South Africa in its struggle against the oppressive *apartheid* régime. India has all along firmly opposed all forms of racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* pursued by the racist régime of South Africa. The issue of racism in South Africa, in fact, was first included in the agenda of the United Nations in 1946 on the initiative of India.

After attaining independence in 1947, India unilaterally severed all diplomatic, economic, trade, cultural and sports

links with the Pretoria régime. India's boycott of the South African régime is complete and total. The question of importing arms etc. from South Africa, therefore, does not arise. As a member of the Security Council, India voted in favour of resolutions 418 (1977) and 558 (1984). The Government of India has always firmly implemented all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. At the same time, the Government of India has been stressing the need to impose comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the South African régime in order to root out completely the evil system of *apartheid*.

It would be appreciated if this note could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

**DOCUMENT S/17041\***

**Letter dated 18 March 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[19 March 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 11 a.m. on 16 March 1985 and the following was brought to his attention by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"According to the information provided by the pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the armed raids and provocations by the Pakistani military units stationed in the vicinity of Barikot district, Kunarha province, have recently acquired drastic intensity and expansion. These forces have been continuously targeting Barikot district with the fire of their heavy weapons, as a consequence of which attacks enormous loss of lives and property has been inflicted. For instance, as a result of the attacks that took place on 6 March 1985 on the Barikot garrison and residential districts, one person

was martyred, two men, eight women and one child were severely injured, and five residential houses have been destroyed.

"The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, while condemning and deploring these repeated and constant acts of aggression of the Pakistani forces, strongly protests over them to the Government of Pakistan and points out that the Pakistani authorities must, as soon as possible, put an end to such acts of armed aggression and provocation against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; otherwise the heavy and grave responsibility emanating from them will rest with the responsible authorities in Pakistan."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF*  
*Permanent Representative of Afghanistan*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/181-S/17041.

**DOCUMENT S/17042\***

**Letter dated 19 March 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan  
to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)*  
*[19 March 1985]*

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 10.30 a.m. on 18 March 1985 and the following was pointed out to him by the officer in charge of the First Political Department:

"In continuation of their previous baseless accusations against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Pakistani authorities have of late once again claimed that four Afghan aircraft allegedly bombed and fired rockets at an area 5 kilometres south-east of Domandi and the Arandu area on 12 and 13 March 1985, respectively.

"After thoroughly investigating these charges, the pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan considered them totally groundless and malicious and, while categorically rejecting them, demand that the Government of Pakistan stop such insinuations and fabrications, which have no other impact but to escalate and aggravate the situation on the frontiers between the two countries."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF*  
*Permanent Representative of Afghanistan*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/182-S/17042.

DOCUMENT S/17043\*

Letter dated 19 March 1985 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

(Original: English/French)  
[19 March 1985]

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, it is my responsibility to bring once again to your attention the Committee's grave concern at renewed acts of repression by the Israeli authorities against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. Of further concern are recent actions taken by the Government of Israel under its policy of establishing Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

It has come to the attention of the Committee that, according to news items in the *Jerusalem Post* and *The New York Times* of 4 March 1985 and *Al-Fajr* of 8 March, Israeli troops carried out night raids on the two campuses of Bir Zeit University on 1 March, seizing hundreds of posters, books and other materials to be used in a Palestinian cultural exhibit. Fifty-three students and their guests were detained for questioning. Eight of them are still being detained in Fara's prison in Nablus without charge. Tel Aviv Radio reported on 8 March that still further detentions are expected.

Immediately after the raids, the Bir Zeit campuses were declared closed military areas and the entrance was barred to all. A week later, as reported by UPI on 11 March, the Military Governor of the occupied West Bank decided to close the new campus of Bir Zeit for a period of two months. The Bir Zeit University Board of Trustees denounced these new Israeli actions as "a new link in a series of recurrent infringements on academic freedom which aim at obstructing university education and development of the Palestinian Arab society". The closure reportedly comes at the end of the first semester, causing disruption of the academic schedule, interruption of laboratory experiments and costly delay of the building programme at the university.

I wish, also, to express the profound concern caused to the Committee by yet further grave action taken by the Israeli Government in flagrant violation of basic human rights. It was reported by the Bethlehem Press Office on 12

March that 35 youths from the Dheishfeh refugee camp, who were arrested on 31 January during a night raid on the camp, are still being detained for interrogation and without charges by the occupying military government. Two of the detainees are reported to have been tortured by electronic devices; the others were continually beaten and humiliated. Some 300 Palestinians from the occupied West Bank have been detained at Fara's prison since January 1985.

At the same time, the committee is gravely concerned at the Israeli Government's continued application of the policy of establishing settlements in the occupied territories. On 6 March 1985, Ha'aretz reported that the Israeli Housing Ministry had begun the construction of three permanent settlements: Azmona, on the Gaza shore; Kaddim, on the northern West Bank; and, Na'an in the Jordan Rift Valley. Settlers are already living in temporary accommodation in all three new settlements.

As on previous occasions, this information is being brought to your attention so that you may be kept informed of the continuing danger to international peace and security posed by the policies of the Israeli Government towards the illegally occupied territories in violation of the resolutions of the United Nations and of its obligation under the fourth Geneva Convention.<sup>10</sup>

Clearly, a new, resolute approach to the search for a just, comprehensive and lasting solution of the question of Palestine is urgently required. To that end, I wish to reiterate the Committee's firm conviction that the early convening of the proposed international peace conference on the Middle East is of critical importance.

In conclusion, I wish to request that the text of this letter be distributed as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Massamba SARRÉ  
Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights  
of the Palestinian People

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/183-S/17043.

DOCUMENT S/17044\*

Letter dated 19 March 1985 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Secretary-General

(Original: Arabic)  
[20 March 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a telegram addressed to you by Mr. Ali A. Treiki, Secretary of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its

annex circulated as a document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Ashur FARTAS  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of  
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/39/880-S/17044.

**TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE'S BUREAU FOR FOREIGN LIAISON OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

Within the framework of the efforts being made by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to halt the escalation of the war between the fraternal countries of Iran and Iraq and to save civilians from the afflictions of that war and from the ruin and destruction that it causes to civilian installations and towns in both countries, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, leader of the great revolution of 1 September, has addressed telegrams to Imam Khomeini and President Saddam Hussein in which he calls upon them to

put an immediate halt to the bombardment of civilian installations and populated areas.

In response thereto, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran has delivered to Colonel Muammar Qaddafi a written communication from Imam Khomeini in which he has affirmed Iran's compliance with that appeal and its readiness to cease attacking towns and civilian installations immediately upon Iraq's ceasing to do so.

Accordingly, we still await Iraq's response to this appeal with a view to sparing innocent blood in the two fraternal countries.

*(Signed) Ali A. TREIKI  
Secretary of the People's Committee  
of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison  
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*

**DOCUMENT S/17045\***

**Letter dated 19 March 1985 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[20 March 1985]*

Further to my letter dated 13 March 1985 [S/17030], I have the honour to report to you several violations of Pakistan's airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side that occurred on 13, 14 and 16 March 1985. The details of the incidents are as follows:

On 13 March, Afghan aircraft committed three violations of Pakistan's airspace and territory in the Arandu area of Chitral. At 0830 hours, Pakistan Standard Time, two Afghan aircraft intruded 3 kilometres into Pakistan's airspace in the Arandu area, dropped 16 bombs and fired a few rockets inside Pakistan's territory approximately 3 kilometres south of Arandu. At 1040 hours, three Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace, again in the Arandu area, and dropped eight bombs. Later, at 1515 hours, six Afghan aircraft intruded into Pakistan's airspace in the same area and dropped 13 bombs and fired a few rockets.

On 14 March, Afghan aircraft committed two violations of Pakistan's airspace and territory in the Arandu area of Chitral. At 0910 hours, four Afghan aircraft intruded 3 kilometres into Pakistan's airspace, dropped four bombs and

fired a few rockets approximately 2 kilometres south of Arandu. Later, at 1120 hours, four Afghan aircraft and two helicopters intruded 2 kilometres into Pakistan's airspace, dropped one bomb and fired a few rockets approximately 1 kilometre south of Arandu, as a result of which one Pakistani citizen and one Afghan refugee were killed.

On 16 March, four Afghan aircraft intruded 3 kilometres into Pakistan's airspace, dropped two bombs and fired a few rockets approximately 1 kilometre south of Arandu.

I take this opportunity to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected as totally baseless the allegations made by the Kabul authorities that, on 6 March 1985, there had been incidents of firing from the Pakistan side towards Barikot in Kunarha Province resulting in loss of life and property. Pakistan's rejection of the allegations was conveyed to the Afghan Chargé d'affaires in Islamabad on 16 March.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/186-S/17045.

**DOCUMENT S/17046\***

**Letter dated 20 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[21 March 1985]*

Further to my letter of 14 March 1985 [S/17031], I have the honour to report the details of the latest Iraqi use of chemical agents, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol<sup>8</sup> and the relevant rules of customary international law, against the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On 16 March at 8.30 and 8.35 a.m., a number of Iraqi planes dropped at least six large capsules on an Iranian position east of Majnoon Island. According to the poisoned combatants, upon impact of the capsules, a greyish-white smoke ascended into the air. Iranian experts have carried out an investigation and they believe that cyanide, phosphorous and mustard gases have been used.

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/189-S/17046.

This chemical attack had been preceded by four others since 11 March. As a result, 200 Iranian combatants have been hospitalized. Dr. Taherian, the head of a special medical team set up for the treatment of victims of the use of Iraqi chemical agents, has announced that the poisoned combatants suffer particularly from weakness, eye and skin irritation and respiratory difficulties.

The foregoing detailed information is submitted so that you will promptly consider appropriate measures to terminate peacefully the Iraqi repeated use of chemical weapons in the war. We indeed hope that the international community will this time stand up for its own rules. Otherwise, the

Islamic Republic of Iran may be driven to a position of resorting to effective retaliation in kind, in spite of its own desire and values.

You will subsequently be informed of any further detailed information regarding this matter.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council

*(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

#### DOCUMENT S/17047

**Letter dated 18 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[21 March 1985]*

I have the honour to bring to your attention that, following the violations of international rules and regulations by the Baathist régime of Iraq, including attacks on civilian areas and the use of chemical agents, the criminal régime of Iraq has taken upon itself to declare the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran unsafe for commercial aircraft. This is, in itself, in contravention of yet another international regulation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran therefore considers it its duty to inform all nations and their peoples of the consequences of such an action and it requests them to save the lives of thousands of human beings by their outright condemnation of this act of the Iraqi régime.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations*

#### DOCUMENT S/17048

**Note verbale dated 13 March 1985 from the representative of Mongolia to the Secretary-General**

*(Original: English)  
[21 March 1985]*

The Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and with reference to the latter's note of 21 December 1984 has the honour to communicate the following.

The Mongolian People's Republic has consistently and resolutely condemned the criminal policy of *apartheid* pursued by the racist régime of South Africa against the country's indigenous people and firmly supported all the decisions and resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council on the policies of *apartheid* of South Africa.

Mongolia strictly abides by and carries out the provisions of all the relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 558 (1984), maintains no re-

lations with South Africa in any field, does not carry on any arms trade with the régime.

Mongolia resolutely condemns certain countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which continue to give every support and encouragement to the racist régime by maintaining and expanding economic, military and other types of collaboration with Pretoria. Mongolia firmly believes that more effective actions should be taken for a speedy and total elimination of *apartheid*.

The Mongolian People's Republic holds that the Security Council is duty bound to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Mongolia has consistently supported the peoples of South Africa and Namibia and the national liberation movements

in southern Africa in their just struggle against the South African régime of *apartheid* for their freedom and independence.

The Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations requests that this note be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### DOCUMENT S/17049

#### Letter dated 21 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[22 March 1985]

I have been instructed by my Government to inform you of the sad news, which you may already be aware of, that the régime of Saddam Hussein has announced its intention to annihilate the whole city of Ahwaz within seventy-two hours of its ultimatum to the inhabitants of the city to evacuate it. In the face of the continued silence of the international community with regard to the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein, it is indeed likely that, contrary to our desire, we may be forced to retaliate in kind.

It is painful for us to have been pushed into a corner where there is no option but that of retaliation against our brothers and sisters in Baghdad. We believe that the international community, owing to its indifference and lack of initiative, shares in the responsibility not only for the crimes of Saddam Hussein against the people of the Islamic Republic of Iran but also for the inevitable though reluctant measures that we will take against Baghdad.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/17050

#### Statement by the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/French]  
[22 March 1985]

The following statement was made by the President of the Security Council on 22 March 1985:

"The members of the Security Council have entrusted me to express on their behalf their grave concern over the rapid deterioration of the situation in South Africa resulting from the spate of violence against defenceless opponents of *apartheid* throughout the country and most recently in the town of Uitenhage on 21 March 1985, where the South African police opened fire on innocent people proceeding to a funeral, killing and wounding scores of them.

"The members of the Council strongly deplore such acts of violence, which can only further aggravate the situation in South Africa and make more difficult the

search for a peaceful solution of the South African conflict.

"The members of the Council recall the provisions of resolution 560 (1985), adopted unanimously on 12 March 1985, in which the Council noted with deep concern the intensification of repression in South Africa, commended the massive united resistance of the oppressed people of South Africa against *apartheid*, and reaffirmed the legitimacy of their struggle for a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

"The members of the Council urge the Government of South Africa to end violence and repression against the black people and other opponents of *apartheid* and to take urgent measures to eliminate *apartheid*."

**DOCUMENT S/17051**

**Letter dated 22 March 1985 from the representative of South Africa  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[25 March 1985]*

I refer to the statement made today by the President of the Security Council in regard to the situation in South Africa [S/17050].

The South African Government has expressed its profound regret at the tragic loss of life as a result of the events of 21 March 1985. It remains determined to continue the efforts to promote, in the words of the South African State President, "a programme of fundamental reform in every sphere of life . . . and specifically constitutional reform".

Nevertheless, it has not gone unnoticed that the events at Uitenhage occurred on the anniversary of Sharpeville. The organizers of this ill-conceived march, so tragic in its consequences, cannot escape a heavy responsibility for what occurred.

I should like to take this opportunity to convey to you the following relevant facts:

At 10 a.m. a crowd of people, estimated at three to four thousand, armed with stones, petrol bombs and bricks, marched along the road approaching Uitenhage. About one kilometre outside the town, a police unit of 19 men parked two police vehicles across the road and when the crowd were a few metres from the vehicles, the officer in charge signalled them to stop. He addressed the leader, informing him that the march was unlawful and urged the crowd to disperse. The appeal was ignored, whereupon the officer fired a warning shot. In spite of this the crowd surrounded the police and pelted them with stones, and other missiles including petrol bombs. The police were left with no alternative but to fire in self-defence. The crowd retreated and fire ceased immediately.

I would also draw your attention to a press statement made by the South African Minister of Justice on 22 March, which reads as follows:

"The State President has appointed a Commission to investigate forthwith all the factual circumstances regarding the incident itself on 21 March 1985 at Uitenhage, where people were killed and injured, and to submit an urgent report.

"The Honourable Mr. Justice D. D. V. Kannemeyer is the Chairman and only member of the Commission. He will in that capacity issue a statement on Monday 25 March 1985 concerning the venues and dates of sittings of the Commission.

"Special attention is drawn to the regulations pertaining to the Commission that will be published in the *Government Gazette* today.

"Interested persons and bodies wishing to submit evidence to or give evidence before the Commission are requested to contact the Secretary of the Commission, c/o the Registrar of the Supreme Court, Private Bag 1011, Grahamstown, 6140 (tel. 0461 3936)."

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Kurt VON SCHIRNDING  
Permanent Representative  
of South Africa  
to the United Nations*

**DOCUMENT S/17052**

**Letter dated 25 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]  
[25 March 1985]*

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to write to you about yet another Iraqi violation of an international instrument, i.e., the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.<sup>24</sup>

As you are, no doubt, already aware, the Baathist rulers of Iraq have recently threatened to shoot down passenger planes over the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran, thus rendering the entire civil aviation over the airspace of the Iranian territory unsafe.

Threats against innocent passengers can only be used by such ruthless criminals as the Iraqi rulers, who have actually perpetrated such a crime by shooting down the aeroplane of the late Foreign Minister of Algeria. The Islamic Republic

of Iran hereby announces that it cannot conceivably resort to retaliatory measures against civilian aircraft, endangering the lives of innocent people. However, should a civilian aircraft be shot down over the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Baghdad airport will be levelled.

It took two and a half years before the Islamic Republic of Iran convinced itself to retaliate against the Iraqi attacks on civilian population centres, and it has not yet retaliated against Iraqi use of chemical weapons.

The Islamic Republic of Iran will, therefore, not allow the recent Iraqi threat against the safety of its civil aviation to provoke and force it into retaliatory measures against innocent passengers, which would totally contradict the hu-

manitarian and Islamic values that the Islamic Republic of Iran advocates.

May I add that knowledge of this fact, however, does not relieve the international bodies of the discharge of their constitutional responsibilities.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/17053

##### Note verbale dated 22 March 1985 from the representative of Denmark to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 March 1985]

The Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, in reply to his note of 21 December 1984, has the honour to inform him that Denmark does not import arms, ammunition or military vehicles from South Africa and has not done so for many years.

Thus Denmark is already abiding by Security Council resolution 558 (1984) and existing legislation has made it unnecessary for the Danish authorities to introduce special measures in order to ensure implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

The rules governing import and possession of weapons and ammunition are laid down in the so-called Arms Act of 20 January 1965.

According to this Act it is prohibited, except with permission issued by the Minister for Justice or by anyone acting on his behalf, to import or manufacture:

- Firearms, and barrels and breechblocks for same,
- Ammunition for firearms, including cartridge cases, priming screws, percussion caps, fuses and projectiles,
- Hand grenades, bombs and similar weapons,
- Explosives.

Smoothbase shotguns (hunting weapons) and parts thereof as well as ammunition (shot cartridges) are not covered by

the prohibition. An abolishment of this exception is envisaged in the near future (warranted by already existing legislation).

Thus the Danish authorities have at their disposal the legal instruments required to monitor the import of weapons and, where warranted, to withhold import permits. Whenever the permit of the Minister for Justice is required, the Ministry of Justice will submit the application to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot recommend the import in question, the application will be refused by the Ministry of Justice. This would be the case with respect to import of arms and ammunition from South Africa.

As far as the mandatory embargo of the export of arms to South Africa imposed by Security Council resolution 418 (1977) is concerned, the Permanent Representative of Denmark wishes to reiterate that in accordance with their joint programme of action against South Africa, Denmark and the other Nordic countries work actively for a strict compliance with and a strengthening of the embargo.

The Permanent Representative of Denmark has the honour to request that this note be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### DOCUMENT S/17054\*

##### Letter dated 25 March 1985 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 March 1985]

Further to my letter dated 19 March 1985 [S/17045], I have the honour to report to you two violations of Pakistan's airspace and territory from the Afghanistan side that occurred on 18 and 19 March 1985. The details of the incidents are as follows:

On 18 March, four Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace, dropped nine bombs and fired a few rockets 1 kilometre south of Arandu.

On 19 March, two Afghan aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace and dropped seven bombs 1 kilometre south of Arandu.

I take this opportunity to inform you that the Government of Pakistan has rejected as totally baseless the allegations

made by the Kabul authorities that on 12, 13 and 14 March 1985 the Pakistan armed forces had fired across the border towards Barikot in Kunarha Province and that on 8, 14 and 15 March a number of persons supported by Pakistani troops had attacked the Afghan border post at Torkham, resulting in loss of life. On 23 March Pakistan's rejection of these allegations was conveyed to the Afghan Chargé d'affaires in Islamabad, who was told that by fabricating baseless charges the Kabul authorities were merely trying to shift the blame to Pakistan for developments within Afghanistan.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. Shah NAWAZ  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/204-S/17054.

DOCUMENT S/17055\* \*\*

Letter dated 23 March 1985 from the representative of Lebanon  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]  
[25 March 1985]

Further to my earlier letters concerning Israeli practices and the acts of aggression committed by Israel in southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the district of Rachaiya, I have the honour to inform you, on instructions from my Government, of further inhuman acts of aggression perpetrated by that country against the innocent inhabitants of southern Lebanon.

On 21 March 1985, after an intensive bombardment of the villages of Houmine El-Tahta and Kfar Milké, the Israeli forces besieged the following villages of the district of Zah-rani: Arab Salim, Houmine El-Faouqa, Sarba, Ain Qana, Jabaa, Kfar Fila, Kfar Milké, Jbal El-Arab, Mazraat Tiba and Anqoun.

Approximately 60 motorized vehicles and Merkava tanks, hundreds of soldiers and elements of the Lahad force and helicopters and special paratroop units participated in the operation. The Israeli forces advanced to within seven kilometres of the town of Sidon, besieging, on their way, three Lebanese army posts situated in areas which they had evacuated in the first phase of their withdrawal, leaving 22 people killed and several wounded and causing material damage.

At Houmine El-Tahta, 20 persons were found dead under the ruins of a school and several houses which the Israeli forces had destroyed.

The Israeli tanks pounded the village of Kfar Milké, killing two journalists from a United States television team—Tawfik Ghazawi and Bahij Metni, hit by shots aimed intentionally in their direction by one of the Israeli tanks.

After their withdrawal, the Israeli forces destroyed and burnt the State police post of the village of Jabaa and a number of houses and took dozens of prisoners. Moreover,

it was not until some hours later that members of the civil defence and the Red Cross were authorized to enter the besieged villages.

In the district of Tyre, the Israeli forces besieged two villages and made the inhabitants assemble in the school courtyard for the purpose of checking identities. Before withdrawing, they took dozens of prisoners and destroyed more than 20 houses. On 22 March, the Israeli forces besieged the village of El-Qoulailé, killing six persons and taking 20 young men prisoner. Among the victims were a Lebanese army sergeant and two women.

The Lebanese Government emphatically condemns the above-mentioned practices and savage and repeated acts of aggression perpetrated by the occupying Israeli forces against the civilian population of southern Lebanon, the western Bekaa and the district of Rachaiya. It draws the Security Council's attention to the gravity and inhuman character of such practices, which are contrary to international law, human rights and the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.<sup>10</sup>

The continuation of these practices confirms what Lebanon has constantly reiterated, namely that, because the Security Council is obstructed in its work and is unable to perform the tasks incumbent on it, Israel is tacitly encouraged to pursue its inhuman policy towards the civilian population of the Lebanese territory which it occupies and even of the territory from which it has withdrawn.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of this letter to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Rachid FAKHOURY  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/205-S/17055 and Corr.1.

\*\* Incorporating document S/17055/Corr.1 of 15 April 1985.

DOCUMENT S/17056

Note verbale dated 1 March 1985 from the Mission of Madagascar  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]  
[26 March 1985]

The Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note of 21 December 1984, has the honour to inform him of the following:

The Democratic Republic of Madagascar, unwavering in its policy of support for just causes and the legitimate struggles of all oppressed peoples, unreservedly and steadfastly condemns the Pretoria régime for its *apartheid* policy, which

is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and incompatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Persuaded that the *apartheid* régime and its policy of internal repression, political assassinations, destabilization and aggression against the front-line States are the sole obstacle to peace, security and stability in southern Africa, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar has no dealings with South Africa in the political, economic, military or any other field.

The Democratic Republic of Madagascar has consistently implemented the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the question of South Africa. The continuing purchase by the South African régime of arms and other military equipment from certain States and the local manufacture of weapons and munitions under licenses granted by certain circles are not conducive to the maintenance of the security and sovereignty of African States hostile to the policy of *apartheid*.

Because of its sympathy towards the struggle of the African States in combating the *apartheid* régime, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar endorses the Declaration on Southern Africa adopted at the twentieth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of Af-

rican Unity<sup>25</sup> and reaffirms its full support for the fight waged by the oppressed people of South Africa under the aegis of their national liberation movement, the African National Congress.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar would like to see all States Members of the United Nations take the necessary measures for the effective implementation of the Security Council and General Assembly decisions on South Africa with a view to the total and swift elimination of the *apartheid* system.

The Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the United Nations requests that this note be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

#### DOCUMENT S/17057\*

#### Letter dated 25 March 1985 from the representative of Viet Nam to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[26 March 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letters of 11 and 13 March 1985,<sup>26</sup> I have the honour to inform you that we categorically reject as sheer fabrications the slanderous allegations of Thailand made by its representative in his letter dated 14 March [S/17038], which were echoed by Beijing and Western circles in the letter from the Permanent Representative of China of 11 March [S/17023].

Realities have shown that it is Thailand that has grossly interfered in the internal affairs and violated the territories of Kampuchea, Laos and Viet Nam.

The world knows too well that Thailand is teaming up with China, providing sanctuaries for the Pol Pot clique and other Khmer reactionaries and nurturing them in an attempt to sabotage the Kampuchean people's rebirth, thus causing instability and constant tension in the region.

By launching this wicked campaign, Thailand and its supporters seek to divert public opinion, cover up their

bankrupt policy of using the Khmer reactionaries to oppose the Indochinese countries, distort Viet Nam's good will and deliberately create tension and confrontation so as to sabotage the developing trend toward dialogue in the region.

The stance of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, completely shared by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, is quite clear, that is, to respect the non-interference principle and Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to strive for a peaceful and friendly border with Thailand as well as other neighbouring countries. This correct stance has been warmly welcomed by world opinion, including several circles in the member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

I should be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LE KIM CHUNG  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/206-S/17057.

#### DOCUMENT S/17058

#### Letter dated 25 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[26 March 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you the letter of Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAI-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Following the resumption of Iraqi attacks on civilian population centres and commercial vessels, I would like to inform you that the Islamic Republic of Iran was regrettably obliged to launch a surface-to-surface missile on Baghdad on Monday, 25 March 1985.

As you are no doubt aware, since there was an interruption in Iraqi aerial and missile attacks on, and shellings of, civilian population centres as well as in attacks against ships

in the past two days, the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran had readily halted their retaliatory attacks on Iraqi cities.

Today's missile attack by the Islamic Republic of Iran was simply a limited retaliatory measure against the renewed Iraqi attacks on civilian population centres and commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly announced, while reserving for itself the right to retaliate, it is fully

prepared to stop all military operations against Iraqi cities provided that Iraq stops its military operations against civilian population centres and third-party commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf.

(Signed) Ali Akbar VELAYATI  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran

**DOCUMENT S/17059\***

**Letter dated 26 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[26 March 1985]

Pursuant to my letters of 12 April [S/16481] and 28 June 1984 [S/16652], I have the honour to report the detailed list of seven Iraqi violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,<sup>a</sup> which occurred between 9 August 1984 and 14 February 1985.

The criminal Iraqi régime has employed chemical weapons against the civilian and military targets in the Islamic Republic of Iran uninterruptedly since the early days of the imposed war.

International bodies concerned with upholding the authority of the relevant international instrument and those

\* Also circulated as a document of the General Assembly under the symbol A/40/209 of 29 March 1985.

constitutionally obliged to maintain international peace and security have remained irresponsibly reticent all along in connection with these crimes against humanity. Thus not only do they appear to be condoning the use of chemical agents in the war but, regrettably, they also seem to be forcing the other party to retaliate in kind.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

**ANNEX**

**Attacks with chemical weapons by the armed forces of Iraq against civilian and military objectives in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

<i>Date and hour of attack</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Mode of delivery</i>	<i>Casualties and fatalities</i>
9 August, 1984, 0600 hours . . . .	Suburbs of Abadan	Artillery shells	Personnel suffering from dizziness, nausea and some cases of inflammation of the skin
21 September, 2214 hours . . . . .	Kharg Island	Aerial bombardment	Personnel suffering from nausea and some cases of skin irritation
29 September, 0730 hours . . . . .	Shalamchek region	Artillery shells	No casualties or fatalities
23 October . . . . .	Nosood region	Artillery shells	8 people poisoned and hospitalized
15 January, 1985, 1830 hours . . . .	Pol-e-no region (Khorramshahr)	Artillery shells	Personnel suffering from dizziness and some cases of severe abdominal pain. Two of the poisoned personnel were hospitalized in Ahwaz and Tehran.
4 February . . . . .	Suburbs of Khorramshahr	Artillery shells	Personnel suffering from nausea, eye irritation
14 February . . . . .	The vicinity of the military bases of Ashkan and Garmab (Sardasht region)	7 artillery shells	No effects on the personnel because of the direction of the wind.

**DOCUMENT S/17060\***

**Letter dated 25 March 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[27 March 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of

Afghanistan at 2.30 p.m. on 20 March 1985 and the officer in charge of the First Political Department conveyed to him the following:

"According to the information provided by the pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghan-

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/208-S/17060.

istan, repeated armed and irresponsible acts of aggression by the frontier forces of Pakistan with the use of heavy weapons against the frontier residential localities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are continuing.

"As a result of these shellings, a number of elderly men, women and even children have been martyred. The residential areas of Barikot district, Kunarha Province, in particular, have been subjected to atrocious shellings.

"During the last several months, the residential areas of Barikot district have sustained 29 acts of aggression by the Pakistani forces which were carried out by shellings with various weapons such as reactive mortar ammunition, artillery mortar and heavy machine-guns. The most severe and cruel shellings took place on 19, 20 and 21 January and 5, 7 and 8 February 1985.

"Recently, Pakistani frontier forces once again carried out shellings on the Barikot district on 12, 13 and 14 March 1985. As a result of these shellings, during the last four months 27 persons have been martyred and 24 others wounded.

"Likewise, the Afghan border passage and control posts in the Torkham area were subjected to firing of light weapons by the Pakistani functionaries at 5.30 a.m. on 8 March 1985. The same areas again sustained the shellings with mortars and heavy machine-guns from 6.10 a.m. to 10.00 a.m. on 10 March 1985, which resulted in the martyrdom of three persons and the wounding of two others.

"After heavy shelling, a group 150 strong, supported by the Pakistani Government forces, attacked the Afghan passage and control post in the Torkham area on 14 March; this group was repelled by the frontier forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, as a result of which, one of the frontier personnel was martyred and two others were wounded.

"Likewise, at 10.30 p.m. on 15 March 1985, two border posts came under attack, as a result of which three persons were martyred and four others were wounded.

"The authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan strongly condemn these repeated and constant acts of aggression of the Pakistani military forces, the arming of bandits and their dispatch into the territory of

Afghanistan to commit murder and destruction and the direct collaboration of the Pakistani militia forces with these bands of murderers and robbers, and strongly protest to the Government of Pakistan.

"Furthermore, it is to be mentioned that the Pakistani authorities must immediately put an end to their acts of armed aggression and interference which have endangered the peace and security of the frontiers; otherwise, the responsibility for the grave and heavy consequences of such actions must rest with the military authorities of Pakistan."

According to other information, the officer in charge of the First Political Department pointed out to the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul that:

"The Pakistani authorities, with a view to concealing their hostile actions and in continuation of their previous baseless allegations against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, have recently once again claimed that four Afghan aircraft allegedly penetrated 3 kilometres into the airspace of Arandu at 9.10 a.m. on 14 March and dropped 40 bombs and also fired several rockets on an area south of Arandu without causing any losses.

"Likewise, the Pakistani authorities have levelled charges that on the same day, at 11.20 a.m., four Afghan aircraft and two helicopters penetrated 1 kilometre into the airspace of Arandu and dropped one bomb and fired several rockets at an area south of Arandu, as a result of which, one Afghan refugee and one Pakistani were killed.

"The pertinent authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, after thoroughly investigating these charges, consider them to be groundless and malicious accusations and categorically reject them; they demand that the Government of Pakistan put an end to such fabrications and slanders which have no other result but aggravation of the situation in the frontier areas of the two countries."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF  
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/17061

Note verbale dated 21 March 1985 from the Mission of Czechoslovakia to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[27 March 1985]

The Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, in reply to the Secretary-General's note dated 21 December 1984, has the honour to advise him of the following.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic strictly complies with all United Nations resolutions pertaining to the arms embargo against South Africa, fully recognizing the necessity for a total isolation of the racist régime of Pretoria.

In accordance with the principles of its foreign policy, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic maintains no relations with the South African régime, does not supply to it any arms and does not import any arms from South Africa. Czechoslovakia condemns all the more the policy of those Western States which have a share in the increase in the arms potential of South Africa which serves the inhuman oppression of the non-white population and the aggressive attacks against the neighbouring independent African States.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic fully supports Security Council resolutions 418 (1977) and 558 (1984) demanding the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. Czechoslovakia calls upon all States which have not yet done so to refrain from their shameful co-operation with the South African régime and thus to con-

tribute to the elimination of the brutal policy of *apartheid* pursued by the Government of South Africa.

The Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations would be grateful if this note could be circulated as a Security Council document.

#### DOCUMENT S/17062

##### Letter dated 27 March 1985 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

*(Original: Arabic)*  
[27 March 1985]

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Lebanon has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 19 April 1985, for a further period of six months, on the basis of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982) and of other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

The Lebanese Government, while calling for the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions, would like to reaffirm the terms of the mandate of UNIFIL as laid down in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978 [S/12611] and resolution 501 (1982).

Accordingly, the Lebanese Government is not requesting any change in the mandate of the Force, since that mandate, as laid down in the above-mentioned resolutions, is adequate, and since those resolutions require the withdrawal of all Israeli forces beyond the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon and the extension of the exclusive authority of the Lebanese State over all the territories evacuated by Israel.

Lebanon's understanding of the role which the Force is required to play in Lebanon is as follows:

1. The UNIFIL area of deployment extends from the Litani River southward as far as the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon.

2. The whole of this region should be under the exclusive authority of the Lebanese army, assisted in its task solely by the United Nations Force, since Lebanon is not

prepared to assign any role to any military force which is not a legal force.

3. Lebanon is in no circumstance prepared to accept the creation of what is known as "buffer zones" or of "security cordons" of any kind.

4. The area of deployment of UNIFIL should not become a disengagement zone between illegal armed forces within Lebanese territory.

5. The posts which the United Nations forces are to occupy will be determined by agreement with the Lebanese Government alone.

In this connection, I should like to assure you that my Government remains persuaded that, in spite of the difficult conditions in south Lebanon, the presence of UNIFIL continues to be necessary and constitutes an important factor of stability and an international commitment to the upholding of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

My Government takes this opportunity to pay tribute and express its gratitude to UNIFIL and the countries which have sent contingents for their efforts and sacrifices in serving the cause of peace in Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* M. Rachid FAKHOURY  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/17063

##### Letter dated 27 March 1985 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)*  
[27 March 1985]

Upon instructions from my Government, and in view of the recent developments in the Iraqi-imposed war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, I have the honour to bring the following points to your attention.

The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that international conventions, protocols and regulations concerning the conduct of hostilities and humanitarian limitations on the conflicting parties should be observed by all members

of the international community, and endorsed by international public opinion as well as competent international forums without any consideration of issues underlying and surrounding specific conflicts. The integrity of such rules as prescriptions for conduct during the course of hostilities is highly dependent on their unqualified and complete observance and enforcement. Otherwise, it is unavoidable that a mockery will be made of all those humanitarian rules in the name of military necessity. It is certainly not time at

this juncture of the history of the United Nations when we are celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Organization to repeat the Nazi doctrine of total war. Rules and regulations embodied in international conventions and protocols concerning respect for purely civilian targets, freedom of civil aviation and of unarmed merchant shipping, and a total and unqualified commitment to refrain from the use of chemical weaponry under any circumstances have been developed after many sad experiences in the international community. Such rules should not be allowed to be violated and such tragedies should not be allowed to be repeated. We believe it is the duty of the Security Council to condemn the violations of these rules by any party to any dispute. The Council is morally obliged to prevent international humanitarian law from becoming the subject of negotiations, and their violation to be downgraded to a simple matter of strategy for a savage régime which has not hesitated since the beginning of the war to attack innocent civilian population centres or to violate international humanitarian laws.

We believe that your statement of 26 March 1985 is, in principle, in keeping with such moral obligations and also with your constitutional responsibilities. The Islamic Republic of Iran once again reiterates its support for and commitment to the principles of international humanitarian law as well as international conventions and norms concerning the conduct of hostilities. As a people steadfastly involved in a defensive struggle, we share your desire for a just and honourable settlement to the issues once those equitable and

legal conditions spelled out in the beginning of the imposed war by the Islamic Republic of Iran are satisfied. Meanwhile, since the repeated use of chemical weapons by the régime in Baghdad has been documented through several independent sources, and Iraqi threats to civil aviation and merchant shipping as well as the bombardment of innocent civilian populations are a matter of governmental policy in Baghdad and known to all members of the international community, it is imperative that the duty of the Security Council as well as all other competent international bodies is to condemn such violations of international humanitarian law, and call upon the Iraqi rulers to stop their flagrant violations of those laws immediately. Such action by the Security Council, along with a courageous condemnation of the original aggressor, are more in line with the constitutional duties of that body than the partial resolutions of the past. It is needless to say that once Iraq ceases its violations of the above-mentioned international conventions, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately stop the retaliatory measures which it has regretfully been forced to take.

It will be highly appreciated if this letter is distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) SAID RAJAJIE-KHORASSANI  
Permanent Representative of  
the Islamic Republic of Iran  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/17064\*

#### Letter dated 26 March 1985 from the representative of Viet Nam to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[27 March 1985]

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of the statement made on 25 March 1985 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

I should be grateful if you could have this note and its enclosure circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LE KIM CHUNG  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the  
United Nations

#### ANNEX

#### Statement made on 25 March 1985 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

According to press reports from Bangkok, on 22 March 1985 the Thai Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulanonda, spoke of the possibility of Thai armed forces fighting against Vietnamese forces inside Kampuchea. Earlier, the Deputy Commander of the Thai army, Tienchai Sirisamphan, declared that the Thai army would carry out an offensive against Vietnamese forces inside Kampuchea. A high-ranking official of Thailand has also declared that he did not rule out the possibility of Thailand using its right to "hot pursuit" into Kampuchean territory. What is serious is that these statements were made after the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations had urged other countries to give military aid to the Khmer reac-

tionaries against the Kampuchean people and following the visit to Thailand of the Head of State of China and several Chinese generals.

The above-mentioned bellicose statements of the Thai authorities are a mere repetition of the position of the Thai ruling circles 15 years ago, when they took up the "hot pursuit" theory of Nixon at the time of the American invasion of Kampuchea in April 1970. This is a new step forward in Thailand's support for the Polpotists and other Khmer reactionary forces against the revival of the Kampuchean people, after it had allowed the Khmer reactionaries to use "sanctuaries" on Thai territory and undertaken a series of undeclared acts of war such as firing artillery and conducting aggressive operations against the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in support of the Pol Pot clique throughout the past six years. This is also a bold-faced act of great seriousness following the brazen military occupation of the three hamlets in Laos by Thailand in June 1984.

These bellicose statements have shed more light on the obdurate policy of the Thai ruling circles in rejecting the proposal of the People's Republic of Kampuchea on the establishment of a safety zone on either side of the Thai-Kampuchean border and the proposal of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on ending the tense situation in the border area between Laos and Thailand. They also prove that the Thai ruling circles continue to collude with China in maintaining a hot situation on the border with Kampuchea as well as on the border with Laos, to nibble at the territories of these two countries and support the Pol Pot genocidal clique, the Lao reactionaries and the Vietnamese reactionaries against the three Indochinese countries.

The situation at the Kampuchean-Thai border during the past six years has fully proved that the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam have shown the utmost restraint before the arrogant acts of Thailand. While sweeping up the Polpotists and the other Khmer reactionaries, the armed forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/210-S/17064.

and the Vietnamese army volunteers have always respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand. The People's Republic of Kampuchea and Viet Nam have desisted from using their right to "hot pursuit" in order to destroy the Khmer reactionaries now taking refuge in the sanctuaries on Thai soil. Should the Thai ruling circles put into effect the "hot pursuit" theory of the United States and violate the sovereignty and territory of the People's Republic of Kampuchea they will have to shoulder all responsibility for the serious consequences of their acts. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam demands that the Thai authorities end immediately all acts of violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and stop allowing their territory to be used by the Polpotists and other reactionary Khmers as a refuge to oppose the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

#### DOCUMENT S/17065

### Letter dated 23 March 1985 from the representative of the People's Republic of China to the Secretary-General

*(Original: Chinese/English)*  
[28 March 1985]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a statement made by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China on 22 March 1985 on the recent suppression of the black people by the authorities of South Africa in that country. I should be grateful if you could arrange for the circulation of this letter and the statement as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) LING Qing*  
*Permanent Representative of*  
*the People's Republic of China*  
*to the United Nations*

#### ANNEX

Statement made on 22 March 1985 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

On 21 March 1985, several thousand black people in the suburbs of

Port Elizabeth, South Africa, gathered in a peaceful assembly and held a demonstration in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre. The South African authorities dispatched armed police to suppress them, creating a tragic incident of 16 people being killed and more than 20 wounded. This is another crime committed by the South African authorities against the South African people. The Chinese Government and people express indignation at and strong condemnation against the atrocities committed by the South African authorities.

The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the just struggle of the South African people and are convinced that with the support of the justice-upholding peoples in the world, the South African people, by closing their ranks and persevering in struggle, are sure to win final victory.

This act of the South African authorities has once again revealed their ferocious racist nature and exposed the fraud of their so-called "reform". All these perverted acts of theirs will only further arouse the South African people to an intensified struggle against *apartheid* and for racial equality and other basic rights.

The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the just struggle of the South African people and are convinced that with the support of the justice-upholding peoples in the world, the South African people, by closing their ranks and persevering in struggle, are sure to win final victory.

The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the just struggle of the South African people and are convinced that with the support of the justice-upholding peoples in the world, the South African people, by closing their ranks and persevering in struggle, are sure to win final victory.

#### DOCUMENT S/17066\*

### Letter dated 28 March 1985 from the representative of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

*(Original: English)*  
[28 March 1985]

I have the honour to inform you of the following statement which was made by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on 25 March 1985:

"The Pakistani authorities have recently expanded their provocative and poisonous propaganda and fabrications against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and once again have levelled baseless charges that Afghan aircraft allegedly conducted flights and dropped bombs over the Arandu area on 16, 18 and 19 March 1985.

"In connection with these false and malicious accusations, the Chargé d'affaires of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 11.30 a.m. on 25 March 1985, and the officer in charge of the First Political Department pointed out to him that the pertinent

authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan consider the claim of the Pakistani authorities as totally groundless and void of reality and, therefore, categorically reject them. It was further mentioned that Pakistani authorities would better immediately put an end to the levelling of such insinuations and accusations, which are aimed at covering up the repeated and overt aggressions of that country against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and to the escalation of tension along the frontiers of the two countries."

I have further the honour to request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) M. Farid ZARIF*  
*Permanent Representative of Afghanistan*  
*to the United Nations*

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/212-S/17066.

Letter dated 29 March 1985 from the Secretary-General to  
the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/French]  
[29 March 1985]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 28 March 1985 addressed to me by the representatives of the troop-contributing countries for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

I fully appreciate and understand the views expressed by those representatives regarding the functioning of UNIFIL and the necessity to ensure the security of its troops in the performance of their difficult and important tasks. This is an objective to which I and my colleagues devote a great deal of time and attention.

I wish to take this opportunity to express once again my deep appreciation to the troop-contributing countries for their steadfast and generous support of UNIFIL during the past years and to pay tribute to their contingents, which have carried out their tasks with exemplary dedication and courage in extremely difficult circumstances.

(Signed) Javier PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR  
Secretary-General

ANNEX

Letter dated 28 March 1985 from the representatives of the troop-contributing countries for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the Secretary-General

In view of recent developments in southern Lebanon, the Member States participating in UNIFIL deem it appropriate to express to you their deep concern at these events, which not only have made it even more difficult for UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate, but which also pose serious security risks to the members of the Force. This element of risk is causing increasing concern in their countries.

For more than two years now, UNIFIL has carried out interim tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This had become necessary because UNIFIL was unable to carry out the original mandate, given to it by the Security Council in its resolution 425 (1978), which decided to establish the Force "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the Israeli Forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area".

In spite of the difficult circumstances under which UNIFIL has been forced to operate during these past few years, the troop-contributing countries are convinced that UNIFIL has had a stabilizing effect on the situation in southern Lebanon. Moreover, the Force has been able to play a useful humanitarian role, and its presence symbolizes the will of the international community to restore international peace and security and to re-establish Lebanese authority in the area in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

The troop-contributing countries wish to recall that the mandate of the Force, contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978 and approved by the Security Council in its resolution 426 (1978), speaks of "three essential conditions [that] must be met for the Force to be effective".

"First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council." In this respect the troop-contributing countries think it incumbent on the Council to insist that all parties concerned respect the integrity of UNIFIL in all its component parts, as well as of other United Nations personnel operating in southern Lebanon under the present difficult circumstances.

"Secondly, [the Force] must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned." UNIFIL can only hope to fulfil its mandate on the basis of an understanding between all the parties concerned on the role of the Force and the security situation in the area. This applies a fortiori to

a situation in which the absence of the necessary co-operation would endanger the personal safety of the members of the Force.

"Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit." In the opinion of the troop-contributing countries, UNIFIL will only be able to carry out its original mandate if the Force is allowed to be deployed and operate effectively in an area that forms one uninterrupted whole up to the internationally recognized boundary.

The troop-contributing countries take note of the declaration by the Government of Israel that it will fully implement the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Force from Lebanese territory, thus complying with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. They call for the strict observance of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, they deplore all acts of violence at present occurring in the area. As far as UNIFIL is concerned, they consider that the Force, in performing its functions, should continue to act with complete impartiality and in accordance with the provisions laid down in the mandate.

The troop-contributing countries urgently call upon the Governments of Israel and Lebanon to meet the requirements necessary to ensure security for all concerned in the area in the wake of a full Israeli withdrawal behind international borders. They continue to support you in your efforts to bring about this goal, thereby acting on the basis of resolution 523 (1982). For their part, the troop-contributing countries have shown great patience thus far in the expectation that positive events in the near future would allow UNIFIL to play the role originally envisaged for the Force. They expect that the above-mentioned principles will apply to the future operation of UNIFIL, and on that basis they indicate their willingness to continue to support the Force with a view to the implementation of the mandate given to it by the Security Council.

The Member States participating in UNIFIL would be grateful if you could bring this letter to the attention of the Council, and they have the honour to request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bal RAM  
For the Permanent Representative of Fiji  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Keijo KORHONEN  
Permanent Representative of Finland  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Philippe LOUET  
Acting Permanent Representative of France  
to the United Nations

(Signed) James VICTOR GBEMO  
Permanent Representative of Ghana  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Robert McDONAGH  
Permanent Representative of Ireland  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Maurizio BUCCI  
Permanent Representative of Italy  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Uddhav DEO BHATT  
Permanent Representative of Nepal  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Hans MEESMAN  
Acting Permanent Representative of the Netherlands  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Sverre J. BERGH JOHANSEN  
Acting Permanent Representative of Norway  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Anders PERM  
Permanent Representative of Sweden  
to the United Nations

Letter dated 29 March 1985 from the representative of Thailand  
to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)  
[29 March 1985]

Upon the instructions of my Government and pursuant to my letter dated 19 February 1985 [S/16965], I have the honour to enclose herewith eight photographs of the Thai villagers who were wounded and killed on 16 February 1985 by the Vietnamese artillery shells which were fired by the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea into Thai territory at Ban Kruat, Buriram Province, about 13 kilometres from the Thai-Kampuchean border.

These photographs belie the contention made by the representative of Viet Nam in his letter to you dated 25 March [S/17057] that the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand.

The Royal Thai Government is outraged by these atrocities committed by the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea

against innocent Thai civilians inside Thailand and the Vietnamese Government's attempts to cover up these brutal acts by slandering Thailand. The Royal Thai Government once again strongly condemns such cowardly behaviour on the part of the Vietnamese Government and reaffirms its legitimate right to undertake all necessary measures to safeguard Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I have the honour to request that the text of this letter as well as the accompanying photographs<sup>27</sup> be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Birabhongse KASEMSRI  
Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations

\* Circulated under the double symbol A/40/214-S/17068.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 17th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See A/39/539.

<sup>3</sup> See letter dated 14 June 1984 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (*Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1984*, p. 11).

<sup>4</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1983*, p. 8. See also 2430th meeting.

<sup>5</sup> Issued subsequently as document S/16916.

<sup>6</sup> Not reproduced in the present *Supplement*; may be consulted in the files of the Secretariat.

<sup>7</sup> *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984*, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 169.

<sup>8</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65).

<sup>9</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 3, document A/39/574.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.

<sup>11</sup> See International Committee of the Red Cross, *Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, Geneva, 1977, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> A/38/68.

<sup>13</sup> A/39/630.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972, p. 135.

<sup>15</sup> For the sake of conciseness and convenience, the terms "loyalists" and "believers" are used in the report, as they are used in the Islamic Republic of Iran to denote, respectively, the factions supporting the Government of Iraq and those opposing it.

<sup>16</sup> At the official rate of exchange at the time, 1 Iraqi dinar is equivalent to 3.75 United States dollars.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 970, p. 31.

<sup>18</sup> At the official rate of exchange at the time, 93 rials are equivalent to about 1 United States dollar.

<sup>19</sup> A/39/864.

<sup>20</sup> A/39/857.

<sup>21</sup> Issued subsequently as document S/17033.

<sup>22</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).

<sup>23</sup> *Report of the International Conference on Kampuchea, New York, 13-17 July 1981* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.20), annex I.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 15, No. 102, p. 295.

<sup>25</sup> A/40/87, annex.

<sup>26</sup> A/40/170 and A/40/175.

<sup>27</sup> The photographs are not reproduced in the present *Supplement*; they may be consulted in the files of the Secretariat.

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